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THE 



PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 



OF 



LEIBNITZ 



COMPRISING 

The Monadology, New System of Nature, Principles of Nature and 

of Grace, Letters to Clarke, Refutation of Spinoza, and his 

other important philosophical opuscides, together 

loith the Abridgment of the Theodicy and 

extracts from the New Essays on 

Human Understanding 

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN AND FRENCH 



WITH NOTES 



BY 

GEORGE MARTIN DUNCAN 

Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Yale University 



SECOND EDITION 



NEW HAVEN 

THE TUTTLE, MOREHOUSE & TAYLOR COMPANY 
1908 



■£> 



y- 






UBRARYofCO 

Two Copies Hec:-.-_ 

FEB 11 1908 

\iQw>n«in. cIWi 

1W> 10 (4oB 
OLASfi A- aXc. «l 

COPY 6.1 




COPTBIGHT. 1908 

BY 

THE TrTTLE. MOREHOUSE ct TAYLOR COMPANY 



PREFACE. 



This translation has been made with the hope of rendering the specula- 
tions of one of the greatest of modern thinkers more accessible to ordinary 
students. Whatever estimate may be taken of the intrinsic merits of these 
speculations, their influence has been too marked to allow the student of 
philosophy to ignore them. He will here find all that is necessary to 
enable him to gain a comprehensive insight into Leibnitz's own system 
and to understand the objections found by h|im to the philosophy of his 
great predecessors, Descartes,. Malebranche, : Spinoza, Locke. All the 
important philosophical opuscules- ,are ; given entire; also the abridgment 
of the Theodicce and extracts from the Nouveaux Essais. A few notes 
and references have been added to help the student. The translations 
have been made directly from the original Latin and French by my wife and 
myself, the only exception being the Letters to Clarke, which are repub- 
lished from Clarke's own translation. In making the translations Erdmann's 
Leibnitii Opera Philosophica (Berlin, 1840), Janet's Oeuvres Philosophiques 
de Leibniz (Paris, 1866), Gerhardt's Die philosophisclien Schriften von 
G. W. Leibniz (Berlin, 1875-1890), and Foucher de Careil's Refutation 
Inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz (Paris, 1854), have been used. 

G. M. D. 
Yale University, Nov. 30, 1890. 



Prefatory Note to the Second Edition. 

This work is reissued by the publishers in consequence of the continued 
demand for it from students and teachers of philosophy. The translations 
have been revised; the Preface to the Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium has 
been removed from the notes to the body of the work, where it properly 
belongs ; the extracts from the ISiouveaux Essais have been inserted among the 
other pieces in chronological order; and a few bibliographical changes and 
additions have been made in the notes, including a full list of the English 
renderings of Leibnitz's writings. With these exceptions the work is sub- 
stantially unchanged. 

G. M. D. 

New Haven, 1908. 



I 



"One day I happened to say that the Cartesian philosophy in so far as 
it was true was but the ante-ehaniber of the true philosophy. A gentleman 
of the company who frequented the Court, who was a man of some reading 
and who even took part in discussion on the sciences, pushed the figure to 
an allegory and perhaps a little too far; for he asked me thereupon, if I did 
not believe that it might be said that the ancients had shown us the stairs, 
that the modern school had come as far as into the ante-chamber, and that 
he should wish me the honor of introducing us into the cabinet of nature? 
This tirade of parallels made us all laugh, and I said to him Tou see, sir, 
that your comparison has pleased the company; but you have forgotten 
that there is the audience chamber between the ante-chamber and the 
cabinet, and that it will be enough if we obtain audience without pretending 
to penetrate into the interior.' " 

Leibnitz, Letter to a friend on Cartesianism, 1695. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Translations. 

Page 

I— On the Philosophy of Descartes, 1679-1680, 1 

II — Notes on Spinoza's Ethics, c. 1679, 11 

III — Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, 1684, 28 

IV — On a General Principle useful in the Explanation of the Laws of 

Nature, 1687, 34 

V — Statement of personal views on Metaphysics and Physics, 1690, .... 38 

VI — Does the Essence of Body consist in extension? 1691, 42 

VII — Animadversions on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, books 1 

and 2, 1692, 47 

VIII— On the Notions of Right and Justice, 1693, 66 

IX — Reply of Leibnitz to the Extract of the Letter of Foucher, canon 

of Dijon, published in the Journal des Savants of March 16, 1693, 70 

X— On the Philosophy of Descartes, 1693, 72 

XI — On the reform of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance, 1694, 74 
XII — -A New System of the Nature and of the Interaction of Substances, 

as well as of the Union which exists between the Soul and the 

Body, 1695, 77 

XIII — The Reply of Foucher to Leibnitz concerning his New System, 

1695, 87 

XIV— Explanation of the New System, 1695, 91 

XV— Second Explanation of the New System, 1696, 96 

XVI— Third Explanation of the New System, 1696, 98 

XVII — Observations on Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, 1696, 100 

XVIII— On the Ultimate Origin of Things, 1697, 106 

XIX — On Certain Consequences of the Philosophy of Descartes, 1697, ... 114 

XX— On Nature in Itself, 1698, 119 

XXI— Ethical Definitions, 1697-1698, 135 

XXII — On the Cartesian Demonstration of the Existence of God, 1700- 

1701, 140 

XXIII — Considerations on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit, 1702, .... 147 
XXIV — On the Supersensible in Knowledge and on the Immaterial in 

Nature, 1702, 157 



X 



VI TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Page 

XXV — Explanation of Points in his Philosophy, 1704, 167 

XXVI — Extracts from the Nouveaux Essais, 1704, 171 

XXVII— On the Principles of Life, 1705, 251 

XXVIII— Necessity and Contingency, 1707, 259 

•XXIX— Refutation of Spinoza, c. 1708, 264 

XXX — Remarks on the Doctrine of Malebranche, 1708, 274 

^ XXXI — On the Active Force of Body, on the Soul, and on the Souls of 

Brutes, 1710, 279 

XXXII— Abridgment of the Theodicy, 1710, 284 

XXXIII— On Wisdom— the Art of Reasoning, etc., 1711, 295 

XXXIV— The Principles of Nature and of Grace, 1714, 299 

XXXV— The Monadology, 1714, 308 

XXXVI— On the Doctrine of Malebranche, 1715, 324 

XXXVII— Five Letters to Samuel Clarke, 1716, 329 



Notes. 

1. Life of Leibnitz, 381 

2. Leibnitz's Writings, and English Translations of Them, 382 

3. Expositions and Criticisms of Leibnitz's Philosophy, 385 

Article I. 

4. Leibnitz and Descartes, 386 

5. Literature on Descartes and his Philosophy, 386 

6. The Search for Final Causes (p. 1 ) , . 388 

7. Philipp (p. 2) , 388 

8. The Epicurus of Lseertius (p. 8) , 388 

Article II. 

9. Relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza, 388 

10. Literature on the Philosophy of Spinoza, 389 

11. The Conception of Contingent (p. 23) , 390 

12. Natura naturans and natura naturata (p. 24) , 390 

« 
Article III. 

13. The Quality of Terms (p. 28) , 391 

14. Descartes' Argument for proving the Existence of God (p. 30), 392 

15. True and False Ideas (p. 31 ) , '. 392 

16. "Whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is true" (p. 32), .... 392 

17. Antoine Arnauld's On the Art of Thinking Well (p. 32), 392 

18. "Whether we see all things in God" (p. 33) , 392 

19. Malebranche and The Search after Truth (p. 34) , 392 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. VII 

Article IV. Page 

20. The Law of Continuity, 393 

Article V. 

21. Statement of Personal Views on Metaphysics and Physics, 393 

Article VI. 

22. Does the Essence of Body consist in Extension? 393 

23. The System of Occasional Causes (p. 45) , 394 

Article VII. 

24. Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, 394 

25. Truths of Fact and Truths of Reason (p. 49) , 394 

26. The Source and Nature of Error (pp. 52-3) , 394 

27. The Author of the Philosophia Mosaica (p. 64) , 394 

Article VIII. 

28. Leibnitz's Preface to his Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium, 394 

Article IX. 

29. Two Essays on Motion (p. 64) , 394 

Article X. 

30. Descartes' Man (p. 73) , 395 

Article XL 

31. The Notion of Substance, 395 

32. Mersenne (p. 75), 395 

Article XII. 

33. "One of the greatest theologians and philosophers of our time" 

(p. 77) , 395 

34. "To find real units" (p. 78 ) , 395 

35. Swammerdam, Malpighi, Leewenhoeck, Rigis, Hartsoeker (p. 80), .. 395 
/ 36. The System of Preestablished Harmony (pp. 84-85) , 395 

Article XIII. 

37. Objections to the Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony, 396 

Article XIV. 

38. Answers to Objections to the Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony, 396 

Articles XV and XVI. 

39. The Illustration of the Clocks, 396 



Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Article XVII. Page 

40. Leibnitz and Locke, 396 

41. Literature on Locke, 397 

42. The Function della crusca (p. 105) , 397 

Article XVIII. 

43. The Law of Sufficient Reason, 397 

Article XIX. 

44. On the Consequences of Certain Passages in Descartes, 398 

Article XX. 

45. On Nature in Itself, etc., 398 

46. Aristotle's Definition of Motion (p. 120) , 398 

47. Imaging and Intellectual Conception (pp. 123-4), 398 

48. The Principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles" (pp. 130-1), 398 

Article XXI. 

49. Ethical Definitions, 398 

Article XXII. 

50. The Ontological Argument for the Being of God, 398 

Article XXIII. 

51. The Doctrine of a Universal Spirit, 400 

52. Molinos, Angelus Silesius, and Weigel (p. 147) , 400 

Article XXIV. 

53. Leibnitz on the Non-Sensuous Element in Knowledge (p. 157), 400 

Article XXV. 

54. Lady Masham, 400 

Article XXVI. 

55. The Nouveaux Essais, 400 

56. Analysis of the Second Chapter of Bk. 1, of the Nouveaux Essais, . . 401 

Article XXVII. 

57. Proof of the Existence of God from the Doctrine of Preestablished 

Harmony (p. 253) , 403 

Article XXVIII. 

58. Contingency and Necessity, 403 

59. The Sevennese Prophets (p. 262) , 404 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX 

Article XXIX. Page 

60. "The Refutation of Spinoza by Leibnitz," 404 

61. Malcuth in Malcuth (p. 272) , 404 

Article XXX. 

62. Remarks on Locke's Examination of Malebranche, 404 

Article XXXI. 

63. Leibnitz on the Nature of the Soul, 404 

p 64. The different Classes of Monads, 404 

65. Genii (p. 281), 405 

Article XXXII. 

66. Leibnitz's Theodicee, 406 

67. Leibnitz's Optimism, 406 

Article XXXIII. 

68. Leibnitz's Rules for the Conduct of the Mind and the Increase of 

Knowledge, 406 

Article XXXIV. 

69. The Principles of Xature and of Grace, 407 

Article XXXV. 

70. The Monadology, 407 

71. Analysis of the Monadology. 407 

Article XXXVI. 

72. Remond de Montmort, 408 

Article XXXVII. 

73. Leibnitz's Correspondence with Clarke, 408 



LEIBNITZ. 



On the Philosophy of Descartes. 1679-16S0. 
[From the French.] 

As to the Philosophy of Descartes, of which you ask my 
opinion, I do not hesitate to say absolutely that it leads to atheism. 
It is true that there are some things very suspicious to me who 
have considered it attentively: for example, these two passages, 
that final cause ought not to be considered in physics, and that 
matter takes successively all the forms of which it is capable. 
There is an admirable passage in the Phaedo of Plato which justly 
blames Anaxagoras for the very thing which displeases me in 
Descartes. Tor myself, I believe that the laws of mechanics which 
serve as a basis for the whole system depend on final causes ; that 
is to say, on the will of God determined to make what is most per- 
fect ; and that matter does not take all possible forms but only the 
most perfect; otherwise it would be necessary to say that there 
will be a time when all will be evil in turn, which is far removed 
from the perfection of the author of things. As for the rest, if 
Descartes had been less given to imaginary hypotheses and if he 
had been more attached to experiments, I think that his physics 
would have been worthy of being followed. For it must be 
admitted that he had great penetration. As for his geometry and 
analysis they are far from being as perfect as those pretend who 
are given but to the investigation of minor problems. There are 
several errors in his metaphysics, and he has not known the true 
source of truths nor that general analysis of notions which Jung, 
in my opinion, has better understood than he. Nevertheless, I 
confess that the reading of Descartes is very useful and very 



2 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

instructive, and that I like incomparably more to have to do with 
a Cartesian than with a man from some other school. Finally, I 
consider this philosophy as the ante-chamber of the true philos- 
ophy. — Extract from a letter to Pliilipp, 1679. 

I esteem Descartes almost as highly as it is possible to esteem a 
man, and although there are among his opinions some which 
appear to me false and even dangerous, I do not hesitate to say 
that we owe almost as much to Galileo and to him in matters 
of philosophy as to all antiquity. I remember at present but 
one of the two dangerous propositions of which you wish me to 
indicate the place, viz: Principiorum- Philosophicorum Part. 3. 
Articulo .4? ', his verbis: "Atque omnino parum refert, quid hoc 
pacto supponatur, quia postea justa leges naturae est mutandum. 
Et vix aliquid supponi potest ex quo non idem effectus, quanquam 
fortasse operosius, deduci possit. Cum enim illarum ope materia 
formas omnes quorum est capax successive assumai, si formas istas 
ordine eonsideremus, tandem ad illa.m quae est hujus mundi pote- 
rimus devenire, adeo ut hie nihil erroris ex falsa hypothesi sit 
timenclum." I do not think that it is possible to form a more dan- 
gerous proposition than this. For if matter receive successively 
all possible forins it would follow that nothing so absurd, so strange 
and contrary to what we call justice, could be imagined, which has 
not occurred or would not some day occur. These are exactly the 
opinions which Spinoza has more clearly explained, namely, that 
justice, beauty, order belong only to things in relation to us, but 
that the perfection of God consists in a fullness of action such that 
nothing can be possible or conceivable which he does not actually 
produce. This is also the opinion of Hobbes, who maintains that 
all that is possible is past, or present, or future, and that there will 
be no room for relying on providence if God produces all and 
makes no choice among possible beings. Descartes took care not 
to speak so plainly, but he could not help revealing his opinions in 
passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by 
those who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects. This, in 
my opinion, is the irpunov tyevSos. the foundation of atheistic 
philosophy, which does not cease to say things beautiful in appear- 
ance of God. But the true philosophy ought to give us an entirely 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. 6 

different notion of the perfection of God which could serve us 
both in physics and in morals ; and I, for my part, hold that far 
from excluding final causes from the consideration of physics, as 
Descartes- pretends, Part 1, Article 28, it is rather by them that all 
should be determined, since the efficient cause of things is intelli- 
gent, having a will and consequently tending toward the Good ; that 
which is still far from the opinion of Descartes who holds that 
goodness, truth and justice are so simply because God by a free act 
of his will has established them, which is very strange. For if 
things are not good or bad, save by an effect of the will of God, 
the good will not be a motive of his will since it is subsequent to 
the will. And his will would be a certain absolute decree, with- 
out reason ; here are his own words, Resp. ad object, sext. n. 8 : 
"Attendenti ad Dei immensitatem manifestum est, nihil omnino 
esse posse quod ad ipso non pendeat, non modo nihil subsistens, sed 
etiam nullum ordinem, nullam legam, nullamve rationem veri et 
boni, alioqui enim, ut paulo ante dicebatur, non fuisset plane 
indifferens ad ea creaucla quae creavit [he was then indifferent as 
regards the things which we call just and unjust, and if it had 
pleased him to create a world in which the good had been forever 
unhappy and the wicked (that is to say, those who seek only to 
destroy the others) happy, that would be just. Thus we cannot 
determine anything as to the justice of God, and it may be that he 
has made things in a way which we call unjust, since there is no 
notion of justice as respects him, and if it turns out that we are 
unhappy in spite of our piety, or that the soul perishes with the 
body, this will also be just. — He continues] : iSTam si quae ratio 
boni ejus per ordinationem antecessisset, ilia ipsum determinasset 
ad it quod optimum est faciendum [without doubt, and this is the 
basis of providence and of all our hopes ; namely, that there is 
something good and just in itself, and that God, being Wisdom 
itself, does not fail to choose the best] . Sed contra quod se deter- 
minavit ad ea jam sunt facienda, idcirco, ut habetur in Genesi, 
sunt valde bona [this is cross reasoning. If things are not good by 
any idea or notion of goodness in themselves, but because God 
wills them, God, in Genesis, had but to consider them when they 
were made and to be satisfied with his work, savins; that all was 



4 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

good; it would have sufficed for him to say, I "will it, or to have 
remembered that he willed them, if there is no formal difference 
between the two things, to be willed by God, and to be good. But 
it is apparent that the author of Genesis was of another opinion, 
introducing a God who would not be content with having made 
them unless he found further that he had made them well.] hoc est 
ratio eorum bonitatis ex eo pendet, quod voluerit ipsa sic facere." 
This is as distinct an expression as one could desire. But after 
this it is useless to speak of the goodness and justice of God, and 
providence will be but a chimera. It is evident that even the will 
of God will be but a fiction employed to dazzle those who do not 
sufficiently strive to fathom these things. For what kind of a will 
(good God!) is that which has not the Good as object, or motive? 
What is more, this God will not even have understanding. For if 
truth itself depends only on the will of God and not on the nature 
of things, and the understanding being necessarily befoke the will 
(I speak de prioritate naturae, non temporis), the understanding of 
God will be before the truth of things and consequently will not 
have truth for its object. Such an understanding is undoubtedly 
nothing but a chimera, and consequently it will be necessary to 
conceive God, after the manner of Spinoza, as a being who has 
neither understanding nor will, but who produces quite indiffer- 
ently good or bad, and who is indifferent respecting things and 
consequently inclined by no reason toward one rather than the 
other. Thus, he will either do nothing or he will do all. But to say 
that such a God has made things, or to say that they have been pro- 
duced by a blind necessity, the one, it seems to me, is as good as the 
other. I have been sorry myself to find these things in Descartes, 
but I have seen no means of excusing them. I wish he could clear 
himself from these, as well as from some other imputations with 
which More and Parker have charged him. Tor to wish to 
explain everything mechanically in physics is not a crime nor 
impiety, since God has made all things according to the laws of 
mathematics ; that is, according to the eternal truths which are the 
object of wisdom. 

There are still many other things in the works of Descartes 
which I consider erroneous and by which I judge that he has not 



ON" THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. O 

penetrated so far in advance as is imagined. For example, in 
geometry, I do not really believe that he has made any paralogism 
(as yon inform me that some one has said to you) ; he was a suffi- 
ciently skillful man to avoid that, and you see by this that I judge 
him equitably ; but he has erred through too much presumption, 
holding all for impossible at which he saw no means of arriving ; 
for example, he believed it was impossible to find a proportion 
between a curved line and a straight line. Here are his own 
words: Lib. 2, Geom., articulo 9 fin. editionis Schotenianae de 
anno, 1659, p. 39: cum ratio quae inter rectos et curvas existit, 
non cognita sit nee etiam ab hominibus ut arbitror cognosci queat. 
In which, estimating the powers of all posterity by his own, he 
was very much mistaken. For a little while after his death a 
method was found of giving an infinity of curved lines to which 
could be geometrically assigned equal straight lines. He would 
have perceived it himself if he had considered sufficiently the dex- 
terity of Archimedes. He is persuaded that all problems may be 
reduced to equations {quo modo per methodum qua utor, inquit, 
p. 96, lib. 3, Geom., id onine quod sub Geometricam contempla- 
tioneni cadit, ad unum idemque genus problematical reducatur, 
quod est ut quaeratur valor radicum alien jus aequationis) . . This 
is wholly false, as Huygens, Hudde and others who thoroughly 
understand Descartes' geometry, have frankly avowed to me. 
This is why there is need of much before algebra can do all that is 
promised for her. I do not speak lightly and there are few people 
who have examined the matter with as much care as I. 

The physics of Descartes has a great defect ; this is that his rules 
of motion or laws of nature, which should serve as its foundation, 
are for the most part false. There is demonstration of this. His 
great principle also that the same quantity of motion is preserved 
in the world is an error. What I say here is acknowledged by the 
ablest men of France and England. 

Judge from this, sir, whether there is reason for taking the opin- 
ions of Descartes for oracles. But this does not hinder me from con- 
sidering him an admirable man, and for saying between ourselves 
that if he still lived perhaps he alone would advance farther in 
physics than a great number of others, although very able men. 



b PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXTTZ. 

That befalls me liere which ordinarily befalls moderate men. The 
Peripatetics regard me as a Cartesian, and the Cartesians are 
surprised that I do not yield to all their pretended insights. For 
when I speak to prepossessed men of the school who treat Descartes 
with scorn. I extol the brilliancy of his qualities ; but when I have 
to do with a too zealous Cartesian I find myself obliged to change 
my note in order to modify a little the too high opinion which they 
have of their master. The greatest men of the time in these matters 
are not Cartesians, or if they have been in their youth they have 
gotten over it, and I notice among the people who make a profession 
of philosophy and of mathematics, that those who are properly 
Cartesians ordinarily remain among the mediocre and discover 
nothing of importance, being but commentators on their master, 
although for the rest they may be more able than the man of the 
school. — Letter to Philipp, Jan., 1680. 

[The following is an extract from a letter of about the same date as the 
preceding and on the same subject, 'o-ritten to an unknown correspondent.] 

Sir, since you desire very much that I express freely my 
thoughts on Cartesianism, I shall not conceal aught of what I think 
of it, and which I can say in few words; and I shall advance noth- 
ing without giving or being aide to give a reason for it. In the 
first place, all those who give themselves over absolutely to the 
opinions of any author are in a slavery and render themselves sus- 
pected of error, for to say that Descartes is the only author who is 
exempt from considerable error, is a proposition which could be 
true but is not likely to be so. In fact, such attachment belongs 
only to small minds who have not the force or the leisure to medi- 
tate themselves, or will not give themselves the trouble to do so. 
This is why the three illustrious academies of our times, the Royal 
Society of England, which was established first, and then the 
Academie Royale cles Sciences, at Paris, and the Academia del 
Cimento, at Florence, have loudly protested that they wish to be 
known neither as Aristotelians, nor Cartesians, nor Epicureans, nor 
followers of any author whatever. 

I have also recognized by experience that those who are wholly 
Cartesians are not adepts in discovering : they are but interpreters 
or commentators of their master, as the philosophers of the school 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OP DESCARTES. 



7 



were of Aristotle; and of the many beautiful discoveries which 
have been made since Descartes, I know of not one which comes 
from a true Cartesian. I know these gentlemen a little and I defy 
them to name one coming from them. This is an evidence that 
Descartes did not know the true method or that he has not trans- 
mitted it to them. 

Descartes himself had a sufficiently limited mind. Of all men 
he excelled in speculations, but in them he found nothing useful 
for life which is evident to the senses and which serves in the 
practice of the arts. All his meditations were either too abstract, 
like his metaphysics and his geometry, or too imaginary, like his 
principles of natural philosophy. The only thing of use which he 
believed he had given was his telescope, made according to the 
hyperbolic line, with which he promised to make us see animals, or 
parts as small as animals, in the moon. Unfortunately he was never 
able to find workmen capable of executing his design, and since 
then it has even been demonstrated that the advantage of the hyper- 
bolic line is not so great as he believed. It is true that Descartes 
was a great genius and that the sciences are under great obligations 
to him, but not in the way the Cartesians believe. I must there- 
fore enter a little into details and give examples of what he has 
taken from others, of what he has himself done, and of what he has 
left to be done. From this it will be seen whether I speak without 
knowledge of the subject. 

In the first place, his Ethics is a compound of the opin- 
ions of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, something not very 
difficult, for- Seneca had already reconciled them very well. 
He wishes us to follow reason, or the nature of things as 
the Stoics said ; with which everybody will agree. He adds 
that we ought not to be disturbed by the things which are not 
in our power. This is exactly the dogma of the Porch which 
established the greatness and liberty of their sage, so praised for 
the strength of mind which he had in resolving to do without the 
things which do not depend upon us and to endure those which 
come in spite of us. It is for this reason that I am wont to 
call this ethics the art of patience. The Sovereign Good, accord- 
ing to the Stoics and according to Aristotle himself, was to act in 



8 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

accordance with virtue or prudence, and the pleasure resulting 
therefrom together with the resolution mentioned above is prop- 
er] y that tranquility of the soul, or calm, which the Stoics and 
Epicureans sought and equally recommended under different 
names. One has only to examine the incomparable Manual of 
Epietetus and the Epicurus of Laertius to acknowledge that 
Descartes has not advanced the practice of morals. But it seems 
to me that this art of patience, in which he makes the art of living 
consist, is yet not the whole. A patience without hope does not 
endure and does not console, and it is here that Plato, in my 
opinion, surpasses others, for by good arguments he makes us 
hope for a better life and approaches nearest to Christianity. It is 
sufficient to read the excellent dialogue, on the Immortality of the 
Soul or the Death of Socrates, which Theophile has translated into 
Erench, to conceive a. high idea of it. I think that Pythagoras 
did the same, and that his metempsychosis was merely to accom- 
modate himself to the range of common people, but that among his 
disciples he reasoned quite differently. Also Ocellus Luc anus, who 
was one of them, and from whom we have a small but excellent 
fragment on the universe, says not a word of it. 

It will be said that Descartes establishes very well the exist- 
exce oe God and the immortality of the soul. But I fear that 
we are deceived by fine words, for the God, or Perfect Being, of 
Descartes is not a God such as we imagine him and such as we 
desire: that is to say. just and wise, doing everything for the good 
of creatures as far as is possible: but rather he is similar to the 
God of Spinoza, namely, the principle of things, and a certain 
sovereign power or primitive nature which sets everything in 
action and does everything which is feasible. The God of Des- 
cartes has neither will nor understanding, since according to Des- 
cartes he has not the Good as the object of the will nor the True 
as object of the understanding. Also he does not wish that his God 
should act according to some end, and for this reason he rejects 
from philosophy the search after final causes, under the adroit 
pretext that we are not capable of knowing the ends of God. Plato, 
on the contrary, has very well shown that. God being the author of 
things and provided he acts according to wisdom, true physics 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. 9 

is to know the ends and the uses of things, for science is the 
knowledge of reasons, and the reasons of what has been made 'by 
an understanding are the final causes or the designs of him who 
made them, and these appear from the use and the function which 
they have. This is why the consideration of the use of parts is so 
useful in anatomy. This is why a God such as that of Descartes 
leaves us no other consolation than that of patience par force. 
He says in some passages that matter passes successively 
through all possible forms ; that is to say, that his God 
does everything which is feasible and passes, following a necessary 
and fated order, through all possible combinations; but for this 
the mere necessity of matter sufficed, or rather his God is nothing 
but this necessity, or this principle of necessity, acting in matter as 
it can. It must not, therefore, be believed that this God has any 
more care of intelligent creatures than of the others. Each one 
will be happy or unhappy, according as it will find itself involved 
in great torrents or whirlpools ; and he is right in recommending 
to us patience without hope (in place of felicity). 

But some one of the better class of Cartesians, deluded by the 
fine discourses of his master, will say to me that he nevertheless 
establishes very well the immortality of the soul and con- 
sequently a better life. When I hear these things I am astonished 
at the ease with which the world is deceived, if one can merely' 
play adroitly with agreeable words, although their meaning is 
corrupted ; for just as hypocrites abuse piety, heretics the 
scriptures, and the seditious the word liberty, so the Cartesians 
have abused those grand words, the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul. It is necessary, therefore, to unravel 
this mystery and to show them that the immortality of the 
soul, following Descartes, is worth no more than his God. I well 
believe that I shall not please some, for people do not enjoy 
being awakened when their minds are occupied with an agree- 
able dream. But what is to be done ? Descartes teaches that 
false thoughts should be uprooted before true ones are introduced ; 
his example ought to be followed, and I shall think that I am ren- 
dering a service to the public if I can disabuse them of such 
dangerous doctrines. I say then that the immortality of the soul, 



10 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

as it is established by Descartes, is of no use and can in no way 
console us. For grant that the soul is a substance and that no sub- 
stance perishes ; this being so the soul will not perish, but in reality 
also nothing perishes in nature. But like matter the soul too will 
change in form, and as the matter composing a man has at other 
times formed plants and other animals, so this soul may be immor- 
tal in reality but it will pass through a thousand changes and not 
remember at all what it has been. But this immortality without 
memory is altogether useless, viewed ethically, for it destroys all 
reward, all recompense, and all punishment. Of what use would 
it be to you, sir, to become king of China on condition of forgetting 
what you have been. Would it not be the same thing as if God at 
the same time that he destroyed you created a king in China? 
This is why, in order to satisfy the hope of the human race, it 
must be proved that God who governs all is wise and just, and 
that he will leave nothing without recompense and without punish- 
ment. These are the great foundations of ethics ; but the doctrine 
of a God who does not act for the Good, and of a soul which is 
immortal without memory, serves only to deceive the simple and 
to pervert the spiritually minded. 

I could, moreover, show mistakes in the pretended demonstration 
of Descartes, for there are still many things to be proved in order 
"to complete it. But I think that at present it is useless to amuse 
one's self thus, since these demonstrations would be of almost no 
use, as I have just shown, even if they were good. 



II. 

Notes on Spinoza^s Ethics. 
[From the Latin.] 

Part I. — Concerning God. 

Definition 1. Self-Caused is that the essence of which 
involves existence. 

Definition 2. That a thing is finite which can be limited by 
another thing of the same kind, is obscure. For what is thought 
limited by thought ? Or what other greater than it is given ? He 
says that a body is limited because another greater than it can be 
conceived. Add to this what is said below, Prop. 8. 

Definition 3. Substance is that which is in itself and is con- 
ceived through itself. This also is obscure. For what is it to be 
in itself ? Then we must ask, Are to be in itself and to be con- 
ceived through itself conjoined cumulatively or disjunctively? 
That is, whether this means : Substance is that which is in itself, 
also substance is that which is conceived through itself ; or, indeed, 
whether it means : Substance is that in which both these concur ; 
namely, that it both is in itself and is conceived through itself. 
Or it will be necessary for him to demonstrate that what has the 
one, has the other, when rather, on the contrary, it seems that 
there are some things which are in themselves although they are 
not conceived through themselves. And so men usually conceive 
substances. He adds : Substance is that, the conception of which 
does not require the conception of another thing. But there is 
also a difficulty in this, for in the following definition he says, An 
attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as con- 
stituting its essence. Therefore the concept of attribute is neces- 
sary for the formation of the concept of substance. If you say 
that the attribute is not the thing itself, but require indeed that 
substance shall not need the conception of another thing, I reply: 
You must explain what is called thing, that we may understand the 
definition and how the attribute is not the thine;. 



12 PHILOSOPHICAL VOKES OF LEIBNITZ. 

Deeixitiox 4. That an attribute is that -which the intellect per- 
ceives of substance as constituting its essence, is also obscure. For 
we ask whether by attribute he understands every reciprocal predi- 
cate : or every essential predicate whether reciprocal or not ; or, 
finally, every first or undemonstrable essential predicate. Vide 
Definition 5. 

Deetnition 5. -V mode is that which is in another and is con- 
ceived through another. It seems, therefore, to differ from, 
attribute in this, that attribute is indeed something in substance, 
yet is conceived through itself. And this explanation added, the 
obscurity of Definition -i. is removed. 

Deetnitiosj 6. Goch he says. I define as a being absolutely 
infinite, or a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which 
each expresses eternal and infinite essence. He ought to show 
that these two definitions are equivalents, otherwise he cannot sub- 
stitute the one in place of the other. But they will be equivalents 
when he shall have shown that there are many attributes or predi- 
cates in the nature of things, which are conceived through them- 
selves : likewise, when he shall have shown that many predicates 
can co-exist. Moreover, every definition (although it may be true 
and clear) is imperfect, which, although understood, allows of 
doubt as to the possibility of the thing defined. This, moreover, is 
such a definition, for thus far it may be doubted whether being 
does not imply having infinite attributes. Or for this reason. 
because it may be questioned whether the same simple essence can 
be expressed by many diverse attributes. There are. indeed, many 
definitions of compound things but only a single one of a simple 
thing, nor does it seem that its essence can be expressed, except in 
a single "way. 

Defixitiox 7. A free thing is that -which exists and is deter- 
mined to action by the necessity of its own nature: a constrained 
thing is that which is determined to existence and to action by 
another. 

Deeixitiox S. By eternity I understand existence itself so far 
as it is conceived to follovc from the essence of a thing. These 
definitions [i. e.. 7 and 8], I approve. 

As to the Axioms. I note these things : The first is obscure as 
long as it is not established -what to be in itself is. The second and 



notes ok spiwoza's "ethics." 13 

seventh require no comment. The sixth seems incongruous, for 
every idea agrees with its ideate, nor do I see what a false idea can 
be. The third, fourth and fifth can, I think, be demonstrated. 

Pkoposition 1. Substance is by nature prior to its modifica- 
tions ; that is, modes, for in Def . 5 he said that by modifications of 
substance he understands modes. Still he did not explain what to 
be by nature prior is, and thus this proposition cannot be demon- 
strated from what precedes. Moreover, by nature prior to another 
seems to mean that through which another is conceived. Besides 
I confess that there is some difficulty in this, for it seems that not 
only can posterior things be conceived through the prior, but also 
prior things through the posterior. Nevertheless, prior by nature 
may be defined in this way, as that which can be conceived 
without another thing being conceived ; as also, on the other 
hand, the other, second thing, cannot be conceived except 
the first itself be conceived. But if I may say what the 
matter is, prior by nature is a little too broad; for example, the 
property of ten, that it is 6-f-4, is by nature posterior to this, that 
it is 6— |— 3— |— 1 (because the latter is nearer to the first of all : ten is 
l-f-l-r-l-|-l-j-l-(-l-j-l-|-l + l + l) and nevertheless it can be con- 
ceived without this ; nay, what is more, it can be demonstrated 
without it. I add another example: The property in a triangle, 
that the three internal angles are equal to two right angles is by 
nature posterior to this: that two internal angles are equal to the 
external angle of the third, and nevertheless the former can be con- 
ceived without the latter ; nay, even, although not equally easily, 
it can be demonstrated without it. 

Pkoposition 2. Two substances whose attributes are diverse 
have nothing in common. If by attributes he means predicates 
which are conceived through themselves, I concede the proposi- 
tion, it being posited, however, thaf there are two substances, A 
and B, and that c is an attribute of substance A, d an attribute of 
substance B ; or if c, e are all the attributes of substance A, like- 
wise d, f are all the attributes of substance B. It is not so if these 
two substances have some diverse attributes, some common attri- 
butes, as if the attributes of A were c, d and of B itself were 
d, f. But if he denies that this can happen, the impossibility must 



14 PHILOSOPHICAL WOPvKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

be demonstrated. He will, perchance, in case of objection, dem- 
onstrate the proposition itself in this way : Because d and c equally 
express the same essence (since ex hypothesi they are attributes of 
the same substance. A >. and for the same reason also d and / (since 
also ex hypothesi they are attributes of the same substance. B) ; 
therefore c and / express the same essence. Whence it follows 
that A and B are the same substance, which is contrary to the 
hypothesis : therefore it is absurd to say that two diverse substances 
have anything in common. I reply, that I do not concede that 
there could be two attributes which can be conceived through 
themselves, and nevertheless express the same thing. For when- 
ever this happens then these two attributes, expressing the same 
thing in a diverse way. can moreover be resolved, or at least one or 
the other of them. This I can easily demonstrate. 

Proposition 3. Things which have nothing in common cannot 
be the one the cause of the other, by Axioms 5 and 4. 

Peopositiox 4. Two or more distinct things are distinguished 
one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the 
substances or by the difference of their modifications. He demon- 
strates this thus : Everything which exists, exists either in itself or 
in something else, by Axiom 1 : that is. by Defs. 3 and 5. nothing 
is granted in addition to the understanding, except substances and 
their modifications. [Here I am surprised that he forgets attri- 
butes for, Def. 5, by modification of substance he understands only 
modes : it follows, therefore, either that he spoke ambiguously, or 
that attributes are not numbered by him among the things existing* 
outside of the understanding, but only substances and modes. 
Still he could have proved the proposition more easily if only he 
had added, that things which can be conceived through attributes or 
modifications are necessarily known and therefore distinguished.] 

Peopositiox 5. There cannot be given in the nature of things 
two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. 

[I note here what seems to be obscure in this, viz : in the nature 
of things. Does he mean, in the universe of existing things, or in 
the region of ideas or possible essences '. Then it is not clear 
whether he wishes to say that many essences are not given having* 
the same common attribute, or whether he wishes to sav manv 



NOTES OK" SPINOZA S ETHICS. 



15 



individuals are not given having the same essence. I wonder 
indeed why he here employs the words nature and attribute as 
equivalents, unless he understands by attribute that which contains 
the whole nature. While being posited, I do not see how there 
can be given many attributes of the same substance which may be 
conceived through themselves.] Demonstration: If they are dis- 
tinguished, they are distinguished either by their modifications or ■ 
by their attributes ; if by their modifications, then since substance 
is by nature prior to its modifications, by Prop. 1, their modifica- 
tions being put aside, they must still be distinguished, therefore, by 
their attributes ; if by their attributes, then two substances are not 
given possessing the same attribute. I reply that a paralogism 
seems to lurk here. For two substances can be distinguished by 
attributes, and yet have some common attribute, provided they also 
have in addition some which are peculiar. For example, A and B ; 

erf d e 

the attributes of the one being c d, of the other, d e. I remark that 
Prop. 1 is only useful for this. But it might have been omitted 
because it suffices that substance can be conceived without modifi- 
cations whether it be by nature prior or not. 

Proposition 6. One substance cannot be produced by another 
substance, for two substances, by Prop. 5, do> not possess the same 
attribute, therefore they have nothing in common, by Prop. 2 ; 
therefore, it cannot be that one is the cause of the other, by Axiom 
5. The same in other words and more briefly : Because what is 
conceived through itself cannot be conceived through another as 
cause, by Axiom 4. But I reply, that I grant the demonstration, if 
substance is understood as a thing which is conceived through 
itself; it is otherwise if it is understood as a thing which is in 
itself, as men commonly understand it, unless it be shown that to be 
in itself and to be conceived through itself are the same thing. 

Proposition 1. Existence belongs to the nature of substance. 
Substance cannot be produced by anything else, Prop. 6. There- 
fore it is the cause of itself ; that is, by Def . 1, its essence involves 
existence. He is not unjustly censured because sometimes he 
employs cause of itself as a definite something to which he ascribes 
a peculiar signification, Def. 1 ; sometimes he uses it in the 
common and vulgar meaning. ]STevertheless, the remedy is easy, if 



16 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

lie converts this Def . 1 into an Axiom and says : Whatever is not 
by another, is by itself or of its own essence. But here other diffi- 
culties still exist : the reasoning, namely, is valid only when it is 
posited that substance can exist. For it is then necessary that, 
since it cannot be produced by another, it exists by itself, and thus 
necessarily exists ; but it must be demonstrated that it is a possible 
substance; that is. that it can be conceived. It seems that it can 
be demonstrated from the fact that if nothing can be conceived 
through itself nothing also can be conceived through another, and 
hence nothing at all can be conceived. But that it may be shown 
distinctly, we must consider that if a is posited as conceived 
through b, there is in the conception of a itself the conception of 1) 
itself. And again, if b is conceived through c, there is in the con- 
ception of b the conception of c itself, and thus the conception of c 
itself will be in the conception of a itself, and so on to the last. 
But if any one reply that the last is not given, I answer, neither is 
the first, which I thus show. Because in the conception of that 
which is conceived through another there is nothing except what 
belongs to the other, so step by step through many there will either 
be nothing at all in it or nothing except what is conceived through 
it itself; which demonstration, I think, is wholly new but infalli- 
ble. By this means we can demonstrate that what is conceived 
through itself can be conceived. But nevertheless, thus far it can 
be doubted whether it be possible in the way in which it is here 
assumed to be possible, certainly not for that which can be con- 
ceived, but for that of which some cause can be conceived, to be 
resolved into the first. For those things which can be conceived 
by us. nevertheless cannot therefore all be produced, on accoimt of 
others which are preferable with which they are incompatible. 
Therefore, being which is conceived through itself must be proved 
to be in actual existence by the additional evidence that because 
those things exist which are conceived through another, therefore 
that also through which they are conceived, exists. You see what 
very different reasoning is needed for accurately proving that a 
thing exists through, itself. However, perhaps there is no need of 
this extreme caution. 



notes on spinoza's "ethics. 



Proposition 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite, since 
otherwise it would be limited by another of the same nature, by 
Def. 2, and two substances would be given with the same attribute, 
contrary to Prop. 5. This proposition must be understood thus: 
A thing which is conceived through itself is infinite in its own 
kind, and thus is to be admitted. But the demonstration labors 
not only with obscurity as respects this is limited, but also with 
uncertainty, by reason of Prop. 5. In the scholium he has excellent 
reasoning to prove that the thing which is conceived through itself 
is one, of course after its kind, since many individuals are posited 
as existing, therefore there ought to be a reason in nature why 
there are so many, not more. The reason which accounts for there 
being so many accounts for this one and that one ; hence also for 
this other one. But this reason, is not found in one of these rather 
than in another. Therefore it is outside of all. One objection 
might be made, if it were said that the number of these is bound- 
less or none, or that it exceeds every number. But it can be 
disposed of, if we assume only some of these and ask why these 
exist, or, if we posit more having something in common, for exam- 
ple existing in the same place, why they exist in this place. 

Proposition 9. The more reality or being a thing has the 
greater the number of its attributes. [He ought to have explained 
what is meant by reality or being, for these terms are liable to 
various significations.] Demonstration: It is clear from Def. 4. 
Thus the author. It seems to me not to be clear from it. For one 
thing may have more of reality than another, as what is itself 
greater in its own kind, or has a greater part of some attribute; 
for example, a circle has more extension than the inscribed square. 
And still it may be doubted whether there are many attributes of 
the same substance, in the way in which the author employs attri- 
butes. I confess, however, that if this be admitted and if it is 
posited that attributes are compatible, substance is more perfect 
according as it has more attributes. 

Proposition 10. Each particular attribute of the one sub- 
stance must be conceived through itself, by Defs. 4 and 3. But 
hence it follows, as I have several times urged, that there is but a 
single attribute of one substance, if it expresses the whole essence. 
2 



15 PHTLOSOPHICAX WOEKS OP PPPBXITZ. 

Peopositiox 11. God, or substance, consisting of infinite 
attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence, 
necessarily exists. He oners three demonstrations of tins. F >:. 
because he is substance: therefore, by Prop. 7. he exists. But in 
this he supposes both that substance necessarily exists, which, up to 
Pr : . 7. was not sufficiently demonstrated, and that God is a possi- 
ble substance, which is not equally easy to demonstrate. Second. 
There must be a reason as well why a thing is as why it is not. 
But there can be no reason why God does not exist, not in his own 
nam:? for it does not involve a contradiction; not in another, for 
that other will either have the same nature and attribute, and hence 
will be God. or will not have them and hence will have nothing in 
common with God, and thus it can neither posit nor prevent his 
existence. I reply. 1st. that it is not yet proved that the nature of 
God does not involve a contradiction, although the author says it is 
absurd to assert, without proof, that it does. 2d. There might be 
something having the same nature with God in some things, not in 
all. Third. Finite being; ex:-: by experience): therefore if the 
infinite does not exist there will be beings more powerful than the 
infinite being. It may be answered, if it implies anything, infinite 
being will have no power at all. I need say nothing of the impro- 
priety of c all ing the potentiality of existence a power. 

Ppopositioxs 12 axd 13. Xo attribute of substance can be 
conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be 
divided : or substance taken absolutely is indivisible. Tor it will be 

- royed by division and the parts will not be infinite and hence 
not substances. ]\Iany substances of the same nature would be 
given. I grant it of a thing existing through itself. Hence the 
corollary follows that no substance, and therefore no corporeal sub- 
- nee is divisible. 

Peopositiox 14. Besides God. no substance can be granted or 
conceived. Because all attributes belong to God. nor are several 
substances having the same attribute given: therefore, no sub- 
stance besides God is given. All these suppose the definition of 
substance, namely, being which is conceived through itself, and 
many others noted above which are not to be admitted. [It does 
not yet seem certain to me that bodies are substances. It is other- 
wise with minds.] 



"— » 19 



NOTES ON SPINOZA S ETHICS. 

Coeollaey 1. God is one. 

Coeollaey 2. Extension or thought are either attributes of 
God, or, by Axiom . . ., modifications of attributes of God. [This 
is speaking confusedly ; besides he has not yet shown that extension 
and thought are attributes or conceived through themselves.] 

Peoposition 15. Whatever is, is in God, and without God 
nothing can be, or be conceived. For since there is no substance 
except God, Prop. 14, so all other things will be modifications of 
God, or modes, since besides substances and modes nothing is given. 
[Again he omits attributes.] 

Peoposition 16. From the necessity of the divine nature must 
follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways ; that is, all 
things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect, by 
Def. 6. 

Coeoelaey 1. Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause 
of all things which fall under his intellect. 

Coeoelaey 2. God is a cause through himself, not indeed per 
accidens. 

Coeollaey 3. God is the absolutely first cause. 

Peoposition 11. God acts solely by the laws of his own 
nature and is not constrained by any one, since there is nothing 
outside of himself. 

Coeoelaey 1. Hence it follows, 1st, that there can be no cause 
which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of 
his own nature, moves God to act. 

Coeollaey 2. God only is a free cause. 

In the Scholium he further explains that God created every- 
thing which is in his intellect (although,' nevertheless, it seems that 
he has created only those which he wished) . He says also that the 
intellect of God differs from our intellect in essence, and that, 
except equivocally, the name intellect cannot be attributed to both, 
just as the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, a barking 
animal, differ. The thing caused differs from its cause in that 
which it has from the cause. A man differs from man as respects 
the existence which he has from that man ; he differs from God as 
respects the essence which he has from God. 



20 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

Proposition 18. God is the immanent, not the transient 
cause of all things. From this it follows that God only is sub- 
stance; other things are its modes. 

Proposition 19. God, or all his attributes are eternal. For 
his essence involves existence, and his attributes involve his essence. 
In addition, the author cites and approves the way in which he 
demonstrated this in Prop. 19 of his "Principles of Descartes." 

Proposition 20. The essence of God and his existence are one 
and the same thing. He proves all this from the fact that the 
attributes of God because eternal (by Prop. 19), express existence 
(by the definition of eternity) . But they also express essence, by 
the definition of attribute. Therefore essence and existence are 
the same thing in God. I answer that this does not follow, but 
only that they are expressed the same. I note, moreover, that 
this proposition supposes the preceding, but if in place of the pre- 
ceding proposition its demonstration be employed in the demon- 
stration of this, a senseless circumlocution will be apparent. Thus : 
I prove that the essence and existence of God are one and the same 
thing, because the attributes of God express both existence and 
essence. They express essence by the definition of attribute, they 
express existence because they are eternal ; they are, moreover, 
eternal because they involve existence, for they express the essence 
of God which involves existence. What need is there, therefore, 
of mentioning the eternity of the attributes and Prop. 19, when the 
point merely is to prove that the existence and essence of God 
are one and the same thing, since the essence of God involves 
existence. The rest is pompously introduced that it may be fash- 
ioned into a sort of demonstration. Reasonings of this sort are 
exceedingly common with those who do not possess the true art of 
demonstration. 

Corollary 1. Hence it follows that God's existence, like his 
essence, is an eternal truth. I do not see how this proposition fol- 
lows from the preceding ; on the contrary, it is far truer and clearer 
than the preceding.' For it is immediately apparent when it is 
posited that the essence of God involves existence, although it may 
not be admitted that they are one and the same. 

Corollary 2. God and all his attributes are immutable. 
This the author proposes and proves obscurely and confusedly. 



notes on spinoza's "ethics." 21 

Proposition 21. All things which follow from the absolute 
nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite ; 
or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attri- 
bute. He demonstrates this obscurely and quite at length, 
although it is easy. 

Proposition 22. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of 
God, in so far as it is modified by a modification which exists nec- 
essarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist 
necessarily and as infinite. He says the demonstration proceeds as 
in the preceding. Therefore, also obscurely. I could wish that he 
had given an example of such a modification. 

Proposition 23. Every mode, which exists both necessarily 
and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute 
nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified 
by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite. That is, 
such a mode follows from the absolute nature of some attribute 
either immediately or mediately through another such mode. 

Proposition 24. The essence of things produced by God does 
not involve existence; otherwise, by Def. 1, they would be the 
cause of themselves, which is contrary to the hypothesis. This 
from elsewhere is manifest ; but this demonstration is a paralogism. 
For cause of itself, by his Def. 1, has not retained its common 
meaning, but has received a peculiar one. Therefore the author 
cannot substitute the common meaning of the word for the pecul- 
iar one assumed by him at his will, unless he shows that they are 
equivalent. [Leibnitz has remarked on the margin of the manu- 
script : From this proposition it follows, contrary to Spinoza him- 
self, that things are not necessary. For that is not necessary whose 
essence does not involve existence. — Gerhardt.^ 

Proposition 25. God is the efficient cause not only of the 
existence of things but also of their essence. Otherwise the essence 
of things could be conceived without God, by Axiom 4. But this 
proof is of no moment. For even if we concede that the essence 
of things cannot be conceived without God, from Prop. 15, it does 
not therefore follow that God is the cause of the essence of things. 
For the fourth axiom does not say this : That without which a 
thing cannot he conceived is its cause (which would indeed be 



22 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

false, for a circle cannot be conceived without a center, a line with- 
out a point, but the center is not the cause of the circle nor the 
point the cause of the line) , but it says only this : Knowledge of the 
effect involves knowledge of the cause, which is quite different. 
For this axiom is not convertible ; not to mention that to involve 
is one thing, not able to be conceived without it is another. Knowl- 
edge of a parabola involves in it knowledge of a focus, nevertheless 
it can be conceived without it. 

Corollary. Individual things are nothing but modifications 
of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God 
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. This, he says, is 
evident from Def. 5 and Prop. 15, but it does not appear in what 
way the corollary is connected with this Prop. 25. Certainly 
Spinoza is not a great master of demonstration. This corollary is 
sufficiently evident from what was said above ; but it is true if it 
is understood in a right sense, not indeed that things are such 
modes, but modes of conceiving particular things are determinate 
modes of conceiving divine attributes. 

Proposition 28. Every individual thing, or everything which 
is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be condi- 
tioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a 
cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned 
existence; and likewise this by another, and so on ad infinitum. 
Because nothing conditioned, finite and existing in a certain time, 
can follow from the absolute essence of God. Prom this opinion 
strictly taken many absurd consequences follow. Por indeed 
things will not follow in this way from the nature of God. For 
the conditioning thing itself is again conditioned by another, and 
so on ad infinitum. In no way, therefore, are things determined by 
God. God only contributes of himself certain absolute and gen- 
eral things. It would be more correct to say, that one particular 
thing is not determined by another in a progression ad infinitum, 
for otherwise, indeed, they always remain indeterminate, however 
far you progress ; but rather all particular things are determined 
by God. ISTor are posterior things the full cause of prior things, 
but rather God creates posterior things so that they are connected 
with the prior, according to rules of wisdom. If we say that prior 



notes on spinoza's "ethics." 23 

things are the efficient causes of the posterior, the posterior will in 
turn be in a way the final cause of the prior, according to the 
view of those who claim that God operates according to ends. 

Proposition 29. Nothing in the nature of things is contingent, 
but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular 
manner by the necessity of the divine nature. The demonstration 
is obscure and abrupt, deduced from preceding propositions abrupt, 
obscure and doubtful. It depends upon the definition of contin- 
gent, which he has nowhere given. I, with others, employ 
contingent for that the essence of which does not involve existence. 
In this meaning, particular things are contingent, according to 
Spinoza himself, by Prop. 24. But if you employ contingent 
according to the custom of certain scholastics, a custom unknown 
to Aristotle and to other men and to the usage of life, for that 
which happens, so that a reason can in no way be given why it 
should occur thus rather than otherwise ; the cause of which also, 
all the requisites as well within as without it having been posited, 
was equally disposed toward acting or not acting ; I think that such 
a contingent implies that all things are by their nature, according 
to the hypothesis of the divine nature and the condition of things, 
certain and determinate, although unknown to us, and do not have 
their determination in themselves but through the supposition or 
hypothesis of things external to them. 

Proposition 30. The actual intellect, whether finite or 
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifica- 
tions of God, and nothing else. This proposition, which is suffi- 
ciently clear from the preceding and in a right sense true, our 
author according to his custom proves by others which are obscure, 
doubtful and remote ; namely, that a true idea must agree with its 
ideate, that is, as known per se (so he says, although I do not see 
how what is known per se is any the more true) ; that what is 
contained in the intellect objectively must necessarily be granted 
in nature ; that but one substance is given, namely, God. Never- 
theless, these propositions are obscure, doubtful and far-fetched. 
The genius of the author seems to have been greatly distorted. 
He rarely proceeds by a clear and natural road ; he always goes by 
an abrupt and circuitous one. And most of his demonstrations 
rather surprise (surprenneni) the mind than enlighten it. 



24 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

Proposition 31. The actual intellect, whether finite or 
infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive 
nature (natura naturata) , not to active nature (natura naturans). 
He understands by active nature, God and his absolute attributes ; 
by passive nature, his modes. But the intellect is nothing else 
than a certain mode of thought. Henqe elsewhere he says that 
God properly does not know or will. I do not assent to this. 

Proposition 32. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a 
necessary cause, because, forsooth, that is free which is determined 
by itself, The will, moreover, is a mode of thought and so is mod- 
ified by another. 

Proposition 33. Things could have been produced by God in 
no other manner or order than that in which they have been pro- 
duced. For they follow from the immutable nature of God. This 
proposition is true or false according as it is explained. On the 
hypothesis of a divine will choosing the best or operating most 
perfectly, certainly nothing but these could have been produced; 
but according to the nature of things regarded in themselves, things 
might have been produced otherwise. Just as we say that the 
angels confirmed [in holiness] cannot sin, in spite of their liberty ; 
they can if they will but they do not will. They may be able, 
absolutely speaking, to will it, but in the actually existing state 
of affairs they are not able to will it. The author rightly acknowl- 
edges in the scholium that a thing is rendered impossible in two 
ways, either because it implies it in itself or because no external 
cause is given suitable for producing it. In the second scholium he 
denies that God does all things with the Good in view (sub ratione 
boni). He certainly has denied to him will, and he thinks that 
those differing from him subject God to fate, although nevertheless 
he himself confesses that God does all things by reason of the 
Perfect (sub ratione perfecti). 

Proposition 34. God's power is his very essence, because it 
follows from the nature of essence that he is the cause of himself 
and of other things. 

Proposition 35. Whatever exists in the power of God exists 
necessarily; that is, follows from his essence. 

Proposition 36. Nothing exists from whose nature some 
effect does not follow, because it expresses the nature of God in a 



notes on spinoza's "ethics." 25 

certain and determined mode ; that is, by Prop. 34, the power of 
God [it does not follow, but it is nevertheless true]. 

He adds an Appendix against those who think that God acts 
with an end in view, mingling true with false. For although it 
may be true that all things do not happen for the sake of man, 
nevertheless it does not follow that God acts without will or with- 
out knowledge of good. 



In the copy of Spinoza's Opera Posthuma, now contained in the 
royal library at Hanover, Leibnitz has written the following notes : 

Part Second of the "Ethics." 

On Def. 4, "By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so 
far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object has all 
the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea," Leibnitz writes : 
He had therefore to explain what a true idea is, for in Part I, 
Axiom 1, it is employed only as agreement with its ideate. 

At the end of the Proof of Prop. 1, "Thought is an attribute of 
God or God is a thinking thing," Leibnitz adds : In the same way 
he will prove that God fears and hopes. If you reply that they 
are modes of thought, it can perhaps be said that thought is a 
mode of another attribute. 

On Prop. 6, "The modes of any given attribute are caused by 
God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which 
they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any 
other attribute," Leibnitz remarks : I doubt it, because it seems 
that something besides is required for modifying any attribute. 
The reason is the same with that which concludes that not all 
exist; on the contrary, that certain distinct ones exist. 

On Prop. 12, "Whatever comes to pass in the object of the idea, 
which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the 
human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human 
mind of this occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea consti- 
tuting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that 
body without being perceived by the mind," is written : Ideas do 
not act. The mind acts. The whole world is indeed the object 
of each mind. The whole world in a certain way is perceived by 



26 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

each mind. The whole world in a certain way is perceived bj any 
mind whatever. The world is one, and nevertheless minds are 
diverse. Therefore the mind is made not through the idea of the 
body, but because God in various ways intuites the world as I do a 
city. 

To Prop. 13, "The object of the idea constituting the human 
mind is the body; in other words, a certain mode of extension 
which actually exists, and nothing else,"' Leibnitz adds : Hence it 
follows that some mind is momentarily, at least, in the same man. 

At the end of the Proof to Prop. 15, "The idea which consti- 
tutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but 
compounded of a great number of ideas," he remarks : Therefore, 
also, the human mind is an aggregate of many minds. 

On Prop. 20, "The idea or knowledge of the human mind, is 
also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being 
referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of 
the human body,'' he writes : Therefore the idea of the idea is 
given. Hence it would follow that the thing would go on in 
infinitum, if indeed the human mind is an idea. 

On the words of the Scholium to Prop. 21, "That is, mind and 
body are one and the same individual, conceived now under the 
attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension," he 
remarks : Therefore, in fact, mind and body do not differ any more 
than a city regarded in different ways differs from itself. It fol- 
lows that extension does not in fact differ from thought, dro7ra. 
At the end of this scholium Leibnitz adds : Hence it follows that 
to understand the idea of the body, or the mind, there is no need 
of another idea. 

On Prop. 23, "The mind does not know itself, except in so far 
as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body," he 
writes : If the mind perceives itself in any way whatsoever, it fol- 
lows that there is no idea of the mind in God, other than from the 
mind itself, for it perceives itself in so far as it expresses God per- 
ceiving the mind. 

On the words in the proof of this proposition, "The human mind 
does not know the human body itself," he remarks : On the con- 
trary, just as God or the mind knows the body through the ideas 



notes ok spinoza's "ethics." 27 

of the modifications of the body, so they know the mind through 
the ideas of the modifications of the mind. 

Part Third of the "Ethics.'" 

On Def. 3, "By emotion I mean the modifications of the body 
by which the active power of the body itself is increased or dimin- 
ished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of these modifica- 
tions," he remarks : Emotion is understood also when we do not 
think of the body. 

To Prop. 23, "When we love a thing similar to ourselves we 
endeavor, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in 
return," he writes : The reason why we endeavor to do good to it 
is to bring about that we may be loved. But this can and ought 
to be proved otherwise, for any one can will to do good although 
he does not seek and think to be loved in return. 

On Def. 2 of the Emotions, "Joy is the transition of a man 
from less to greater perfection," . he remarks : I can increase the 
perfection of the body, so that I am not aware that I am becoming 
more beautiful and that my limbs are growing to greater strength. 
It may be replied that this transition is insensible, and so also is 
the joy. 

On Parts IV and V of the Ethics no remarks are found. 



III. 

Thoughts ox Kxowledge. Teeth axd Ideas. 

[From the Latin. Acta Eruditorum Lipsiensium, Xov. ; 1684.] 

Sixce eminent men are to-day raising discussions concerning 
true and false ideas, and since this subject. which even Descartes 
lias not always satisfactorily explained, is of the greatest import- 
ance for the knowledge of truth. I propose to explain in a few 
words, what, in my opinion, may be said with certainty regarding 
the distinctions and the criteria of our ideas and of our knowledge. 
Thus knowledge is either obscure or clear, and clear knowledge is 
farther either confused or distinct , and distinct knowledge is either 
inadequate or adequate, or again, symbolical or intuitive; and if 
it is at the same time adequ-ate and intuitive, it is perfect in 
every respect, 

A notion is obscure when it is not sufficient to enable us to 
recognize the thing represented; as for example, where I should 
have some vague idea of a flower or of an animal which I should 
have already seen but not sufficiently to be. able to recognize it if 
offered to my sight, nor to distinguish it from some neighboring 
one; or where I should consider some term badly defined in 
the schools, such as the entelecliy of Aristotle, or cause in so far 
as it is common to matter, to form, to efficient cause, or to end, 
and other expressions of which we have no fixed definition ; this 
renders the proposition of which such a notion forms part equally 
obscure. Knowledge then is clear when it is sufficient to enable 
me to recognize the thing represented, and it is farther either con- 
fused or distinct; confused, when I cannot enumerate separately 
the marls necessary to distinguish one thing from others, notwith- 
standing that the object has in reality such marks, as well as data 
requisite to the analysis of the notion. It is thus that we recog- 
nize clearly enough, colors, odors, flavors and other particular 
objects of the senses, and that we distinguish the one from the 
other by the simple testimony of the senses and not by enunci- 
able signs. This is why we cannot explain to a blind person what 



ON KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH AND IDEAS. 29 

red is, nor can we make other people recognize qualities of this 
kind except by placing them in direct communication with them, 
that is, by making them see, smell and taste, or at least by 
recalling to them a certain sensation which they have already 
experienced ; and nevertheless it is certain that the notions of 
these qualities are composite and may be analyzed, because they 
have their causes. Just so we often see painters or other artists 
who judge very correctly that a work is good or defective, without 
being able to account for their judgment, and who reply to those 
who ask their opinion, that that of which they disapprove, lacks 
something, I know not toliat. But a distinct notion resembles 
that which the assayers have of gold, by the aid of distinctive signs 
and of means of comparison sufficient to distinguish the object 
from, all other similar bodies. Such are the means of which we 
make use for notions common to several senses, such as those of 
numbers, of magnitude and of figure, as well as for many affections 
of the mind, such as hope and fear : in a word, for all the objects 
of which we have a nominal definition, which is nothing else than 
an enumeration of sufficient distinctive marks. We have however 
a distinct knowledge of an indefinable thing when it is primitive, 
or when it is only the mark of itself — that is, when it is irreducible 
and is only understood through itself, and consequently does not 
possess the requisite marks. As for composite notions where each 
of the component marks is sometimes clearly known, although in 
a confused way, as gravity, color, aqua fortis, which form a part 
of those [the marks] of gold, it follows that such a knowledge of 
gold is distinct without always being adequate. But when all the 
elements of a distinct notion are themselves also known distinctly, 
or when its analysis is complete, the idea is adequate. I do not 
know that men can give a perfect example of this, although the 
knowledge of numbers approaches it very nearly. It very often 
happens, nevertheless, especially in a long analysis, that we do not 
perceive the whole nature of the object at one time, but substitute 
in place of the things, signs, the explanation of which, in any 
present thought, we are accustomed for the sake of abbreviation 
to omit, knowing or believing that we can give it; thus when I 
think a chiliogon, or polygon with a thousand equal sides, I do 



3<_l PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBXITZ. 

not always consider the nature of a side, of equality, and of the 
number thousand (or of the cube of ten) ; but these words, the 
sense of which presents itself to my mind in an obscure, or at least 
imperfect manner, take the place to me of the ideas which I have 
of them, because my memory attests to me that I know the signifi- 
cation of these words, and that their explanation is not now neces- 
sary for any judgment. I am accustomed to call this thought 
blind or again symbolical: and we make use of it in algebra, in 
arithmetic and almost everywhere. And assuredly when a ques- 
tion is very complex, we cannot embrace in thought at the same 
time all the elementary notions which compose it ; but when this 
can be done, or at least as far as this can be done. I call this 
knowledge intuitive. AVe can only have an intuitive knowledge of 
a distinct, primitive notion, as most often we have only a sym- 
bolical knowledge of composite ideas. 

From this it clearly follows that even of the things which we 
know distinctly, we only conceive the ideas in as far as they form 
the object of intuitive thought. Also it often happens that we 
imagine that we have in our minds ideas of things, from suppos- 
ing, wrongly, that we have already explained to ourselves the terms 
of which we make use. And it is not true, as some say, or at least 
it is very ambiguous, that we cannot speak of anything, understand- 
ing fully what we say. without having an idea of it. For often 
we vaguely understand each of the terms, or we remember that 
we have formerly understood them; but as we content ourselves 
with this blind thought and as we do not push far enough the 
analysis of notions, it happens that unwittingly we fall into the 
contradiction which the composite idea may imply. I have been 
led to examine this question more closely by an argument, long- 
celebrated in the schools and renewed by Descartes, for proving 
the existence of God. It is as follows : All that follows from the 
idea or from the definition of a thing may be affirmed of the thing 
itself. From the idea of God (or the most perfect being, or one a 
greater than whom cannot be conceived), existence follows. (For 
the most perfect being involves all perfections, among which is 
also existence.) Therefore existence may be affirmed of God. But 
it must be known how it comes about that if God be possible, it 



ON KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH AND IDEAS. 31 

follows that he exists. For in drawing conclusions, we cannot safely 
use definitions before knowing whether they are real and do not 
involve any contradiction. The reason of this is, that if the ideas 
involve contradiction, opposite things may be concluded at the 
same time, which is absurd. I am accustomed, in order to render 
this truth clear, to make use of the example of quickest motion, 
which involves an absurdity. Suppose then that a wheel turn with 
the quickest motion, who does not see that a spoke prolonged will 
move more rapidly at its extremity than at the center of the cir- 
cumference; therefore the motion is not the quickest, which is 
contrary to the hypothesis. However it seems at first view, as if 
we might have an idea of quickest motion, for we understand fully 
what we say, and yet we cannot have an idea of impossible things. 
So it does not suffice that we think the most- perfect being, to 
assure us that we have the idea of such a being, and in the demon- 
stration which we have just produced, the possibility of the most 
perfect being must be shown or supposed, if the conclusion be 
legitimately drawn. However it is very true both that we have 
an idea of GrOD, and that the most perfect being is possible, and 
even necessary; but the argument is not conclusive and has already 
been rejected by Thomas Aquinas. 

And it is thus that we find a difference between nominal defini- 
tions, which only contain the marks of the thing which is to be 
distinguished from others, and real definitions which show clearly 
that the thing is possible. And in this way answer is made to 
Hobbes, who pretended that truths were arbitrary, because they 
depended on nominal definitions, not considering that the reality 
of the definition is independent of arbitrariness, and that notions 
are not always reconcilable among themselves. Nominal defini- 
tions are only sufficient to a perfect science when it is well 
established otherwise that the thing defined is possible. It is very 
evident also what a true idea is, what a false ; the idea is true when 
the notion is possible ; it is false when the notion involves contra- 
diction. ISTow we know the possibility of a thing either a priori or 
a posteriori. A priori, when we resolve the notion into its 
elements, or into other notions of known possibility, and when we 
know that it includes nothing which is incompatible ; and, to cite 



S2 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LPIPXITZ. 

but one case, this takes place when we understand by what means a 
thing may be produced, a fact which makes causal definitions more 
useful than any others : a posteriori, when experience shows us the 
thing actually existing : for that which exists in fact is necessarily 
possible. Every time that we have an adequate knowledge, we 
have also knowledge of the possibility a priori : for if we push + he 
analysis to the end and no contradiction appears, the notion is 
necessarily possible. Xow. is it possible that men should ever con- 
struct a perfect analysis of notions, or that they should reduce their 
thoughts down to first possibilities, to irreducible notions, or what 
is the same thing, down to the absolute attributes of God ; that is. 
to the first causes and to the final reason of things ' I should not 
dare to actually decide this question. Most often we content our- 
selves with learning from experience the reality of certain notions, 
from which afterwards we compose others, after the example of 
nature. 

TVhence I think it may be understood that it is not always -. : '.- 
to appeal to ideas, and that many abuse this specious title for 
establishing certain imaginations of their own. For we have not 
always immediately the idea of the thing of which we are conscious 
of thinking, as we have shown above in the example of greatest 
swiftness. And I see that none the less to-day do men abuse this 
famous principle : Everything that I conceive clearly and distinctly 
of a thing is true or may he predicated of it. For often men, judg- 
ing hastily, imagine things clear and distinct which are obscure and 
confused. The axiom is therefore useless unless the criteria of 
clearness and distinctness, which we have indicated be applied, and 
the truth of the ideas be well established. As for the rest, it is not 
necessary in the exposition of truth to reject as criteria the rules of 
ordinary logic of which geometricians make use and which eonsist 
in admitting nothing as certain which is not proved by exact expe- 
rience or solid demonstration. Now a solid demonstration is one 
which observes the form prescribed by logic, without, however, 
always having need of syllogisms disposed in the regular order of 
the schools (like those of which Christianus Fferlinus and Conradus 
Dasypodius made use for the demonstration of the first six books 
of Euclid) : but at least in a way that the reasoning is conclu- 
sive by virtue of its form — an example of such reasoning conceived 



ON KNOWLEDGE, TKUTH AND IDEAS. 33 

in the regular form may be found in any legitimate calculus. 
Thus no necessary premise will be omitted, and all the previous 
premises must be either proved or at least admitted as hypotheses, 
in which case the conclusion is hypothetical. Those who will care- 
fully observe these rules will easily guard themselves from 
deceptive ideas. It is in accordance with such principles that the 
great genius, Pascal, in an excellent dissertation on the Mathemat- 
ical Genius (a fragment of which exists in the remarkable book of 
the celebrated Antoine Arnauld, On the Art of Thinking Well), 
says that the geometrician must define all terms in the least obscure 
and prove all truths in the least doubtful. But I wish he had 
defined the limits beyond which a notion or an affirmation is no 
longer in the least obscure or doubtful. However, we may judge 
what there is in it by an attentive examination of the considera- 
tions which we have just mentioned, for now I wish to be brief. 

As to the question whether ive see all things in God (an old 
opinion, too, which reasonably understood ought not to be 
altogether rejected), or whether we have ideas of our own, it must 
be understood that even if we see all things in God it is none the 
less necessary that we have also ideas of our own ; that is, not as it 
were certain little images, but affections or modifications of our 
mind, answering to that which we perceive in God. For since our 
thoughts are constantly being succeeded by others, a certain change 
is wrought in our mind; as for the things not actually conceived 
by us, ideas of them are in our mind as the statue of Hercules in 
the rough marble. But with God, on the contrary, must neces- 
sarily exist in actuality the idea not only of absolute and infinite 
extension, but also of each figure, which is nothing else than the 
modification of absolute extension. Moreover, when we perceive 
colors and odors we have no other perception but that of figures 
and motions, but so multiplex and delicate that our mind, in its 
present state, is incapable of distinctly considering each one, and 
consequently it does not notice that the perception is only com- 
posed of extremely small figures and motions. So when, after 
having mixed yellow powder with blue we perceive a green color, 
we perceive nothing but the yellow and blue minutely mixed, 
although we do not notice it, or rather imagine that we perceive 
some new entity. 
3 



IV. 

Extract from a Letter to Bayle, Concerning a General 

Principle useful in the Explanation of the Laws of 

Nature. 1687. 

[From the French.] 

I have seen the reply of Malebranche to the remark which I 
made concerning certain laws of nature which he had estab- 
lished in the Search after Truth. He seems sufficiently disposed 
to abandon them himself, and this ingenuousness is highly praise- 
worthy; but as he gives reasons and restrictions, which would 
land us in the obscurity from which I think I have relieved this 
subject, and which clash with a certain principle of general order 
which I have observed, I hope that he will have the kindness to 
permit me to avail myself of the present opportunity to explain 
this principle, which is of great use in reasoning and which I think 
is not yet sufficiently employed nor sufficiently known in all its 
bearing. It takes its origin from the infinite; it is absolutely nec- 
essary in geometry, but it holds good also in physics, for this reason 
that the sovereign wisdom which is the source of all things acts as 
a perfect geometrician, and according to a harmony to which noth- 
ing can be added. This is why this principle often serves as proof 
or test to show at first sight and from without, the error of a badly 
constructed opinion, even before coming to the discussion of the 
matter itself. It may be stated thus : When the difference of two 
cases may be diminished below any magnitude given in datis or in 
that which is posited, it must also be found diminished below any 
magnitude given in quaesitis or in that which results therefrom. 
Or to express it more familiarly, when the cases (or that which is 
given), continually approach each other and finally lose themselves 
one in the other, the results or events (or that which is required), 
must also do the same. This depends again on a more general 
principle, to wit: datis ordinatis etiam quaesita sunt ordinata. 
But in order to understand it examples are necessary. 

It is known that the case of the supposition of an ellipse may 
approach the case of a parabola as much as may be, so that 



THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY. 35 

the difference of the ellipse and of the parabola may become less 
than any given difference, provided that one of the foci of the 
ellipse be sufficiently distant from the other, for then the radii com- 
ing from this distant focus will differ from the parallel radii as 
little as may be, and consequently all the geometrical theorems 
which are true of the ellipse in general can be applied to the 
parabola by considering the latter as an ellipse, one of the foci of 
which is infinitely distant, or (to avoid this expression), as a figure 
which differs from any ellipse less than any given difference. 
The same principle holds good in physics ; for example, rest may 
be considered as an infinitely small velocity, or as an infinite slow- 
ness. This is why all that is true in respect to slowness or velocity 
in general, must be true also of rest thus understood ; so much so 
that the law of rest ought to be considered as a particular case of 
the law of motion; otherwise, if this does not hold, it will be a 
sure sign that the laws are badly formulated. So equality may be 
considered as an infinitely small inequality, and inequality may be 
made to approach equality as much as you please. 

It is among other faults from oversight of this consideration 
that Descartes, very able man as he was, failed in more than one 
way in his pretended laws of nature. For (not to repeat here what 
I said before of the other source of his error, when he took the 
quantity of motion for force), his first and his second laws, for 
example, do not agree. The second says that two bodies, B and C, 
meeting in the same line with equal velocities, and B being as little 
as possible larger, C will be turned back with its first velocity, 
but B will continue its movement ; whereas according to the first 
law, B and C being equal, both will turn back and retrograde with 
a velocity equal to' that which had carried them thither. But the 
difference in the results of these two cases is not reasonable; for 
the inequality of the two bodies may be as slight as you please, 
and the difference which is in the suppositions of these two cases, 
to wit: the difference between such an inequality and a perfect 
equality, could be less than any given ; hence, by virtue- of our 
principle, the difference between the results or outcomes ought also 
to be less than any given ; notwithstanding if the second law were 
as true as the first the contrary would happen, for according to 
this second law any increase, however small, of body B before 



36 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBKS OF LEIB^TITZ. 

equal to C. makes a difference grandissime in the effect, such that 
it changes absolute retrogression into absolute continuation. which 
is a great leap front one extremity to the other, whereas in this case 
body B ought to turn back a little less, and body C a little niore 
than in the case of equality, from which this case can hardly be 
distinguish- , 

There are many other like incongruities resulting from the Car- 
tesian laws, which the attention of a reader applying our principle 
will easily remark, and the like case which I had found in the 
rules of the Search after Truth came from the same source. 
Malebranche in a way avoirs that there are inconsistencies, but he 
does not cease to believe that the laws of motion depending on 
the good pleasure of God, are regulated by his wisdom, and the 
_ metricians would be also almost as much surprised to see these 
kinds of irregularities coming into nature as to see a parabola 
to which might be applied the properties of an ellipse with an infi- 
nitely distant focus. Also such inconsistencies will never be 
encountered in nature, I think. The better it is known the more 
it is found to be geometrical. It is easy to judge from this that 
these inconsistencies do not properly come from that which Male- 
branche asserts they do. to wit : from the false hypothesis of the 
perfect hardness of bodies, which I admit is not found in nature. 
Tor even if we should suppose in it this hardness, regarding it as 
infinitely quick elasticity, there would result from it nothing which 
could not be adjusted perfectly to the true laws of nature as 
regards elastic bodies in general, and never shall we encounter laws 
so little connected as these in which I have found something to 
censure. It is true that in composite things sometimes a little 
change may produce a great effect ;. as for example, a spark falling 
into a great mass of gunpowder is capable of overturning a whole 
city : but this is not contrary to our principle, and these cases may 
be accounted for by even greater principles, but as respects ele- 
ments or simple things, nothing similar could happen, otherwise 
nature would not be the effect of infinite wisdom. 

TYhence it is seen (a little better than in what is commonly said 
of it) how true physics must be derived really from the source of 
the divine perfections. It is God who is the final reason of things, 
and the knowledge of God is no less the principle of the sciences 



THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY. 37 

than his essence and his will axe the principles of beings. The 
most reasonable philosophers agree in this, but there are very few 
of them who can make nse of it to discover truths of importance. 
Perhaps these little attempts will arouse some to go much farther. 
It is sanctifying philosophy to make its streams flow from the 
fountain of the attributes of God.' Far from excluding final causes i 
and the consideration of a being acting with wisdom, it is from 
thence that all must be derived in physics. This it is which 
Socrates in the Phaedo of Plato has already admirably remarked, 
when reasoning against Anaxagoras and other material philoso- 
phers who, after having at first recognized an intelligent principle' 
above matter, do not employ it at all when they come to philoso- 
phize on the universe, and instead of showing that this intelligence 
does everything for the best, and that this is the reason of the 
things which it has found good to produce conformably to its ends, 
try to explain everything by the mere concourse of senseless parti- 
cles, confounding the conditions and instruments with the true 
cause. It is (said Socrates) as if, in order to explain why I am 
seated in prison awaiting the fatal stroke and am not on the 
way to the Boeotians or other peoples, whither, it is known, I 
might have escaped, it should be said that it is because I have 
bones, tendons and muscles which can be bent as is necessary in// 
order to be seated. My faith (he says), these bones and these mus- 
cles would not be here, and you would not see me in this posture, if 
my mind had not judged that it is more worthy of Socrates to - 
suffer what the laws of the country ordain. This passage in Plato 
deserves to be read entire, for these are very beautiful and solid 
reflections. Nevertheless I admit that particular effects of nature 
may and must be explained mechanically, without forgetting, how- 
ever, their admirable designs and uses which Providence has known 
how to take care of ; but the general principles of physics and even 
of mechanics themselves depend on the direction of a sovereign 
intelligence, and cannot be explained without taking it into consid- J\ 
oration. Thus it is that piety must be reconciled with reason, and 
that good people may be satisfied who fear the results of the 
mechanical or corpuscular philosophy, as if it would lead us from 
God and immaterial substances, whereas, with the required correc- 
tions and everything well understood, it ought to lead us to him. 



V. 

LETTER FROM LEIBXITZ TO ArXAUED IX WHICH HE SUMMARIZES 

his Personal Views ox Metaphysics and Physics. 1690. 
[From the French.] 

Sir — I am now on the point of returning home after a long 
journey, undertaken at the order of my prince for the purpose of 
historical researches, in which I found certificates, titles and indu- 
bitable proofs sufficient to justify the common origin of the illus- 
trious houses of Brunswick and Este, which Messrs. Juste, 
du Cange and others had good reasons for calling in question, 
because there were contradictions and falsities in the historians of 
Este in this respect, together with an utter confusion of times and 
persons. At present I think of returning and resuming my former 
course of life, and having written to you two years ago shortly 
before my departure, I take the same liberty to-day, to inform 
myself of your health, and to make known to you how the idea of 
your eminent merit is always present in my mind. When I was at 
Rome I saw the denunciation of a new heresy attributed to you, or 
to your friends, and afterwards I saw the letter of reverend Father 
Mabillon to one of my friends, in which there was the statement 
that the defense by the reverend Father Le Tellier of the mission- 
aries against the practical morals of the Jesuits, had given to many 
people impressions favorable to these Fathers, but that he had 
heard that you had replied to it and that it was said that you had 
overthrown by geometrical reasoning the arguments of that Father. 
All of which leads me to think that you are still in condition to 
render service to the public, and I pray God that it may be so for a 
long time to come. It is true that this is to my interest, but it is a 
praiseworthy interest which may give me the means of learning, 
whether it be in common with all others who shall read your 
works, or j^ersonally, when your judgments shall instruct me — if 
the little leisure you have may permit me again to hope sometimes 
for that advantage. 






VIEWS ON" METAPHYSICS AND PHYSICS. * 39 

As this voyage has in part served to relieve my mind from its 
ordinary occupations, I have had the satisfaction of conversing on 
matters of science and erudition with several able men, and I have 
communicated my personal views, which you know, to some in 
order to profit by their doubts and difficulties ; and there have been 
some who, not satisfied with the common doctrines, have found an 
extraordinary satisfaction in some of my views. This has led me 
to write them down that they may be the more easily communi- 
cated, and perhaps I shall cause some copies to be printed some 
day without jny name, merely to send them to my friends in order 
that I may haveTheir judgment on them. I would like you to be 
able to examine them first, and for that reason I have made the 
following abstract : 

* — i 

A body is an aggregate of substances, and not properly speaking i \ 
one substance. It must be, consequently, that everywhere in body 
there are found indivisible substances, ingenerable and incorrup- 
tible, having something corresponding to souls. That all these sub- 
stances have always been and always will be united to organic 
bodies differently transformable. That each of these substances 
contains in its nature legem contimiationis seriei suarum opera- 
tionum and all that has happened or will happen to it. That all 
its actions come from its own depths, except dependence on God. 
That each substance expresses the entire universe, but one more 
distinctly than an other, especially each as regards certain things 
and according to its own point of view. That the union of soul"? 
with body, and the operation also of one substance on another, 
consists merely in that perfect mutual accord, expressly established 
by order of the first creation, in virtue of which each substance 
following its own laws agrees in what the others demand ; and the 
operations of the one follow or accompany thus the operations or 
changes of the other. That intelligences, or souls capable of reflect"/' 
tion and of the knowledge of eternal truths and of God, have many ) 
privileges which exempt them from the vicissitudes of bodies. 
That for them moral laws must be added to physical. That all 
things are made principally for them. That they form together the 
republic of the universe, of which God is the monarch. That there 
is a perfect justice and order observed in this city of God, and 



40 * PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

that there is no wrong action without chastisement, nor good action 
without proportioned recompense. That the more we come to 
know things, the more we will find them beautiful and conformed 
to that which a sage wonld desire. That we should always be 
content with the order of the past, because it is conformed to the 
absolute will of God which is known by the event; but that we 
must try to render the future, as far as it depends on us, conform- 
able to the presumptive will of God or to his commandments ; to 
beautify our Sparta and to labor to do good, without being 
depressed, however, when success fails, and this in the firm belief 
that God can discover the times most suited for changes for the 
better. That those who are not satisfied with the order of things 
cannot boast of loving God as he should be loved. That justice 
<$s but the love of the sage. That love is a universal benevolence 
which the sage fulfils conformably to the measure of reason, to the 
end of obtaining lasting contentment, which consists in a contin- 

< ual advance to greater perfection, or at least in the variation of a 
like degree of perfection. 

— As regards physics, it is necessary to understand the nature of 
force, a thing entirely different from motion, which is something 
more relative. That this force is to be measured by the quantity 
of effect. That there is an absolute force, a directive force and 
a respective force. That each of these forces continues in the same 
degree in the universe, or in each mechanism not in communication 
with others, and that the two latter forces, taken together, compose 
the first or absolute. But that the same quantity of motion is 
not preserved, since I show that otherwise perpetual motion would 

ibe found, and that an effect would be more powerful than its cause. 
It is now some time ago that I published in the Leipsic Acta an 
essay on physics, to find the physical cause of the motions of 
the stars. I lay down as basal that all motion of a solid in a 
fluid, taking place in a curved line or the velocity of which is 
continually changing, comes from the motion of the fluid 
itself; whence I draw the inference that the stars have different 
but fluid orbs. I have demonstrated an important general proposi- 
tion, viz : that every body that moves with a revolution which is 
harmonic (i. e., such that the distances from the center being in 



VIEWS ON METAPHYSICS AND PHYSICS. 41 

arithemetical progression the velocities are in harmonic progres- 
sion, or inversely to the distances), and which furthermore has 
a paracentric motion, that is, of gravity or of levity as regards 
the same center (a certain law which this attraction or repulsion 
keeps), the said body describes areas which vary necessarily as 
the times, just as Kepler observed among the planets. Then con- 
sidering, ex observationibus, that this movement is elliptic, I find 
that the laws of paracentric motion, which motion joined to har- 
monic revolution describes ellipses, must be such that the gravita- 
tions are reciprocally as the squares of the distances ; i. e., as the J 
illuminations ex sole. 

I shall say nothing to you of my calculus of increments or differ- 
ences, by which I determine the tangents, without eliminating the 
irrational quantities and fractions even when an unknown quan- 
tity is involved in them, and by which I subject quadratics and 
transcendental problems to analysis. And I will not speak either 
of an entirely new analysis which belongs to geometry and is 
entirely different from algebra ; and still less of some other things 
on which I have not yet had time to' prepare essays. All of which 
I should like to be able to explain to you in few words, in order 
to have your opinion, which would be of greatest use to me, on 
them; if you had as much leisure as I have deference for your 
judgment. But your time is too precious, and my letter is already 
sufficiently long. Therefore I close here, and am, sir, 

Your obedient and humble servant, 

Leibnitz. 
Venice, March 23, 1690. 



VI. 

Letter ox the Question. "Whether the Essence of Body 
Consists est Extension. 1691. 

[From the French.] 

Toe ask. sir. the reasons which I have for believing that tlie 
idea of body or of matter is other than that of extension. It is 
true, as yon say. that many able men are to-day of the opinion that 
the essence of body consists in length, breadth and depth. Never- 
theless there are still others who cannot be accused of too much 
attachment to scholasticism, who are not content with this opinion. 

M. Nicole, in a certain place in his Essais, states that he is of 
this number and it seems to him that there is more of bias than 
of insight in those who do not appear repelled by the difficulties 
which are therein encountered. 

It would require a very full discourse to explain clearly what I 
think on the subject. However, here are some considerations 
which I submit to your judgment, which I beg you to make known 
to me. 

If the essence of body consisted in extension, this extension 
alone ought to be sufficient to account for all the properties of 
body. But this is not so. We notice in matter a quality, called 
by some natural inertia, by which body resists in some way motion; 
so that it is necessary to employ some force to set it in motion (even 
making abstraction of the weight), and a large body is moved 
with more difficulty than a small body. For example : 



Fig. i. 



J 



if body A, in motion, encounters body B. at rest, it is evident that 
if body B were indifferent to motion or to rest, it would allow itself 
to be pushed by body A without resisting it. and without decreas- 
ing the velocity or changing the direction of body A : and after 
their meeting A would continue its path and B would go in com- 



IS THE ESSENCE OF BODY EXTENSION 



43 



parry with it, preceding it. But it is not thus in nature. The 
larger body B is, the more it will decrease the velocity with which 
body A moves, even to compelling it to retrograde if B is much 
larger than A. JSTow if there were nothing in bodies but exten- 
sion, or situation, that is, that which geometricians recognize in 
them, joined to the one notion of change, this extension would be 
entirely indifferent respecting this change, and the results of the 
meeting of bodies would be explained by the mere geometrical 
composition of motions ; that is to say, the body after the meet- 
ing would advance with a motion composed of the impression 
which it had before the shock and of that which it received from 
the concurrent, in order not to hinder it; that is, in this case of 
meeting it would go with the difference of the two velocities and 
from the side of the direction. 

As the velocity of 2 A 3 A, or 2 B 3 B, in figure II, is the differ- 
ence between 1 A 2 A and 1 B 2 B ; and in this case of contact, 
figure III, the 



Fig. ii. 




l A 



2 B 



1 B 



3 A 



3 B 



Fig. III. 




1 A 



1 B 



2 A 



2 B I 



3 A 



3 B 



quicker would strike the slower one which precedes it, the slower 
would receive the velocity of the other, and in general they would 
proceed always together after the meeting ; and in particular, as I 
said at the beginning, that one which is in motion would carry for- 
ward the one in repose, without receiving any diminution of its 
speed, and without the size, equality or inequality of the two 
bodies changing this in any respect ; a thing utterly irreconcilable 



44 PHILOSOPHICAL WOPiKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

with experience. And even if it were supposed that size ought 
to make a change in the motion, there would be no principle for 
determining the means of estimating it in detail, and for knowing 
the resulting direction and velocity. In any case there would be 
an inclination toward the opinion of the conservation of motion; 
whereas I believe that I have proved that the same force is pre- 
served, and that its quantity is different from the quantity of 
motion. 

All this shows that there is in matter something other than 
what is purely geometrical ; that is, than extension and its 
changes pure and simple. And when we consider it well we 
perceive that there must be joined to it some higher or metaphys- 
ical notion, to wit: that of substance, action and force; and that 
these notions show that everything which suffers must act recipro- 
cally, and that everything which acts must suffer some reaction; 
and consequently that a body at rest cannot be carried along by 
another in motion without changing something of the direction and 
of the velocity of the agent. 

I agree that naturally every body is extended, and that there is 
no extension without body. Xevertheless the notions of place, of 
space, of pure extension, must not be confounded with the notion 
of substance, which besides extension includes resistance, that is. 
activity [action] and passivity [passion']. 

This consideration seems to me important, not only in order to 
know the nature of extended substance, but also in order not to 
slight in physics the higher and immaterial principles, to the 
prejudice of piety. For although T am persuaded that evervthing 
takes place mechanically in corporeal nature I do not cease to 
believe also that even the principles of mechanics, that is, the first 
laws of motion, have a more exalted origin than that which pure 
mathematics can furnish. And I imagine if this were better 
known or more considered many pious persons would not have 
such a bad opinion of the corpuscular philosophy, and modern phi- 
losophers would join better the knowledge of nature with that of 
its author. 

I do not enlarge upon other reasons touching the nature of body, 
for that would lead me too far. 



IS THE ESSENCE OF BODY EXTENSION ? 45 

[Extracts from a Letter in Support of what he published in the "Journal des 
Savants" of June 18, 1691. 1693.] 

■To prove that the nature of body does not consist in extension 
I made use of an argument explained in the Journal des Savants of 
June 18, 1691, the gist of which is that we cannot explain by mere 
extension the natural inertia of bodies; that is, that which 
causes matter to resist motion, or in other words that which 
brings it about that a body which is already in motion cannot carry 
along with it another which is at rest, without being retarded 
thereby. For extension in itself, being indifferent to motion 
and to rest, nothing ought to hinder the two bodies from going 
along together with all the velocity of the first, and which it tries to 
impress upon the second. To this, answer is made in the Journal 
of July 16th of the same year (as I learned only a short time ago), 
that really body ought to be indifferent to motion or to rest, 
supposing that its essence consists only in being extended; but that 
nevertheless a body impelling another must be retarded by it (not 
because of extension but because of force), because the same force 
which ivas applied to one of the bodies is now applied to both. 
Now the force which moves one of the bodies with a certain 
velocity must move the tvoo together with less velocity. It is as if 
it were said in other words that body, if it consist in extension; 
ought to be indifferent to motion, but that in reality not being 
indifferent to it, since it resists that which ought to give it motion, 
it is necessary to employ, in addition to the notion of extension, 
that of force. Thus this reply grants just what I wish. And in 
truth those who are in favor of the system of Occasional Causes 
have already clearly perceived that force, and the laws of motion 
which depend on it, cannot be drawn from extension alone, and as 
they have taken for granted that there is only extension in matter, 
they have been obliged to deny to it force and action and to have 
recourse to the general cause, which is the pure will and action of 
God. As to which it may be said that they have very well rea- 
soned ex hypothesi. But the hypothesis has not yet been proved ; 
and as the conclusion appears not acceptable in physics, there is 
more probability for saying that there is a mistake in the hypothesis 
(which moreover involves many other difficulties), and that there 



46 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

must be recognized in matter something more than what consists 
in the. mere relation of extension; which, like space, is incapable 
of action and of resistance, these pertaining only to substances. 
Those who hold that extension itself is a substance reverse the 
order of words as well as of thoughts. Besides extension, there 
must be a subject which is extended, that is, a substance to which 
it belongs to be repeated or continued. For extension signifies only 
a repetition or continued multiplication of that which is extended ; 
a plurality, continuity and co-existence of parts; and hence exten- 
sion is not sufficient to explain the nature of the extended or 
repeated substance, the notion of which is anterior to that of its 
repetition. 



VII. 

* 

Animadversions on Descartes" Principles of Philosophy. 1692. 

[From the Latin.] 

On Article 1. As to what is said by Descartes, that we must 
doubt all thiugs in which there is the least uncertainty, it would be 
preferable to express it by this better and more expressive precept : 
We ought to think what degree of acceptance or dissent everything 
merits ; or more simply, We ought to inquire after the reasons of 
any dogma. Thus the Cartesian wranglings concerning doubt 
would cease. But perhaps the author preferred Trapaho^o\o<yelv , in 
order that he might excite the listless reader by novelty. But I 
could wish that he himself had remembered his own precept, or 
rather, that he had conceived its true force. We shall explain it 
and its use best by the example of the geometers. It is agreed 
among them that there are axioms or postulates, on the truth of 
which all other things rest. We admit these, both because they 
immediately satisfy the mind and because they are verified by 
numberless examples ; and nevertheless it would be of importance 
to the perfection of science that they be demonstrated. This, 
Apollonius and Proclus in olden time and recently Robervallius, 
among others, have attempted. And certainly just as Euclid 
wished to demonstrate that two sides of a triangle taken together 
are greater than the third (as a certain one of the ancients jest- 
ingly said, even asses know enough to go after their food by a 
straight line, not by a roundabout way) , because indeed he wished 
that geometrical truths should rest not on images of the senses but 
on reasons ; so also he could have demonstrated that two right lines 
(which if extended do not meet) can have only one common point, 
if he had had a good definition of right. And I know that the 
demonstrating of axioms is of great use to a true analysis or art of 
discovery. Thus if Descartes had wished to follow what is best in 
his precept, he ought to have labored toward demonstrating the 
principles of the sciences, and to have done in philosophy what 
Proclus wished to do in geometry where it is less necessary. But 



48 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

it seemed preferable to our author to have applause, rather than to 
have certainty. jSTor would I blame him for being content with 
probability, if he had not aroused our minds by such a great pro- 
fession of strictness : but I blame Euclid much less when he makes 
assumptions without proof, for he maintained that we know that if 
a few hypotheses are admitted, all else is sure and thus equal to 
them in trustworthiness. If Descartes or other philosophers had 
done something similar to this, we should not be troubled. And the 
skeptics also, who condemn the sciences on the pretext that they 
use principles not immediately demonstrated, ought to regard this 
as said to them. I, on the contrary, hold that the geometers ought 
rather to be praised because they prop up the sciences by these, as 
it were, pegs, and devise an art of proceeding and of deducing- 
many things from few; for if they wished to defer the inven- 
tion of theorems or problems until all axioms or postulates had been 
demonstrated, we should perhaps to-day have no geometry. 

On Article 2. For the rest I do not see of what use it is to 
consider doubtful things as false. This would not be to cast aside 
prejudices, but to change them. But if the fiction is so understood, 
it must not be abused, as, for example, when later on in Article 8 a 
paralogism will seem to arise when the distinction of the mind 
from the body is discussed. 

On Article 4. Moreover we can neither know nor ought we 
to desire anything of sensible things than that they harmonize as 
well among themselves as with indubitable reasons and in such a 
way that future things may, in a certain degree, be foreseen from 
past things. Any other truth or reality will be sought in them in 
vain than that which this vouches for, nor ought skeptics ask any- 
thing else nor the dogmatics promise it. 

On Article 5. We cannot otherwise doubt of mathematical 
demonstrations except as error may be feared in the reckoning of 
arithmeticians. This cannot be remedied except by examining the 
reckoning often, or by different reckonings, confirming proofs 
being added. This weakness of the human mind, arising from 
want of attention and of memory, cannot be perfectly removed, and 
what is adduced by Descartes as a remedy is useless. The same 
thing suffices as guarantee in other departments which suffices in 



OX DESCAKTES' "PRINCIPLES." 49 

mathematics; indeed all reasoning, even the Cartesian, however 
proved or accurate, will yet be subject to this doubt, whatever may 
finally be thought of any powerful deceptive genius or of -the dif- 
ference between sleep and wakefulness. 

On Article 6. We have free will not in thinking but in act- 
ing. It is not in my will whether honey shall seem to be sweet or 
bitter, but neither is it in the power of my will whether a theorem 
proposed to me shall seem true or false, but it is a matter of con- 
sciousness alone to consider what seems so. Whoever has affirmed 
anything is conscious either of a present feeling or reason, or, at 
least, of a present memory renewing a past feeling or a perception 
of a past reason ; although we are often deceived in this by failure 
of memory or lack of attention. But consciousness of anything 
present or past assuredly does not belong to our will. We know 
that this one thing is in the power of our faculty of will ; namely, 
that it may command attention and zeal, and thus, although it may 
not make an opinion in us, it can nevertheless indirectly contribute 
to it. So it happens that often men finally believe that what they 
wish is true, after they have accustomed the mind to attending 
most of all to those things which favor it; in which way they 
bring about that it satisfies not only the will but also conscious- 
ness. Cf. Art. 31. 

Ok Article 7. I think therefore I am is well remarked by 
Descartes to be among the first truths. But it was but just that he 
should not neglect others equal to this. In general, therefore, it 
may be said : Truths are either of fact or of reason. The first of 
the truths of reason is, as Aristotle rightly observed, the principle 
of contradiction or, what amounts to the same thing, of identity. 
First truths of fact are as many as the immediate perceptions, or 
those of consciousness, so to speak. Moreover not only am I con- 
scious of my thinking but also of my thoughts. Nor is it more 
certain that I think than that this or that is thought by me. Thus 
first truths of fact may not inconveniently be traced back to these 
two, / thintc, and Various things are thought by me. Whence it fol- 
lows not only that I am but also that I am affected in various ways. 

On Article 8. This is not valid: "I am able to assume or 
imagine that no corporeal things exist but I am not able to imagine 
4 



50 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

that I do not exist or that I do not think ; therefore I am not cor- 
poreal, nor is thought a mode of body." And I marvel that such 
an able man could attribute so much to so light a sophism ; certainly 
he adds nothing more in this article. What he brings forward in 
his Meditations will be examined in its proper place. He who 
thinks that the mind is corporeal, will not admit that you can affirm 
that no corporeal things exist ; but he will admit this, that you can 
doubt (as long as you are ignorant of the nature of the mind) 
whether corporeal things exist or do not exist; and since, never- 
theless, you see clearly that your mind does exist, he will concede 
that this one thing thence follows, namely that you can doubt 
whether the mind is corporeal; nor will anything further be 
wrested by any tortures from this argument. But this furnished a 
handle to the paralogism in Art. 2 above, the liberty being assumed 
of rejecting what is doubted as if it were false; as if it were 
admissible to assume that there are no corporeal things because it 
can be doubted whether they exist, which ought not to be conceded. 
It would be otherwise if we knew the nature of the mind as 
perfectly as we knew its existence, for thus whatever did not 
appear in it, it would be agreed was not in it. 

Ox Article 13. I have already remarked, on Art. 5, that the 
errors which may arise from want of memory or attention and 
which occur also in arithmetical calculations (even after a perfect 
method has been found as in numbers) are recounted here to no 
purpose, since no art can be devised in which they are not to be 
feared, especially when the reasoning must be long drawn out ; and 
that therefore we must have recourse to examinations. As for the 
.rest, God seems to be summoned hither for a sort of show or pomp ; 
not to mention that the strange fiction or doubt, whether we are not 
made to err even in matters most evident, ought to move no one,, 
since the nature of evidence is against it and the experiences and 
successes of all life are contrary to it. And if ever this doubt 
could justly be raised, it would be absolutely insuperable ; it would 
confront even Descartes himself and every one else even when 
presenting the most evident things ; this I say, not to mention that, 
it must be known that this doubt is not established by denying* 
God nor removed bv introducine; him. For even if there were no 



ON DESCARTES 



'principles." 51 



God, provided it were possible for us to continue to exist, there 
would be no reason for our being less capable of truth; and 
although it be conceded that there is a God, it does not therefore 
follow that a creature exceedingly fallible and imperfect does not 
exist, especially when it may be that its imperfection is not native, 
but perhaps superinduced by a great sin, as Christian theologians 
teach concerning original sin, yet so that this sin cannot be imputed 
to God. Moreover although God does not seem to be here aptly 
introduced, I think, nevertheless, but in a different way, that true 
knowledge of God is the principle of higher wisdom ; for God is 
not less the first cause than the ultimate reason of things ; nor are 
things known better than from their causes and reasons. 

On Article 14. The argument for the existence of God 
drawn from the notion itself of him, Anselm, Archbishop of Can- 
terbury, first, so far as is known, discovered and stated in his 
extant Liber contra Insipientem. And it was examined here and 
there by the writers of the scholastic theology and by Aquinas 
himself, whence Descartes, not without study of it, seems to have 
borrowed it. This reasoning possesses some beauty but is neverthe- 
less imperfect. The argument amounts to this : Whatever may be 
demonstrated from the notion of a thing, that can be attributed to 
the thing. Now from the notion of most perfect or greatest being, 
existence can be demonstrated. Therefore existence ,can be attrib- 
uted to the most perfect being (God), or God exists. The assump- 
tion is proved : Most perfect or greatest being includes all perfec- 
tions, therefore existence also, which undoubtedly is of the number 
of perfections, since to exist is more or greater than not to exist. 
Thus far the argument. But if perfection or greatness had been 
omitted, the argument might have been constructed even more 
strictly and more closely in this way : Necessary being exists (or 
being to whose essence existence belongs, or being of itself exists), 
as is evident from the terms. Now God is such a being (from the 
definition of God) ; therefore God exists. These arguments are 
valid, provided it be admitted that most perfect or necessary being 
is possible, and does not imply contradiction, or, what is the same 
thing that the essence from which existence follows is possible. 
But as long as this has not been demonstrated, it certainly ought 



52 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

not to be thought that the existence of Gocl has been perfectly 
demonstrated by such an argument. And, generally, it ought to 
be known (as I formerly urged), that from a definition nothing can 
be safely inferred concerning the thing defined, so long as it is not 
established that the definition expresses something possible. For 
if, perchance, it implies some hidden contradiction, it might 
happen that something absurd would be deduced from it. Mean- 
while from this argument we become acquainted with this wonder- 
ful privilege of the divine nature that provided it be possible it 
exists of itself, which is not sufficient for proving existence in other 
things. There only remains for the geometrical demonstration of 
the divine existence that the possibility of God be demonstrated 
with accurate severity in geometrical rigor. Meanwhile the exis- 
tence of that which only lacks possibility receives great faith : as 
for the rest, that there is some necessary being is evident from the 
fact that contingent things exist. 

Ox Article IS. We have an idea of a most perfect being, and 
therefore the cause of this idea (that is, the most perfect being) 
exists. This which is Descartes' second argument, is even more 
doubtful than the possibility of God. It is denied also by many of 
those who with great zeal acknowledge that God is not only possi- 
ble but that he exists. Xor is it true, what I remember Descartes 
somewhere says, that when we speak of something, understanding 
what we say. we have the idea of the thing. Tor it often happens 
that we combine incompatibles, as when we think of quickest 
motion, which is admitted to be impossible and therefore lacks 
idea ; and nevertheless we admit that we speak of this with under- 
standing. Indeed it has been explained by me elsewhere that we 
often only confusedly think that of which we speak, and are not 
conscious of an idea existing in our mind unless we understand the 
thing and resolve it as far as is sufficient. 

Ox~ Aeticle 20. The third argument is burdened with this 
same vice, as well as others, since it assumes that the idea of the 
highest perfection, Gocl, is in us, and hence it concludes that God 
exists, since we who have this idea exist. 

Ox- Article 21. From the fact that we now are, it follows 
that we shall still hereafter be, unless a reason of change exists. So 



on descartes' "principles." 53 

unless it were established otherwise that we could not even exist 
unless by favor of God, nothing would be proved as to the existence 
of God from our duration ; as if indeed one part of this duration 
could be wholly independent of the other ; which is not to be 
admitted. 

On Article 26. Although we are finite, we may nevertheless 
know many things concerning the infinite, as concerning asymp- 
totic lines or those which produced ad infinitum always approach 
but never meet ; concerning infinite spaces not greater than a finite 
length as respects area; concerning the last members of series 
which are infinite. Otherwise we should know nothing certain con- 
cerning God either. Moreover it is one thing to know something of 
a thing, another to comprehend the thing, that is to have in our 
power whatever lies hidden in the thing. 

On Article 28. As to what pertains to the ends which God 
proposed to himself, I clearly think both that those ends of God 
are to be known and to be investigated with great profit and that 
contempt of this inquiry is not free from peril or suspicion. And, 
in general, as often as we see that something has remarkable uses, 
we may safely assert that among others this end also, namely, that 
he might furnish these uses, Was proposed to God when producing 
this thing, since he both knew and procured this use of the thing. 
•Elsewhere I have noted and shown by examples that certain hidden 
physical truths of great moment, which cannot be so easily known 
through efficient causes, might be disclosed by the consideration of 
final cause. 

On Article 30. Even if we admit a perfect substance, which 
is undoubtedly not the cause of imperfections, the true or fictitious 
grounds for doubting which Descartes introduced are not thus 
removed, as I have already noticed, Art. 13. 

On Articles 31, 35. That errors depend more upon the will 
than upon the intellect, I do not admit. To believe that true which 
is false or that false which is true when this may be known by 
investigating, this is to err. So also through consciousness or 
memory certain perceptions or reasons arise, and therefore do not 
depend on the will except in so far as in some indirect way, and 
sometimes even unknown to us, it may happen that we seem to 



54 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

ourselves to see those things which we will. Cf. Art. 6. We 
judge therefore not because we will but because it appears. 
And as for the saying that the will is wider than the intellect, 
this is more sounding than true; in a word, I may say it is 
but trappings for the people. We will nothing except it appear 
to the intellect. The origin of all errors is the same, that 
which is observed as the reason of errors of reckoning among 
arithmeticians. For it often happens from a defect of attention or 
memory that we do what we ought not to do, or leave undone what 
we ought to do, or think that we have done what we have not done 
or that we have not done what we have done. So it happens that 
in reckonings (to which reasoning corresponds in the mind) the 
right figures are not set down, wrong ones are put down, something- 
is passed over among the things which ought to be taken into 
account, the method is disturbed. Our mind, indeed, wearied or 
distracted, does not, for its present operations, sufficiently attend to 
the matter; or, by an error of memory, it assumes as if formerly 
proved that which only adheres to us deeply because it has been 
often inculcated or fixedly regarded or eagerly desired. The 
remedy also for our errors is the same as that for the errors of 
reckoning, namely, that we attend to the matter and to the form, 
that we proceed slowly, that we repeat and vary the operation, that 
we institute examinations or proofs, that we divide longer reason- 
ings into parts, by which the mind may breathe, and that we con- 
firm each part, as may be, by particular proofs. And since we 
must in action sometimes be hurried, the great thing is to have 
acquired presence of mind for one's self by force of habit, just as 
those have done who in the midst of tumult and even without writ- 
ing or calculations are none the less able to compute large numbers, 
so that the mind is not easily distracted either by the external 
senses or by its own imaginations or emotions, but always rises 
above what it is doing and retains the power of regarding, or, as we 
commonly say, of turning itself back upon itself, so that presently, 
in place of an external admonisher it may say, "See what you are 
doing, say why you are here, the hour passes." The Germans 
admirably call this sich begreiffen; the French not less happily, 
saviser, as if it were to warn one's self, to suggest to one's self, as 



ON DESCARTES PRINCIPLES. 



55 



the nomeiiclators suggested to Roman candidates the names and 
merits of citizens worthy to be taken, as the prompter suggests to 
the comedian the initial words of the rest of the piece, as a certain 
youth suggested to Philip, king of Macedon, "Remember you are 
mortal." But this turning of the mind, s'aviser, is not in our 
power nor in the election of our will ; on the contrary it must first 
occur to the intellect, and it depends on the present degree of our 
perfection. It belongs to the will in advance to strive zealously 
that the mind be well prepared, which is advantageously done both 
by the consideration of the experiences and losses or dangers of 
others, and also by the use of our own, but (as is allowable) this is 
at the risk of the loss of time or at least of a light or ludicrous 
injury; but at the same time there is the accustoming of the mind 
to a certain order and method of thinking so that afterwards it may 
occur, when it is needed, as if voluntarily. There nevertheless are 
errors which without guilt escape or are not avoided. Where we 
are in trouble not by defect of judgment but by want of memory 
or ability we are not so much in error as we are ignorant, for we 
cannot bring it about that we may either know or remember what 
we will. That kind of directing the mind suffices by which we 
fight against lack of attention, and as often as memory repeats to 
us past proofs which perchance were in reality none, we have a 
confused recollection which is suspicious ; and either we repeat the 
inquiry if it may be done and the matter is important, or we do 
not rely on past care unless it is sufficiently tested. 

On Article 37. The highest perfection of man is not more 
that he acts freely than that he acts with reason ; or rather, both 
are the same, since the freer one is the less is the use of reason dis- 
turbed by the violence of the emotions. 

On Article 39. To ask whether there is liberty in our will is 
the same as to ask whether choice is in our will. Free and volun- 
tary mean the same thing. For free is the same as spontaneous 
with reason ; and to will is to be carried to action by a reason per- 
ceived by the intellect ; moreover the more unconditional the reason 
is and the less the impulse has of bare and confused perception 
mixed with it, the freer the action is. To abstain from judgments 
does not belong to our will but to the intellect suggesting some 
attention to itself, as has been already said on Art. 35. 



56 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

Ox Article 40. If anyone thinking that God has preordained 
all things and nevertheless that he himself is free, and his argu- 
ments exhibiting conflict among themselves, makes this one reply, 
as Descartes orders; namely: that his mind is finite and cannot 
comprehend such things, he seems to me to reply to the conclusion, 
not to the argument, and to cut, not to untie, the knot. The ques- 
tion is not whether you comprehend the thing itself, but rather 
whether you do not comprehend your absurdity on my showing 
it. There must certainly be a contradiction also in the mysteries of 
faith not less than in the mysteries of nature. Therefore if you 
wish to excel as a philosopher, it behooves that you take up the 
argument, which one of your opponents infers with some appear- 
ance of truth from your assertions, and point out the defect in it, 
which assuredly can always be done, unless you have erred. 

Ox Articles 43, 45, 46. I have elsewhere called attention to 
the fact that there is no great use in this rule which is laid down, 
of approving only tuliat is clear and distinct, unless better marks 
of clear and distinct are brought forward than those which 
Descartes gave. The rules of Aristotle and the geometers are 
better, namely: That we should admit nothing, principles (i. e. 
first truths and hypotheses) of course excepted, unless proved by 
legimate argument ; legitimate, I say, that is, burdened neither 
with defect of form nor of matter. But it is a defect of matter 
if anything except principles, or again things proved from prin- 
ciples by legitimate argument, be assumed. But I understand the 
right form to be not only the common syllogistic form, but also any 
other predemonstrated which concludes by force of its own dis- 
position; which also the forms of the operations of the arithme- 
ticans and algebraists, the forms of the book-keepers, indeed also, 
in some degree, the forms of .judiciary process, do : for occasionally 
we are content to proceed with a certain degree of resemblance. 
Nevertheless the art of logic, esj)ecially useful in life for estimat- 
iug degrees of probability, remains still to be discussed, concerning 
which not a few things have been noted down by me. On form, 
compare further what is said on Art. 75. 

Ox Articles 47, 48. Some one, I know not whom (I think it 
was Comenius), formerly rightly criticized Descartes for promis- 



on descartes' "principles." 57 

ing, Art. 47, summarily to enumerate all simple notions, and yet 
directly in the following Article 48, he deserts us, and, some being 
named, he adds: and the like; besides which the larger part of 
those which he does name are not simple. This is an inquiry of 
greater moment than is thought. 

On Article 50. Truths entirely simple but which neverthe- 
less are not admitted on account of the prejudged opinion of men, 
we must take especial pains to demonstrate by those more simple. 

On Article 51. I do not know whether the definition of sub- 
stance as that which needs the concurrence of Go'd alone to exist is 
appropriate for any created substance known to us, unless inter- 
preted in some less common meaning. For not only do we need 
other substances, but we need also much more accidents. Since 
therefore substance and accident mutually need each other, there is 
need of other marks for discriminating substance from accident ; 
among which may be this, that although the substance may need 
some accident it often nevertheless does not need a determinate 
one but when this one is taken away is content with the substitu- 
tion of another; the accident, however, not only needs some sub- 
stance in general but also that one of its own in which it is once 
present, so that it may not change it. Nevertheless there remain 
other things to be said elsewhere concerning the nature of sub- 
stance, of greater moment and of more profound discussion. 

On Article 52. I confess that there is one principle of sub- 
stance and one attribute of it, expressing its essence ; but I do not 
know whether it can be explained in words, and those few, so that 
if you understand an individual substance, other kinds of sub- 
stances may be explained by definitions. But that extension con- 
stitutes the common nature of corporeal substance I see asserted by 
many with great confidence, never proved. Certainly neither 
motion nor action nor resistance nor passivity is thence derived; 
nor do the laws of nature which are observed in the motion and con- 
junction of bodies come from the mere notion of extension, as I 
have elsewhere shown. And indeed the notion of extension is not 
primitive but resolvable. Tor it is required in extension that there 
be a whole continuum, in which many things exist at once. And, 
to speak farther, to extension indeed, the notion of which is rela- 



58 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

tive, something is required which is extended or continued, as in 
milk whiteness, in body that itself which makes its essence : the 
repetition of this (whatever it may be) is extension. And I cer- 
tainly agree with Huygens (whose opinion in natural philosophy 
and mathematics is of great weight with me) that the conception 
of a vacant space and of mere extension is the same; nor in my 
opinion can mobility itself or avrnwiria be understood of mere 
extension but of the subject of extension, by which place is not only 
constituted but also filled. 

Oisr Article 54. I do not remember that as yet it has been per- 
fectly demonstrated either by our author or by his partisans that 
thinking substance is devoid of extension or extended substance of 
thought, so that thence it is evident that the one attribute is not 
required for the other in the same subject nor indeed can consist 
with it. ISTor is this surprising ; for the author of the book, Search 
After Truth (in which some excellent things are said), correctly 
remarks that no distinct notion of thought is offered by the Carte- 
sians, and thus it is not strange if what is involved in it is not clear 
to them. 

On Articles 60, 61. To deny a real distinction between modes 
is not a necessary change of the received use of words. For hitherto 
it has been held that modes exist between things, and they have 
been seen to really differ, as a spherical wax figure from a square 
one ; certainly there is a true change from one figure to the other, 
and thus it has a real foundation. 

On Article 63. To conceive thought and extension as the 
thinking substance itself or the extended substance itself seems to 
me neither right nor possible. This device is suspicious and like 
that by which doubtful things were commanded to be considered 
false. Minds are prepared by these distortions of things for perti- 
nacity and for false reasonings. 

On Articles 65 to 68. Descartes performed a useful service 
after the ancients in eradicating that prejudice by which we regard 
heat, color and other phenomena as something outside of us ; when 
it is evident that what seemed very hot is soon felt by the same 
hand to be tepid ; and he who observes a green color in a pulver- 
ized mixture, his eye being presently assisted, no longer perceives a 



OX DESCARTES' "PRINCIPLES." 59 

green color but a mixture of yellow and blue, and, with a better 
equipment or other experiences or reasons, the causes of these two 
may be perceived ; from which it appears that no such thing exists 
outside of us, the phantasm of which hovers before our imagination. 
We are ordinarily like boys who are persuaded that a golden pot is 
to be found at the very end of the rainbow where it touches the 
earth, which in vain they try to find by running. 

On Articles 71 to 74. On the causes of errors we have said 
something above, on Arts. 31 and 35. From these also the reason 
for the present ones may be given. For the prejudices of infancy 
have to do with unproved assertions. Fatigue, moreover, lessens 
attention; and ambiguity of words belongs to the abuse of signs 
and makes an error in form; and thus it is as if (as the German 
proverb says) X were put in place of V in a calculation, or as if a 
quack doctor in a prescribed formula should select sandarach 
instead of dragon's blood. 

On Article 75. It seems to me fair that we should give 
to the ancients each one his due; not by a silence, malignant and 
injurious to ourselves, conceal their merits. Those things which 
Aristotle prescribed in his Logic, although not sufficient for discov- 
ery, are nevertheless almost sufficient for judging; at least where 
he treats of necessary consequences ; and it is important that the 
conclusions of the human mind be established as if by certain 
mathematical rules. And it has been noted by me that those who 
admit false reasonings in serious things oftener sin in logical form 
than is commonly believed. Thus in order to avoid all errors there 
is need of nothing else than to use the most common rules of logic 
with great constancy and severity. But since the complication of 
things often does not admit of this pedantry, we hence furnish, in 
the sciences and in things to be done, certain special logical forms, 
which ought to be demonstrated beforehand by those general rules ; 
the nature of each subject being taken into account ; just as Euclid 
had a certain logic of his own concerning conversions, compositions, 
divisions of reasons, established first in the special book on ele- 
ments, and afterwards ruling in the whole geometry. And thus 
brevity and certainty are at once regarded ; and the more there are 
of these, the more there is of science and of whatever there is that 



60 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

is refined. Those things are to be added which we have noted on 
Articles 43 et seq., concerning reasonings which are said to be 
made in form and which extend farther than is commonly believed. 

Ox Pajrt II. 

Ox Article 1. The argument by which Descartes seeks to 
demonstrate that material things exist is weak: it were better 
therefore not to try. The gist of the argument is this : The reason 
why we believe in material things is external to us, and hence 
either from God or from another or from things themselves ; not 
from God, if no things exist, for he would be a deceiver ; not from 
another, this he has forgotten to prove ; therefore from themselves, 
therefore they themselves exist. It might be replied, that a sensa- 
tion may be from an other than God, who as he permits all other 
evils for certain weighty reasons so may permit this deceiving of us 
without having the character of a deceiver, especially as it is joined 
with no injury, since it would rather be unpleasant to us not to be 
deceived. Besides the deception therein, which the argument con- 
ceals, is that it may be that the perceptions are from God or from 
another but that the judgment (concerning the cause of the sen- 
sation, whether it be from a real object outside of us), and hence 
the deception, comes from ourselves. .Just as happens also when 
colors and other things of this sort are considered as real objects. 
Besides souls might have merited by previous sins' that they lead 
this life full of deception where they snatch at shadows for things ; 
to which the Platonists do not seem to be averse, to whom this life 
seemed as a sleep in the cave of AEorpheus. the mind being 
demented by Lethean draughts before it came thither. 

Ox Aeticle 4. That body consists in extension alone. Descartes 
tries to demonstrate by an enumeration of the other attributes 
which he removes, but it ought to have been shown that the enumer- 
ation is sufficient; then not all are well removed, certainly those 
who admit atoms, that is bodies of greatest hardness, denied that 
hardness consists in this, namely, that the body does not yield to the 
motion of the hands, but rather in this, that it preserves its form. 
And those who place the essence of body in avnrv7ria, or impene- 
trabilitv. do not derive its notion from our hands or senses but from 



ox desgartes' "prixcipi/es." 61 

the fact that it does not give place to another homogeneous body 
unless it itself can go elsewhere. Just as if we imagine that against 
a cube there run six other cubes precisely similar to and resembling 
the first, so that each one of them with one of its sides accurately 
coincides with one side of the intercepting cube ; on this supposi- 
tion it would be impossible for either the intercepting cube itself 
or a part of it to be moved, whether it be understood as flexible or 
as rigid. But if that middle cube be held to be penetrable exten- 
sion or empty space then the six concurring cubes will oppose their 
angles to each other mutually ; if however they are flexible, noth- 
ing will prevent the middle parts of these from breaking into the 
intercepting cubical space. Whence also we understand what is 
the difference between hardness, which belongs to certain bodies, 
and impenetrability, which belongs to all; which latter Descartes 
ought to have remembered not less than hardness. 

Ox Articles 5, 6, 1. Descartes has excellently explained that 
rarefaction and condensation such as we perceive by the senses may • 
take place although neither interspersed vacuum nor a change of 
dimensions of the same part of matter be admitted. 

Ox Articles 8 to 19. ISTot a few of those who defend a vacuum 
consider space as a substance, nor can they be refuted by the Car- 
tesian arguments ; other principles are needed to end this dispute. 
They will admit that quantity and number do not exist outside of 
the things to which they are attributed, but they will deny that 
space or place is quantity of body, and they will rather believe that 
it has quantity or capacity and that body is equal to it in content. 
Descartes had to show that internal space or place does not differ 
from the substance of body. Those who are contrary minded will 
defend themselves by the common notion of mortals who think 
that body succeeding body passes over the same space and the same 
place which has been deserted by a previous body ; but this cannot 
be said if space coincides with the substance itself of body. 
Although to have a certain situation or to be in a given place 
is an accident of body they will nevertheless no more admit 
that place itself is an accident of body than that, as contact is 
an accident, so also what is touched is an accident. And indeed 
Descartes seems to me not so much to bring forward good reasons 



(52 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

for his own opinion as to reply to opposing arguments ; which in 
this place he does not unskillfully. And he often employs this 
artifice in place of demonstration. But we expected something- 
more and if I am not mistaken we were commanded to expect more. 
To nothing, it must be confessed, there is no extension, and this 
may be rightly hurled against those who make space an imaginary 
something. But those to whom space is a substance are not affected 
by this argument ; they would indeed be affected if Descartes had 
shown above, what he here assumes, that every extended substance 
is body. 

Ox Article 20. The author does not seem satisfactorily to 
oppose atoms. Their defenders concede that they may be divided 
as well in thought as by divine power. But whether bodies which 
have a firmness inseparable by the forces of nature (which is the 
true notion of atom among them) can exist naturally, is a question 
which Descartes (what I wonder at) does not even touch upon in 
this place, and nevertheless he here declares that atoms have been 
overthrown by him, and he assumes it in the whole course of his 
work. We shall have more to say on atoms on Article 51. 

Ox Articles 21, 22, 23. That the world has no limits of exten- 
sion and thus can only be one, then that all matter everywhere is 
homogeneous and is not distinguished except by motions and 
figures, are opinions which are here built upon the proposition, 
which is neither admitted by all nor demonstrated by the author, 
that extension and body are the same thing. 

Ox Article 25. If motion is nothing but change of contact or 
immediate vicinity, it follows that it can never be determined 
which thing is moved. For as in astronomy the same phenomena 
are presented in different hypotheses, so it is always permissible to 
ascribe real motion to either one or other of those bodies which 
change among themselves vicinity or situation ; so that one of 
these bodies being arbitrarily chosen as if at rest or, for a given 
reason moving in a given line, it may be geometrically determined 
what motion or rest must be ascribed to the others so that the 
given phenomena may appear. Hence if there is nothing in 
motion but this respective change, it follows that no reason is 
given in nature why motion must be ascribed to one thing rather 



ON DESCARTES' ."PRINCIPLES." 63 

than to others. The consequence of this will be that there is no 

real motion. Therefore in order that a thing can be said to be 

moved, we require not only that it change its situation in respect 

to others, but also that the cause of change, the force or action, be 

in it itself. . 

[The remarks on the rest of the book, excepting those on Articles 45 and 64, 
are omitted here as being of little philosophical interest. They treat princi- 
pally of Descartes' opinions as to the laws of motion.] 

On Article 45. Before I undertake to examine the special 
laws of motion laid down by our author, I will give a general crite- 
rion, or Lydian stone as it were, by which they may be examined, 
which I am accustomed to call the law of continuity. I have 
recently explained it elsewhere, but it must be repeated here and 
amplified. Certainly when two hypotheses or two different data 
continually by turns approach until at length one of them ends in 
the other, it must be also that the quaesita aid eventa of both by 
turns continually approach one another, and finally, that one van- 
ishes in the other, and vice versa. Thus it is with ellipses one 
focus of which remains unmoved, if the other focus recedes 
from it more and more, then the new ellipses which are thus 
produced will continually approach a parabola and finally wholly 
vanish in it, since indeed the distance of the receding focus will 
have become immeasurable. Whence both the properties of such 
ellipses will approach more and more to the properties of a para- 
bola so far even that they finally vanish in them, and also* a 
parabola may be considered as an ellipse one focus of which is 
infinitely distant, and hence all the properties of ellipses may be 
also verified of a parabola as if of such an ellipse. And indeed 
geometry is full of examples of this kind ; but nature, the most wise 
Author of which employes the most perfect geometry, observes the 
same, otherwise no ordered progress would be preserved in it. 
Thus motion gradually decreasing finally vanishes into rest, and 
inequality continually diminished ends in true equality, so that rest 
may be regarded as infinitely slight motion or as infinite slowness, 
and equality as infinitely slight inequality; and for this reason 
whatever may be demonstrated either of motion in general or of 
inequality in general must also according to this interpretation be 



64 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

verified of rest or of equality, so. that the law of rest or of equality 
may in a certain way be conceived as a special case of the law of 
motion or of inequality. But if this does not follow, it must be 
considered as certain that the rules are awkward and badly 
conceived. 

Ox Article 64. The author closes the Second and General 
Part concerning the principles of material things with a certain 
admonition which seems to me to need restriction. He says truly 
that in order to explain the phenomena of nature there is no need 
of other principles than those found in abstract mathematics or in 
the theory of magnitude, figure and motion. !Nor does he recog- 
nize any other matter than that which is the subject of geometry. 
I indeed fully assent that all the special phenomena of nature can 
be explained mechanically if they are sufficiently examined by us, 
nor can the causes of material things be understood in any other 
way. But I think also that this ought to be repeatedly considered, 
that the very mechanical principles and hence the general laws 
of nature are derived from higher principles, nor can they be 
explained by the mere consideration of quantity and of that which 
is geometrical, but that there is rather in them something metaphys- 
ical, independent of the notions which the imagination presents 
and which must be referred to a substance destitute of extension. 
For in addition to extension and its variations there is in matter 
force itself or power of acting which forms a transition from meta- 
physics to nature, from material things to immaterial. This force 
has its own laws, derived from principles not of mere absolute, and, 
so to speak, brute necessity, as in mathematics, but of perfect 
reason. But these being embraced together in a general discussion, 
afterwards when a reason is given for the phenomena of nature, 
all can be explained mechanically, and as vainly as fundamental 
(archaei) perceptions and desires, and operating ideas, and forms 
of substances, and souls also are then employed, so vainly would we 
call in the universal cause of all, as a Deus ex machina, to explain 
each natural thing by his simple will, which I remember the author 
of Philosophia Mosaica does, the words of Sacred Scripture being 
badly understood. He who will consider this properly will hold a 
middle position in philosophy and will satisfy theology no less than 



ow descartes' "principles." 65 

physics, and he will understand that it was not so much a sin of 
the schoolmen to hold the doctrine of intelligible forms as to 
apply it as they did, at the time when the inquiry was rather of 
the modifications and instruments of substance and its manner of 
acting, that is, its mechanism. ISTature has as it were an empire 
within an empire, and so to say a double kingdom, of reason and of 
necessity, or of forms and of particles of matter; for just as all 
things are full of souls, so also they are full of organized bodies. 
These realms, without confusion between them, are governed each 
by its own law, nor is the reason of perception and of desire to be 
sought in the modifications of extension, any more than the reason 
of nutrition and of other organic functions is to be sought in forms 
or souls. But the highest substance, which is the universal 
cause of all, brings it about by his infinite wisdom and power that 
these two very different series are referred to the same corporeal 
substance and perfectly harmonize between themselves just as if one 
was controlled by the influence of the other; and if you observe 
the necessity of matter and the order of efficient powers, you 
observe that nothing happens without a cause satisfying the imag- 
ination and except on account of the mathematical laws of mechan- 
ism ; or if you regard the circle of ends as a golden chain and of 
forms as an intelligible world, the apexes of ethics and of meta- 
physics being joined in one on account of the perfection of the 
supreme author, you notice that nothing can be done without the 
highest reason. For God and eminent form and first efficient are 
the same, and he is the end or final reason of things. Moreover 
it is our part to reverence his footprints in things, and not only 
to admire his instruments in operating and the mechanical cause 
of material things, but also the higher uses of admirable inge- 
nuity, and as we recognize God as the architect of bodies so also 
to recognize him especially as the king of minds and his intelli- 
gence as ruling all things for the best, which constitutes the most 
perfect Republic of the Universe under the most powerful and 
wisest of Monarchs. Thus in the particular phenomena of nature 
and in the connection of each consideration, we shall consult 
equally utility of life and perfection of mind, and wisdom no less 
than piety. 



VIII. 

OlS THE ISTOTIOWS OF PiIG-HT A2S3J -JUSTICE. 1693. 
[From, the Latin.] 

I do not know -whether, even after so many eminent writers 
have discussed them, the notions of right and of justice have been 
sufficiently cleared up. Bight is a certain moral power, and obliga- 
tion a moral necessity. Moreover, I understand by moral that 
vrhich among good men is equivalent to natural: for. as a cele- 
brated Roman jurisconsult says, things vrhich are contrary to 
good morals must be regarded as things which cannot be done. 
A good man moreover is one who loves all as much as reason allows. 
■Justice, therefore, which virtue, is the mistress of the affection 
which the Greeks call fyCkavOpanria . we will define most properly, 
unless I am mistaken, as the charity of the wise man [caritatem 
sapientis], that is. charity according to the dictates of wisdom. 
Therefore, what Cameades is reported to have said, namely, that 
justice is the highest folly, because it commands us. neglecting our 
own interests, to care for the interests of others, comes from igno- 
rance of the definition. Charity is universal benevolence, and 
benevolence is the habit of loving. Moreover to love is to take 
delight in the happiness of another, or. what amounts to- the same 
thing, it is to account another's happiness one's own. TThence the 
difficult knot, which is also of great moment in theology, is untied, 
how there can be a disinterested love, vrhich is free from hope and 
from fear, and from regard for personal advantage : it is evident 
that the joy of those whose joy enters into our own delights its. 
for those things which delight are sought after for their own sake. 
And just as the contemplation of beautiful objects is itself agree- 
able, and a. painting by Raphael affects him who understands it. 
even if it brings no riches, in such a way that it is kept bet : r :- 
his eyes and regarded with delight, as a symbol of love : so when 
the beautiful object is at the same time also capable of happiness. 
his affection passes over into true love. But the divine love sur- 
passes other loves because God can be loved with the greatest 



ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE. 67 

success, since nothing is at once happier than God, and nothing 
more beautiful and more worthy of happiness can be known than 
he. And since he also possesses the highest power and wisdom, 
his happiness does not only enter into ours (if we are wise, that 
is love him) but it also constitutes it. Since, moreover, wisdom 
ought to direct charity, there will be need of denning it also. I 
think, however, that the notions of men are best satisfied if we 
say that wisdom is nothing else than the science itself of happi- 
ness. Thus we are brought back again to the notion of happiness, 
to explain which this is not the place. 

From this source flows natural right, of which there are three 
grades; strict right in commutative justice, equity (or charity in 
the narrow sense of the word) in distributive justice, finally piety 
(or probity) in universal justice: whence spring the rules, to 
injure no one, to concede to each his own, to live honorably (or 
rather piously), as well as the most general and commonly recog- 
nized precepts of right, just as I formerly outlined it in my youth- 
ful essay, De Methodo Juris. 

The law of bare or strict right is, No one is to be injured, so 
that in the state no cause for action be given him, out of the state 
no right of war ; whence comes the justice which philosophers call 
commutative and the right which Grotius calls power [facultas]. 
The higher grade I call equity, or, if you prefer, charity (namely, 
in the narrower sense), which I extend beyond the rigor of bare 
right to those obligations also to the performance of which we may 
not be forced; such as gratitude, almsgiving, to which we have, 
according to Grotius, an aptitude [aptitudo, moral claim], not a 
power. 

And just as it belonged to the lowest grade to injure no 
one, so to the middle grade it belongs, To do good to all; but so far 
only as is fitting to each or so far as each deserves, so that it is 
not allowable to favor all equally. Thus this is the sphere of 
distributive justice, and the law of right here is that which com- 
mands us to give to each his due [suum cuique tribui]. And to 
this the political laws in the commonwealth extend which secure 
the happiness of the subjects, and along with this bring it about 
that those who had only aptitude acquire power, that is, that they 



68 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

are able to demand what is fair that others perform. And while 
in the lowest grade of right the differences among men were not 
regarded, except those which arise from the particular affair 
itself, but all men are held as equals, now, however, in this higher 
grade, deserts are weighed; whence privileges, rewards, punish- 
ments have their place. This difference in the grade of right 
Xenophon has excellently sketched, with the boy Cyrus as example, 
who, chosen as judge between two boys, the stronger of whom had 
exchanged coats with the other by force, because he had found 
the coat of the other more fitting to his figure, and his own coat 
to the figure of the other, had pronounced in favor of the robber : 
but it was pointed out by his teacher that the question here was 
not as to which the coat might fit, but to which it belonged, and 
that this form of giving judgment could only then be employed 
rightly, when he himself had coats to be distributed. For equity 
itself commends to us strict right in affairs, that is, equality 
among men, except when a weighty reason of greater good com- 
mands us to recede from it. Moreover, what is called respect of 
persons has its place not in exchanging goods with others, but in 
distributing our own or the public goods. 

The highest degree of right I have called by the name of probity 
or rather piety. For what has been hitherto said can be so under- 
stood as to be confined within the consideration of mortal life. 
And, moreover, bare or strict right springs from the principle of 
preserving peace; equity or charity extends to something more; 
so that while each one benefits the other as much as he can, he 
increases his own happiness in that of the other; and, in a word, 
strict right avoids misery, the highest right tends to happiness, but 
happiness such as belongs to mortality. But that we ought to 
place life itself and whatever makes this life desirable, after 
another's great good ; that, moreover, the greatest griefs ought to 
be endured for the sake of others ; this is more beautifully taught 
by philosophers than solidly demonstrated. For the honor and 
glory and joyous feeling in the virtue of one's own soul, to which, 
under the name of honor, they appeal, are goods of thought or of 
the mind, and, moreover, have great superiority, but not with all 
men and for all bitterness of evils, since all men are not equally 



ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE. 69 

affected by the imagination ; especially those whom neither a liberal 
education nor a free-born mode of living or the discipline of life 
or of rank has surely accustomed to the estimation of honor and to 
the appreciation of the goods of the soul. But that it may be set- 
tled by a general demonstration that all that is worthy is useful, 
and all that is base is injurious, the immortality of the soul, and 
the director of all, God, must be assumed. Thus it is that we 
know that we all live in the most perfect state under a monarch 
who on account of his wisdom cannot be deceived and on account 
of his power cannot be eluded; and he too is so lovable that to 
serve such a master is happiness. Therefore, he who spends his 
soul for this master, as Christ teaches, wins it. By his power and 
providence it comes to pass that all right passes over into fact, 
that no one is injured except by himself, that nothing done rightly 
is without its reward, no sin without punishment. Since, as Christ 
has divinely taught, all our hairs are numbered, and even a cup 
of water is not given in vain to one thirsting, so nothing is 
neglected in the Commonwealth of the Universe. It is on this 
account that justice is called universal and includes all other 
virtues ; for that also which otherwise does not concern the interest 
of another, namely, that we do not misuse our body or our means, 
this is also forbidden outside of human laws, by natural right, 
i. e., by the eternal laws of the divine monarchy, since we are 
indebted to God for ourselves and for what we have. For as it 
is to the interest of the State so it is much more to that of the 
Universe that no one make a bad use of his own. Here, therefore, 
that highest law of right receives its force, which commands us to 
live honorably (i. e., piously). And in this sense it is rightly 
put by learned men among the things to be demanded, that the 
natural law and the law of nations be taught according to the 
doctrines of Christianity, that is (from the example of Christ) 
ra av(OTepa } the sublime things, the divine things of the wise. Thus 
we seem to ourselves to have explained most fitly the three precepts 
of right, or three degrees of justice, and to have pointed out the 
sources of natural law. 



IX. 

Leibnitz's Reply to the Extbact ebo\e the Lettee oe aL 

ForcHEB; Caxox oe Dijox, published ix the "Joeexal" of 

March 16. 1693. 

[From the French.] 

Oxe ought to be very glad. sir. that you give a reasonable mean- 
ing to the doubt of the Academics. It is the best apology that 
you could make for them. I shall be charmed to see sometime 
their views digested and made clear by your pains. But you will 
be obliged from time to time to lend them some ray of your light, 
as you hare begun to do. 

It is true that I wrote two little discourses, twenty years ago, 
one on the theory of abstract motion, wherein I considered it as 
outside of the system, as if it were a thing purely mathematical : 
the other on the hypothesis of concrete and systematic motion, such 
as really is met with in nature. There may be some good in them 
since you with others judge so. However there are many points 
on which I believe that I am better instructed at present, and 
among others I explain to-day indivisibles in an entirely different 
way. That was the attempt of a young man who had not yet 
fathomed mathematics. The laws of abstract motion which I gave 
at that time would really hold good if there was nothing else in 
body but what is conceived there according to Descartes and even 
according to Gassendi. But as I have found that nature treats 
body quite differently as regards motion it is one of my arguments 
against the received notion of the nature of body, as I have indi- 
cated in the Journal, des Savants of June 2. 1692. 

As regards indivisibles, when by that word is understood simple 
extremities of time or of line, new extremities could not be 
conceived in them, nor actual nor potential parts. Thus points 
are neither large nor small, and there needs no leap to pass them. 
However, although there are such indivisibles everywhere, the con- 
tinuum is not composed of them, as the objections of the sceptics 
appear to suppose. In my opinion these objections have nothing 



REPLY TO FOTTCHER. Tl 

insurmountable about them, as will be found by reducing them to 
form. Gregory of St. Vincent has well shown by the calculations 
even of divisibility ad infinitum, the place where Achilles ought 
to overtake the tortoise which precedes him, according to the pro- 
portion of velocities. Thus geometry serves to dissipate these 
apparent difficulties. - 

I am so much in favor of the actual infinite that instead of 
admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it 
affects it everywhere in order better to mark the perfections of its 
author. So I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, 
I do not say divisible, but actually divided ; and consequently the 
least particle must be regarded as a world full of an infinity of i 
different creatures. 



X. 

ExTBACT FROM A LETTEB TO THE ABBE XlCAISE OX THE PHILOS- 
OPHY oe Descaetes. 17£3. 
[From the French.] 

I hoxoe exceedingly the Bishop d'Avranches, and I beg you, 
sir, to give hirti Ely respects when occasion offers. One of niy 
friends in Bremen having sent me the hook of Herr Swelling, pro- 
fessor there, against the censure of that illustrious prelate, in order 
to have my opinion of it. I replied that the best answer that the 
Cartesians could make would be to profit by the advice of 
d'Avranches ; to emancipate themselves from the spirit of sect, 
always contrary to the advancement of the sciences ; to unite to 
the reading of the excellent works of Descartes that of some other 
great men, ancient and modem ; not to despise antiquity, whence 
Descartes has taken a good part of his best thoughts; to give 
themselves to experiments and to demonstrations in place of those 
general reasonings which serve but to support idleness and to cover 
up ignorance; to try to make some advance and not to content 
themselves with being simple paraphrasers of their master ; and not 
to neglect or despise anatomy, history, the languages, criticism, for 
want of knowing their importance and value ; not to imagine that 
we know all that is necessary or all we may hope to ; finally, to be 
modest and studious, in order not to draw upon themselves this apt 
saying: Ignorantia inflat. I shall add that I do not know how or 
by what star, the influence of which is the enemy of every sort of 
secret, the Cartesians have done almost nothing that is new, and 
that almost all the discoveries have been made by persons not of 
the sect. I know but the little pipes of M. Rohault ; which do not 
deserve the name of a Cartesian discovery. It seems that those 
who attach themselves to a single master abase themselves by this 
kind of slavery and conceive almost nothing except in imitation of 
him. I am sure that if Descartes had lived longer he would have 
given us many important things. This shows us either that it was 
rather his genius than his method, or else that he has not published 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. 73 

his method. In fact I remember having read in one of his letters 
that he intended simply to write a discourse on his method, and to 
give some examples of it ; but that he had no intention of publish- 
ing it. Thus the Cartesians who think that they have the method 
of their master deceive themselves very much. Nevertheless, I 
imagine that this method was not so perfect as we are made to 
believe. I think so from his geometry. This is, without doubt, 
his strong point; nevertheless we know to-day that it is very far 
from going as far as it ought to go and as he said it went. The 
most important problems need a new sort of analysis entirely 
different from his, examples of which I myself have given. It 
seems to me that Descartes did not sufficiently penetrate the 
important truths of Kepler on astronomy which the course of time 
has verified. His "Man' is very different from the true man, as 
M. Stenon and others have shown it to be. The knowledge he had 
of salts and chemistry was very meagre; this is the reason that 
what he says thereon, as well as on minerals, is mediocre. The 
metaphysics of this author, although it has some fine traits, is 
intermingled with great paralogisms, and has some very weak pas- 
sages. I have discovered the source of his errors as to the laws of 
motion, and although I esteem very highly his physics it is not 
because I regard it as true, except in some particular things, but 
because I consider it as an admirable model and as an example of 
what could and ought now to be produced on principles more solid 
than experiments have thus far furnished us with. In a ward, I 
esteem Descartes very highly, but very often it is not permitted me 
to follow him. I have in the past made remarks on the first and 
second parts of his "Principles." These parts comprise, in 
epitome, his general philosophy, in which I have most often been 
obliged to separate myself from him. The following parts come to 
the detail of nature, which is not yet so easily explained. This is 
why I have not yet touched them. But I do not know how I have 
been insensibly led to entertain you so long on this subject. 



XI. 

On the Refobm of Metaphysics and ok the Motion of 
Substance. 1694. 

[From the Latin.] 

I see that most of those who devote themselves with pleasure to 
the study of mathematics entertain a dislike for that of meta- 
physics because in the former they find clearness and in the latter 
obscurity. I think that the principal reason of this is that general 
notions, which are believed to be perfectly known by all, have 
become ambiguous and obscure by the negligence of men and by 
the inconsistency of their thoughts, and that what are ordinarily 
given as definitions are not even nominal definitions, because they 

( explain absolutely nothing. And it is not to be wondered at that 
this evil has spread into the other sciences, which are subordinate 
to this first and architectonic science. Thus we have subtile dis- 
tinctions in place of clear definitions, and in place of truly 
universal axioms we have general rules which are more often bro- 
ken by exceptions than supported by examples. And yet men by 

. a sort of necessity frequently make use of metaphysical terms, and 
flatter themselves that they understand what they have learned to 
say. And it is manifest that the true and fruitful meanings not 
only of substance but also of cause, of action, of relation, of simi- 
larity and most other general terms, lie for the most part hidden. 
Whence it is not surprising that this queen of the sciences, which 
is called first philosophy and which Aristotle defined as the science 
desired or to be sought for (^nrovfievj]), remains to-day in the num- 

Vber of the sciences sought. Plato, it is true, often in his Dialogues 
inquires into the value of notions ; Aristotle does the same in his 
books entitled Metaphysics; nevertheless, without much apparent 
profit. The later Platonists fall into monstrosities of language, and 
the disciples of Aristotle, especially the Scholastics, were more 
fdesirous of raising questions than of answering them. In our day 
some illustrious men have also devoted themselves to the first 
philosophy, but up to the present time without much success. It 



ON" METAPHYSICS AND THE NOTION" OF SUBSTANCE. 



75 



cannot be denied that Descartes brought to it many excellent 
things ; that he has above all the merit of having renewed Platonic 
study by turning the mind away from the things of sense and of 
having afterward employed usefully, academic scepticism. But 
soon, by a sort of inconsistency or of impatience to affirm, he was 
led astray, no longer distinguished the certain from the uncertain, 
and made the nature of corporeal substance incorrectly consist / 
in extension, and held false notions of the union of the soul j 
and the body ; the cause of all of which was that the nature of,, 
substance in general was not understood. For he had proceeded at 
a bound, as it were, to the solution of the gravest questions, without 
having explained the notions which they implied. Hence, nothing 
shows more clearly how far his metaphysical meditations are 
removed from certainty than the writing in which, at the prayer of 
Mersenne and others, he vainly tried to clothe them with a mathe- 
matical garb. I see also that other men gifted with rare penetra- 
tion have broached metaphysics and treated some parts of it with 
(profoundness, but enveloping them with so much obscurity that 
they appear to surmise rather than to prove. But 'metaphysics, it 
seems to me, has more need of clearness and certainty than even 
the mathematics, because the latter carry with them their proofs 
and corroborations, which is the principal cause of their success ; 
whereas in metaphysics we are deprived of this advantage. There- 
fore a certain particular plan is necessary in exposition which, like 
the thread in the Labyrinth, serves us, no less than the method of 
Euclid, for solving our problems as it were by reckoning; pre- 
serving,' nevertheless, always the clearness which even in com- | 
mon conversation should not be sacrificed. 

How important these things are is apparent, especially from the 
notion of substance which I give, because it is so fruitful that from : 
it first truths, even those which concern God and souls and the 
nature of bodies, follow ; truths in part known but not sufficiently 
proved ; in part unknown up to this time but which would be of 
the greatest usefulness in the other sciences. To give 'a foretaste 
of them, it is sufficient for me to say that the idea of energy, 
called by the Germans hraft, and by the French la force, and 
for the explanation of which I have designed a special science of 



76 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

dynamics, adds much to the understanding of the notion of sub- 
stance. For active force differs from the bare power familiar to the 
schools, in that the active power or faculty of the scholastics is 
nothing else than the possibility ready to act, which has neverthe- 
less need, in order to pass into action, of an external excitation, 
and as it were of a stimulus. But active force includes a sort of act 
or eWeXe^em } which is midway between the faculty of acting and 
the action itself, and involves an effort, and thus of itself passes 
into operation; nor does it need aid other than the removal of 
impediments. This may be illustrated by the example of a heavy 
hanging body straining the rope which sustains it, or of a tense bow. 
For although gravity or elastic force may and must be explained 
mechanically from the motion of ether, nevertheless the final 
reason of motion in matter is the force impressed upon it at the 

V creation, a force inherent in every body, but which is variously 
limited and confined in nature by the very collision of bodies. I 
say, then, that this property of acting resides in every substance ; 
that always some sort of action is born of it; and that, conse- 
quently, corporeal substance, no less than spiritual, never ceases 
to act ; a truth which those who* place its essence in mere extension 
or even in inrpenetrability, and who have imagined that they con- 
ceived of body absolutely at rest, seem not to have sufficiently 
understood. It will appear also from our meditations that a 
created substance receives from another created substance, not the 
force itself of acting but only the limits and determination of an 

(_ already preexistent tendency or virtue of acting. I omit hero other 
considerations useful for the solution of the difficult problem con- 
cerning the mutual operation of substances. 



XII. 

A jSTew System of the Nature and of the Interaction of 
Substances, as well as of the union which exists between 
the Soul and the Body. 1695. 

[From the French.] 

1. I conceived this system many years ago and communicated it 
to some learned men, and in particular to one of the greatest theo- 
logians and philosophers of our time, who, having been informed 
of some of my opinions by a very distinguished person, had found 
them highly paradoxical. When, however, he had received my 
explanations, he withdrew his condemnation in the most generous 
and edifying manner ; and, having approved a part of my proposi- 
tions, he ceased censuring the others with which he was not yet in 
accord. Since that time I have continued my meditations as far as 
opportunity has permitted, in order to give to the public only 
thoroughly examined views, and I have also tried to answer the 
objections made against my essays in dynamics, which are related 
to the former. Finally, as a number of persons have desired to see 
my opinions more clearly explained, I have ventured to publish 
these meditations although they are not at all popular nor such as 
to be enjoyed by every sort of mind. I have been led to do this 
principally in order that I might profit by the judgments of those 
who are learned in these matters, inasmuch as it would be too 
inconvenient to seek and challenge separately those who would be 
disposed to give the instructions which I shall always be glad to 
receive, provided the love of truth appears in them rather than 
passion for opinions already held. 

2. Although I am one of those who have worked very hard at 
mathematics I have not since my youth ceased to meditate on phi- 
losophy, for it always seemed to me that there was a way to 
establish in it, by clear demonstrations, something stable. I had 
penetrated well into the territory of the scholastics when mathe- 
matics and modern authors induced me while yet young to with- 
draw from it. Their fine ways of explaining nature mechanically 



78 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

charmed me ; and, with reason, I scorned the method of those who 
employ only forms or faculties, by which nothing is learned. But 
afterwards, when I tried to search into the principles of mechanics 
to find proof of the laws of nature which experience made known, 
I perceived that the mere consideration of an extended mass did 
not suffice and that it was necessary to employ in addition the 
notion of force, which is very easily understood although it belongs 
to the province of metaphysics. It seemed to me also that the 
opinion of those who transform or degrade animals into simple 
machines, notwithstanding its seeming possibility, is contrary to 
appearances and even opposed to the order of things. 

3. In the beginning, when I had freed myself from the yoke of 
Aristotle, I occupied myself with the consideration of the void and 
atoms, for this is what best fills the imagination ; but after many 
meditations I j)erceived that it is impossible to find the principles 
of true unity in mere matter, or in that which is only passive, 
because there everything is but a collection or mass of parts ad 
infinitum. 2\Tow, multiplicity cannot have its reality except from 
real unities, which orginate otherwise and are entirely different 
things from the points of which it is certain the continuum could 
not be composed. Therefore, in order to find these real unities I 
was compelled to resort to a formal atom, since a material being 
could not be at the same time material and perfectly indivisible, or 
in other words, endowed with true unity. It became necessary, 
therefore, to recall aud, as it were, reinstate the substantial forms, 
so decried now-a-days, but in a way to render them intelligible, and 
distinguish the use which ought to be made of them from the 
abuse which had befallen them. I found then that their nature is 
force and that from this something analogous to sensation and 
desire results, and that therefore it was necessary to conceive them 
similarly to the idea which we have of soids. But as the soul 
ought not to be employed to explain the details of the economy of 
the animal body, likewise I judged that it was not necessary to 
employ these forms to explain particular problems in nature 
although they are necessary in order to establish true general prin- 
ciples. Aristotle calls them the first entelecliies. I call them, 
perhaps more intelligibly, primitive forces which contain in them- 



NEW SYSTEM. 79 

selves not only actuality [facte] or complement of possibility, but 
also an original activity. 

4. I saw that these forms and these souls ought to be indivisible, 
just as much as our mind, as in truth I remembered was the 
opinion of St. Thomas in regard to the souls of brutes. But this 
innovation renewed the great difficulties in respect to the origin 
and duration of souls and of forms. For as every simple substance 
which has true unity cannot begin or end except by miracle, it fol- 
lows, that it cannot begin except by creation, nor end except 
by annihilation. Therefore, with the exception of the souls 
which God might still be pleased to create expressly, I was obliged 
to recognize that the constitutive forms of substances must have 
been created with the world, and that they must exist always. Cer- 
tain scholastics, like Albertus Magnus and John Bacon, had also 
foreseen a part of the truth as to their origin. And the matter 
ought not to appear at all extraordinary for only the same duration 
which the Gassendists accord their atoms is given to these forms. 

5. I was of the opinion, nevertheless, that neither spirits nor the 
rational soul, which belong to a superior order and have incom- 
parably more perfection than these forms implanted in matter \. 
which in my opinion are found everywhere, ought to be mixed 
up indifferently or confounded with other forms or souls — being 
in comparison with them, like little gods made in the image of God 
and having within them some rays of the light of divinity. This is 
why God governs spirits as a prince governs his subjects, and even~~ 
as a father cares for his children; while he disposes of the other 
substances as an engineer manipulates his machines. Thus spirits 
have peculiar laws which place them above the changes which , 
matter undergoes, and indeed it may be said that all other things 
are made only for them, these changes even being arranged for the 
felicity of the good and the punishment of the bad. 

6. However, to return to ordinary forms or to animal souls 
[times brutes'] , the duration which must be attributed to them in 
place of that which had been attributed to atoms, might raise the 
question as to whether they pass from body to body, which would be 
metempsychosis — very like the belief of certain philosophers in the 
transmission of motion and of species. But this fancy is very far 



80 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

removed from the nature of things. There is no snch passage; 
and here it is that the transformations of Swammerdam, Malpighi 
and Leewenhoeck, who are the best observers of our time, have 
come to my aid and have made me admit more easily that the 
animal and every other organized substance does not at all begin 
when we think it does, and that its apparent generation is only a 
development and a sort of augmentation. I have noticed also that 
the author of the Search after Truth [i. e., Malebranche] , Rigis, 
Hartsoeker and other able men, have not been far removed from 
this opinion. 

7. But the most important question of all still remained : What 
do these souls or these forms become after the death of the animal 
or after the destruction of the individual of the organized sub- 
stance? It is this question which is most embarrassing, all the 
more so as it seems unreasonable that souls should remain uselessly 
in a chaos of confused matter. This obliged me finally to believe 
that there was only one reasonable opinion to hold, namely, that 
not only the soul but also the animal itself and its organic mechan- 
ism were preserved, although the destruction of its gross parts had 
rendered it so small as to escape our senses now just as much as it 
did before it was born. Thus there is no person who can accurately 
note the true time of death, which can be considered for a long 
time solely as a suspension of visible actions, and indeed is never 
anything else in mere animals ; witness the resuscitation of 
drowned flies after being buried under pulverized chalk, and other 
similar examples, which make it sufficiently clear that there would 
be many more resuscitations and of far more intricacy if men were 
in condition to set the mechanism going again. And apparently it 
was of something of this sort that the great Democritus, atomist as 
he was, spoke, although Pliny makes sport of the idea. It is then 
natural that the animal having, as people of great penetration 
begin to recognize, always been living and organized, should 
always remain so. And since, therefore, there is no first birth nor 
entirely new generation of the animal, it follows that there will be 
no final extinction nor complete death taken in its metaphysical 
rigor, and that in consequence instead of the transmigration of 
souls there is only transformation of one and the same animal, 



NEW SYSTEM. 



81 



according as its organs are folded differently and more or less 
developed. 

8. Nevertheless, rational souls follow very much higher laws 
and are exempt from all that could make them lose the quality of 
being citizens in the society of spirits, God having planned for 
them so well, that all the changes in matter cannot make them lose 
the moral qualities of their personality. And it can be said that 
everything tends to the perfection not only of the universe in gen- 
eral but also of these creatures in particular who are destined to 
such a measure of happiness that the universe finds itself inter- 
ested therein, by virtue of the divine goodness which communi- 
cates itself to each one, according as sovereign wisdom permits. 

9. As regards the ordinary body of animals and of other cor- 
poreal substances, the complete extinction of which has up to this 
time been believed in, and the changes of which depend rather 
upon mechanical rules than upon moral laws, I remarked with 
pleasure that the author of the book On Diet, which is attributed 
to Hippocrates, had foreseen something of the truth when he said 
in express terms that animals are not born and do not die, and 
that the things which are supposed to begin and to perish only 
appear and disappear. This was also the opinion of Parmenides 
and of Melissus, according to Aristotle, for these ancients were 
more profound than is thought. 

10.' I am the best disposed in the world to do justice to the 
moderns ; nevertheless I think they have carried reform too far, 
for instance, in confounding natural things with artificial, for the 
reason that they have not sufficiently high ideas of the majesty 
of nature. They conceive that the difference between its machines 
and ours is only that of large to small. This caused a very able 
man, author of Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, to say 
recently that in regarding nature close at hand it is found 
less admirable than had been believed, being only like the work- 
shop of an artisan. I believe that this does not give a worthy idea 
of it and that only our system can finally make men realize the true 
and immense distance which there is between the most trifling 
productions and mechanisms of the divine wisdom and the greatest 
masterpieces of the art of a finite mind, this difference consisting 
6 



82 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

not merely in degree but also in kind. It must then be known 
that the machines of nature have a truly infinite number of organs 
and that they are so well protected and so proof against all acci- 
dents that it is not possible to destroy them. A natural machine 
remains a machine even to its least parts and. what is more, it 
remains always the same machine it has been, being only trans- 
formed by the different folds it receives, and sometimes expanded, 
sometimes compressed and. as it were, concentrated, when believed 
to be lost. 

11. Farther, by means of the soul or of form there arises a true 
unity which answers to what vre call the I in us. that which could 
take place neither in the machines of art nor in the simple mass 
of matter however well organized it might be, which can only be 
considered as an army, or as a herd of cattle, or as a pond full of 
fish, or as a watch composed of springs and wheels. Xevertheless, 
if there were not real substantial unities there would be nothing 
substantial or real in the mass. It was this which forced Cordemoi 
to abandon Descartes, and to embrace Democritus" doctrine of the 
Atoms, in order to find a true unity. But atoms of matter are con- 
trary to reason, leaving out of account the proof that they are made 
up of parts, for the invincible attachment of one part to another 
(if such a thing could be conceived or with reason supposed) would 
not at all destroy their diversity. Only atoms of substance, i. e.. 
unities which are real and absolutely destitute of parts, are sources 
of actions and the absolute first principles of the composition of 
things, and. as it were, the last elements of the analysis of sub- 
stances. They might be called metaphysical points; they possess 
a certain vitality and a kind of perception, and mathematical 
points are their points of view to express the universe. But when 
corporeal substances are compressed all their organs together form 
only a physical point to our sight. Thus physical points are only 
indivisible in appearance : mathematical points are so in reality hut 
they are merely modalities : only metaphysical points or those of 
substance (constituted by forms or souls) are exact and real, and 
without them there would be nothing real, for without true unities 
there could not be multiplicity. 

12. After having established these propositions 1 thought myself 
entering into port, but when I came to meditate on the union of 



N"EW SYSTEM. 83 

the soul with the body I was as if cast back into the open sea. 
For I found no way of explaining how the body can cause anything 
to pass into' the soul, or vice versa; nor how one substance can 
communicate with another created substance. Descartes gave up 
the attempt on that point, as far as can be learned from his writ- 
ings, but his disciples seeing that the common view was inconceiv- 
able, were of the opinion that we perceive the qualities of bodies 
because God causes thoughts to arise in the soul on the occasion of 
movements of matter ; and when the soul wished to move the body 
in its turn they judged that it was God who moved it for the soul. 
And as the communication of motions again seemed to them incon- 
ceivable, they believed that God gave motion to a body on the 
occasion of the motion of another body. This is what they call the 
system of Occasional Causes, which has been much in vogue on 
account of the excellent remarks of the author of the Search after 
Truth. 

13. It must be confessed that the difficulty has been well gone 
into in telling us what cannot take place, but it does not appear 
that it is done away with by their explanation of what actually 
takes place. It is indeed true that there is no real influence of 
one created substance upon another, speaking in metaphysical 
strictness, and that all things with all their realities are continually 
produced by the power of God ; but in resolving problems it is not 
enough to employ a general cause and to call in what is called the 
Deus ex Machina. For when this is done and there is no other 
explanation which can be drawn from secondary causes, this is, 
properly, having recourse to miracle. In philosophy we should 
try to give reasons by explaining how things occur by divine wis- 
dom in conformity with the idea of the subject under considera- 
tion. 

14. Being then obliged to admit that it is not possible for the 
soul or any true substance to receive any influence from without, if 
it be not by the divine omnipotence, I was led insensibly to an 
opinion which surprised me but which appears inevitable and 
which has in truth great advantages and many beauties. It is this : 
it must then be said that God created the soul, or every other real 
unity, in the first place in such a way that everything with it comes 



84 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

into existence from its own proper nature [fonds] through perfect 
spontaneity as regards itself and in perfect harmony with objects 
outside itself. And that thus our internal feelings (i. e., those 
within the soul itself and not in the brain or finer parts of the 
body), being only phenomena consequent upon external objects or 
true appearances, and like well-ordered dreams, it is necessary that 
these internal perceptions within the soul itself come to it by its 
own proper original constitution, i. e., by the representative 
nature (capable of expressing beings outside itself by relation to 
its organs), which has been given it at its creation and which 
constitutes its individual character. This brings it about that 
each of these substances in its own way and according to a certain 
point of view, represents exactly the entire universe, and percep- 
tions or impressions of external things reach the soul at the proper 
time in virtue of its own laws, as if it were in a world apart, and 
as if there existed nothing but God and itself (to make use of 
the manner of speaking of a certain person of great elevation of 
mind, whose piety is well known) ; there is also perfect harmony 
among all these substances, producing the same effects as if they 
communicated with each other by a transmission of kinds or of 
qualities, as philosophers generally suppose. 

Farther, the organized mass, within which is the point of view 
of the soul, being expressed more nearly, finds itself reciprocally 
ready to act of itself, following the laws of the bodily mechanism, 
at the moment when the soul wills it, without either one troubling 
the laws of the other, the nerves and the blood having just at that 
time received the impulse which is necessary in order to make 
them respond to the passions and perceptions of the soul ; it is this 
mutual relationship, regulated beforehand in every substance of 
the universe, which produces what we call their inter-communica- 
tion and alone constitutes the union between the soul and body. 
And we may understand from this how the soul has its seat in the 
body by an immediate presence which could not be greater, for it 
is there as the unit is in the complex of units, which is the 
multitude. 

15. This hypothesis is very possible. For why might not God 
give to a substance in the beginning a nature or internal force which 



NEW SYSTEM. 85 

could produce in it in perfect order (as in a spiritual or formal 
automaton, hut free here since it has reason to its share), all that 
which will happen to it ; that is to say all the appearances or expres- 
sions it will have, and that without the aid of any creature ? All 
the more as the nature of the substance necessarily demands and 
essentially includes a progress or change, without which it would 
not have power to act. And this nature of the soul, being repre- 
sentative, in a very exact (although more or less distinct) manner, 
of the universe, the series of representations which the soul will 
produce for itself will naturally correspond to the series of changes 
in the universe itself; as, in turn, the body has also been accom- 
modated to the soul, for the encounters where it is conceived as 
acting outwardly. This is the more reasonable as bodies are only 
made for those spirits which are capable of entering into com- 
munion with God and of celebrating His glory-. Thus from the 
moment the possibility of this hypothesis of harmonies is perceived, 
we perceive also that it is the most reasonable and that it gives a 
marvellous idea of the harmony of the universe and of the perfec- 
tion of the works of God. 

16. This great advantage is also found in it, that instead of say- 
ing that we are free only in appearance and in a way practically 
sufficient, as many persons of ability have believed, it must 
rather be said that we are only enchained in appearance, and that 
according to the strictness of metaphysical expressions we are in a 
state of perfect independence as respects the influence of all other 
creatures. This again places in a marvellous light the immortality 
of the soul and the always uniform preservation of our individ- 
uality, regulated perfectly by its own nature beyond the risk of all 
accidents from without, whatever appearance there may be to the 
contrary. Never has a system so clearly proved our high standing. 
Every spirit, being like a separate world sufficient to itself, inde- 
pendent of every other creature, involving the infinite, expressing 
the universe, is as durable, as stable and as absolute as the universe 
of creatures itself. Therefore we ought always to appear in it in 
the way best fitted to contribute to the perfection of the society of 
all spirits, which makes their moral union in the city of God. 
Here is found also a new proof of the existence of God, which is 
one of surprising clearness. For this perfect harmony of so many 



86 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

substances which have no communication with each other, can only 
come from a common cause. 

17. Besides all these advantages which render this system com- 
mendable, it can also be said that this is more than an hypothesis, 
since it hardly seems possible to explain the facts in any other 
intelligible manner, and since several great difficulties which have 
exercised the mind up to this time, seem to disappear of them- 
selves as soon as this system is well understood. The customary 
ways of speaking can still be retained. For we can say that the 
substance, the disposition of which explains the changes in others 
in an intelligible manner (in this respect, that it may be supposed 
that the others have been in this point adapted to it since the 
beginning, according to the order of the decrees of God), is the one 
which must be conceived of as acting upon the others. Also the 
action of one substance upon another is not the emission or trans- 
fer of an entity as is commonly believed, and cannot be understood 
reasonably except in the way I have just mentioned. It is true 
that we can easily conceive in matter both emissions and receptions 
of parts, by means of which we are right in explaining mechani- 
cally all the phenomena of physics ; but as the material mass is not 
a substance it is apparent that action as regards substance itself can 
only be what I have just said. 

18. These considerations, however metaphysical they may 
appear, have yet a marvellous use in physics in establishing the 
laws of motion, as our Dynamics can make clear. Tor it can be said 
that in the collision of bodies, each one suffers only by reason of its 
own elasticity, because of the motion which is already in it. And 
as to absolute motion, it can in no way be determined mathematic- 
ally, since everything terminates in relations ; therefore there is 
always a perfect equality of hypotheses, as in astronomy, so that 
whatever number of bodies may be taken it is arbitrary to assign 
repose or a certain degree of velocity to any one that may be 
chosen, without being refuted by the phenomena of straight, circu- 
lar and composite motion. Nevertheless it is reasonable to attrib- 
ute to bodies real movements, according to the supposition which 
explains phenomena in the most intelligible manner, since this 
description is in conformity to the idea of action which I have 
just established. 



XIII. 

The Reply of M. Foucher to Leibnitz concerning his JSTew 

System oe the Interaction oe Substances. 1695. 

[From the French.] 

Although your system is not new to me, sir, and "although I 
made known to you, in part, my opinion in replying to a letter 
which you wrote me on this subject more than ten years ago, still I 
will not fail to tell you again what I think of it, since you ask me 
anew. 

The first part aims only to make known in all substances the 
unities which constitute their reality and distinguish them from 
others, and form, to speak after the manner of the school, their 
individuation j this is what you remark first on the subject of 
matter or extension. I agree with you that it is right to inquire 
after the unities ivhich form the composition and the reality of 
extension, for without this, as you very justly remark, an always 
divisible extension is only a chimerical compound, the principles of 
ivhich do not exist since without unities no true multitude is possi- 
ble. Nevertheless, I wonder that people are indifferent on this 
subject, for the essential principles of extension cannot exist really. 
In truth, points without parts cannot be in the universe, and two 
points joined together form no extension ; it is impossible that any 
length can exist without breadth, or any surface without depth. 
And it is of no use to bring forward physical points, for these 
points are extended and involve all the difficulties which we should 
like to avoid. But I will not longer delay on this subject on 
which you and I have already had a discussion in the Journal 
of the sixteenth of March, 1693, and of the third of August of the 
same year. 

You introduce on the other hand another kind of unities which, 
strictly speaking, are unities of composition or of relation, and 
which respect the perfection or completion of a whole which, being- 
organic, is destined for certain functions ; for example, a clock is 
one, an animal is one; and you believe that you can give the name 



OO PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

of substantial forms to the natural unities of animals and of plants, 
so that these unities shall form their individuation in distinguish- 
ing them from every other compound. It seems to me that you 
are right in giving animals a principle of individuation other than 
that which is usually given them, which is only through relation to 
external accidents. In reality this principle must be. internal, as 
much on the part of their soul as of their body ; but whatever dis- 
position there may be in the organs of the animal, that does not 
suffice to render it sentient. For finally all this concerns merely 
the organic and mechanical . structure, and I do not see that you 
are thereby justified in constituting a sensitive principle in brutes 
differing substantially from that of men. And after all it is not 
without reason that the Cartesians acknowledge that if we admit a 
sensitive principle in animals capable of distinguishing good from 
evil, it is consequently necessary also to admit in them reason, 
discernment and judgment. So allow me to say to you, sir, that 
this does not solve the difficulty, either. 

We come to your concomitance, which forms the principal and 
second part of your system. We "will admit that God, that great 
artificer of the universe, can adjust all the organic parts of the body 
of a man so well that they shall be capable of producing all the 
movements which the soul joined to this body might wish to pro- 
duce in the course of his life, without its having the power to 
change these movements or to modify them in any way. And, 
reciprocally, God can produce a contrivance in the soul (be it a 
machine of a new kind or not), by means of which all the thoughts 
and modifications which correspond to these movements shall arise 
successively at the same moment that the body shall perform its 
functions. And I admit that this is not more impossible than to 
make two clocks agree so well and go so uniformly that at the 
moment when clock A shall strike twelve clock B also strikes it, so 
that one would imagine that the two clocks are regulated by the 
same weight or the same spring. But after all, to what can this 
great artifice in substances serve if not to make men believe that 
the one acts upon the other, although this is not true ? In reality, 
it seems to me that this system is hardly more advantageous than 
that of the Cartesians; and if we are right in rejecting theirs 



EOUCHER ON JSTEW SYSTEM. 89 

because it uselessly supposes that God, considering the movements 
which he himself produces in the body, produces also in the soul 
thoughts which correspond to these movements — as if it were not 
more worthy of him to produce all at once the thoughts and modi- 
fications of the soul without needing bodies to serve as regulators 
and, so to speak, inform him what he ought to do — shall we not 
have reason to inquire of you why God does not content himself 
with producing all the thoughts and modifications of the soul 
(whether he do it immediately or by contrivance, as you will), 
without there being useless bodies which the mind can neither 
move nor know? Even to> such an extent that although no move- 
ment should take place in the body, the soul would not cease to 
think always that there was one; just as those who are asleep think 
that they are moving their members and are walking, when never- 
theless those members are at rest and do not move at all. Thus, 
during the waking state, souls would remain always persuaded that 
their bodies would move according to their desires, although, 
nevertheless, these vain and useless masses would be inactive and 
would remain in a continuous lethargy. Truly, sir, do we not see 
that these opinions are made expressly, and that these ex post facto 
systems have been invented only, to save certain preconceived prin- 
ciples ? In fact, the Cartesians, assuming that there is nothing 
in common between spiritual and corporeal substances, cannot 
explain how one acts on the other ; and consequently they are 
compelled ' to say what they do. But you, sir, who could free 
yourself by other ways, I am surprised that you embarrass yourself 
with their difficulties. Tor who does not see that when a balance 
is in equilibrium and inactive, if a new weight is added to one of 
the sides, forthwith movement appears and one of the counter- 
weights makes the other rise in spite of the effort which the latter 
makes to descend. You conceive that material beings are capable 
of efforts and of movement ; and it follows very naturally that the 
strongest effort must surpass the weakest. On the other hand you 
recognize also that spiritual beings may make efforts; and as there 
is no effort which does not suppose some resistance, it is necessary 
either that this resistance be stronger or weaker; if stronger, it 
overcomes ; if weaker, it yields. Now it is not impossible that the 



90 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

mind making an effort to move the body finds it endowed with a 
contrary effort which resists — sometimes more, sometimes less, and 
this suffices to cause it to suffer thereby. It is thus St. Augustine, 
in his books on music, explains of set purpose the action of spirits 
on bodies. 

I know that there are many other questions to be raised before 
resolving from first principles all those which might be discussed ; 
so true is it that one ought to observe the laws of the academics, 
the second of which forbids the calling in question those things 
which one easily sees cannot be decided, such as are almost all 
those of which we have just spoken ; not that these questions are 
absolutely insoluble but because they can only be solved in a 
certain order, which requires that philosophers begin by agreeing 
as to the infallible mark of truth, and confine themselves to dem- 
onstrating from first principles ; and by waiting, one can always 
separate that which is conceived clearly and sufficiently from other 
points or subjects which embrace some obscurity. 

This, sir, is what I can say at present of your system, without 
speaking of the other fine subjects of which you there incidentally 
treat, and which would merit particular discussion. 



XIV. 

Explanation of the jSTew System concerning- the Communi- 
cation between Substances, to serve as a reply to the 
Memoir of M. Eoucher inserted in the "Journal des 
Savants" of September 12, 1695. 1696. 
[From the French.] 

I remember, sir, that I believed I was fulfilling your wishes in 
communicating to you, many years ago, my philosophical hypothe- 
sis, although I assured you at the same time that I had not yet 
made up my mind to avow it. I asked for your opinion of it in 
exchange, but I do not remember to have received any objections 
from you ; otherwise, teachable as I am, I should not have given 
you occasion to make the same objections to me twice. However, 
after the publication, they still come apropos. For I am not one of 
those in whom a prepossession takes the place of reason, as you 
will experience when you are able to bring forward some precise 
and weighty arguments against my opinions, a thing which appar- 
ently has not been your design on this occasion. You have wished 
to speak as a skillful academic and thus give opportunity for a 
thorough examination of these subjects. 

1. I have not wished to explain here the principles of extension, 
but those of effective extension or of corporeal mass ; and these 
principles, in my opinion, are real unities; that is, substances 
endowed with true unity. 

2. The unity of a clock, of which you make mention, is entirely 
different, with me, from that of an animal, which latter is capable 
of being a substance endowed with a true unity, like what we call 
the ego in us ; whereas a clock is nothing but an assemblage. 

3. It is not in the disposition of the organs that I place the 
sentient principle of animals, and I admit that this disposition 
concerns only the corporeal mass. 

4. So it seems that you do not make me out to be wrong when I 
demand true unities and when for this reason I rehabilitate sub- 
stantial forms. But when you seem to say that the soul of the 



92 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

brutes must possess reason if feeling is ascribed to it, you draw a 
conclusion, the force of which I do not see. 

5. You admit, with praiseworthy sincerity, that my hypothesis 
of harmony or of concomitance is possible. But you do> not conceal 
a certain repugnance to it ; undoubtedly because you have believed 
it purely arbitrary, not having been informed that it follows front 
my view of unities, for therein everything is connected. 

6. You demand then, sir, what purpose all this contrivance may 
serve, which I attribute to the author of nature ? As if one could 
attribute too much of it to him, and as if this exact correspondence 
which substances have among themselves, by laws of their own 
which each one has received in the beginning, was not a thing 
admirably beautiful in itself and worthy of its author. You ask, 
too, what advantage I find herein. 

7. I might refer to what I have already said of it ; neverthe- 
less, I reply, in the first place, that when a thing cannot but be it 
is not necessary that, in order to admit it, we should demand of 
what use it is. Of what use is the incommensurability of the side 
with the diagonal ? 

8. I reply, in the second place, that this correspondence serves 
to explain the communication of substances and the union of the 
soul with the body by laws of nature established beforehand, with- 
out having recourse either to a transmission of species, which is 
inconceivable, or to fresh assistance from God, which appears 
very unsuitable. For it must be understood that as there are laws 
of nature in matter, so there are like laws in souls or forms, and 
these laws effect what I have just stated. 

9. I am asked, farther, whence it comes that God does not con- 
tent himself with producing all the thoughts and modifications of 
the soul without these useless bodies which the soul, they say, can 
neither move nor Tcnowf The reply is easy. It is that God has 
willed that there should be more rather than fewer substances, and 
that he has thought it good that these modifications of the soul 
should answer to something external. 

10. There is no useless substance; they all cooperate in the 
design of God. 



FIBST EXPLANATION OF NEW SYSTEM. 93 

11. I am unwilling', also, to admit that the soul does not know 
bodies at all, although this knowledge is gained without the influ- 
ence of the one upon the other. 

12. I should even have no difficulty in saying that the soul 
moves the body ; and as a Copernican speaks truly of the rising of 
the sun, a Platonist of the reality of matter, a Cartesian of the 
reality of sensible qualities, provided that he is rightly understood, 
so I believe that it is quite true to say that substances act, the one 
on the other, provided that it be understood that one is the cause 
of the changes in the other in consequence of the laws of harmony. 

13. As to the objection concerning the lethargy of bodies, that 
they would be inactive while the soul would think them in move- 
ment, this could not be, because of this same unfailing corres- 
pondence which the divine wisdom has established. 

14. I do not know these vain, useless and inactive masses, of 
which you speak. There is action everywhere, and I establish that 
fact better than the received philosophy does, because I believe that 
there is no body without movement, nor substance without force 
[effort]. 

15. I do not understand in what the objection consists contained 
in the words, "In truth, sir, do not we see that these opinions are 
made expressly, and that these ex post facto systems have been 
invented only, in order to save certain principles ?" All hypoth- 
eses are made expressly, and all systems follow after, to save 
phenomena or appearances ; but I do not see what the principles 
are of which I am said to be prepossessed, and which I wish to 
save. 

16. If this means that I am led to my hypothesis by a priori 
reasons or by certain principles, as is in truth the fact, it is rather 
praise for the hypothesis than an objection. It is usually sufficient 
that a hypothesis prove itself a posteriori, because it satisfies the 
phenomena ; but when there are also other and a priori reasons, 
it is so much the better. 

17. But perhaps this means that having invented a new opinion 
I have been glad to employ it, in order to give myself the airs 
of an innovator, rather than because I recognized any usefulness 



94 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

in it. I do not know, sir, whether you have a poor enough 
opinion of me to attribute these thoughts to me. For you know 
that I love the truth and that if I affected novelties so much I 
should be in more haste to produce them, especially those the 
solidity of which is recognized. But in order that those who do 
not know me so well may not give your words a meaning we would 
not like, it will be sufficient to say that in my opinion it is 
impossible to explain otherwise transeunt action conformable to 
the laws of nature, and that I believe that the usefulness of my 
hypothesis will be recognized by the difficulty which the most 
sharp-sighted philosophers of our time have found in the communi- 
cation between minds and bodies, and even of corporeal substances 
among themselves ; and I do not know if you have not found some 
there yourself. 

18. It is true that there are, in my opinion forces [efforts] in 
all substances, but these forces are properly only in the substance 
itself; and what follows in the others is only in virtue of a pre- 
established harmony (if I may be permitted to use this word), 
and in no wise by a real influence or by a transmission of some 
property or quality. As I have explained what activity [action] 
and passivity [passion] are, you may infer also the meaning of 
force [effort] and resistance. 

19. You say, sir, that you know there are many other questions 
to be asked before those which we have just discussed can be 
decided. But perhaps you will find that I have already asked 
them ; and I do not know whether your academics have 
employed with greater rigor or with more effect than I what there 
is of good in their method. I highly approve of seeking to demon- 
strate truths from first principles ; it is more useful than is 
thought ; and I have often put this precept into practice. So I 
approve of what you say on that head, and I would that your 
example would bring our philosophers to think of it as they should. 

20. I will add another reflection which seems to me important 
in making the reality and usefulness of my system better under- 
stood. You know that Descartes believed that the same quantity 
of motion is preserved in bodies. It has been shown that he was 
mistaken on that point, but I have shown that it is always true 



FIRST EXPLANATION OF NEW SYSTEM. 95 

that the same moving force, for which he had substituted the ' 
quantity of motion, is preserved. However, the changes which 
take place in the body in consequence of the modifications of the 
soul, embarrassed him, because they seemed to violate this law. 
But he believed that he had found an expedient, which in truth is 
ingenious, by saying that we must distinguish between motion 
and direction, and that the soul cannot increase or diminish the 
moving force, but that it changes the direction or determination 
of the course of the animal spirits, and that it is in this way that 
voluntary movements take place. It is true that he was unwilling 
to explain how the soul acts to change the course of bodies, that 
which is as inconceivable as to say that it gives them motion, 
unless recourse is had with me to the preestablished harmony. 
But it should be known that there is another law of nature, which 
I have discovered and demonstrated, and which Descartes did not 
know. It is that not .only is the same quantity of moving force 
preserved, but also the same quantity of direction towards what- 
ever side in the world is taken. That is to say, drawing any 
straight line you please, and taking also such and as many bodies 
as you please, you will find, in considering all these bodies together, 
without omitting any of those which act upon any one of those 
you have taken, that there will always be the same quantity of 
progress in the same direction [du meme cote] in all lines parallel 
to the right line which you have taken, taking care to estimate the 
sum of the progress by subtracting that of the bodies which move 
in the direction opposite to that of the bodies which move in the 
direction taken. This law, being just as beautiful and just as 
general as the other, no more deserves to be violated than the 
other; and this is avoided by my system, which preserves the 
force and the direction, and in a word all the natural laws of 
bodies, in spite of the changes which take place in them, in con- 
sequence of the changes of the soul. 



XV. 

Second Explanation of the System of the Covqifnication 
between Substances. 1696. 

[From the French.] 

By your reflections, sir, I see clearly that the thought which one 
of my friends has published in the Journal de Paris has need of 
explanation. 

You do not understand, you say, how I could prove that which I 
advanced concerning the communication or harmony of two sub- 
stances so different as the soul and the body. It is true that I 
believe that I have found the means of doing so, and this is how I 
propose to satisfy you. Imagine two clocks or watches which 
agree perfectly. Now, this may take place in three ways. The 
first consists in a mutual influence; the second is to have a skillful 
workman attached to them who regulates them and keeps them 
always in accord; the third is to construct these two clocks with so 
much art and accuracy as to assure their future harmony. Put 
now the soul and the body in place of these two clocks; their 
accordance may be brought about by one of these three ways. 
The way of influence is that of common philosophy, but as we can- 
not conceive of material particles which may pas? from one of these 
substances into, the other, this view must be abandoned. The way 
of the continual assistance of the creator is that of the system of 
occasional causes: but I hold that this is to make a Deus ex 
21 1 1 china intervene in a natural and ordinary matter, in which, 
according to reason, he ought not to cooperate except in the way in 
which he does in all other natural things. Thus there remains 
only my hypothesis; that is. the way of harmony. From the 
beginning God has made each of these two substances of such a 
nature that merely by following its own peculiar laws, received 
with its being, it nevertheless accords with the other, just as if 
there were a mutual influence or as if God always put his hand 
thereto in addition to his general cooperation. After this I have 
no need of proving anything, unless you wish to require me to 



SECOND EXPLANATION OF NEW SYSTEM. 97 

prove that God is sufficiently skillful to make use of this prevenient 
contrivance, semblances of which we see even among men. '.Now, 
taking for granted that he can do it, you easily see that this is the 
way most beautiful and most worthy of him. You suspected that 
my explanation would be opposed to the very different idea which 
we have of the mind and of the body ; but you will presently clearly 
see that no one has better established their independence. For 
while it has been necessary to explain their communication by a 
kind of miracle, occasion has always been given to many people to 
fear that the distinction between the body and the soul was not as 
real as was believed, since in order to maintain it it was necessary 
to go so far. I shall not be at all sorry to sound enlightened per- 
sons concerning the thoughts which I have just explained to you. 



XVI. 

Thibd Explaxatiox. Exteact feoae a eettee of Leibxitz ox 
his Philosophical Hypothesis axd the ceeioes Peobeeai 

PEOPOSED BY OXE OF HIS FBIEXDS TO THE Ma.THEMATICIAJSTS. 

1696. 

[From the Frencli.] 

Some wise and penetrating friends, having considered my novel 
hypothesis concerning the great question of the union of soul and 
body, and having found it of importance have besought me to give 
some explanations of the difficulties which have been raised and 
which come from the fact that it has not been well understood. 

I have thought that the matter might be rendered intelligible to 
every sort of mind by the following comparison : 

Imagine two clocks or two watches which agree perfectly. 
Xow this may happen in three ways. The first consists in the 
mutual influence of one clock on the other : the second, in the care 
of a man who attends thereto ; the third, in their own accuracy. 

The first way, which is that of influence, has been experimented 
on by the late M. Huygens, to his great astonishment. He had 
two large pendulums attached to the same piece of wood; the 
continual beats of these pendulums communicated similar vibra- 
tions to the particles of wood; but these different vibrations not 
being able to subsist very well in their order and without inter- 
fering with each other, unless the pendulums agreed, it happened 
by a kind of marvel that even when their beats had been pur- 
posely disturbed they soon came again W "beat together, almost 
like two chords which are in unison. 

The second way of making two clocks, even although poor ones, 
always accord, would be to have a skillful workman who should see 
to it that they are kept in constant agreement. This is what I call 
the way of assistance. 

Finally, the third way would be to make at the start these 
two clocks with such art and accuracy that we could be assured 
of their future accordance. This is the way of preestablished 
agreement. 



THIRD EXPLANATION OF NEW SYSTEM. 99 

Put now the soul and the body in the place of these two clocks. 
Their harmony or sympathy will arise in one of these three ways. 
The way of influence is that of the common philosophy; but as 
we cannot conceive of material particles or properties, or imma- 
terial qualities, which can pass from one of these substances into 
the other, we are obliged to abandon this view. The way of 
assistance is that of the system of occasional causes ; but I hold 
that this is making a Deus ex Machina intervene in a natural and 
ordinary matter, when, according to reason, he ought not to inter- 
vene except in the manner in which he cooperates in all the other 
affairs of nature. 

Thus, there remains only my hypothesis ; that is, the way of 
the harmony preestablished by a prevenient divine contrivance, 
which from the beginning has formed each of these substances in 
a way so perfect, and regulated with so much accuracy, that merely 
by following laws of its own, received with its being, it never- 
theless agrees with the other, just as if there were mutual influence, 
or as if God in addition to his general cooperation constantly put 
his hand thereto. 

After this I do not think I need to prove anything, unless it be 
that you wish me to prove that God has everything necessary to 
making use of this prevenient contrivance, semblances of which we 
see even among men, according to their skill. And supposing that 
he can do it you see well that this is the most admirable way and 
the one most worthy of him. 

It is true that I have yet other proofs but they are more pro- 
found, and it is not necessary to state them here. 



XVII. 

Reflections ox Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. 1696. 

[From the French.] 

I find so many marks of unusual penetration in what Mr. Locke 
has given us on the Human Understanding and on Education, and 
I consider the matter so important, that I have thought that the 
time would not he badly employed which I should give to such 
profitable reading ; all the more as I have myself deeply meditated 
concerning that which has to do with the foundations of our 
knowledge. It is for this reason that I have jotted down on this 
sheet some of the reflections which have occurred to me in reading 
his Essay on the Understanding. Of all researches, there is none 
more important, because it is the key to all others. 

The first book considers mainly the principles said to be born 
with us. Mr. Locke does not admit them, any more than he does 
innate ideas. He has undoubtedly had good reasons for putting 
himself in opposition on this point to ordinary prejudices, for the 
name of ideas and principles is extremely abused. Common phi- 
losophers make for themselves principles at their fancy; and the 
Cartesians, who profess more accuracy, do not fail to intrench 
themselves behind so-called ideas of extension, of matter and of the 
soul, wishing in this way to exempt themselves from the necessity 
of proving what they advance, on the pretext that those who will 
meditate on these ideas will find in them the same thing that 
they do ; that is to say. that those who will accustom themselves to 
their manner of thinking will have the same prepossessions, which 
is very true. 

My opinion is, then, that nothiug ought to be taken as primitive 
principles except experiences and the axiom of identity, or, what is 
the same thing, contradiction, which is primitive, since otherwise 
there would be no difference between truth and falsehood; and 
since all researches would cease at the start if to say yes or no were 
indifferent. TTe cannot, therefore, prevent ourselves from assum- 
ing this principle as soon as we wish to reason. All other truths 



REFLECTIONS ON LOCKe's "ESSAY." 101 

are capable of proof, and I highly esteem the method of Euclid, 
who without stopping at what would be thought to be sufficiently 
proved by the so-called ideas, has proved, for example, that in 
a triangle one side is always less than the other two together. 
Yet Euclid was right in taking some axioms for granted, not as if 
they were truly primitive and undemonstrable, but because he 
would have come to a standstill if he had wished to draw conclu- 
sions only after an accurate discussion of principles. Thus he 
judged it proper to content himself with having pushed the 
proofs up to this small number of propositions, so that it can be 
said that if they are true, all that he says is also true. He has left 
to others the trouble of demonstrating further these principles 
themselves, which, besides, are already justified by experience; but 
in these matters this does not satisfy us. This is why Appolonius, 
Proclus and others have taken the trouble to demonstrate some 
of Euclid's axioms. This manner of proceeding ought to be 
imitated by philosophers in order to arrive finally at some estab- 
lished positions, even if they be but provisional, after the way of 
which I have just sj)oken. 

As for ideas, I have given some explanation of them in a short 
essay entitled Meditationes de Cognitione, Yeritate et Ideis, and I 
could have wished that Mr. Locke had seen and examined it ; for I 
am one of the most docile of men, and nothing is more fitted to 
advance our thoughts than the considerations and remarks of per- 
sons of merit, when they are made with care and sincerity. Here I 
shall only say that true or real ideas are those of the possibility of 
whose fulfillment we are assured ; the others are doubtful, or (in 
case of proof of their impossibility) chimerical. !Now the possi- 
bility of ideas is proved as much a priori by demonstrations, by 
making use of the possibility of other simpler ideas, as a posteriori 
by experience ; for what is, cannot fail to be possible. But primi- 
tive ideas are those whose possibility is undemonstrable, and which 
indeed are nothing else than the attributes of God. 

As regards the question, whether there are ideas and truths 
bom with us, I do not consider it absolutely necessary for the 
beginning nor for the practice of the art of thinking, to' decide it ; 
whether they all come to us from without, or whether they come 



102 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

from ourselves, we will reason correctly if we observe what I have 
just said above and if we proceed with order and without prej- 
udice. The question concerning the origin of our ideas and of 
our maxims is not preliminary in philosophy, "and we must have 
made great progress to be able to answer it well. I think, however, 
that I can say that our ideas, even those of sensible things, come 
from within the soul [de noire propre fond] ; of which view you 
may the better judge by what I have published concerning the 
nature and interaction of substances and what is called the union 
of the soid with the body. For I have found that these things had 
not been well understood. I am in no wise in favor of the 
tabula rasa of Aristotle; and there is something sound in what 
Plato called reminiscence. There is even something more; for 
we have not only a reminiscence of all our past thoughts but also 
a presentiment of all our future thoughts. It is true that it is 
confusedly and without distinguishing them, very much as when 
I hear the sound of the ocean, I hear that of all the waves in 
particular which make up the total sound, although it is without 
discerning one wave from another. And thus it is true in a cer- 
tain sense, which I have explained, that not only our ideas but 
also our sensations, spring from within our own soul, and that the 
soul is more independent than is thought, although it is always 
true that nothing takes place in it which is not determined and 
that nothing is found in creatures which God does not continually 
create. 

In the second booh, which goes into the details of ideas, I confess 
that Mr. Locke's reasons for proving that the soul is sometimes 
without thought do not seem to me convincing, unless he gives the 
name of thoughts to only those perceptions sufficiently noticeable 
to be distinguished and retained. I hold that the soul, and even 
the body, is never without action, and that the soul is never without 
some perception. Even in dreamless sleep we have some confused 
and dim feeling of the place where we are and of other things. But 
even if experience should not confirm this view, I believe that it 
may be demonstrated. It is very much as when we cannot prove 
absolutely by experience whether there is a vacuum in space, and 
whether there is rest in matter. And yet questions of this kind 
seem to me, as well as to Mr. Locke, to be decided demonstratively. 



REFLECTIONS ON LOCKE'S "ESSAY." 103 

I assent to the difference which he makes, with good reason, 
between matter and space. But as concerns the vacuum, many 
learned people have believed in it. Mr. Locke is of this number. 
I was almost persuaded of it myself, but I gave it up long ago. 
And the incomparable Mr. Huygens, who was also for the vacuum 
and for the atoms, began at last to reflect upon my reasons, as his 
letters can bear witness. The proof of a vacuum, taken from 
motion, of which Mr. Locke makes use, supposes that body is 
originally hard, and that it is composed of a certain number of 
inflexible parts. For in this case it would be true, whatever finite 
number of atoms might be taken, that motion could not take place 
without a vacuum. But all the parts of matter are divisible and 
even pliable. 

There are some other things in this second book which arrest 
my attention ; for example, when it is said, chapter XVII, that 
infinity is to be attributed only to Space, Time and Number. I 
believe, in truth, with Mr. Locke, that, strictly speaking, it may 
be said that there is no space, no time and no number which is 
infinite, but that it is only true that however great may be a space, 
a time or a number, there is always another larger than it, ad 
infinitum; and that thus the true infinite is not found in a whole 
made up of parts. It is none the less, however, found elsewhere; 
namely, in the Absolute, which is without parts and which has 
influence upon compound things because they result from the limi- 
tation of the absolute. Hence the positive infinite being nothing 
else than the absolute, it may be said that there is in this sense a 
positive idea of the infinite, and that it is anterior to that of the 
finite. For the rest, by rejecting a composite infinite, we do not 
deny what the geometricians, and especially the excellent Mr. 
Newton, prove de Seriebus infinitis, not to mention what I myself 
have contributed to the subject. 

As for what is said, chapter XXX, de ideis adaequatis, it is per- 
missible to give to the terms the signification one finds a propos. 
Nevertheless, without finding fault with Locke's meaning, I put 
degrees in ideas, according to which I call those adequate in which 
there is nothing more to explain, very much as in numbers. Now 
all ideas of sensible qualities, as of light, color, heat, not being of 



104 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

this nature, I do not count them among the adequate; also it is 
not through themselves, nor a 'priori, but by experience, that we 
know their reality or possibility. 

There are again many good things in the third took, where he 
treats of words or terms. It is very true that everything cannot 
be denned, and that sensible qualities have no nominal definition 
and may be called primitive in this sense ; but they can none the 
less receive a real definition. I have shown the difference between 
these two kinds of definition in the meditation quoted above. The 
nominal definition explains the name by the marks of the thing; 
but the real definition makes known a priori the possibility of the 
thing denned. For the rest, I heartily approve of Mr. Locke's doc- 
trine concerning the demonstrabUity of moral truths. 

The fourth or last book, which treats of the knowledge of truth, 
shows the use of what has just been said. I find in it, as well as in 
the preceding books, numberless beautiful reflections. To make 
fitting remarks upon them would be to make a book as large as the 
work itself. It seems to me that the axioms are a little less con- 
sidered in it than they deserve to be. It is apparently because, 
with the exception of those of the mathematicians, there are not 
ordinarily found any which are important and solid. I have tried 
to remedy this defect. I do not despise identical propositions, and 
I have found that they are of great service even in analysis. It is 
very true that we know our own existence by an immediate intui- 
tion, and that of God, by demonstration; and that a mass of 
matter, the parts of which are without perception, cannot make a 
whole which thinks. I do not despise the argument, invented some 
centuries ago by Anselm, which proves that the perfect being must 
exist ; although I find something lacking in this argument, because 
it takes for granted that the perfect being is possible. For if this 
one point were proved in addition the whole demonstration would 
be complete. 

As for the knowledge of other things, it is very well said that 
experience alone does not suffice for advancing sufficiently in 
physics. A penetrating mind will draw more conclusions from 
some very ordinary experiences than another could draw from the 
most choice ; besides there is an art of experimenting and of inter- 



REFLECTIONS ON LOCKE'S "eSSAV 



105 



rogating, so to speak, nature. Yet it is always true that progress 
cannot be made in the details of physics except in proportion as 
one has experience. 

Mr. Locke is of the opinion, held by many able men, that the 
forms of logic are of little use. I should be almost of the opposite 
opinion ; and I have often found that paralogisms, even in mathe- 
matics, are faults of form. Mr. Huygens has made the same 
observation. Much might be said on this point, and many excel- 
lent things are despised because the use is not made of them of 
which they are capable. We are prompted to despise what we have 
learned in the schools. It is true that we there learn many use- 
less things, but it is good to exercise the function delta Crusca, 
that is, to separate the good from the bad. Mr. Locke can do 
it as well as anyone whatsoever; and in addition he gives us 
important thoughts of his own invention. He is not only an 
assayer, but he is also a transmuter, by the augmentation which 
he makes of good metal. If he continued to make a present of it 
to the public we should be greatly indebted to him. 



XVIII. 

Ox the Ultimate Obigtx of Teoxgs. 1697. 
[Frora tlie Latin.] 

Jjs addition to the world or aggregate of finite things, there is 
some unique Being who governs. n<:»T only like the soul in m- 
rather like the Ego itself in my body, but in a much higher sense. 
For one Being, dominating the universe, not only rules the world 
but he creates and fashions it. is superior to the world, and. so 
to speak, extramundane. and by this very fact is the ultimate 
reason of thing-. For the sufficient reason of existence can not be 
found either in any particular thing or in the whole aggregate 
or series. Suppose a boot on the elements of geometry to have 
been eternal and that others had been successively copied after it, 
it is evident that, although we might account for the present book 
by the book which was its niodel. we could nevertheless never, by 
assuming anv number of books whatever, reach a perfect reason 
for them; for we may always wonder why such books have 
existed from all. time ; that is. why books are at all and why they 
are thus written. TThat is true of books is also true of the different 
states of the world, for in spite of certain laws of transformation a 
succeeding state is in a certain way only a copy of the preceding, 
and to whatever anterior state you may go back you will never 
find there a perfect reason why, f orsooth. there is any world at all, 
and such a world as exists. And even if you imagine the world 
eternal, nevertheless since you posit nothing but a succession of 
states, and as you find a sufficient reason for them in none of them 
whatsoever, and as any number of them whatever does not aid you 
in giving a reason for them, it is evident that the reason must be 
sought elsewhere. For in eternal things even where there is no 
cause there must be a reason which, in perduring things, is 
necessity itself or essence, but in the series of changing things, 
if it were supposed that they succeed each other eternally, this 
- m world be. as will soon be seen, the prevailing of inclinations 
where the reasons are not necessitating (?". e.. of an absolute or 



ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGIN OF THINGS. 



107 



metaphysical necessity trie opposite of which would imply contra- 
diction), but inclining. From which it follows that by supposing 
the eternity of the world, an ultimate extramundane reason of 
things, or God, cannot be escaped. 

The reasons of the world, therefore, lie hidden in something 
extramundane different from the chain of states or series of things, 
the aggregate of which constitutes the world. We must therefore 
pass from physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the 
posterior states of the world by the prior, to something which is of 
absolute or metaphysical necessity, the reason for which cannot 
be given. For the present world is necessary, physically or hypo- 
thetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically. It being granted, 
indeed, that the world such as it is, is to be, it follows that things 
must happen in it just as they do. But as the ultimate origin must 
be in something which is metaphysically necessary, and as the 
reason of the existing can only be from the existing, there must 
exist some one being metaphysically necessary, or whose essence 
is existence ; and thus there exists something which differs from 
the plurality of beings or from the world, which, as we have recog- 
nized and shown, is not metaphysically necessary. 

But in order to explain a little more clearly how, from eternal 
or essential or metaphysical truths, temporary, contingent or phys- 
ical truths arise, we ought first to recognize that from the very fact 
that something exists rather than nothing, there is in possible 
things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain need of 
existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence ; in a word, 
that essence tends of itself towards existence. Whence it further 
follows that all possible things, whether expressing essence or 
possible reality, tend by equal right toward existence, according to 
their quantity of essence or reality, or according to the degree of 
perfection which they contain, for perfection is nothing else than 
quantity of essence. 

Hence it is most clearly understood that among the infinite com- 
binations of possibles and possible series, that one actually exists 
by which the most of essence or of possibility is brought into exist- 
ence. And indeed there is always in things a principle of deter- 
mination which is to be taken from the greatest and the smallest, 



108 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXTTZ. 

or in such a way that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, 
so to speak, expenditure. And here the time, place, or in a word, 
the receptivity or capacity of the world may be considered as the 
expenditure or the ground upon which the world can be most 
easily built, whereas the varieties of forms correspond to the com- 
modiousness of the edifice and the multiplicity and elegance of 
its chambers. And the matter itself may be compared to certain 
games where all the spaces on a table are to be filled according 
to determined laws, and where, unless a certain skill be employed, 
you will be finallv excluded by unfavorable spaces and forced to 
leave many more places empty than you intended or wished. But 
there is a certain way of filling most easily the most space. Just 
as. therefore, if we have to make a triangle, there being no other 
determining reason, it follows that an equilateral results ;. and 
if we have to go from one point to another, without any further 
determination as to the way. the easiest and shortest path will be 
chosen : so it being once posited that being is better than not 
being, or that there is a reason why something should be rather 
than nothing, or that we must pass from the possible to the actual, 
it follows, that, even if nothing further is determined, the quantity 
of existence must be as great as possible, regard being had to the 
capacity of the time and of the place I or to the possible order 
of existence), exactly as tiles are disposed in a given area in such 
a way that it shall contain the greatest number of them possible. 
From this it is now marvelously understood how in the very origin 
of things a sort of divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanics 
was employed, and how the determination of 'the greatest quantity 
of existence takes place. It is thus that from all angles the deter- 
mined angle in geometry is the right angle, and that liquids placed 
in heterogeneous positions take that form which has the most 
capacity, or the spherical: but especially it is thus that in ordi- 
nary mechanics itself, when several heavy bodies act against each 
other the motion which results constitutes, on the whole, the great- 
est descent. For just as all possibles tend by equal right to exist 
in proportion to their reality, so all weights tend by an equal right 
to descend in proportion to their gravity: and as here a motion 
is produced which contains the greatest possible descent of heavy 



ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGIN OF THINGS. 



109 



bodies, so there a world is produced in which is found realized 
the greatest number of possibles. 

And thus we now have physical necessity from metaphysical ; 
for although the world be not metaphysically necessary, in the 
sense that its contrary implies a contradiction or a logical absurd- 
ity, it is nevertheless physically necessary, or determined in such 
a way that its contrary implies imperfection or moral absurdity. 
And as possibility is the principle of essence, so perfection or the 
degree of essence (through which the greatest possible number is 
at the same time possible), is the principle of existence. Whence 
at the same time it is evident that the author of the world is free, 
although he makes all things determinately ; for he acts according 
to a principle of wisdom or of perfection. Indeed indifference 
arises from ignorance, and the wiser one is, the more determined 
one is to the highest degree of perfection. 

But, you will say, however ingenious this comparison of a cer- 
tain determining metaphysical mechanism with the physical 
mechanism of heavj' bodies may appear, nevertheless it fails in 
this, that heavy bodies truly exist, whereas possibilities and 
essences prior to existence or outside of it are only fancies or 
fictions in which the reason of existence cannot be sought. I 
answer, that neither these essences nor the so-called eternal truths 
regarding them are fictions, but that they exist in a certain region 
of ideas, if I may thus speak, that is in God himself, the source 
of all essences and of the existence of all else. And the existence 
of the actual series of things shows sufficiently of itself that my 
assertion is not gratuitous. For since the reason of the series is 
not found in itself, as we have shown above, but must be sought 
in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths, and since that which 
exists can only come from that which exists, as we have remarked 
above, eternal truths must have their existence in a certain subject, 
absolutely and metaphysically necessary, that is in God, through 
whom those things which otherwise would be imaginary, are, to 
speak barbarously but significantly, realized. 

And in truth we discover that everything takes place in 
the world according to the laws, not only geometrical but 
also metaphysical, of eternal truths ; that is, not only accord- 



110 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

ing to material necessities but also according to formal necessi- 
ties; and this is true not only generally in that which con- 
cerns the reason, which we have just explained, of a world existing 
rather than non-existing, and existing thus rather than otherwise 
(a reason which can only he found in the tendency of the possible 
to existence) ; hut if we descend to the special we see the meta- 
physical laws of cause, of power, of action holding good in admir- 
able manner in all nature, and prevailing over the purely geo- 
metrical laws themselves of matter, as I found in accounting for 
the laws of motion: a thing which struck me with such astonish- 
ment that, as I have explained more at length elsewhere, I was 
forced to abandon the law of the geometrical composition of forces 
which I had defended in my youth when I was more materialistic. 

Thus, therefore, Ave have the ultimate reason of the reality, as 
well of essences as of existences, in one Being who is necessarily 
much superior and anterior to the world itself, since it is from him 
that not only the existences which this world contains, but also the 
possibles themselves derive their reality. And this reason of things 
can be sought only in a single source, because of the connection 
which they all have with one another. But it is evident that it is 
from this source that existing things continually emanate, that they 
are and have been its products, for it does not appear why one state 
of the world rather than another, the state of yesterday rather 
than that of to-day, should come from the world itself. TVe see, 
also, with the same clearness, how God acts, not only physically 
but freely; how both the efficient and final cause of things is in 
him, and how he manifests not only his greatness and his power 
in the mechanism of the world as constructed, but also his 'goodness 
and his wisdom in constructing it. 

And in order that no one should think that we confound here 
moral perfection or goodness with metaphysical perfection or great- 
ness, and that the former is denied while the latter is granted, it 
must be known that it follows from what has been said that the world 
is most perfect, not only physically, or, if you prefer, metaphysically, 
because that series of things is produced in which there is actually 
the most of reality, but also that it is most perfect morally, because 
real moral perfection is physical perfection for souls themselves. 



ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGIN OF THINGS. Ill 

Thus the world is not only the most admirable mechanism, but in 
so far as it is composed of souls, it is also the best republic, through 
which as much happiness or joy is brought to souls as is possible, in 
which their physical perfection consists. 

But, you will say, we experience the contrary in this world, for 
often good people are very unhappy, and not only innocent brutes 
but also innocent men are afflicted and even put to death with tor- 
ture ; finally, the world, if you regard especially the government of 
the human race, resembles a sort of confused chaos rather than the 
well ordered work of a supreme wisdom. This may appear so at 
the first glance, I confess, but if you examine the thing more 
closely, it evidently appears from the things which have been 
adduced, that the contrary should be affirmed ; that is, that all 
things, and consequently souls, attain to the highest degree of per- 
fection possible. 

And, in truth, as the jurisconsults say, it is not proper to judge 
before having examined the whole law. We know only a very 
small part of eternity which extends into immensity; for the 
memory of the few thousands of years which history transmits 
to us is indeed a very little thing. And yet from an experience 
so short we dare to judge of the immense and of the eternal, like 
men who, born and brought up in a prison, or, if you prefer in 
the subterranean salt mines of the Sarmatians, think that there 
is no other light in the world than the lamp whose feeble gleam 
hardly suffices to direct their steps. Let us look at a very beauti- 
ful picture, and let us cover it in such a way as to see only a 
very small part of it, what else will appear in it, however closely we 
may examine it and however near we may approach to it, except a 
certain confused mass of colors without choice and without art ? 
And yet when we remove the covering and regard it from the 
proper point of view we will see that what appeared thrown on the 
canvas at haphazard has been executed with the greatest art by the 
author of the work. What the eyes discover in the picture, the 
ears discover in music. The most illustrious composers often 
mingle discords with their harmonies in order to excite and pique, 
so to speak, the listener, who, anxious as to the outcome, is all the 
more pleased when soon all things are restored to order. Just as we 



112 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

rejoice to have passed Through slighi clangers and experienced small 
ills, whether because of a feeling of egotism, or becanse we find 
pleasure in The frightful images which right-rope dances or leap- 
ings beiween swords (sauts perilleux) present ; so we partly loose 
laughing children. preTending to Throw Them far away from us, 
like The ape which, having taken Christian, king of the Danes, 
while still an infant wrapped in swaddling clothes, carried him to 
the top of the roof, and when everybody was frightened brought 
him back laughing, safe and sound to his cradle. According to The 
same principle, it is insipid always to eai sweetmeats: we must 
mingle with them sharp, acid and even birter things, which excite 
The Tasie. He who has not tasted bitter Things has not meriied 
sweei Things and. indeed, will noi appreciate them. It is the law 
even of joy. ihaT pleasure be not uniform, for ihis engenders 
disgust and renders us sttipid and not joyous. 

As to whai we said. Thai a part may be disturbed withouT preju- 
dice to the general harmony, it must not be understood as mean- 
ing Thai no account is made of the parts, or That it suffices Thai 
the entire world be perfect in measure, although it might happen 
thai The human race should be unhappy, and Thar There should be 
in The universe no regard for justice, no heed Taken of our lot. as 
some think who do not judge rightly enough of The whole of Things. 
For it ought be known that as in a well-constituted republic as 
much care as possible is taken of the good of the individual, so the 
universe cannot be perfect if individual interests are not protected 
as much as the universal harmony will permit. And for this a 
better law could not be established than the very law of justice 
which declares that each one participate in the perfection of the 
universe and in a happiness of his own in proportion to his own 
virtue and to the good will he entertains toward the common good ; 
by which that which we call charity and love of God is fulfilled. 
in which alone, according to the judgment of the wisest theologians. 
the force and power of the Christian religion itself consists. And 
it ought not appear astonishing that so large a part should be given 
to souls in the universe since they reflect the most faithful image of 
the supreme Author, and hold to him not only the relation of 
machine to artificer, but also that of citizen to prince : and they are 



ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGIN OE THINGS. 



113 



to continue as long as the universe itself; and in a manner they 
express and "concentrate the whole in themselves so that it can be 
said that souls are whole parts. 

As. regards especially the afflictions of good people, we must hold 
for certain that there results for them a greater good, and this is 
not only theologically but physically true. So grain cast into the 
ground suffers before producing its fruit. And we may affirm, 
generally, that afflictions, temporarily evil, are in effect good, since 
they are short cuts to greater perfections. So in physics, liquors 
which ferment slowly take more time also* to improve; whereas 
those the agitation of which is greater, reject certain parts with 
more force and are more promptly improved. And we might say 
of this that it is retreating in order the better to leap forward 
(quon recede, pour mieux sauter). We should therefore regard 
these considerations not merely as agreeable and consoling, but also 
as most true. And, in general, I feel that there is nothing truer 
than happiness, and nothing happier or sweeter than truth. 

And in addition to the general beauty and perfection of the 
works of God, we must recognize a certain perpetual and very 
free progress of the whole universe, such that it advances always 
to still greater refinement [cultus]. It is thus that even now a 
great part of our earth has received cultivation and will receive 
more and more. And although it is true that sometimes certain 
parts of it grow up wild again or again suffer destruction and 
deterioration, this nevertheless must be understood as we inter- 
preted affliction above, that is to say, this very destruction and 
deterioration leads to some greater result, so that we profit in some 
way by the loss itself. 

And as to the possible objection, that if it were so the world 
ought long ago to have become a paradise, the reply is ready : Even 
if many substances have already reached great perfection, neverthe- 
less on account of the infinite divisibility of the continuum, there 
always remain in the depths of things slumbering parts which 
must yet be awakened and become greater and better, and, in a 
word, attain a better culture. And hence progress never comes to 
an end. 



XIX. 

Reply to Refeectioxs, fouxd ix the "Journal des Savants" 
of this teak, eeeatixg to the coxseqeexces oe cebtaix 

PASSAGES OF THE PhIEOSOPHT OF DESCAETES. 1697. 
[From the French.] 

I am accused of wishing to establish my reputation' on the ruins 
of that of Descartes. I hare a right to complain of this. Very 
far front "wishing to ruin the reputation of this great man, I find 
that his real merit is not sufficiently known, because what is most 
excellent in him is not enough considered and imitated. Men 
fasten on the weakest passages because these are most easily under- 
stood by those who are not willing to give themselves the trouble 
of thinking profoundly and who yet would like to understand the 
foundation of things. This is why. to my great regret, his par- 
tisans add almost nothing to his discoveries, and this is the usual 
effect of the sectarian spirit in philosophy. As all my views are 
intent only upon the public good, I have said something from time 
to time to arouse them, well knowing that their penetration would 
lead them very far. if they did not believe that their master had 
done enough. I have always declared that I esteem Descartes 
exceedingly ; there are few who approach him in genius. I know 
but Archimides, Copernicus, Galileo. Kepler. Jung, Huygens, 
Xewton, and a few others of such force: to whom Pythagoras, 
Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Suisset. Cardan, Gilbert, Verulam, 
Campanella. Harvey, Pascal, and some others might be added. It 
is nevertheless true that Descartes has made use of artifices in 
order to profit by the discoveries of others without wishing to 
appear indebted to them. He treated some excellent men in an 
unjust and unworthy way when they offended him, and he had an 
unbridled ambition to set himself up as a party chief. But this 
does not diminish the beauty of his thoughts. Par from approving 
those who despise him and who repay true merit with ingratitude, 
it is this that I blame principally in Descartes, and still more in 
several of his partisans, whose misunderstood attachment for a 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. 115 

single author nourishes prejudice and hinders them from profiting 
by the light of so many others. I am accustomed to say that the 
■ Cartesian, philosophy is as it were the ante-chamber of the truth, 
and that it is difficult to penetrate well beyond without having 
passed through there ; but one deprives himself of the true knowl- 
edge of the heart of things if he stops there. 

As for the little of reputation which I am honored by having 
accorded me, I have not acquired it in refuting Descartes ; I have 
no need of that means ; law, history and letters contributed to it 
before I had thought of mathematics. And if our new analysis, 
the calculus of which I have propounded, surpasses that of- Des- 
cartes as much as and more than his surpassed preceding methods, 
his remains none the less worthy of esteem, although it has been 
necessary for the progress of science to disabuse those who think it 
suffices for everything ; which cannot better be done than by pro- 
posing to them problems, beautiful and attractive, and, for those 
who know their method, even simple, but which not one of the 
Cartesian analysts has been able to solve 

Let us come now to the heart of our dispute. I am not the nrst 
who has blamed Descartes for having rejected the search for final 
causes. Besides the Rev. Father Malebranche, the late Mr. Boyle 
did so with much zeal and solidity; not to speak of numerous 
other grave, moderate and well-disposed authors, men who other- 
wise make much of Descartes. The reply is here made that he 
banished final causes from physics, and that he was right in so 
doing; but that he would have been wrong if he had banished them 
from ethics : For the whole good and the whole evil of 
our free actions depends upon their end. This reply is 
surprising. The question is not concerning our free actions, 
of which it is very true that ethics treats, but concerning 
God and his wisdom, which appears among the things which 
Descartes ought not to have neglected. And the reply, far from 
excusing him, would charge, if it were true, that according to him 
final causes belong only to our free actions. But I suppose that 
this is not the view of the author of the Reflections, nor that of 
Descartes. Nevertheless, his silence might do harm contrary to his 
intention. He did not wish to avail himself of this means of prov- 



116 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

ing the existence of God: he may be excused on this point, 
although many hare blamed him for it ; but he has not done well in 
everywhere else passing by so important a point, which ought to 
have been employed in some passages of his Principles of Philos- 
ophy. If God is the author of things and if he is sovereignly 
wise, one could not very well reason as to the structure of the uni- 
verse without making considerations of his wisdom enter therein, 
just as one could not well reason concerning a building without 
entering into the designs of the architect. I have adduced else- 
where an excellent passage from the Phaedo of Plato (which is the 
dialogue on the death of Socrates), where the philosopher Anaxi- 
mander [ Anaxagoras] , who had posited two principles, an intelli- 
gent mind and matter, is blamed for not having employed this 
intelligence or this wisdom in the progress of his work, having 
contented himself with the figures and motions of matter; and 
this is exactly the case with our too materialistic modem 
philosophers. 

But. it is said, in physics we do not ask why things are but how 
they are. I reply that both questions are there asked. Often 
the end and aim makes clear the means, because in knowing the 
end we can better judge of the means. Besides to explain a 
machine we could not do better than to state its design and to 
show how all its parts conduce thereto. This may even be useful 
in finding the origin of the intention. I wish that this method 
were employed also in medicine. The animal body is a machine. 
at once hydraulic, pneumatic and pyrobolic, the design of which is 
to maintain a certain motion; and by showing what conduces to 
this design and what is injurious to it, physiology as well as thera- 
peutics, would be understood. Thus it is seen that final causes are 
of service in physics, not only to make us admire the wisdom of 
God, which is the principal reason, but also for knowing things and 
for managing them. I have elsewhere shown that whereas we may 
still dispute as to the efficient cause of light, which Descartes, as 
the most intelligent now acknowledge, has not sufficiently well 
explained, yet the final cause suffices for divining the laws which it 
follows, for provided we imagine that nature had as its design the 
conducting of rays from a given point to another given point by 
the easiest path, we find all these laws admirably, by simply 



ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES. 117 

employing, as I have done in the Acta Eruditorum of Leipsic, 
some lines of analysis. Molineux thanked me for this in his 
Dioptrics, and he highly approved of the remark, which I made on 
the occasion, on the important use of final causes, which lead ns to 
the consideration of Sovereign Wisdom, in showing ns at the same 
time the laws of nature which are its consequence. 

The author of the Reflections asks me to give the passage where 
Descartes says that matter receives successively all the forms of 
which it is capable. He has searched Articles 203 and 204 of the 
fourth part of his Principles for it. But it is found in Article 47 
of the third part. I shall quote it in the words of the original 
Latin. The author remarks in the summary that the falsity of his 
suppositions regarding the origin of the world could not be inju- 
rious, and to prove it the better he adds : _ "Atque omnino parum 
refert quid hoc pacto supponatur, quia postea juxta leges naturae 
est mutandum. ■ Et vix aliquid supponi potest, ex quo non idem 
effectus (quanquam fortasse operosius) per easdem naturae leges 
deduci possit. Gum earum ope materia formas omnes, quarum est 
capax, successive assumat, si formas istas ordine consideremus, tan- 
dem ad illam quae est hujus mundi poterimus devenire." From 
this it may be judged whether I have imposed upon this author, 
and whether he does not say positively not only that matter can 
take, but also that it does take effectively, as well as successively, 
all the forms of which it is susceptible, and that it is thus of little 
importance what suppositions are made. There is much to be 
said against this reasoning. In order to sustain it, it would be 
necessary to suppose that the same state of the universe returns 
always precisely after a certain period ; since otherwise, a state 
of the world being taken which is posterior in fact to another, 
this latter state could never be deduced from the former, even if 
matter should receive all the forms of which it is capable. But 
these periods involve other difficulties, so much so that thus all 
the infinite possibilities would have to occur in this finite, periodic 
interval; and all eternity could produce nothing new. To say, 
also, with Descartes, that he is at liberty to suppose almost any- 
thing he wishes, it would not suffice that each supposition or 
hypothesis should finally lead to our world ; for it might be so 
distant and the passage from one to the other might be so long 



V 



118 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

and so difficult that it would be impossible for the mind of man 
to follow it and to comprehend it. But the only proposition here 
in question is the one I have adduced, and whose strange conse- 
quences I have noted: for if everything possible, and everything 
imaginable, however unworthy it be, some day comes to pass ; if 
every fable or fiction has been or will become true history, there 
is naught but necessity, and no choice, no providence. And this 
consequence it is that the author of the Reflections does not disown, 
he having simply undertaken to disprove the proposition itself, 
which he did not find in the Principles of its author. 

Nevertheless I am unwilling to attack the religion and piety of 
Descartes, as is unjustly imputed to me. I protested the contrary 
in express terms, for a doctrine may be dangerous, without the one 
circulating it, or the one following it, remarking the fact or approv- 
ing its consequences. Nevertheless it is well to make them known, 
to the end that we may be on our guard against them, forasmuch 
as it clearly appears that Spinoza and some others have drawn 
them. For there are minds disposed to seize upon the worst pas- 
sages, and ingenious in deducing the most dangerous conclusions. 
I would not have spoken of Spinoza if I had thought that what I 
wrote would be published, from the fear that it would be believed 
that I wished to cast odium upon the Cartesians, knowing well that 
they have sometimes been wronged by mistaken zeal. Neverthe- 
less, since there is a desire to criticize my words, it has been 
necessary to show that I have advanced nothing groundlessly. As 
one of the best uses of true philosophy, and particularly of physics, 
is to nourish piety and to lead us to God, I am not ill-pleased 
with those who have given me this occasion for explaining myself 
in a way which may make good impressions on some one ; although 
I could wish that it had been done without attributing to me a pas- 
sion and partiality, from which, j>erhaps, few people are more 
removed than I. To express in few words the feeling which I 
have toward an author whose reputation I am wrongly accused of 
wishing to ruin (an enterprise which would be as unjust as it is 
impossible), I will say that he who does not acknowledge the emi- 
nent merit of Descartes is not very penetrating ; but that he who 
acknowledges and esteems none but him and those who follow him, 
will never amount to much. 



XX. 

On Nature in Itself ; or On the Force residing in Created 
Things,, and their Actions. 1698. 

[From the Latin.] 

1. I have recently received from the very illustrious John 
Christopher Sturm, a man especially meritorious for his work in 
mathematics and physics, the Apology which he published at 
Altorf in defence of his Dissertation, De Idolo Naturae, which 
Gunther Christopher Schelhammer, the eminent and beloved phy- 
sician of Kiel, attacked in his book on nature. As I have formerly 
examined the same question, and as I have had by letters some dis- 
cussions on this subject with the eminent author of the Disserta- 
tion, mention of which he made in a way very gratifying to me in 
recalling publicly some details of our correspondence in the first 
volume of his Select Physics (Vol. I, Sec. 1, Chap. 3, epilog. § v, 
pp. 119, 120), I have been thereby but the more disposed to give 
serious attention to such an important subject, judging it necessary 
that my view and the whole question should be a little more 
distinctly set forth from those principles which I have already 
often indicated. This apologetic dissertation seemed to me to offer 
an opportunity favorable to my design, because it was easy to see 
that the author had there treated in a few words the essential 
points of the question. For the rest I do not take sides between 
these illustrious men. 

2. Two points especially, it seems to me, are in question : first, 
in what consists the nature which we are accustomed to attribute 
to things, the commonly received attributes of which, according to 
the judgment of the celebrated Sturm, savor a little of paganism ; 
next, whether there is in creatures any evepyeca, a thing which he 
apj)ears to deny. As for the first point, concerning nature in itself, 
if we examine what it is and what it is not, I admit indeed that 
there is no soul of the universe ; I even admit that these marvels, 
which happen every day and of which we are wont to say with 
reason that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, are 



120 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

not to be attributed to certain created intelligences endowed with a 
wisdom and virtue porportioned to so great a matter; but that 
^^universal nature is, so to speak, the handiwork of God, and one so 
great that every natural machine (and this is the true but little 
observed difference between nature and art) is composed of really 
infinite organs, and consequently requires in the author and 
director infinite wisdom and power. This is why I hold the omnis- 
- cient heat of Hippocrates and the soul-giving Cholco-gocldess of 
Avicenna and the very wise plastic virtue of Scaliger and others 
and the hylarchic principle of Henry More, some of them impossi- 
ble, others superfluous ; and it is enough for me that the mechan- 
ism of things is constructed with so much wisdom that all these 
marvels come to pass through its very development, organized 
, beings being evolved, I think, according to a preconceived plan. 
I am therefore of the opinion of the illustrious author when he 
rejects the figment of a certain created nature, whose wisdom forms 
and governs the mechanisms of bodies ; but it does not hence follow, 
I believe, and reason does not admit, that all created, indwelling, 
active force must be rejected. 

3. We have just spoken of what it is not ; let us now examine 
more closely what this nature is which Aristotle was not wrong in 
calling the 'principle of motion and of rest, although this philoso- 
pher seems to me to take the word in too broad a meaning, and 
understand by it not only local motion or rest in a place, but in 
general change and rdo-ats or persistence. Whence, also, as I may 
say in passing, the definition which he gives of motion is truly 
obscure ; it is, however, not so absurd as it seems to those who sup- 
pose that he meant to define only local motion. But let us return 
to the matter in hand. Bobert Boyle, a man eminent and skilled 
in the accurate observation of nature, has written on nature in 
itself a little book, the thought of which, if I remember correctly, 
is summed up in this, that we ought to regard nature as being the 
very mechanism of bodies; which indeed may be proved -rg? ez/ 
irXdrei ; but if he had examined the thing with more a/cpi/3eia he 
would have distinguished in the mechanism itself the principles 
ivfrom their derivatives. So it does not suffice, in order to explain a 
clock, to say that it is moved in a mechanical manner, without dis- 



ON NATURE EST ITSELF. 121 

tinguishing whether it receives this impulse from a weight or from 
a spring. I have already declared more than once (what I think 
will be of profit in hindering the abusing of mechanical explana- 
tions of material things, to the prejudice of piety, as if matter 
could exist of itself and as if the mechanism had no need of any 
intelligence or of any spiritual substance) that the origin of the 
mechanism itself does not come merely from a material principle 
alone nor from mathematical reasons but from a certain higher 
principle, and, so to speak, metaphysical source. 

4. One remarkable proof, among others, of this truth is that 
the foundation of the laws of nature must be made to consist not 
in this, that the same quantity of motion is preserved, as was com- 
monly believed, but rather in this, that the same quantity of active 
power, still more (and I have discovered that this happens for an 
admirable reason), the same quantity of moving force [actio] 
must be preserved, the estimation of which must be very different 
from that which the Cartesians conceive under quantity of motion. 

I have conferred on this subject, partly by letters, in part 
publicly, with two mathematicians of superior talent, and one of 
them embraced my opinion altogether; the other, after long and 
thorough examination, ended by renouncing all his objections and 
avowing frankly that he had not yet been able to find an answer to 
my demonstration. And I am all the more astonished to see that 
the illustrious man, in the edited portion of his Select Physics, in 
explaining the laws of motion, has admitted the common doctrine 
as if it did not permit of doubt (he has, however, recognized that 
it rests upon no demonstration but on a certain probability, and he 
has repeated it in this last dissertation, Chap. 3, § 2) ; but perhaps 
he wrote before my writings appeared and had not the time or the 
thought for revising his own, especially as he was persuaded that 
the laws of motion are arbitrary, which appears to me not at all 
according to reason. For I think that it is because of reasons 
determined by wisdom and order that God has been led to make the 
laws which we observe in nature ; and hence it is evident, accord- 
ing to the remark which I formerly made on the occasion of an 
optical law and which the celebrated Molineux later highly 
approved in his Dioptrics, that final cause is not only useful to vir- 



122 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

tue and to piety in ethics and in natural theology, but that even in 
physics it serves to find and to discover hidden truths. So when 
the renowned Sturm, where he treats of final cause in his Select 
Physics, presented my doctrine among the hypotheses, I could have 
wished that he had sufficiently examined it in his criticism ; for he 
would have found opportunity for saying in favor of the impor- 
tance and fruitfulness of the argument many excellent things and 
such as are useful for piety. 

5. But we must now examine what he says of the notion of 
nature in his apologetic dissertation, and what seems to us insuffi- 
cient in it. He grants, Chap. IV, §§ 2, 3, and often elsewhere, 
that the movements which take place now are the result of the 
eternal law once decreed by God, which law he calls soon after 
volition and command; and that there is no need of a new com- 
mand from God, of a new volition, and still less of a new effort 
or of a sort of laborious operation (§ 3) ; and he repels as an 
unjust imputation on the part of his opponent the thought that God 
moves things as a wood-cutter does his two-edged ax, or as a 
miller governs his mill by retaining the waters or by turning them 
loose on the wheel. But in truth, as indeed it seems to me, this 
explanation does not suffice. For I ask if this volition or this 
command, or, if you prefer, this divine law, decreed originally, 
attributed to things only an extrinsic denomination; or if, in 
forming them, it created in them some permanent impression, or 
as Schelhammer, remarkable as well for his judgment as for his 
experience, well calls it, an indwelling law (although it is most 
often unknown to the creatures in whom it resides), whence pro- 
ceed all actions and all passions. The first appears to be the 
doctrine of the authors of the system of Occasional Causes, and 
especially of the very ingenious Malebranche; the latter is 
received (and as I believe rightly) as the most true. 

6. And in truth since this past decree does not exist at present, 
it can produce nothing now unless it then left after it some perdur- 
ing effect, which now still continues and operates. And he 
who thinks otherwise renounces, if I judge rightly, all distinct 
explanation of things ; and it can be said that anything is, by an 
equal title, the result of anything, if that which is absent in space 



ON NATURE IjST ITSELF. 123 

and time can without intermedium operate here and now. Thus 
it is not sufficient to say that in creating things in the beginning- 
God willed that they should observe a certain law in their progress, 
if his will is conceived to have been so inefficacious that things 
were not affected by it and no lasting effect was produced in them. 
And assuredly it is contrary to the notion of the divine power and 
will, which is pure and absolute, that God should will and never- 
theless in willing produce or change nothing; that he is always 
acting and never effecting; that in a word he leaves no work or 
cnroTeXeo-fAa. Without doubt, if nothing was impressed on 
creatures by this divine word, "Let the earth bring forth, let the 
animals multiply" ; if after it things were not affected otherwise 
than if no command intervened, it follows (since there must be 
between the cause and the effect a certain connection, either 
immediate or mediate), either that nothing takes place now con- 
formably to this mandate or that this mandate effecting so much 
in the present must be always renewed in the future, a consequence 
which the learned author, with reason, repels. But if, on the con- 
trary, the law decreed by God left some trace of itself impressed 
on things ; if things were so formed by the mandate as to render 
them fit to accomplish the will of the legislator, then it must 
be admitted that a certain efficacy, form or force, such as we are 
accustomed to call by the name of nature, is impressed on things, 
whence proceeds the series of phenomena according to the pre- 
scription of the first command. 

1. But this indwelling force may. indeed be conceived dis- 
tinctly but not explained by images ; nor, certainly, ought it to be 
so explained any more than the nature of the soul, for force is one 
of those things which are not to be grasped by the imagination but 
by the understanding. Thus, when the author of the apologetic 
dissertation (Chap. 4, § 6) asks that the manner in which indwell- 
ing law operates in bodies ignorant of this law be explained to him 
by the imagination, I understand him to desire to have an 
explanation of it through the understanding; for otherwise, it 
might be believed that he demanded that sounds be painted and 
colors heard. Furthermore, if the difficulty of ex23laining things 
is sufficient for rejecting them, he therefore merits the imputation 



124 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

which he himself (Chap. 1, § 2) repels as unjust, of preferring to 
decide that everything is moved merely by a divine virtue rather 
than to admit, under the name of nature, something the nature of 
which is unknown to him. And certainly even Hobbes and others 
could claim with equal right that all things are corporeal, because 
they are persuaded that only bodies can be explained distinctly and 
by the imagination. But they themselves are justly refuted by the 
very fact that there is in things a power of acting which is not 
derived from imageable things, but merely to trace this to a man- 
date of God, which once given, in no wise affects things nor leaves 
any effect after it, so far from clearing up the difficulty, is rather 
to renounce the role of the philosopher and to cut the Gordian 
knot with the sword. For the rest, a more distinct and correct 
explanation of active force than has up to this time been given, 
may be drawn from our Dynamics, in which we give an interpre- 
tation of the laws of nature and of motion, which is true and in 
accordance with things. 

8. But if some defender of the new philosophy which intro- 
duces the inertia and torpor of things, goes so far as to take away 
from the commands of God all durable effect and all efficacy for 
the future, and has no scruples in requiring of God incessantly 
renewed efforts (that which Sturm prudently declares he is averse 
to) , he himself may see how worthy he thinks this of God ; more- 
over, he could not be excused unless he offered an explanation of 
why things themselves can last some time but the attributes of 
things which we understand under the name of nature cannot be 
lastiug ; why it may not be, furthermore, according to reason that 
just as the word fiat left something after it, namely, the persisting 
thing itself, so the not less admirable word of blessing has left also 
after it in things a certain fecundity or virtue of producing their 
acts and of operating, whence, if there is no obstacle, the operation 
results. That which I have explained elsewhere might be added to 
this if perchance it is not yet perfectly clear to all, that the very 
substance of things consists in their power of acting and suffering, 
whence it follows that not even durable things can be produced if 
a force of some permanence cannot be imprinted upon them by the 
divine power. Thus it would follow that no created substance, no 



ON NATURE IN ITSELF. 125 

soul, would remain numerically the same; that nothing would be 
preserved by God, and consequently that all things would be only 
certain passing or evanescent modifications, and, so to speak, 
apparitions, of one permanent divine substance; and, what 
amounts to the same thing, that nature itself or the substance of all 
things, would be God; a pernicious doctrine, recently introduced 
into the world or renewed by a subtle but profane author. In 
truth, if corporeal things contained nothing but matter 
it would be quite true to say that they are in a flux and have 
nothing substantial, as the Platonists formerly very well 
recognized. 

9. Another question is whether we must say that creatures 
properly and truly act. This question is included in the first if we 
once understand that the indwelling nature does not differ from 
the power of acting and suffering. For there cannot be action with- 
out the power of acting, and on the other hand that potency is 
worthless which can never be exercised. Since, however, action 
and potency are none the less different things, the first successive, 
the second lasting, let us consider the action. Here, I confess, I 
find no little difficulty in explaining the thought of the learned 
Sturm. For he denies that created things act properly and of 
themselves, and, nevertheless soon after, while admitting that they 
act, he does not wish that the comparison of creatures to an ax 
moved by a wood-cutter be attributed to him. I cannot draw from 
this anything certain nor do I find explained with sufficient clear- 
ness to what extent he recedes from the received opinions, or what 
distinct notion he has conceived in his mind of action, which, &s 
the debates of the metaphysicians attest, is far from being obvious 
and simple. As for me, as far as I seem to have grasped the notion 
of action, the doctrine generally received in philosophy, that 
actions belong to subjects, follows from it and is established by it; 
and I think that this principle is so true that it may be inverted ; 
so that not only is everything which acts a particular substance, 
but also every particular substance acts without cessation, not even 
excepting body itself, in which no absolute rest is ever found. 

10. But let us now examine a little more attentively the opin- 
ion of those who take away from created things true and individual 



126 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

action; a thing which Robert Fludd, author of the Philosophia 
Mosaica, formerly did, and also now some Cartesians do who think 
that it is not at all the things which act, but indeed God, on occa- 
sion of things and according to the aptitude of things ; and thus 
things are occasions not causes ; they receive, but do not effect or 
produce. After Cordemoi, de La Forge and other Cartesians had 
proposed this doctrine, Malebranche, with his superior mind, lent 
it the lustre of his style ; but no one, in my opinion, has presented 
solid proofs. Certainly if this doctrine is pushed to the point of 
suppressing even the immanent actions of substances (a view which 
the illustrious Sturm in his Select Physics, Bk. I, ch. iv, Epilo., 
§ 11, p. 176, rightly rejects, and in this he gives proof of much 
circumspection), then nothing in the world appears to be more 
contrary to reason. In truth, who will question that the mind 
thinks and wills, and that many thoughts and volitions in us are 
elicited from ourselves, and that we are endowed with spontaneity ? 
This would be not only to deny human liberty and to make God 
the cause of evil, but also to contradict the testimony of our 
inmost experience and of our conscience ; through which we feel 
that those things are ours, which, without any kind of reason, our 
adversaries would transfer to God. But if we attribute to our 
soul the indwelling power of producing immanent actions, or, 
what is the same thing, of acting immanently, then nothing 
hinders, on the contrary, it is conformable to reason, that this same 
power should reside in other animated beings or forms, or, if you 
prefer, in the nature of substances ; but if some one should think 
that in the nature of things as known to us only our souls are 
active, or that . all power of acting immanently, and so to speak 
vitally, is joined with intellect, such assertions certainly rest on no 
ground, .and can be defended only in opposition to the truth. As 
to what is to be believed concerning the transient actions of 
creatures, that will be explained better in another place, and has, 
in part, already been explained by us elsewhere: that is to say, 
the communication of substances or of monads has its source not in 
influx but in a concord proceeding from divine preformation : each 
substance, at the same time, that it follows the indwelling power 
and laws of its own nature, being accommodated to the others ; and 
it is in this that the union of the soul and body consists. 



OlST NATURE IN" itself. 



127 



11. Moreover, tliat bodies are of themselves inert is true if it 
is rightly understood, to this extent, namely, that what is, for any 
reason, once assumed to be at rest cannot set itself in motion or 
allow itself without resistance to be set in motion by another body ; 
any more than it can of itself change the rate of velocity or the 
direction which it once has, or allow it easily and without resis- 
tance to be changed by another body. And also it must be con- 
fessed that extension, or what is geometrical in body if taken sim- 
ply, has nothing in it which can give rise to action and to motion ; 
on the contrary, matter rather resists motion by a certain natural 
inertia, as Kepler has well called it, so that it is not indifferent 
to motion and rest, as is generally thought, but it needs in order to 
move an active force proportionate to its size. Wherefore I make 
the very notion of materia prima, or of mass, which is always the 
same in body and proportioned to its size, consist in this very 
passive force of resistance (involving impenetrability and some- 
thing more) ; and hence, I show that entirely different laws of 
motion follow than if there were in body and in matter itself 
only impenetrability together with extension; and that, as there 
is in matter a natural inertia opposed to motion, so in body itself, 

and what is more, in every substance, there is a natural constancy 

opposed to change. But this doctrine does not defend, but rather 
opposes, those who deny action to things; for just as certain 
as it is that matter of itself does not begin motion, so certain 
is it (as very fine experiments on the motion communicated 
by a moving body show) that body retains of itself the 
impetus which it has once acquired, and that it is constant 
in its mobility or makes an effort to persevere in that very series 
of changes which it has entered on. As these activities and 
entelechies cannot be modifications of primary matter or of mass, 
a thing essentially passive, as was recognized by the very judicious 
Sturm himself (as we shall see in the following paragraph), it may 
be inferred that there must be found in corporeal substance a first 
entelechy or irpoirov Se/e™%oV for activity; that is, a primitive 
moving force which being joined to extension (or what is purely 
geometrical) and to mass (or what is purely material) always 
indeed acts but nevertheless, in consequence of the meeting of 
bodies, is variously modified through efforts and impetus. And it 



128 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LELBXITZ. 

is this same substantial principle which is called soul in living 
beings, and substantial form in others : and so far as by its union 
with matter it constitutes a substance truly one, or one per se, it 
forms what I call a monad: since if these true and real unities are 
taken away only beings by aggregation will remain ; nay, rather, 
it follows from this, that there will be no real entities in bodies. 
For although there are atoms of substance given, that is, our 
monads without parts, there are no atoms of mass, i. e., of the small- 
est extension, or ultimate elements, since the continuous cannot be 
formed of points. In short, no being is given which is the greatest 
in mass or infinite in extension, although there may always be 
some larger than others : but a being is given which is the greatest 
by intension of perfections or infinite in power. 

"12. I see. however, that in this same apologetic dissertation, 
ch. IV, § 7 et seq., the celebrated Sturm has undertaken to attack 
by certain arguments the moving force residing in bodies. "I 
shall abundantly here prove," he says, "that corporeal substance 
is not even capable of any actively moving potency." But I do not 
understand what a power not actively moving can be. Moreover, 
he says that he will employ two arguments, one drawn from the 
nature of matter and of body, the other from the nature of motion. 
The first amounts to this, that matter, in its nature and essentially;, 
is a passive substance ; and that thus it is no more possible to give 
it active force than it is for God to will that a stone, as long as it 
remains a stone, shall be living and rational, that is, not a stone; 
further, whatever qualities are posited in bodies are but modifica- 
tions of matter, moreover (what I acknowledge is well said), a 
modification of a thing essentially passive cannot render this thing 
active. But it is easy to reply with the received and true philoso- 
phy that matter is to be understood as secondary or as primary; 
the secondary is a certain complete but not purely passive sub- 
stance; the primary is purely passive but not complete, and conse- 
quently there must be added to it a soul, or form analogous to the 
soul, a primary ev-eke-^eLa , that is, a certain effort or primitive 
power of acting, which is itself the indwelling law imprinted by 
divine decree. I do not think that such a view is repugnant to the 
illustrious and ino-enious man who latelv maintained that bodv is 



ON" NATURE IN ITSELF. 129 

composed of matter and of spirit ; provided that spirit is taken not 
for an intelligent thing (as in other cases is done) but for a soul 
or form analogous to the soul ; not for a simple modification, but 
for something constituent, substantial and perduring, which I am 
accustomed to call monad, and which possesses a sort of perception 
and desire. Therefore this received doctrine, agreeing with the 
favorably explained dogma of the schoolmen, must be first refuted, 
in order that the argument of this illustrious man may have any 
weight. Whence also it is evident that we cannot admit, what he 
assumes, that whatever is in corporeal substance is but a modifica- 
tion of matter. For it is well known that according to received 
philosophy there are in the bodies of living beings souls which 
assuredly are not modifications. For although the illustrious man 
appears to maintain the contrary and to take away from the brutes 
all feeling, in the true meaning of the word, and soul, properly 
speaking, nevertheless, he cannot assume this opinion as the 
foundation of his demonstration until it itself has been proved. 
And I believe, on the contrary, that it is consistent neither with the 
order nor the beauty nor the reason of things, that this vital or 
immanently active principle should be only in a small part of 
matter, when greater perfection demands that it be in all. !Nor 
does aught hinder souls, or at least forms analogous to souls, from 
being everywhere, although the dominant, and hence intelligent, 
souls, like the human, cannot be everywhere. 

13. The second argument, which the illustrious Sturm draws 
from the nature of motion, does not appear to me to be necessarily 
conclusive. He says that motion is only the successive existence of 
the thing in different places. Let us grant this provisionally, 
although we are not at all satisfied with it, and although it 
expresses rather the result of motion than its so-called formal 
reason; nevertheless moving force is not thus excluded. For a 
body is not only at the actual moment of its motion in a place 
commensurate to it, but it has also a tendency or effort to change 
its place so that the succeeding state follows of itself from the 
present by the force of nature; otherwise at the actual moment, 
and hence at any moment, a body A, which is in motion, would in 
no wise differ from a body B, which is at rest ; and from the 



130 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

opinion of the illustrious man, were ! it contrary to ours on 
this point, it would follow that there would be no difference 
whatever in bodies, because in the fullness of a mass in 
itself uniform no "other difference can be assumed than that 
which respects the motion. Finally, it would further follow 
that there would be absolutely no variation in bodies, and 
that they would remain always in the same state. For if 
any portion of matter does not differ from another equal to and 
like it (which the illustrious Sturm must admit, since he does away 
with active forces, impulses, and all other qualities and modifica- 
tions, except existence in this place, which would be successively 
another and another) ; if moreover the state at one instant does 
not differ from the state at another instant except by the transposi- 
tion of portions of matter, equal and similar, and at every point 
fitting to each other, it evidently follows that, on account of the 
perpetual substitution of indiscernible things, it will be absolutely 
impossible to distinguish the states in the world of bodies at differ- 
ent moments. In truth, it would only be an extrinsic denomina- 
tion by which one part of matter would be distinguished from 
another, that is, by the future, namely, that it would be later 
in another and still another place ; but for the present state, there 
is no difference; and not even from the future could a well 
founded difference be drawn, because we could even later never 
arrive at any true present difference, since by no mark can one 
place be distinguished from another place, nor (on the hypothesis 
of the perfect uniformity in matter itself) matter from other 
matter of the same place. In vain also would we after motion 
have resort to figure. In a mass perfectly similar, indistinguish- 
able and full, there arises no figure, nor limit and distinction of 
various parts, except from the motion itself. If then motion does 
not contain any mark of distinction it will impart none to figure ; 
and as everything which is substituted for that which was, is 
perfectly equivalent, no one, even were he omniscient, could grasp 
the least indication of change, and consequently everything will be 
just as if no change and no distinction occurred in bodies: and 
we could never in this way account for the diverse appearances 
which we perceive. And it would be as if we should imagine two 
perfect concentric spheres, perfectly similar in themselves and 



ON NATURE IN ITSELF. 



131 



in all their parts, one of which should be enclosed in the other 
so that not the least aperture should be left: then, if we suppose 
that the inner sphere is either in motion or at rest, not even an 
angel, to say nothing more, will be able to perceive any difference 
between the states at different times, and will have no sign by 
which to distinguish whether the inner sphere is at rest or in 
motion and according to what law the motion is. Moreover, not 
even the boundary of the spheres can be defined, because of the 
want both of aperture and of difference ; just as in this case motion 
cannot be noticed because of the lack of difference. Whence 
it must be considered as certain (although those who have not suffi- 
ciently penetrated into these things have little noticed it) that such 
things are foreign to the nature and order of things, and that (what 
is among the number of my new and greater axioms) there is 
/ nowhere any perfect similarity ; whence it follows also that we 
find in nature neither corpuscles of an extreme hardness, nor a 
fluid of an extreme tenuity, nor subtile matter universally diffused, 
nor ultimate elements, called by some by the name of primary or 
secondary. It is, I believe, because he had understood something 
of this, that Aristotle, more profound in my opinion than many 
think, judged that in addition to local change there was need of 
alteration, and that matter would remain invariable. Moreover, 
this dissimilarity or diversity of qualities, and hence this aXXotWt? 
or alteration, which Aristotle did not sufficiently explain, comes 
from the diverse degrees and directions of efforts, and so from the 
modifications of indwelling monads. We can understand by this 
that there must necessarily be posited in bodies something 
besides a uniform mass. Certainly, those who hold to atoms and 
a vacuum diversify matter at least in some degree by making it 
here divisible, there indivisible, full in one place, porous in 
another. But for a long time now I have understood (by laying 
aside the prejudices of youth) that atoms together with vacuum 
must be rejected. The celebrated author adds that the existence of 
matter through diverse moments is to be attributed to the divine 
will ; why not then, he says, attribute to the same its existence here 
and now ? I reply, that this, like all other things in so far as they 
involve some perfection, must undoubtedly be attributed to God ; 



132 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

but just as this universal first cause which preserves all things 
does not destroy, but rather produces, the natural permanence, 
or once granted perseverance in existence, of the thing which 
begins to exist; so it will not destroy but rather strengthen the 
natural efficacy, or perseverance in action once communicated, of 
the thing set in motion. 

14. Many other things are met with in this apologetic disser- 
tation which present difficulties, as what is said in chapter IY, § 11, 
concerning motion transmitted from one ball to another through 
several intermediaries, that the last ball is moved by the same force 
by which the first is moved, whereas, it seems to me, it is moved by 
an equivalent but not the same force ; for (what may appear sur- 
prising), each ball repelled by the next impinging it is set in 
motion by its own force, viz., its elasticity. (I do not here discuss 
at all the cause of this elasticity, nor do I deny that it ought to be 
explained mechanically by the movement of an indwelling and 
unstable fluid.) So also it will rightly seem surprising when he 
says, § 12, that a thing which cannot set itself in motion cannot 

/"of itself continue the motion. For it is evident rather that, as there 

\ is need of force to communicate motion, so, when the impulse is 

) once given, so far from there being need of a new force to continue 

\ it there "is rather need of a new force to stop it. For the question 

V here is not of that preservation of motion by means of a universal 

cause necessary to things, which, as we have remarked, could not 

destroy the efficiency of things without taking away their existence. 

15. By this it will be again perceived that the doctrine of 
occasional causes defended by some (unless it be explained in such 
a way as to admit of modifications which the illustrious Sturm has 
in part admitted and in part seems disposed to admit), is subject 
to dangerous consequences which are certainly not agreeable to its 
very learned defenders. For so far is it from augmenting the 
glory of God by doing away with the idola of nature, that on the 
contrary, by resolving all created things into simple modifications 
of a single divine substance, it seems, with Spinoza, to make of 
God the very nature of things ; since that which does not act, that 
which lacks active force, that which is deprived of distinctive 
mark, and finally, of all reason and ground of permanence, can in 



OK NATURE IN ITSELF. 133 

no wise be a substance. I am thoroughly persuaded that the illus- 
trious Sturm, a man remarkable for his piety and learning, is very 
far removed from these monstrosities. Thus there is no doubt 
but that he will either have to show clearly that there remains in 
things some substance, or even some variation, without prejudice 
to his doctrine, or he will have to accept the truth. 

16. I have many reasons for suspecting that I have not suffi- 
ciently grasped his meaning, nor he mine. He has somewhere 
admitted to me that a certain portion of divine power (that is, I 
think, an expression, imitation, proximate effect; for the divine 
force itself can certainly not be divided into parts) can and even in 
a way must be regarded as possessed by and attributed to things. 
What he has transmitted to me and what he has repeated in his 
Select Physics, may be seen in the passage which I quoted at the 
beginning of this essay. If this be interpreted (as the terms seem 
to imply) in the sense in which we speak of the soul as a portion of 
the divine breath, then there is no longer any controversy between 
us. But what prevents me from affirming that such is his meaning, 
is that nowhere else do I see him propounding anything like it, nor 
advancing any deductions from it. I notice on the contrary, that 
his general views are little in harmony with this opinion, and that 
his apologetic dissertation goes into everything else. When indeed 
my views concerning indwelling force were first published in the 
month of March, 1694, in the Acta Eruditorum of Leipzig (views 
which my Essay on Dynamics published in the same in April, 
1695, farther developed), he addressed to me by letter certain 
objections ; but after having received my reply, he decided in a 
very friendly way that the only difference between us was in the 
manner of expressing ourselves. When I, remarking this, had 
brought some other things to his attention, he turning about 
declared there were many differences between us, which I recog- 
nized : and finally, these having been removed, he wrote me anew 
that there was no difference between us except in terms, a thing 
very agreeable to me. I have, therefore, wished, on the occasion 
of the recent apologetic dissertation, to so explain the matter that 
finally the opinion of each one of us and the truth of the same may 
the more easily be established. For the illustrious author possesses, 



131 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

moreover, such rare penetration and clearness of exposition, that I 
hope that no little light will be thrown by his zeal on this great sub- 
ject. And consequently this work of mine will not be useless 
because it furnishes him the opportunity, with his wonted talent 
and force of judgment, to examine and to explain some things of 
importance in the present subject, which have up to this time been 
omitted by authors and by me. But these things will be supple- 
mented, if I am not mistaken, by new, more profound, and more 
comprehensive principles, whence perhaps may come, some day, 
a reconstructed and amended system of philosophy midway 
between the formal and the material (and properly uniting and 
preserving both) . 



XXI. 

Ethical Definitions. 1697-1698. 

[From the French.] 

As to charity or disinterested love, on which I see embarrassing 
disputes have arisen, I think that one could not extricate one's self 
better than by giving a true definition of love. I believe that 
in the preface to the work [Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium] 
which is known to you, sir, I have formerly so done in noting the 
source of justice. For Justice is fundamentally nothing else than 
charity conformed to wisdom. Charity is universal benevolence. 
Benevolence is a disposition or inclination to love and it has the 
same relation to love that habit has to act. And Love is this act or 
active state of the soul which makes us find our pleasure in the 
happiness or satisfaction of others. This definition, as I have since 
noted, is capable of solving the enigma of disinterested love, and of 
distinguishing it from the bonds of interest or debauchery. I 
remember that in a conversation, which I had several years ago with 

the Count and other friends, in which human love alone was 

spoken of, this difficulty was considered, and my solution was 
found satisfactory. When one loves a person sincerely one does 
not seek one's own advantage or a pleasure severed from that of 
the beloved person, but one seeks one's pleasure in the contentment 
and in the felicity of this person. And if this felicity did not 
please in itself, but merely because of an advantage resulting there- 
from to us, this would no longer be pure and sincere love. It must 
be then that pleasure is immediately found in this felicity, and 
that grief is found in the unhappiness of the beloved person. For 
whatever produces pleasure immediately through itself is also 
desired for itself, as constituting (at least in part) the end of our 
wishes, and as something which enters into our own felicity and 
gives us satisfaction. 

This serves to reconcile two truths which appear incompatible ; 
for we do all for our own good, and it is impossible for us to have 
other feelings whatever we may say. Nevertheless we do not yet 



136 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

love altogether purely, .when we seek the good of the beloved object 
not for itself and because it itself pleases us, but because of an 
advantage which we foresee from it. But it is apparent from the 
notion of love which we have just given that we seek at the same 
time our good for ourselves and the good of the beloved object for 
it itself, when the good of this object is immediately, finally 
(ultimato) and through itself our end, our pleasure and our good; 
as happens in regard to all the things wished for because they are 
pleasing in themselves, and are consequently good of themselves, 
even if one should have no regard to consequences ; these are ends 
and not means. 

]STow divine love is infinitely above the loves of creatures, for 
other objects worthy of being loved constitute in fact part of our 
contentment or our happiness, in so far as their perfection touches 
us, while on the other hand the felicity of God does not compose a 
part of our happiness, but the whole. He is its source and not its 
accessory, and since the pleasures of lovable earthly objects can 
injure by their consequences, only the pleasure taken in the enjoy- 
ment of the divine perfections is surely and absolutely good, with- 
out danger or excess being possible. 

These considerations show in what the true disinterestedness of 
pure love consists, which cannot be severed from our own content- 
ment and felicity, as M. de la Trappe has well remarked, because 
our true felicity embraces essentially the knowledge of the felicity 
of God and of the divine perfections, that is to say, the love of 
God. And consequently it is impossible to prefer one to the other 
by a thought founded in distinct notions. And to wish to sever 
one's self from one's self and from one's own good is to play with 
words; or if you wish to go to the effects, it is to fall into an 
extravagant quietism, it is to desire a stupid, or rather affected and 
simulated inaction in which under pretext of resignation and of the 
annihilation of the soul swallowed up in God, one may go to liber- 
tinism in practice, or at least to a hidden speculative atheism, such 
as that of Averroes and of others more ancient, who taught that our 
soul finally lost itself in the universal spirit, and that this is perfect 
union with God. — Extract from a letter to Nicaise, 1697. 



ETHICAL DEFINITION'S. 137 

The error concerning pure love appears to be a misunderstand- 
ing, which as I have already said to you, sir, comes perhaps from 
not paying sufficient attention to forming definitions of terms. 

To love truly and disinterestedly is nothing else than to be led 
to find pleasure in the perfections or in the felicity of the object, 
and consequently to experience grief in what may be contrary to 
these perfections. This love has properly for its object subjects 
susceptible of felicity; but some resemblance of this is found as 
regards objects which have perfections without being aware of it, 
as for example, a beautiful picture. He who finds pleasure in con- 
templating it and would find pain in seeing it ruined even if it 
should belong to another, would love it, so to speak, with a disin- 
terested love. This could not be said of another who should 
merely have in view gain in selling it or the winning of applause 
by showing it, without further caring whether or not it were 
ruined when it should no longer belong to him. This shows that 
pleasure and action cannot be taken away from love without 
destroying it, and that M. des Preaux in the beautiful verses which 
you sent me, was right both in recommending the importance of 
the divine love and in opposing a love which is chimerical and 
without effect. I have explained my definition in the preface of 
my Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium (published before these 
new disputes arose) , because I had need of it in order to give the 
definition of Justice, which in my opinion is nothing but charity 
regulated according to wisdom. ISTow Charity being a universal 
benevolence, and Benevolence being a habit of loving, it was 
necessary to define what it is to love. And since to love is to have 
a feeling which makes us find pleasure in what conduces to the 
happiness of the beloved object, and since wisdom (which makes 
the rule of justice) is nothing but the science of happiness, I 
showed by this analysis that happiness is the basis of justice, and 
that those who would give the true elements of jurisprudence, 
which I do not find laid down as they should be, ought to begin by 
establishing the science of happiness, which does not yet appear 
well determined, although books on Ethics are full of discourses on 
blessedness or the sovereign good. 

As pleasure, which is nothing but the feeling of rare perfec- 
tion, is one of the principal points of happiness, which in turn 



138 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

consists in a lasting condition of possession of what is necessary in 
order to taste pleasure, it were to be desired that the science of 
pleasures which the late M. Lautin meditated had been com- 
pleted. — Extract from a letter to Xieaise, 1698. 

[The following Ethical Definitions, translated from the Latin, are undated.] 

Justice is the charity of the wise. 

Charity is general benevolence. 

Benevolence is the habit of love. 

To love anyone is to delight in his happiness. 

Wisdom is the science of happiness. 

Happiness is durable joy. 

Joy is a state of pleasure. 

Pleasure or delight is a sense of perfection, that is, a sense of 
something which helps or which sustains some power. 

He is perfected whose power is augmented or helped. 

Demonstrate this Hypothesis elsewhere : 

The world is governed by the wisest and most powerful of rnon- 
archs, whom we call God. 

Propositions. 

The end or aim of God is his own joy or love of himself. 

God created creatures, and especially those endowed with mind, 
for his own glory or from love of himself. 

God created all things in accordance with the greatest harmony 
or beauty possible. 

God loves all. 

God bestows on all as much as is possible. 

Xeither hatred, nor wrath, nor sadness, nor envy, belong to God. 

God loves to be loved or those loving him. 

God loves souls in proportion to the perfection which he has 
given to each of them. 

The perfection of the universe, or harmony of things, does not 
allow all minds to be equally perfect. 

The question why God has given to one mind more perfection 
than to another, is among senseless questions, as if you should ask 
whether the foot is too large or the shoe pinching the foot is too 
small. And this is a mystery, ignorance of which has obscured the 
whole doctrine of the predestination and justice of God. 



ETHICAL DEFINITIONS. 139 

He who does not obey God is not the friend of God. 

He who obeys God from fear is not yet the friend of God. 

He who loves God above all things is at length the friend of 
God. 

He who does not seek the common good does not obey God. 

He who does not seek the glory of God does not obey God. 

He who at the same time seeks the glory of God and the 
common good obeys God. 

He who does not in his acts recognize God does not sufficiently 
love God. 

He who is displeased by some things in the acts of God does not 
think God perfect. 

He who thinks God does some things from absolute good 
pleasure, having no reason, or from irrational or indifferent 
liberty, does not think God perfect. 

He who thinks God acts in the best possible way acknowledges 
that God is perfect. 

Whoever does not delight in the contemplation of the divine per- 
fection does not love God. 

All creatures serve the felicity or glory of God in the degree of 
their perfection. 

Whoever against his will serves the felicity of God does not love 
God. 

Whoever places his own felicity in relation with the divine 
felicity, loves himself and loves finally God. 

He who loves God endeavors to learn his will. 

He who loves God obeys God's will. 

He who loves God loves all. 

Every wise man endeavors to do good to all. 

Every wise man does good to many. 

Every wise man is a friend of God. 

The wiser one is the happier he is. 

Every wise man is just. 

Every just man is happy. 



XXII. 

Ox THE CAETESIAX DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF GoD. 

1700-1. 

[From the French.] 

In truth metaphysics is natural theology, and the same God who 
is the source of all good is also the principle of all knowledge. 
This is because the idea, of God embraces that of absolute being, 
that is to say, what is simple in our thoughts, from which all that 
we think takes its origin. Descartes had not considered the -matter 
from this side; he gives two ways of proving the existence of 
God : the first is, that there is in us an idea of God, since we 
undoubtedly think of God and since we cannot think of anything 
without having the idea of it. Xow if we have an idea of God 
and if it is a true one, that is, if it is of an infinite being and if it 
represents it faithfully, it cannot be caused by anything less, and 
consequently God himself must be its cause. He must therefore 
exist. The other argument is still shorter. It is that God is a 
being which possesses all perfections and consequently possesses 
existence which is in the number of perfections ; hence he exists. 
It must be confessed that these arguments are a little suspicious 
because they advance too quickly and do violence to us without 
enlightening us ; whereas true demonstrations are wont to fill the 
mind with some solid nourishment. However it is difficult to find 
the knot of the matter, and I see that a number of able men who 
have made objection to Descartes have passed this by. 

Some have believed that there is no idea of God because he is 
not subject to the imagination, supposing that idea and image are 
the same thing. I am not of their opinion, and I well know that 
there is an idea of thought and of existence and of similar things 
of which there is no image. For we think of something and when 
we remark what made us recognize it, this, so far as it is in our 
soul, is the idea of the thing. This is why there is also an idea of 
what is not material or imaginable. 

Others admit that there is an idea of God, and that this idea 
embraces all perfections, but they cannot understand how existence 



THE OjSTTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 141 

follows from it : be it because they do not admit that existence is 
of the number of perfections, or because they do not see how a 
simple idea or thought can imply existence outside of us. For 
myself I well believe that he who has acknowledged this idea of 
God and who fully sees that existence is a perfection, ought to 
avow that this perfection belongs to God. In fact I do not doubt 
the idea of God any more than his existence, on the contrary, I 
claim that I have a demonstration of it ; but I would not that we 
natter ourselves and pursuade ourselves that we could succeed in 
so great a matter at so little cost. Paralogisms are dangerous in 
this matter; when they are not successful they rebound upon 
ourselves and strengthen the opposite party. I say then that we 
must prove with all imaginable accuracy that there is an idea of 
an all-perfect being, that is to say of God. It is true that the 
objections of those who think that they can prove the contrary 
because there is no image of God are as I have just shown worth- 
less ; but it must also be confessed that the proof which Descartes 
offers for establishing the idea of God is imperfect. How, he will 
say, can we speak of God without thinking of him. And could we 
think of God without having the idea of him ? Yes, undoubtedly, 
we sometimes think of impossible things, and this has even been 
demonstrated; for example, Descartes held that the quadrature 
of the circle is impossible, and yet we do not cease to think of it and 
to draw consequences as to what would happen if it were possible. 
Motion of ultimate swiftness is impossible in any body whatever 
for if it were supposed in a circle, for example, another concentric 
circle, surrounding the first and attached firmly to it, would be 
moved with a velocity still greater than the first, which conse- 
quently is not of the ultimate degree, contrary to what we have 
supposed. All this to the contrary notwithstanding, we think of 
this ultimate swiftness which has no idea since it is impossible. So 
the greatest of all circles is an impossible thing, and a number 
made up of all possible units is no less so: there is proof of it. 
And nevertheless we think of all this. This is why there is cer- 
tainly room to doubt whether the idea of the greatest of all slurs 
is to be trusted and whether it does not involve some contradiction ; 
for I well understand, for example, the nature of motion and of 



112 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

swiftness, and what greatest is. But for all that I do not under- 
stand whether all this is compatible and whether there is a way 
of joining all this and making therefrom an idea of the greatest 
swiftness of which motion is capable. So although I know what 
star is. and what largest and most perfect are. nevertheless. I do 
not yet know whether there is not a hidden contradiction in join- 
ing all these together, as there is in fact in the other examples 
mentioned. That is to say. in a word. I do not know for all this 
whether such a star is possible: for if it were not there would 
be no idea of it. However, I confess, that God in this respect has 
a great advantage over all other things. For it is sufficient to prove 
that he is possible, to prove that he exists, a thing not encountered 
anvwhere else that I know of. Furthermore I infer from this 
that there is a presumption that God exists, for there is always a 
presumption on the side of possibility: that is to say. everything 
is held to be possible until its impossibility is proved. There is 
therefore also a presumption that God is possible, that is. that he 
exists, since in him existence is a consequence of the possibility. 
This may suffice for practical life but it is not sufficient for a 
demonstration. I have disputed much on this point with several 
Cartesians, but. finally. I have gotten some of the more able to 
frankly confess, after having understood the force of my argu- 
ments, that this possibility was still to be demonstrated. There 
are even some who after being challenged by me have undertaken 
to demonstrate this but they have not yet accomplished it. — 
Extract from an undated letter to (probably i the Grand Duchess 
Sophia. 



I have not yet seen the work published at Basle in the year 1699, 
entitled Judicium de argumento Cartcsii pro existentia Dei petito 
ab ejus idea-: but having formerly casually examined the same 
argument in an essay On Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, inserted in 
the Acta of Lepzig. in the year 16 SI. I am curious to read what 
an able man says in the Histoire des Outrages des Savants. May. 
1700, in favor of the arguments of Descartes and against the Latin 
work published at Basle. And I will say to you, sir. that I hold a 
position midway between the work and the reply. The author of 



THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 143 

the work believes that the argument is a sophism, the author of the 
reply considers it a demonstration, and I" myself believe that it is 
an imperfect argument which tacitly takes for granted a proposi- 
tion the proof of which, if added, would complete the demonstra- 
tion. Thus the argument is not to be despised ; it is at least a good 
beginning. Est aliquid prodire tenus, si non datiir ultra. 

Geometricians, who are the true masters of the art of reasoning, 
have seen that in order that demonstrations drawn from definitions 
may be good, it is necessary to prove, or at last postulate, that the 
notion embraced in the definition is possible. This is why Euclid 
placed among his postidata, that the circle is something possible, in 
asking that a circle, the center and radius of which are given, be 
described. The same precaution holds good in every sort of rea- 
soning, and particularly in the argument of Anselm, archbishop of 
Canterbury (in Liber contra insipientem) , quoted and examined 
by St. Thomas and other scholastics, and renewed by Descartes, 
which proves that God, being the greatest or most perfect being, 
embraces that perfection called existence, and that consequently he 
exists. To this it may be said that the reasoning is sound, suppos- 
ing that the being sovereignly perfect or which embraces all per- 
fections, is possible; and that it is the privilege of the divine 
nature (ens a se) that its essence comprises existence, that is, that 
it exists provided it is possible. And even omitting all mention 
of perfection it may be said that if necessary being is possible it 
exists. This is undoubtedly the most beautiful and the most 
important of modal propositions, because it furnishes a passage 
from possibility to actuality, and it is solely here that a posse ad 
esse valet consequentia. Also herein is found the principle of 
existences. 

The author of the work opposes an example to Descartes, in 
reasoning as he does and reaching a false conclusion, for he says 
that existence is contained in the idea of a very perfect body (or 
one which comprises all perfection) , hence such a body exists. To 
this, in my opinion, reply must be made that the idea of a very 
perfect body in this sense is impossible, for a body being limited by 
its essence cannot include all perfections. The work and the reply 
give themselves up a little too much to the terms and distinctions of 
essence and existence, real (or formal) and objective, whither I do 



14ri PHTLOSOPHICAl WOBKS OF XHIB^ITZ. 

not think it necessary to follow them.. It is sufficient to remark 
thaT The author of tie work, having proposed to hims elf the reason- 
ing of those who say thai God must necessarily exist because it is 
not impossible thai God be, has Touched the essential point and has 
replied by no means hadly that it does not follow that a thing is 

-iole because we do not see its impossibility, our knowledge 
being limited. But tMs might have led him to think thaT The 
argument is not a sophism, and thaT those who have proposed it 
have erred only in concealing what they presuppose, instead of 
following the example of the geometricians, who have penetration 
and sincerity enough to see and expressly indicate the axioms and 

stnlates >f which they have need and which they presuppose 

The author of the reply, as far as I can undersTand him, does 
not enTer sufficiently inTo This: he has good reason, p. 211, for 
rejecting this limitation: that wholly perfect being includes ea . - 
ence if it be supposed thai there is a wholly perfect being, that is to 
say an actual being. But if we understand it thus : if it be sup- 
posed thai there is a wholly perfect being possible or among 
e > > s . the limitation is good. He is right in saying that it is not 
permissible to doubt things which are known to us, under the pre- 
text that our knowledge is limited. But this does not appear to 
be the meaning of the author of the work. I have already 
remarked in my - before mentioned, that the true mark of 
perfectly distinct knowledge is ThaT The possibility of the notion 
in question can be proved a priori. Thus he is fundamentally 
g here in attributing to himself a clear and distinct notion 
when he cannot verify it by The mark which is essential to it. The 
example of the proposition that two and two are four is not 
applicable here because it can be demonstrated by definitions the 

ssi ility £ which is recognized. — Extract f ram a letter to . 

:: . 



I have already elsewhere giren my opinion concerning St 
Anselnrs demonstration of the existence of God, renewed by 
Descartes : the substance of which is that that which embraces in 
its idea all perfections, or the greatest of all possible beings, com- 
prehends also in its essence existence, since existence is one of the 



THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 145 

number of perfections, and otherwise something could be added to 
that which is perfect. I hold the position midway between those 
who take this reasoning for a sophism and the opinion of Reverend 
Father Lami, explained here, who considers it a complete demon- 
stration. I admit then that it is a demonstration, but imperfect, 
which demands or supposes a truth which deserves to be further 
demonstrated. For it is tacitly supposed that God, or the Perfect 
Being, is possible. If this point were again demonstrated, as it 
should be, it could be said that the existence of God was demon- 
strated geometrically a priori. And this shows what I have 
already said, that we cannot reason perfectly on ideas except by 
knowing their possibility ; to which geometricians have paid atten- 
tion, but the Cartesians not sufficiently. However it can be said 
that this demonstration is none the less of importance, and so to 
speak, presumptive. • For every being must be held possible until 
its impossibility is proved. I doubt however whether Reverend 
Father Lami was right in saying that it was adopted by the School. 
For the author of the marginal note remarks here very justly that 
St. Thomas had rejected it. 

However this may be, a demonstration still more simple might 
be formed, not mentioning the perfections at all, so as not to be 
stopped by those who should venture to deny that all perfections 
are compatible, and consequently that the idea in question is pos- 
sible. For by simply saying that God is a being of itself or 
primative, ens a se, that is, that which exists by its essence, it is 
easy to conclude from this definition that such a being, if it is 
possible, exists; or rather, this conclusion is a corollary which is 
derived immediately from the definition, and hardly differs from 
it. For the essence of the thing being only that which makes its 
possibility in particular, it is very clear that to exist by its essence, 
is to exist by its possibility. And if being of itself were defined in 
terms still nearer, by saying that it is the being which must exist 
because it is possible, it is manifest that all which could be said 
against the existence of such a being would be to deny its 
possibility. 

On this subject we might again make a modal proposition, which 
would be one of the best fruits of all logic; namely, that if 
10 



146 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

necessary being is possible, it exists. For necessary being and 
being by its essence are only one and the same thing. Thus the 
reasoning taken in this way appears to have solidity; and those 
who will have it that from mere notions, ideas, definitions or 
possible essences, actual existence can never be inferred, in truth 
fall into what I have just said, namely, they deny the possibility of 
being of itself. But it is well to notice that this way of taking it 
itself serves to show that they are wrong, and fills up finally the 
gap in the demonstration. For if being of itself is impossible, 
all beings by others are so also; since they exist ultimately only 
through being of itself ; thus nothing could exist. This reasoning 
leads us to another important modal proposition, equal to the pre- 
ceding, and which joined with it, completes the demonstration. It 
might be expressed thus: If necessary being is not, there is 
no being possible. It seems that this demonstration has not been 
carried so far, up to this time. However I have also labored else- 
where to prove that the perfect being is possible. 

I designed, sir, merely to write you in few words some trifling- 
reflections on the Memoirs which you sent me; but the variety of 
matters, the heat of meditation and the pleasure which I have 
taken in the generous design of the Prince who is the protector 
of this work, have carried me on. I beg pardon for having been 
so lengthy, and I am, etc. — Extract from a letter to the editor of 
the Journal de Trevoux. 1701. 



XXIII. 

Considerations on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit. 

1702. 

Many ingenious persons have believed, and believe now, that 
there is but one spirit, which is universal and which animates all 
the universe and all its parts, each one in accordance with its 
structure and organs, just as the same breath of wind makes the 
various pipes of an organ give forth different sounds. And that 
thus when an animal has its organs in good order, it produces there 
the effect of an individual soul, but when the organs are spoiled, 
this individual soul again becomes nothingness, or returns, so to 
speak, into the ocean of the universal spirit. 

Aristotle has seemed to many to hold a like opinion, which Aver- 
roes, a celebrated Arabian philosopher, has renewed. He believed 
that there was in us an intellectus agens or active understanding, 
and also an intellectus patiens or passive understanding : that the 
former, coming from without, was eternal and universal for all, but 
that the passive understanding was peculiar to each, and took its 
departure at the death of the man. In the last two or three 
centuries, this has been the doctrine of some Peripatetics, as of 
Pomponatius, Contarenus and others ; and traces of it are to be 
recognized in the late M. ISTaude, as his letters and the Naudoeana, 
which have been lately published, show. They taught this in secret 
to their most intimate and best qualified disciples, while in public 
they had the cleverness to say that this doctrine was in reality true 
according to philosophy, by which they understood that of Aris- 
totle par excellence, but that it was false according to faith. Hence 
have finally arisen the disputes over double truth which the last 
Lateran Council condemned. 

I have been told that Queen Christina had a decided leaning 
toward this opinion, and as M. ]STaude, who was her librarian, was 
imbued with it, he probably communicated to her what he knew of 
the secret views of the celebrated philosophers with whom he had 
had intercourse in Italy. Spinoza, who admits only one sub- 



148 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

stance, is not far removed from the doctrine of a single, universal 
spirit, and even the New Cartesians, who claim that God alone acts, 
establish it as it were without being aware of doing so. Apparently 
Molinos and some other New Quietists, among others, a certain 
Joannes Angelus Silesius, who wrote before Molinos and some of 
whose works have recently been reprinted, and even Weigelius 
before them both, embraced this opinion of a sabbath or rest of 
souls in God. This is why they believed that the cessation of par- 
ticular functions was the highest state of perfection. 

It is true that the Peripatetic philosophers did not make this 
spirit quite universal, for besides the intelligences, which according 
to them, animated the stars, they had an intelligence for this world 
here below ; and this intelligence performed the part of the active 
understanding in the souls of men. They were led to this doctrine 
of an immortal soul common to all men, by false reasoning. For 
they took for granted that actual infinite multiplicity is impossible 
and that thus it was not possible that there should be an infinite 
number of souls, but that it must be nevertheless, if particular 
souls existed. For the world being, according to them, eternal, and 
the human race also, and new souls always being born, if these all 
continued to exist, there would now be an actual infinity. This 
reasoning passed among them for a proof. But it was full of false 
suppositions. For neither the impossibility of actual infinitude, 
nor that the human race has existed eternally, nor the generation of 
new souls, is admitted, since the Platonists teach the preexistence 
of souls, and the Pythagoreans teach metempsychosis, and claim 
that a certain determined number of souls remains ever and under- 
goes changes. 

The doctrine of a universal spirit is good in itself, for all those 
who teach it admit in effect the existence of the divinity, whether 
they believe that this universal spirit is supreme — for in this case 
they hold that it is God himself, — or whether they believe with 
the Cabalists that God created it. This latter was also the opinion 
of Henry More, an Englishman, and of certain other modern 
philosophers, and especially of certain chemists who believed in a 
universal Archseus or world-soul ; and some have maintained that 
it was this spirit of the Lord which, as the beginning of Genesis 
says, "moved upon the waters." 



ON" THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL SPIRIT. 149 

But when they go so far as to say that this universal spirit is the 
only spirit and that there are no particular souls or spirits, or at 
least that these particular souls cease to exist, I believe that they 
pass the limits of reason, and advance, without grounds, a doctrine 
of which they have not even a distinct notion. Let us examine a 
little the apparent reasons upon which they rest this doctrine which 
destroys the immortality of souls and degrades the human race, or 
rather, all living creatures, from that rank which belongs to them 
and which has commonly been attributed to them. For it seems 
to me that an opinion of so much importance ought to be proved, 
and that it is not sufficient to have imagined a supposition of this 
kind, which really is only founded on a very lame comparison 
with the wind which animates musical organs. 

I have shown above that the pretended demonstration of the 
Peripatetics, who maintained that there was but one spirit common 
to all men, is of no force, and rests only on false suppositions. 
Spinoza has pretended to prove that there is only one substance in 
the world, but his proofs are pitiable or unintelligible. And the 
New Cartesians, who believed that God alone acts, have given 
very little proof of it ; not to mention that Father Malebranche 
seems to admit at least the internal action of particular spirits. 

One of the most apparent reasons which have been urged against 
particular souls, is the embarrassment as to their origin. The 
scholastic philosophers have disputed greatly over the origin of 
forms, among which they include souls. Opinions differed greatly 
as to whether there was an eduction of power from matter, as a 
statue is extracted from marble ; or whether there was a traduction 
of souls such that a new soul was born of a preceding soul as 
one fire is lighted from another ; or whether souls already existed 
and only made themselves known after the generation of the ani- 
mal ; or finally whether souls were created by God every time there 
was a new generation. 

Those who denied particular souls, believed that they were 
thereby freeing themselves from all difficulties, but this is cutting 
the knot instead of untying it ; and there is no- force in an argument 
which would run thus: the explanations of a doctrine have been 
various, hence the whole doctrine is false. This is the manner in 



150 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

which sceptics reason, and if it were to be accepted, there would be 
nothing which could not be rejected. The experiments of our time 
lead us to believe that souls and even animals have always existed, 
although in small volume, and that generation is only a kind of 
growth ; and in this way all the difficulties concerning the genera- 
tion of souls and of forms disappear. However we do not deny 
God the right to create new souls or to give a higher degree of 
perfection to those which are already in nature, but we speak of 
what is ordinary in nature, without entering into the particular 
economy of God in respect to human souls, which may be privi- 
leged, since they are infinitely above those of animals. 

In my opinion, what has greatly contributed to incline ingenious 
persons toward the doctrine of a single universal spirit, is the fact 
that common philosophers gave currency to a theory concerning 
separate souls, and the functions of the soul independent of the 
body and of its organs, which they could not sufficiently justify. 
They had good reason for wishing to maintain the immortality of 
the soul as in accordance with divine perfections and true moral- 
ity; but seeing that in death the organs visible in animals became 
disordered and are finally spoiled, they believed themselves obliged 
to have recourse to separate souls ; that is to say, to believe that the 
soul existed without any body, and did not even then cease to have 
its thoughts and activities. And in order to better prove this they 
tried to show that the soul even in this life has abstract thoughts, 
independent of material notions. JSTow those who rejected this 
separate state and this independence as contrary to experience and 
reason, were all the more compelled to believe in the extinction of 
the particular soul and the preservation of the single universal 
spirit. 

I have examined this matter carefully and I have proved that 
really there are in the soul some materials of thought or objects of 
the understanding which the external senses do not furnish, 
namely, the soul itself and its activities (nihil est in intellectu quod 
non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus) ; and those who believe 
in a universal spirit will readily grant this, since they distinguish 
it from matter. I find, nevertheless, that there is never an abstract 
thought which is not accompanied by some images or material 



ON THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL SPIRIT. 151 

traces, and I have established a perfect parallelism between what 
takes place in the soul and what takes place in matter, having 
shown that the soul with its activities is something distinct from 
matter, but that nevertheless it is always accompanied by organs 
which must correspond to it ; and that this is reciprocal and always 
will be. 

And as to the complete separation between soul and body, 
although I can say nothing beyond what is said in the Holy Scrip- 
tures of the laws of grace and of what God has ordained in respect 
to human souls in particular, since these are things which cannot 
be known through the reason and which depend upon revelation 
and upon God himself, nevertheless, I see no reason either in 
religion or in philosophy, which obliges me to give up the doctrine 
of the parallelism of the soul and the body, and to admit a perfect 
separation. For why might not the soul always retain a subtile 
body, organized in its fashion, and even resume some day, in the 
resurrection, as much as is necessary of its visible body, since we 
accord to the blessed a glorious, body and since the ancient Fathers 
accorded a subtile body to the angels ? 

Moreover this doctrine is conformable to the order of nature, 
established through experience ; for the observations of very skillful 
observers make us believe that animals do not begin when the 
ordinary person thinks they do, and that the seminal animals, or 
animated seeds, have existed ever since the beginning of things. 
Order and reason demand also that what has existed since the 
beginning should not end ; and thus as generation is only a 
growth of a transformed and developed animal, so death will only 
be the diminution of a transformed and developed animal, 
while the animal itself will always remain, during the 
transformations, as the silkworm and the butterfly are the same 
animal. And it is well to remark here that nature has the skill 
and the goodness to reveal her secrets to us in some small samples, 
to make us judge of the rest, since everything is correspondent and 
harmonious. It is this that she shows in the transformation of 
caterpillars and of other insects — for flies also come from worms — 
to make us divine that there are transformations everywhere. 
Experiments with insects have destroyed the common belief that 



152 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

these animals are engender eel by their nourishment, without propa- 
gation. It is thus that nature has also shown us in the birds a 
specimen of the generation of all animals by means of eggs, a fact 
which new discoveries have now established. 

Experiments also with the microscope have shown that the 
butterfly is only a development of the caterpillar; but, above all, 
that seeds contain the plant or animal already formed, although 
afterward it needs transformation and nutrition or growth in order 
to become an animal perceptible to our ordinary senses. And as 
the smallest insects are also engendered by the propagation of the 
species, we must judge the same to be true of these little seminal 
animals, namely, that they themselves come from other seminal 
animals, even smaller, and so began to exist when the world did. 
This is in harmony with the Sacred Scriptures, which imply that 
seeds have existed from the beginning. 

Nature has given us an example in sleep and swoons, which 
ought to make us believe that death is not a cessation of all the 
functions, but only a suspension of certain of the more noticeable 
functions. And I have explained elsewhere an important point, 
which not having been sufficiently considered has the more easily 
inclined men to the opinion of the mortality of souls : namely, that 
a large number of minute perceptions, equal and interbalanced, 
having no background and no distinguishing marks, are not noticed 
and cannot be remembered. But to wish to conclude from this 
that the soul is then altogether without functions is the same thing 
as when the common people believe that there is a vacuum or 
nothing where there is no visible matter, and that the earth is 
without motion, because its motion is not noticeable, being uniform 
and without shocks. We have innumerable minute perceptions 
which we cannot distinguish : for example, a great deafening 
noise, as the murmur of a whole assembled people, is composed of 
all the little murmurs of particular persons which we would not 
notice separately, but of which we have nevertheless a sensation, 
otherwise we would not be sensible of the whole. So when an 
animal is deprived of the organs capable of giving it sufficiently 
distinct perceptions, it does not at all follow that there do not 
remain to it smaller and more uniform perceptions, nor that it is 



ON THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL SPIRIT. 153 

deprived of all organs and all perceptions. The organs are only 
folded np and reduced to small volume; but the order of nature' 
demands that everything redevelop, and, some day, return to a per- 
ceptible state, and that there be in these changes a certain 
well-regulated progress, which serves to make things ripen and 
become perfect. It appears that Demoeritus himself has seen this 
resuscitation of animals, for Plotinus says that he taught a 
resurrection. 

All these considerations show, how not only particular souls, but 
also animals, subsist, and that there is no reason to believe in an 
utter extinction of souls or a complete destruction of the animal ; 
and consequently that there is no need to have recourse to a single 
universal spirit and to deprive nature of its particular and subsist- 
ing perfections — which would be in reality also not to sufficiently 
consider order and harmony. There are besides many things in 
the doctrine of a single universal spirit which cannot be main- 
tained, and involve difficulties much greater than those of the 
common doctrine. 

Here are some of them : you see, in the first place, that the com- 
parison with the wind which makes various pipes sound differently, 
flatters the imagination, but explains nothing, or rather implies 
exactly the contrary. For this universal breath of the pipes is only 
a collection of a quantity of separate breaths; moreover each pipe 
is filled with its own air which can even pass from one pipe to 
another, so that this comparison would establish rather individual 
souls, and would even favor the transmigration of souls from one 
body to another, as the air can change pipes. 

And if we imagine that the universal spirit is like an ocean, com- 
posed of innumerable drops, which are detached from it when they 
animate some particular organic body, but reunite themselves to 
the ocean after the destruction of the organs, you again form a 
material and gross idea which does not suit the subject and becomes 
entangled in the same difficulties as the breath. For as the ocean 
is a collection of drops, God would likewise be an assembly of all 
the souls, just as a swarm of bees is an assembly of these little ani- 
mals ; but as this swarm is not itself a real substance, it is clear 
that in this way the universal spirit would not be a true being itself, 



154 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

and instead of saying that it is the only spirit, we should have to 
say that it is nothing at all in itself, and that there are in nature 
only individual souls, of which it would be the mass. Besides, the 
drops, reunited to the ocean of the universal spirit after the 
destruction of the organs, would be in reality souls which would 
exist separated from matter, and we should thus fall back again 
into what we wished to avoid ; especially if these drops retain 
something of their preceding state, or have still some functions 
and could even acquire more sublime ones in this ocean of the 
divinity or of the universal spirit. For if you wish that these souls, 
reunited to God, be without any function of their own, you fall 
into an opinion contrary to reason and all sound philosophy; as 
if any subsisting being could ever reach a state where it would be 
without any function or impression. For one thing because it 
is joined to another does not therefore cease to have its own par- 
ticular functions, which joined with those of the others, produce 
the functions of the whole. Otherwise the whole would have none 
if the parts had none. Besides, I have elsewhere proved that every 
being retains perfectly all the impressions it has received, although 
these impressions be no longer perceptible separately, because 
they are joined with so many others. So the soul reunited to the 
ocean of souls, would always remain the particular soul it had 
been while separated. 

This shows that it is more reasonable and more in conformity 
with the custom of nature to allow particular souls to subsist in 
the animals themselves, and not outside in God, and so to preserve 
not only the soul but also the animal, as I have explained above 
and elsewhere ; and thus to allow particular souls to remain always 
in activity, that is, in the particular functions which are peculiar 
to them and which contribute to the beauty and order of the uni- 
verse, instead of reducing them to the sabbath in God of the 
Quietists, that is to say, to a state of idleness and uselessness. For 
as far as the beatific vision of blessed souls is concerned, it is 
compatible with the functions of their glorified bodies, which will 
not cease to be, in their way, organic. 

But if some one wished to maintain that there are no particular 
souls, not even when the function of feeling and of thought takes 



ON THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL SPIRIT. 155 

place with the aid of the organs, he would be refuted by our experi- 
ence which teaches us, as it seems to me, that we are a something 
in particular, which thinks, which apperceives, which wills ; and 
that we are distinct from another something which thinks and 
which wills other things. Otherwise we fall into the opinion of 
Spinoza, or of some other similar authors, who will have it that 
there is but one substance, namely God, which thinks, believes, and 
wills one thing in me, but which thinks, believes and wills exactly 
the contrary in another; an opinion of which M. Bayle, in certain 
portions of his Dictionary, has well shown the absurdity. 

Or even, if there is nothing in nature but the universal spirit and 
matter, we would have to say that if it is not the universal spirit 
itself which believes and wills opposite things in different persons, 
it is matter which is different and acts differently; but if matter 
acts, of what use is the universal spirit? If matter is nothing 
but an original passive substance, or a passive substance only, how 
can these actions be attributed to it? It is therefore much more 
reasonable to believe that besides God, who is the supreme Active 
Being, there are a number of particular active beings, since there 
are a number of particular and opposite actions and passions, 
which can not be attributed to the same subject ; and these active 
beings are none other than the particular souls. 

We know also that there are degrees in all things. There is an 
infinity of degrees between any assumed movement and perfect 
repose, between hardness and a perfect fluidity which is without 
any resistance, between God and nothingness. There is likewise 
an infinity of degrees between any active being whatsoever and 
a purely passive being. Consequently it is not reasonable to admit 
but one active being, namely the universal spirit, with a single 
passive being, namely matter. 

It must also be considered that matter is not a thing opposed to 
God, but that it is rather opposed to the limited active being, that 
is, to the soul or to form. For God is the supreme being opposed 
to nothingness, from whom matter as well as form comes ; and the 
purely passive is something more than nothingness, being capable 
of something, while nothing can be attributed to nothingness. 
Thus with each particular portion of matter must be connected in 



156 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF PEIBXITZ. 

thought the particular forms. — that is, souls and spirits. — which 
belong to it. 

I do not wish here to recur to a demonstrative argument which 
I have employed elsewhere, and which is drawn from the unities 
or simple things, among which particular souls are included. For 
this unavoidably obliges us not only to admit particular souls, but 
also to avow that they are immortal by their nature, and as inde- 
structible as the universe : and. what is more, that each soul is in 
its way a mirror of the universe, without any interruption, and 
that it contains in its depths an order corresponding to that of the 
universe itself. The souls diversify and represent the universe in 
an infinity of ways, all different and all true, and multiply it. so 
to speak, as many times as is possible, so that in this way they 
approach divinity as much as is possible, according to their differ- 
ent degrees, and give to the universe all the perfection of which it- 
is capable. 

After this. I do not see on what reason or probability the doc- 
trine of particular souls can be combated. Those who do so, admit- 
that what is in us is an effect of the universal spirit. But the 
effects of God are subsisting, not to say that even the modifications 
and effects of creatures are in a way durable, and that their 
impressions only unite without being destroyed. Therefore, if in 
accordance with reason and experience, as we have shown, the 
animal, with its more or less distinct perceptions and with certain 
organs, always subsists, and if consequently this effect of God 
subsists always in these organs, why would it- not be permissible 
to call it the soul, and to say that this effect of God is a soul, 
immaterial and immortal, which imitates in a way the universal 
spirit- i since this doctrine, moreover, removes all difficulties, as 
appears by what I have just said here, and in other writings which 
I have produced on these subjects. 



XXIV. 

On the Supersensible Element in Knowledge, and on the 

Immaterial in Nature : A Letter to Queen Charlotte of 

Prussia, 1702. 

[From the French.] 

Madame : 

The letter written not long since from Paris to Osnabruck and 
which I recently read, by your order, at Hanover, seemed to me 
truly ingenious and beautiful. And as it treats of the two impor- 
tant questions, Whether there is something in our thoughts which 
does not come from the senses, and Whether there is something in 
nature which is not material, concerning which I acknowledge that 
I am not altogether of the opinion of the author of the letter, I 
should like to be able to explain myself with the same grace as he, 
in order to obey the commands and to satisfy the curiosity of your 
Majesty. 

We use the external senses as, to use the comparison of one of 
the ancients, a blind man does a stick, and they make us know 
their particular objects, which are colors, sounds, odors, flavors, 
and the qualities of touch. But they do not make us know 
what these sensible qualities are or in what they consist. For 
example, whether red is the revolving of certain small globules 
which it is claimed cause light ; whether heat is the whirling of a 
very fine dust ; whether sound is made in the air as circles in the 
water when a stone is thrown into it, as certain philosophers claim ; 
this is what we do not see. And we could not even understand how 
this revolving, these whirlings and these circles, if they should be 
real, should cause exactly these perceptions which we have of red, 
of heat, of noise. Thus it may be said that sensible qualities are in 
fact occult qualities, and that there must be others more manifest 
which can render the former more explicable. And far from 
understanding only sensible things, it is exactly these which we 
understand the least. And although they are familiar to us we do 
not understand them the better for that ; as a pilot understands no 
better than another person the nature of the magnetic needle 



158 PHILOSOPHICAL WOPlKS OF LELBZTETZ. 

which turns toward the north, although, he has it always before his 
eyes in the compass, and although he does not admire it any the 
more for that reason. 

I do not deny that many discoveries hare been made concerning 
the nature of these occult qualities, as, for example, we know by 
what kind of refraction blue and yellow are formed, and that these 
two colors mixed form green : but for all this we cannot yet under- 
stand how the perception which we have of these three colors 
results from these causes. Also we have not even nominal defini- 
tions of such qualities by which to explain the terms. The purpose 
of nominal definitions is to give sufficient marks by which the thing 
may be recognized; for example, assayers have marks by which 
they distinguish gold from every other metal, and even if a man 
had never seen gold these signs might be taught him so that he 
would infallibly recognize it if he should some day meet with it. 
But it is not the same with these sensible qualities : and marks to 
recognize blue, for example, could not be given if we had never 
seen it. So that blue is its own mark, and in order that a man 
may know what blue is it must necessarily be shown to him. 

It is for this reason that we are accustomed to say that the 
notions of these qualities are clear, for they serve to recognize 
them: but that these same notions are not distinct, because we 
cannot distinguish or dev elope that which they include. It is an J 
hnow not what of which we are conscious, but for which we cannot 
account. AVhereas we can make another understand what a thing 
is of which we have some description or nominal definition, even 
although we should not have the thing itself at hand to show him. 
However we must do the senses the justice to say that, in addition 
to these occult qualities, they make us know other qualities which 
are more manifest and which furnish more distinct notions. And 
these are those which we ascribe to the common sense, because there 
is no external sense to which they are particularly attached and 
belong. And here definitions of the terms or words employed may 
be given. Such is the idea of numbers, which is found equally in 
sounds, colors, and touches. It is thus that we perceive also 
figures, which are common to colors and to touches, but which we 
do not notice in sounds. Although it is true that in order to con- 



ON THE SUPERSENSIBLE IN KNOWLEDGE. 159 

ceive distinctly numbers and even figures, and to form sciences of 
them, we must come to something which the senses cannot furnish, 
and which the understanding adds to the senses. 

As therefore our soul compares (for example) the numbers and 
figures which are in colors with the numbers and figures which are 
found by touch, there must be an internal sense, in which the 
perceptions of these different external senses are found united. 
This is what is called the imagination, which comprises at once the 
notions of the particular senses, which are clear but confused, and 
the notions of the common sense, which are clear and distinct. 
And these clear and distinct ideas which are subject to the imag- 
ination are the objects of the mathematical sciences, namely of 
arithmetic and geometry, which are pure mathematical sciences, 
and of the application of these sciences to nature, forming mixed 
mathematics. It is evident also that particular sensible qualities 
are susceptible of explanations and of reasonings only in so far as 
they involve what is common to the objects of several external 
senses, and belong to the internal sense. For those who try to 
explain sensible qualities distinctly always have recourse to the 
ideas of mathematics, and these ideas always involve size or mul- 
titude of parts. It is true that the mathematical sciences would 
not be demonstrative, and would consist in a simple induction or 
observation, which would never assure us of the perfect generality 
of the truths there found, if something higher and which intelli- 
gence alone can furnish did not come to the aid of the imagination 
and the senses. 

There are, therefore, objects of still other nature, which are not 
included at all in what is observed in the objects of the senses in 
particular or in common, and which consequently are not objects of 
the imagination either. Thus besides the sensible and imageable, 
there is that which is purely intelligible, as being the object of the 
understanding alone, and such is the object of my thought when I 
think of myself. 

This thought of the Ego, which informs me of sensible objects, 
and of my own action resulting therefrom, adds something to the 
objects of the senses. To think a color and to observe that one 
thinks it, are two very different thoughts, as different as the color 



160 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

is from the Ego which thinks it. And as I conceive that other 
beings may also have the right to say I. or that it could be said 
for them, it is through this that I conceive -what is called substance 
in general, and it is also the consideration of the Ego itself which 
furnishes other metaphysical notions, such as cause, effect, action, 
similarity, etc.. and even those of logic and of ethics. Thus it can 
be said that there is nothing in the understanding which does not- 
come from the senses, except the understanding itself, or that 
which understands. 

There are then three grades of notions : the sensible only, which 
are the objects appropriate to each sense in particular ; the sensi- 
ble and at the same time intelligible, which pertain to the com- 
mon sense; and the intelligible only, which belong to the under- 
standing. The first and the second are both imageable, but the 
third are above the imagination. The second and third are intelli- 
gible and distinct ; but the first are confused, although they are 
clear or recognizable. 

Being itself and truth are not known wholly through the senses : 
for it would not be impossible for a creature to have long and 
orderly dreams, resembling our life, of such a sort that everything 
which it thought it perceived through the senses would be but 
mere appearances. There must therefore be something beyond the 
senses, which distinguishes the true from the apparent. But the 
truth of the demonstrative sciences is exempt from these doubts, 
and must even serve for judging of the truth of sensible things. 
Eor as able philosophers, ancient and modern, have already well 
remarked : — if all that I should think that I see should be but a 
dream, it would always be true that I who think while dreaming, 
would be something, and would actually think in many ways, for 
which there must always be some reason. 

Thus what the ancient Platonists have observed is very true. 
and is very worthy of being considered, that the existence of sensi- 
ble things and particularly of the Ego which thinks and which is 
called spirit or soul, is incomparably more sure than the existence 
of sensible things ; and that thus it would not be impossible, speak- 
ing with metaphysical rigor, that there should be at bottom only 
these intelliffible substances, and that sensible things should be but 



ON THE SUPERSENSIBLE IN KNOWLEDGE. 



161 



appearances. While on the other hand our lack of attention makes 
us take sensible things for the only true things. It is well also to 
observe that if I should discover any demonstrative truth, mathe- 
matical or other, while dreaming (as might in fact be), it would 
be just as certain as if I had been awake. This shows us how 
intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence 
outside of us of sensible and material things. 

This conception of being and of truth is found therefore in the 
Ego and in the understanding, rather than in the external senses 
and in the perception of exterior objects. 

There we find also what it is to affirm, to deny, to doubt, to will, 
to act. But above all we find there the force of the consequences 
of reasoning, which are a part of what is called the natural light. 
For example, from this premise, that no wise man is wicked, we 
may, by reversing the terms, draw this conclusion, that no wicked 
man is wise. Whereas from this sentence, that every wise man is 
praiseworthy, we cannot conclude by converting it, that every one 
praiseworthy is wise but only that some praiseworthy ones are wise. 
Although we may always convert particular affirmative proposi- 
tions, for example, if some wise man is rich it must also be that 
some rich men are wise, this cannot be done in particular negatives. 
For example, we may say that there are charitable persons who are 
not just, which happens when charity is not sufficiently regulated ; 
but we cannot infer from this that there are just persons who are 
not charitable; for in justice are included at the same time charity 
and the rule of reason. 

It is also by this natural light that the axioms of mathematics 
are recognized ; for example, that if from two equal things the 
same quantity be taken away the things which remain are equal; 
likewise that if in a balance everything is equal on the one side 
and on the other, neither will incline, a thing which we forsee 
without ever having experienced it. It is upon such foundations 
that we construct arithmetic, geometry, mechanics and the other 
demonstrative sciences ; in which, in truth, the senses are very nec- 
essary, in order to have certain ideas of sensible things, and experi- 
ments are necessary to establish certain facts, and even useful to 
verify reasonings as by a kind of proof. But the force of the 
11 



162 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

demonstrations depends upon intelligible notions and truths, which 
alone are capable of making us discern what is necessary, and 
which, in the conjectural sciences, are even capable of determining 
demonstratively the degree of probability upon certain given 
suppositions, in order that we may choose rationally among oppo- 
site appearances, the one which is greatest. Nevertheless this part 
of the art of reasoning has not yet been cultivated as much as it 
ought to be. 

But to return to necessary truths, it is generally true that we 
know them only by this natural light, and not at all by the experi- 
ences of the senses. For the senses can very well make known, in 
some sort, what is, but they cannot make known what ought to he 
or could not be otherwise. 

For example, although we may have experienced numberless 
times that every massive body tends toward the centre of the 
earth and is not sustained in the air, we are not sure that this is 
necessary as long as we do not understand the reason of it. Thus 
we could not be sure that the same thing would occur in air at a 
higher altitude, at a hundred or more leagues above us ; and there 
are philosophers who imagine that the earth is a magnet, and as 
the ordinary magnet does not attract the needle when a little 
removed from it, they think that the attractive force of the earth 
does not extend very far either. I do not say that they are right, 
but I do say that one cannot go very certainly beyond the experi- 
ences one has had, when one is not aided by reason. 

This is why the geometricians have always considered that what 
is only proved by induction or by examples, in geometry or in 
arithmetic, is never perfectly proved. For 
example, experience teaches us that odd 
numbers continuously added together pro- 
duce the square numbers, that is to say, those 
which come from multiplying a number by 
itself. Thus 1 and 3 make 4, that is to say 
2 times 2. And 1 and 3 and 5 make 9, that 
is to say 3 times 3. And 1 and 3 and 5 and 7 
make 16, that is 1 times 1. And 1 and 3 
and 5 and 7 and 9 make 25, that is 5 
times 5. And so on. 



3 3 
5 5 

7 


3 

5 

7 


9 

16 


9 

25 

i 


3 4 


5 


X X 

3 4 


X 

5 


9 16 


25 



ON THE SUPERSENSIBLE IN KNOWLEDGE. 163 

However, if one should experience it a hundred thousand times, 
continuing the calculation very far, he may reasonably think that 
this will always follow; but he does not therefore have absolute 
certainty of it, unless he learns the demonstrative reason which the 
mathematicians found out long ago. And it is on this foundation 
of the uncertainty of inductions, but carried a little too far, that 
an Englishman has lately wished to maintain that we can avoid 
death. For (said he) the inference is not good: my father, my 
grandfather, my great-grandfather are dead and all the others who 
have lived before us ; therefore we shall also' die. For their death 
has no influence on us. The trouble is that we resemble them a 
little too much in this respect that the causes of their death subsist 
also in us. For the resemblance would not suffice to draw sure 
consequences without the consideration of the same reasons. 

In truth there are experiments which succeed numberless times 
and ordinarily, and yet it is found in some extraordinary cases 
that there are instances where the experiment does not succeed. 
For example, if we should have found a hundred thousand times 
that iron put all alone on the surface of water goes to the botton, 
we are not sure that this must always happen. And without 
recurring to the miracle of the prophet Elisha, who made iron 
float, we know that an iron pot may be made so hollow that it 
floats, and that it can even carry besides a considerable weight, as 
do boats of copper or of tin. And even the abstract sciences like 
geometry furnish cases in which what ordinarily occurs occurs no 
longer. For example, we ordinarily find that two lines which 
continually approach each other finally meet, and many people will 
almost swear that this could never be otherwise. And nevertheless 
geometry furnishes us with extraordinary lines, which are for 
this reason called asymptotes, which prolonged ad infinitum con- 
tinually approach each other, and nevertheless never meet. 

This consideration shows also that there is a light born- with us. 
For since the senses and inductions could never teach us truths 
which are thoroughly universal, nor that which is absolutely neces- 
sary, but only that which is, and that which is found in particular 
examples ; and since we nevertheless know necessary and universal 
truths of the sciences, a privilege which we have above the brutes ; 



164 PHILOSOPHICAL, WOBKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

it follows that we have derived these truths in part from what is 
within us. Thus we may lead a child to these by simple interroga- 
tions, after the manner of Socrates, without telling him anything, 
and without making him experiment at all upon the truth of what 
is asked him. And this could very easily be practiced in numbers 
and other similar matters. 

I agree, nevertheless, that in the present state the external senses 
are necessary to us for thinking, and that, if we had none, we 
could not think. But that which is necessary for something does 
not for all that constitute its essence. Air is necessary for life, 
but our life is something else than air. The senses furnish us the 
matter for reasoning, and we never have thoughts so abstract that 
something from the senses is not mingled therewith ; but reasoning 
requires something else in addition to what is from the -senses. 

As to the second question, whether there are immaterial sub- 
stances, in order to solve it, it is first necessary to explain one's 
self. Hitherto by matter has been understood that which includes 
only notions purely passive and indifferent, namely, extension and 
impenetrability, which need to be determined by something else to 
some form or action. Thus when it is said that there are imma- 
terial substances, it is thereby meant that there are substances 
which include other notions, namely, perception and the principle 
of action or of change, which could not be explained either by 
extension or by impenetrability. These beings, when they have 
feeling, are called souls, and when they are capable of reason, they 
are called spirits. Thus if one says that force and perception are 
essential to matter, he takes matter for corporeal substance which 
is complete, which includes form and matter, or the soul with the 
organs. It is as if it were said that there were souls everywhere. 
This might be true, and would not be contrary to the doctrine of 
immaterial substances. Tor it is not intended that these souls be 
separate from matter, but simply that they are something more 
than matter, and are not produced nor destroyed by the changes 
which matter undergoes, nor subject to dissolution, since they are 
not composed of parts. 

jS~evertheless it must be avowed also that there is substance 
separated from matter. And to see this, one has only to consider 



OK THE IMMATERIAL IN NATURE. 165 

that there are numberless forrns which matter might have received 
in place of the series of variations which it has actually received. 
For it is clear, for example, that the stars could move quite other- 
wise, space and matter being indifferent to every kind of motion 
and figure. 

Hence the reason or universal determining cause whereby things 
are, and are as they are rather than otherwise, must be outside of 
matter. And even the existence of matter depends thereon, since 
we do not find in its notion that it carries with it the reason of its 
existence. 

ISTow this ultimate reason of things, which is common to them 
all and universal by reason of the connection existing between all 
parts of nature, is what we call God, who must necessarily be an 
infinite and absolutely perfect substance. I am inclined to think 
that all immaterial finite substances (even the genii or angels 
according to the opinion of the ancient Church Fathers) are united 
to organs, and accompany matter, and even that souls or active 
forms are everywhere found in it. And matter, in order to con- 
stitute a substance which is complete, cannot do without them, 
since force and action are found everywhere in it, and since the 
laws of force depend on certain remarkable metaphysical reasons 
or intelligible notions, without being explicable by notions merely 
material or mathematical, or which belong to the sphere of the 
imagination. 

Perception also could not be explained by any mechanism what- 
soever. We may therefore conclude that there is in addition some- 
thing immaterial everywhere in these creatures, and particularly 
in us, in whom this force is accompanied by a sufficiently distinct 
perception, and even by that light, of which I have spoken above, 
which makes us resemble in miniature the Divinity, as well by 
knowledge of the order, as by the ordering which we ourselves 
know how to give to the things which are within our reach, in 
imitation of that which God gives to the universe. It is in this 
also that our virtue and perfection consist, as our felicity consists 
in the pleasure which we take therein. 

And since every time we penetrate into the depths of things, we 
find there the most beautiful order we could wish, even surpassing 



166 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

what we have therein imagined, as all those know who have 
fathomed the sciences ; we mar conclude that it is the same in all 
the rest, and that not only immaterial substances subsist always, 
hut also that their lives, progress and changes are regulated for 
advance toward a certain end, or rather to approach more and more 
thereto, as do the asymptotes. And although we sometimes 
recoil, like lines which retrograde, advancement none the less 
finally prevails and wins. 

The natural light of reason does not suffice for knowing the 
detail thereof, and our experiences are still too limited to catch a 
glimpse of the laws of this order. The revealed light guides us 
meanwhile through faith, but there is room ,to believe that in the 
course of time we shall know them even more by experience, and 
that there are spirits which know them already more than we do. 

Meanwhile the philosophers and the poets, for want of this, have 
betaken themselves to the fictions of metempsychosis or of the 
Elysian Fields, in order to give some ideas which might strike the 
populace. But the consideration of the perfection of things or 
(what is the same thing) of the sovereign power, wisdom and good- 
ness of God, who does all for the best, that is to say, in the greatest 
order, suffices to render content those who are reasonable, and to 
make us believe that the contentment ought to be greater, according 
as we are more disposed to follow order or reason. 



XXV. 

An Explanation of Certain Points in his Philosophy: An 

Extract from a letter to Lady Masham. 1704. 

[From, the French.] 

As I am altogether in favor of the principle of uniformity, 
which I think nature observes in the heart of things, while it varies 
in ways, degrees and perfections, my whole hypothesis amounts to 
recognizing in substances which are removed from our view and 
observation, something parallel to what appears in those which are 
within our reach. Thus, taking now for granted that there is in 
us a simple being endowed with action and perception, I think that 
nature would be little connected, if this particle of matter 
which forms human bodies were alone endowed with that which 
would make it infinitely different from the rest (even in physics) 
and altogether heterogeneous in relation to all other known bodies. 
This makes me think that there are everywhere present such active 
beings in matter, and that there is no difference between them 
except in the matter of perception. And as our own perceptions 
are sometimes accompanied by reflection and sometimes not, and as 
from reflection come abstractions and universal and necessary 
truths, no traces of which are to be seen in brutes and still less in 
the other bodies which surround us, there is reason for believing 
that this simple being which is in us and which is called soul is 
distinguished by this from those of other known bodies. 

Whether now these principles of action and of perception be 
called Forms, Entelechies, Souls, Spirits, or whether these 
terms be distinguished according to the notions one would like to 
attribute to them, the things will not thereby be changed. You 
will ask what these simple beings or these souls which I place in 
brutes and in the other creatures as far as they are organic, will 
become ; I reply, that they must not be less inextinguishable than 
our souls, and that they cannot be produced or destroyed by the 
forces of nature. 

But further, to preserve the analogy of the future or past as well 
as of other bodies, with what we experience at present in our 



168 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

bodies, I hold that not only these souls or enteleehies all have a 
sort of organic body with them proportioned to their perceptions 
but also that they will always have one, and have always had one, 
as long as they have existed ; so that not only the soul but also the 
animal itself (or that which is analogous to soul and animal, not to 
dispute about names) remains. And that thus generation and 
death can only be developments and envelopments, some examples 
of which, nature, according to its custom, shows us visibly to aid us 
in divining that which is hidden. And consequently ■ neither iron 
nor fire nor any other violences of nature, whatever ravages they 
may make in the body of an animal, can prevent the soul from 
preserving a certain organic body; inasmuch as the Organism, 
that is to say, order and artifice, is something essential to matter, 
produced and arranged by sovereign wisdom, and the production 
must always retain the traces of its author. This leads me to think 
also that there are no spirits entirely separated from matter, except 
the first and sovereign being, and that the genii, however marvel- 
lous they may be, are always accompanied by bodies worthy of 
them. This must also be said of souls which nevertheless may be 
called separate by relation to this gross body. You see therefore, 
Madame, that all this is only to suppose that it is everywhere and 
always just as with us and at present (the supernatural excepted), 
except degrees of perfections which vary; and I leave you to 
judge if an hypothesis at least simpler and more intelligible can 
be thought of. 

This very maxim, not to suppose unnecessarily anything in 
\ creatures except what corresponds to our experiences, has led me to. 
my System of the P reestablished Harmony. For we experience 
that bodies act among themselves according to mechanical laws, 
and that souls produce in themselves some internal actions. And 
we see no way of conceiving the action of the soul upon matter, or 
of matter upon the soul, or anything corresponding to it; it not 
being explicable by any mechanism whatever how material varia- 
tions, that is to say, mechanical laws, cause perception to arise ; or 
how perception can produce change of velocity or of direction in 
animal spirits and other bodies, however subtile or gross they may 
be. Thus the inconceivability of any other hypothesis, as much as 



CERTAIN POINTS IN HIS PHILOSOPHY. 169 

the good order of nature which is always uniform (without speak- 
ing here of other considerations), have made me believe that the 
soul and the body follow perfectly their laws, each one its own sep- 
arately, without the laws of the body being troubled by the actions 
of the soul and without bodies finding windows through which to 
influence souls. It will be asked then whence comes this accord 
of the soul with the body. The defenders of occasional causes 
teach that God accommodates at each moment the soul to the body 
and the body to the soul. But it being impossible that this be 
other than miraculous, it is unsuited to a philosophy which must 
explain the ordinary course of nature, for it would be necessary 
that God should continually disturb the natural laws of bodies. 
This is why I believed that it was infinitely more worthy of the 
economy of God, and of the uniformity and harmony of his work, 
to conclude that he has at the beginning created souls and bodies 
such that each following its own laws accords with the other. It 
cannot be. denied that this is possible to him whose wisdom and 
power are infinite. In this I still only attribute to souls and to 
bodies for all time and everywhere what we experience in them 
every time that the experience is distinct, that is to say, mechanical 
laws in bodies and internal actions in the soul : the whole consisting 
only in the present state joined with the tendency to changes, 
which take place in the body according to moving forces and 
in the soul according to the perceptions of good and evil. 

The only surprising thing which follows from this is that the 
works of God are infinitely more beautiful and more harmonious 
than had been believed. And it may be said that the subterfuge 
of the Epicureans against the argument drawn from the beauty of 
visible things (when they say that among numberless produc- 
tions of chance it is not to be marvelled at if some world like our 
own has succeeded passably) is destroyed, in that the perpetual 
correspondence of beings which have no influence one upon the 
other can only come from a common cause of this harmony. M. 
Bayle (who is profound), having meditated on the consequences 
of this hypothesis, acknowledges that one never exalted more what 
we call the divine perfections, and that the infinite wisdom of God, 
.great as it is, is none too great to produce such a preestablished 



170 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

harmony, the possibility of which he seemed to doubt. But I made 
him consider that even men produce automata which act as if they 
were rational, and that God (who is an infinitely greater artist or, 
rather, with whom everthing is art as much as is possible) , in order 
to make matter act as minds require, has traced out for it its path. 
So that after this we ought not to be more surprised at the fact 
that it acts with so much reason, than at the course of certain ser- 
pents in fireworks along an unseen cord, which shows that it is a 
man who manages them. The designs of God can only be grasped 
in proportion to the perfections found in them, and bodies being 
subjected to souls in advance in order to be accommodated to their 
voluntary actions, the soul in its turn is expressive of bodies in 
virtue of its primordial nature, being obliged to represent them by 
its involuntary and confused perceptions. Thus each one is the 
original or the copy of the other in proportion to the perfections or 
imperfections which it involves. 



XXVI. 

Extracts from the JSTew Essays on the Ujstderstanditstg-. 

1704." 
[From the French.] 

Preface. 

The Essay on the Understanding, by an illustrious Englishman, 
being one of the most beautiful and esteemed works of the time, I 
have resolved to make Remarks on it, because, having sufficiently 
meditated for a long time on the same subject and upon most of the 
matters which are therein touched upon, I have thought that it 
would be a good opportunity to put forth something under the 
title of Neiv Essays on the Understanding , and to obtain a favor- 
able reception for my thoughts by putting them in such good 
company. I have thought also that I should be able to profit by the 
work of another, not only to lessen my own (since in fact it is less 
difficult to follow the thread of a good author than to labor entirely 
de novo), but also to add something to what he has given us, which 
is always easier than to start from the beginning ; for I think I 
have cleared up some difficulties which he had left in their entire- 
ity. Thus his reputation is advantageous to me; besides, being 
inclined to do justice, and far from wishing to lessen the esteem 
in which that work is held, I would increase it, if my approval 
was of any weight. It is true that I often differ from him; but 
far from denying the merit of celebrated writers, we bear witness 
to it, by making known in what and why we separate ourselves 
from their opinion, when we think it necessary to prevent their 
authority from prevailing over reason on certain points of impor- 
tance; besides by satisfying such excellent men, we make truth 
more acceptable, and it must be supposed that it is principally for 
truth that they labor. 

In fact, although the author of the Essay says a thousand fine 
things of which I approve, our systems differ very much. His has 
more relation to Aristotle, and mine to Plato, although we both 
diverge in many things from the doctrines of these two ancients. 



172 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

He is more popular, and I am forced at times to be a little more 
acromatic and more abstract, which is not an advantage to me, 
especially when I write in a living language. I think nevertheless 
that by making two persons speak, one of whom expounds the 
views taken from the Essay of the author and the other joins thereto 
my observations, the parallel will be more to the liking of the 
reader than wholly dry remarks, the reading of which would be 
constantly interrupted by the necessity of referring to his book 
to understand mine. It will nevertheless be well to compare now 
and then our writings and not to judge of his views except by his 
own work, although I have ordinarily preserved its expression. 
It is true that the constraint which the discourse of another, the 
thread of which must be followed, gives in making Remarks, has 
prevented me from thinking to secure the embellishments of which 
the dialogue is susceptible : but I hope that the matter will make 
up for the defect of style. 

Our differences are on subjects of some importance. The 
question is to know whether the soul in itself is entirely empty, 
like the tablet on which nothing has yet been written (tabula rasa) 
according to Aristotle and the author of the Essay, and whether 
all that is traced thereon comes solely from the senses and from 
experience ; or whether the soul contains originally the principles 
of several notions and doctrines which external objects merely 
awaken on occasions, as I believe, with Plato, and even with the 
schoolmen, and with all those who take with this meaning the 
passage of St. Paul (Romans, 2, 15) where he remarks that the 
law of God is written in the heart. The Stoics called these prin- 
ciples prolepses, that is to say, fundamental assumptions, or what 
is taken for granted in advance. The mathematicians call them 
common notions (jcotval evvoiat). Modern philosophers give them 
other beautiful names, and Julius Scaliger in particular named 
them semina aeternitatis, also zopyra, as meaning living fires, 
luminous rays, concealed within us, but which the encounter of 
the senses makes appear like the sparks which the blow makes 
spring from the steel. And it is not without reason that these 
flashes are believed to indicate something divine and eternal, which 
appears especially in necessary truths. Whence there arises 



new essays: preface. 173 

another question, whether all truths depend on experience, that 
is to say, on induction and examples, or whether there are some 
which have still another basis. For if some events can be foreseen 
before any proof has been made of them, it is manifest that we 
contribute something on our part thereto. The senses, although 
necessary for all our actual knowledge, are not sufficient to give 
to us the whole of it, since the senses never give anything except 
examples, that is to say, particular or individual truths. jSTow all 
the examples which confirm a general truth, however numerous 
they be, do not suffice to establish the universal necessity of this 
same truth; for it does not follow that what has happened will 
happen in the same way. For example, the Greeks and Romans, 
and all other peoples of the earth known to the ancients, have 
always noticed that before the expiration of twenty-four hours 
day changes into night and the night into day. But we would 
be deceived if we believed that the same rule holds good every- 
where else; for since then, the contrary has been experienced in 
the region of ]STova Zembla. And he would still deceive himself 
who believed that, in our climates at least, it is a necessary and 
eternal truth which will last always ; since we must think that 
the earth and the sun even do not exist necessarily, and that there 
will perhaps be a time when this beautiful star will no longer be, 
at least in its present form, nor all its system. Whence it would 
seem that necessary truths, such as are found in pure mathematics 
and especially in arithmetic and in geometry, must have princi- 
ples the .proof of which does not depend on examples, nor, conse- 
quently, on the testimony of the senses, although without the senses 
we would never take it into our heads to think of them. This 
ought to be well recognized, and this is what Euclid has so well 
understood that he often demonstrates by reason that which is 
sufficiently seen through experience and by sensible images. 
Logic also, together with metaphysics and ethics, one of which 
forms theology and the other jurisprudence, both natural, are full 
of such truths ; and consequently their proof can only come from 
internal principles which are called innate. It is true that we must 
not imagine that these eternal laws of the reason can be read in 
the soul as in an open book, as the edict of the pretor is read upon 



174 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

his album without difficulty and without research; but it is 
enough that they can be discovered in us by force of attention, for 
which occasions are furnished by the senses; and the success of 
experiments serves also as confirmation to the reason, very much as 
proofs serve in arithmetic for better avoiding error of reckoning 
when the reasoning is long. It is also in this that human knowl- 
edge and that of the brutes differ : the brutes are purely empirics 
and only guide themselves by examples, for they never, as far as 
we can judge, conic to form necessary propositions ; whereas men 
are capable of demonstrative sciences. It is also for this reason 
that the faculty which brutes have of making consecutions is some- 
thing inferior to the reason which is in man. The consecutions of 
the brutes are merely like those of simple empirics, who claim 
that what has happened sometimes will happen also in a case where 
that which strikes them is similar, without being able to judge 
whether the same reasons hold good. This is why it is so easy 
for men to entrap brutes and so easy for simple empirics to make 
mistakes. This is why persons who have become skilled by age 
or by experience are not exempt from error when they rely too 
much upon their past experience, as has happened to many in 
civil and military affairs ; because they do not sufficiently con- 
sider that the world changes and that men become more skilled by 
finding a thousand new dexterities, whereas deer and hares of the 
present day do not become more cunning than those of past time. 
The consecutions of the brutes are only a shadow of reasoning, 
that is to say, they are but connections of the imagination and 
passages from one image to another, because in a new juncture 
which appears similar to the preceding they expect anew what they 
found conjoined with it before, as if things were linked together in 
fact because their images are connected in the memory. It is true 
that even reason counsels us to expect ordinarily to see that happen 
in the future which is conformed to a long past experience, but 
this is not for this reason a necessary and infallible truth, and 
success may cease when we expect it least, if the reasons which 
have sustained it change. This is why the wisest do not so rely 
upon it as not to try to discover something of the reason (if it 
is possible) of this fact, in order to judge when it will be necessary 



NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 175 

to make exceptions. For reason is alone capable of establishing 
snre rules, and of supplying what is lacking to those which were 
not snch by inserting their exceptions ; and of finding, finally, 
certain connections in the force of necessary consequences, which 
often gives the means of foreseeing the event without having need 
of experiencing the sensible connections of images, to which the 
brutes are reduced ; so that that which justifies the internal prin- 
ciples of necessary truths, distinguishes also man from the brutes. 
Perhaps our able author will not differ entirely from my opinion. 
For after having employed the whole of his first book in rejecting 
innate knowledge [lumieres], taken in a certain sense, he never- 
theless avows at the beginning of the second and in what follows, 
that the ideas which do not orginate in sensation come from 
reflection. Wow reflection is nothing else than attention to what is 
in us, and the senses do not give us that which we already carry 
with us. This being so, can it be denied that there is much that 
is innate in our mind, since we are innate, so to say, in ourselves ? 
and that there is in us ourselves, being, unity, substance, duration, 
change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects 
of our intellectual ideas ? And these objects being immediate 
to our understanding and always present (although they cannot 
be always perceived on account of our distractions and wants) , why 
be astonished that Ave say that these ideas, with all which depends 
on them, are innate in us ? I have made use also of the comparison 
of a block of marble which has veins, rather than of a block of 
marble wholly even, or of blank tablets, that is to say, of 
what is called among philosophers tabula rasa. For if the soul 
resembled these blank tablets, truths would be in us as the figure 
of Hercules is in marble when the marble is entirely indifferent 
toward receiving this figure or some other. But if there were veins 
in the block which should mark out the figure of Hercules rather 
than other figures, the block would be more determined thereto, 
and Hercules would be in it as in some sort innate, although it 
would be necessary to labor in order to discover these veins and to 
cleanse them by polishing and by cutting away that which prevents 
them from appearing. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate 
in us, as inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural capacities, 



176 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

and not as actions; although, these capacities are always accom- 
panied by some actions, often insensible, which correspond to them. 

It seems that our able author claims that there is nothing virtual 
in us,' and nothing even of which we are not always actually con- 
scious; but this cannot be taken strictly, otherwise his opinion 
would be too paradoxical; since, moreover, acquired habits and 
the stores of our memory are not always consciously perceived and 
do not even come always to our aid at need, although we often 
easily bring them back to the mind on some slight occasion which 
makes us remember them, just as we need but the beginning of a 
song to remember it. He modifies also his assertion in other 
places, by saying that there is nothing in us of which we have not 
been at least formerly conscious. But in addition to the fact that 
no one can be sure, by reason alone, how far our past apperceptions, 
which we may have forgotten, may have gone, especially according 
to the doctrine of reminiscence of the Platonists, which, fabulous 
as it is, has nothing in it incompatible, at least in part, with the 
bare reason : in addition to this, I say, why is it necessary that all 
be acquired by us through the perceptions of external things, and 
that nothing can be unearthed in ourselves ? Is our soul then such 
a blank that, besides the images imprinted from without, it is 
nothing ? This is not an opinion (I am sure) which our judicious 
author can approve. And where are there found tablets which are 
not something varied in themselves ? For we never see a surface 
perfectly even and uniform. Why, then, could we not furnish 
also to ourselves something of thought from our own depths, if 
we should dig therein ? Thus I am led to believe that at bottom 
his opinion on this point is not different from mine, or rather 
from the common opinion, inasmuch as he recognized two sources 
of our knowledge, the Senses and Reflection. 

I do not know whether it will be as easy to bring him in accord 
with us and with the Cartesians, when he maintains that the mind 
does not always think, and particularly that it is without percep- 
tion when we sleep without dreaming. And he objects that, since 
bodies may be without motion, souls may also well be without 
thought. But here I reply a little differently than is wont to be 
done, for I maintain that naturally a substance cannot be without 



NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 1 77 

activity, and even that there never is a body without motion. 
Experience already favors me, and one has only to consult the book 
of the illustrious Mr. Boyle against absolute repose, to be persuaded 
of it ; but I believe that reason also favors it, and this is one of 
the proofs which I have for discarding atoms. 

Furthermore, there are a thousand indications which lead us to 
think that there are at every moment numberless perceptions in 
us, but without apperception and without reflection ; that is to say, 
changes in the soul itself of which we are not conscious, because the 
impressions are either too slight or in too great a number or too 
even, so that they have nothing sufficient to distinguish them one 
from the other; but joined to others, they do not fail to produce 
their effect and to make themselves felt at least confusedly in the 
mass. Thus it is that custom causes us not to take notice of 
the motion of a mill or of a waterfall when we have lived near it 
for some time. It is not that the motion does not always strike 
our organs, and that something does not enter the soul which 
answers thereto, on account of the harmony of the soul and the 
body; but these impressions which are in the soul and in body, 
being destitute of the charms of novelty, are not strong enough to 
attract our attention and our memory, attached as they are to 
objects more engrossing. For all attention requires memory, and 
often when we are not admonished, so to speak, and advised to 
attend to some of our own present perceptions, we let them pass 
without reflection and even without being noticed ; but if some one 
calls our attention to them immediately afterwards and makes us 
notice, for example, some noise which was just heard, we remember 
it and are conscious of having had at the time some feeling of it. 
Thus there were perceptions of which we were not immediately 
conscious, consciousness only coming in this case from the warning 
received after some interval, small though it may be. And to 
judge still better of the minute perceptions which we are unable to 
distinguish in the crowd, I am accustomed to make use of the 
example of the roar or noise of the sea which strikes one when on 
the shore. To hear this noise as one does it would be necessary 
to hear the parts which compose the whole, that is to say, 
the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises only 
12 



178 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

makes itself known in the confused collection of all the others 
together, that is to say, in the roar itself, and would not be 
noticed if the wave which makes it was alone. For it must be that 
we are affected a little by the motion of this wave and that we 
have some perception of each of these noises however small ; other- 
wise we would not have that of a hundred thousand waves, since a 
hundred thousand nothings cannot make something. One never 
sleeps so profoundly but that he has some feeble and confused feel- 
ing, and he would never be awakened by the greatest noise in the 
world if he did not have some perception of its small beginning, 
just as one would never break a rope by the greatest effort in the 
world if it was not stretched and lengthened a little by smaller 
efforts, although the little extension which they produce is not 
apparent. 

These minute perceptions are then of greater efficacy by their 
consequences than is thought. It is they which form I know not 
what, these tastes, these images of the sensible qualities, clear in 
the mass but confused in the parts, these impressions which sur- 
rounding bodies make upon us, which embrace the infinite, this 
connection which each being has with all the rest of the universe. 
It may even be said that in consequence of these minute per- 
ceptions the present is big with the future and laden with the 
past, that all things conspire ( a-v^irvota iravra^ as Hippocrates 
said) ; and that in the least of substances eyes as piercing as those 
of God could read the whole course of the things in the universe, 
Quae sint, quae fuerint, quae mox futura trahantur. These insen- 
sible perceptions indicate also and constitute the- same indi- 
vidual, who is characterized by the traces or expressions which 
they preserve of the preceding states of this individual, in making 
the connection with his present state ; and these can be known by a 
superior mind, even if this individual himself should not be aware 
of them, that is to say, when the express recollection of them will 
no longer be in him. But they (these perceptions, I say) furnish 
the means of finding again this recollection at need, by the periodic 
developments which may some day happen. It is for this reason 
that death can be but a sleep, and cannot indeed continue, the 
perceptions merely ceasing to be sufficiently distinguished and 



NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 179 

being, in animals, reduced to a state of confusion which suspends 
consciousness, but which could not last always ; not to speak here 
of man who must have in this respect great privileges in order to 
preserve his personality. 

It is also through the insensible perceptions that the admirable 
p reestablished harmony of the soul and the body, and indeed of 
all monads or simple substances, is to be explained ; which supplies 
the place of the unmaintainable influence of the one upon the 
others, and which, in the judgment of the author of the finest of 
Dictionaries [Bayle], exalts the greatness of the divine perfections 
above what has ever been conceived. After this I should add little, 
if I were to say that it is these minute perceptions which determine 
us in many a juncture without it being thought of, and which 
deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equili- 
brium, as if we were entirely indifferent to turning (for example) 
to the right or to the left. It is not necessary also that I notice 
here, as I have done in the book itself, that they cause that uneasi- 
ness which I show consists in something which does not differ from 
pain except as the small from the great, and which nevertheless 
often constitutes our desire and even our pleasure, in giving to it 
a stimulating flavor. It is also the inconceivable parts of our 
sensible perceptions which produce a relation between the percep- 
tions of colors, of heat and of other sensible qualities and between 
the motions in bodies which correspond to them ; whereas the 
Cartesians with our author, thoroughly penetrating as he is, con- 
ceive the perceptions which we have of these qualities as arbitrary, 
that is to say, as if God had given them to the soul according to 
his good pleasure without having regard to any essential relation 
between these perceptions and their objects : an opinion which 
surprises me, and which appears to me little worthy of the Author 
of things, who does nothing without harmony and without reason. 

In a word, insensible perceptions are of as great use in pneu- 
matics as insensible corpuscles are in physics, and it is equally 
as unreasonable to reject the one as the other under the pretext 
that they are beyond the reach of our senses. Nothing takes place 
all at once, and it is one of my great maxims, and one of the most 
verified, that nature never makes leaps: this is what I called the 



180 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBZSTITZ. 

Law of Continuity, when I spoke of it in the first Nouvelles de la 
Bepublique des Lettres; and the use of this law is very consider- 
able in physics. It teaches that we pass always from the small to 
the great, and vice versa, through the medium, in degrees as in 
parts ; and that motion never rises immediately from repose nor is 
reduced to it except by a smaller motion, just as one never com- 
pletes running any line or length before having completed a shorter 
line; although hitherto those who have laid down the laws of 
motion have not observed this law, believing that a body can 
receive in an instant a motion contrary to the preceding. And all 
this leads us to conclude rightly that noticeable perceptions also 
come by degrees from these which are too minute to be noticed. 
To think otherwise is to little understand the immense subtilty 
of things, which always and everywhere embraces an actual 
V infinite. 

I have also noticed that in virtue of insensible variations, two 
individual things cannot be perfectly alike, arid that they must 
always differ more than numero: which destroys the blank tablets 
of the soul, a soul without thought, a substance without action, a 
void in space, atoms and even particles not actually divided in mat- 
ter, absolute rest, entire uniformity in one part of time, of space or 
of matter, perfect globes of the second element, born of perfect 
and original cubes, and a thousand other fictions of the philoso- 
phers which come from their incomplete notions, and which the 
nature of things does not permit, and which our ignorance and the 
little attention we give to the insensible, let pass, but which can not 
be tolerated, unless they are limited to abstractions of the mind 
which protests that it does not deny what it puts aside and what 
it thinks ought not enter into any present consideration. Other- 
wise if it is rightly understood, namely, that things of which we 
are not conscious, are not in the soul nor in the body, we should be 
lacking in philosophy as in politics, in neglecting to /juxpbv, insen- 
sible progressions ; whereas an abstraction is not an error, provided 
we know that what we feign is there. Just as mathematicians 
employ abstraction when they speak of perfect lines which they 
propose to us, of uniform motions and of other regulated effects, 
although matter (that is to say, the medley of the effects of the 



new essays: preface. 181 

surrounding infinite, always makes some exception. It is in order 
to distinguish the considerations, and to reduce, as far as is 
possible, the effects to reasons, and to foresee some of their con- 
sequences, that we proceed thus : for the more careful we are to 
neglect no consideration which we are able to control, the more 
practice corresponds to theory. But it pertains only to the 
Supreme Reason, which nothing escapes, to comprehend distinctly 
all the infinite and to see all the reasons and all the consequences. 
All that we can do as regards infinites is to recognize them con- 
fusedly, and to know at least distinctly that they are there ; other- 
wise we judge very wrongly of the beauty and grandeur of the 
universe ; so also we could not have a sound physics which should 
explain the nature of bodies in general, and still less a sound 
pneumatics which should comprise the knowledge of God, of souls 
and of simple substances in general. 

This knowledge of insensible perceptions serves also to explain 
why and how two souls, human or otherwise, of the same kind, 
never come from the hands of the Creator perfectly alike, and each 
always has its original relation to the points of view which it will 
have in the universe. But this it is which already follows from 
what I have remarked of two individuals, namely, that their differ- 
ence is always more than numerical. There is still another point 
of importance, on which I am obliged to differ not only from the 
opinions of our author but also from those of the greater part of 
modern philosophers ; this is, that I believe, with most of the 
ancients, that all genii, all souls, all simple created substances are 
always joined to a body, and that there never are souls entirely 
separated. I have a priori reasons for this; but this advantage is 
also found in the doctrine, that it resolves all the philosophical diffi- 
culties as to the condition of souls, as to their perpetual conserva- 
tion, as to their immortality and as to their action. The difference 
of one of their states from another never being and never having 
been anything but that of more sensible to less sensible, of more 
perfect to -less perfect, or vice versa, this doctrine renders their 
past or future state as explicable as that of the present. One feels 
sufficiently, however little reflection one makes, that this is rational, 
and that a leap from one state to another infinitely different state 



182 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

could not be so natural. I am astonished that by quitting the 
natural without reason, the schoolmen have been willing to plunge 
themselves purposely into very great difficulties, and to furnish 
matter for apparent triumphs of freethinkers, all of whose reasons 
fall at a single blow- by this explanation of things ; according to 
which there is no more difficulty in conceiving the conservation of 
souls (or rather, according to me, of the animal) than there is in 
conceiving the change of the caterpillar into the butterfly, and the 
conservation of thought in sleep, to which Jesus Christ has divinely 
well compared death. I have already said, also, that sleep could 
not last always, and it will last least or almost not at all to ratioual 
souls, who are destined always to preserve the personality which 
has been given them in the City of God, and consequently remem- 
brance : and this in order to be more susceptible to chastisements 
and recompenses. And I add further that in general no derange- 
ment of the visible organs is able to throw things into entire con- 
fusion in the animal or to destroy all the organs and to deprive the 
soul of the whole of its organic body and of the ineffaceable 
remains of all preceding impressions. But the ease with which 
the ancient doctrine has been abandoned of subtile bodies united 
to the angels (which was confounded with the corporeality of the 
angels themselves), and the introduction of pretended separate 
intelligences in creatures (to which those [unembodied intelli- 
gences] which make the heavens of Aristotle revolve have con- 
tributed much), and finally the poorly understood opinion into 
which we have fallen that the souls of brutes could not be preserved 
without falling into metempsychosis and without conducting them 
from body to body, and the embarrassment in which men have 
been placed by not knowing what to do with them, have caused us, 
in my opinion, to neglect the natural way of explaining the con- 
servation of the soul. This has done great injury to natural relig- 
ion and has made many believe that our immortality was only 
a miraculous grace of God, of which also our celebrated author 
speaks with some doubt, as I shall presently remark. But it were . 
to be desired that all who are of this opinion had spoken as wisely 
and with as good faith as he ; for it is to be feared that many who 
speak of immortality through grace do it but to save appearances, 



NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 



183 



and approximate at heart those Averroists and some bad Quietists 
who picture to themselves an absorption and the reunion of the 
soul with the ocean of divinity; a notion the impossibility of 
which perhaps my system alone makes evident. 

It seems also that we differ further as regards matter, in that the 
author thinks a vacuum is here necessary for motion, because he 
thinks that the minute parts of matter are rigid. And I acknowl- 
edge that if matter were composed of such parts motion in the 
plenum would be impossible, just as if a room were full of a quan- 
tity of small pebbles without there being the least vacant space. 
But this supposition, for which there appears also no reason, is 
not admissible, although this able author goes to the point of 
believing that rigidity or cohesion of minute parts constitutes the 
essence of body. It is necessary rather to conceive space as full 
of an orginally fluid matter, susceptible of all divisions, and even 
actually subjected to divisions and subdivisions ad infinitum; 
but nevertheless with this difference that it is divisible and divided 
unequally in different places, on account of the motions more or 
less concurring, which are already there. This it is which causes 
it to have everywhere a degree of rigidity as well as of fluidity, 
and which causes no body to be hard or fluid to the highest degree, 
that is to say, no atom to be found of an insurmountable hardness 
nor any mass entirely indifferent to division. The order also of 
nature and particularly the law of continuity destroy both equally. 

I have shown also that cohesion, which would not itself be the 
effect of impulse or of motion, would cause a traction taken 
strictly. For if there were a body originally inflexible, for 
example, an Epicurean atom, which should have a part projecting 
in the form of a hook (since we can conceive atoms of all sorts of 
shapes), this hook pushed would carry with it the rest of the atom; 
that is to say, the part which is not pushed and which does not 
fall in the line of impulsion. ^Tevertheless our able author is him- 
self opposed to these philosophical tractions, such as were attrib- 
uted formerly to the abhorrence of a vacuum ; and he reduces 
them to impulses, maintaining, with the moderns, that one part of 
matter operates immediately upon another only by pushing it by 
contact. In which I think they are right, since otherwise there is 
nothing intelligible in the operation. 



184 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

It is however necessary not to conceal the fact that I have 
noticed a sort of retraction by onr excellent author on this subject ; 
whose modest sincerity in this respect I cannot refrain from prais- 
ing as much as I have, admired his penetrating genins on other 
occasions. It is in the reply to the second letter of the late Bishop 
of Worcester, printed in 1699, p. 408, where to justify the opinion 
which he had maintained in opposition to that learned prelate, 
namely, that matter might think, he says among other things : I 
admit that I have said (book 2 of the Essay on the Understand- 
ing, chap. 8, § 11) that body acts by impulse and not otherwise. 
This also was my opinion ivhen I wrote it, and still at present I 
cannot conceive in it another manner of acting. But since then 
I have been convinced by the incomparable booh of the judicious 
Mr. Neivton, that there is too much presumption in wishing to 
limit the power of God by our limited conceptions. The gravita- 
tion of matter toiuards matter, by ways which are inconceivable to 
me, is not only a demonstration that God can, when it seems good 
to him, put in bodies powers and ways of acting which transcend 
that which can be derived from our idea of body or explained by 
what we hnow of matter; but it is further an incontestable 
instance that he has really done so. I shall therefore take care 
that in the next edition of my book this passage be corrected. I 
find that in the French version of this book, made undoubtedly 
according to the latest editions, it has been put thus in this § 11 : 
It is evident, at least so far as we are able to conceive it, that it is 
by impulse and not otherwise that bodies act on each other, for it 
is impossible for us to understand that body can act upon what it 
does not touch, which is as much as to imagine that it can act 
where it is not. 

I cannot but praise that modest piety of our celebrated author, 
which recognizes that God can do above what we are able to under- 
stand, and that thus there may be inconceivable mysteries in the 
articles of faith: but I should not like to be obliged to resort to 
miracle in the ordinary course of nature, and to admit powers and 
operations absolutely inexplicable. Otherwise too much license 
will be given to bad philosophers, under cover of what God can 
do; and by admitting these centripetal forces [vertus] or these 



new essays: preface. 185 

immediate attractions from a distance, without its being possible 
to render them intelligible, I see nothing to hinder our scholastics 
from saying that everything is done simply by their 'faculties/ 
and from maintaining their 'intentional species' which go from 
objects to us and find means of entering even into our souls. If 
this is so, omnia jam fient, fieri quae posse negabam. So that it 
seems to me that our author, quite judicious as he is, goes here a 
little too much from one extreme to the other. He is squeamish 
concerning the operations of souls, when the question merely is to 
admit that which is not sensible; and now, -behold, he gives to 
bodies that which is not even intelligible; granting them powers 
and actions which surpass all that in my opinion a created spirit 
could do and understand, for he grants them attraction, and that 
even at great distances, without limiting them to any sphere of 
activity, and this to maintain an opinion which does not appear less 
inexplicable; namely, the possibility that in the order of nature 
matter may think. 

The question which he discusses with the celebrated prelate who 
attacked him, is ivhether matter can think; and as this is an 
important point, even for the present work, I cannot exempt 
myself from entering upon it a little and from taking notice of 
their controversy. I will present the substance of it on this sub- 
ject and will take the liberty of saying what I think of it. The 
late Bishop of Worcester, fearing (but in my opinion without 
good reason) that our author's doctrine of ideas was liable to some 
abuses prejudicial to the Christain faith, undertook to examine 
some passages of it in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity; and having done justice to this excellent writer by recog- 
nizing that he regards the existence of the mind as certain as that 
of body, although the one of these substances is as little known 
as the other, he asks (pp. 241 seqq.) how reflection can assure 
us of the existence of the mind, if God can give to matter the 
faculty of thinking, according to the opinion of our author, bk. 
4, chap. 3, since thus the way of ideas which ought to enable us to 
discern what may be proper to the soul or to the body, would 
become useless ; whereas he had said, bk. 2 of the Essay on the 
Understanding, ch. 23, §§ 15, 27, 28, that the operations of the 



186 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

soul furnish us the idea of the niind, and the understanding with 
the will renders this idea as intelligible to us as the nature of 
body is rendered by solidity and impulse. This is how our author 
replies in the first letter (pp. 65 seqq.) : I believe that I have 
proved that there is a spiritual substance in us, for we experience 
in ourselves thought; now this action or this mode could not be 
the object of the idea of a thing subsisting of itself, and conse- 
quently this mode needs a support or subject of inhesion, and the 
idea of this support farms what we call substance. . . For since 
the general idea of substance is everywhere the same, it follows 
that the modification, which is called thought or power of thinking, 
being joined to it, there results a mind without there being need 
of considering what other modification it has in addition; that 
is whether it has solidity or not. And on the other hand, the 
substance which has the modification called solidity will be matter, 
whether thought be joined to it or not. But if by a spiritual 
substance you understand an immaterial substance, I confess that 
I have not proved that there is one in us, and that it cannot be 
proved demonstratively on my principles. Although what I have 
said on the systems of matter (bk. 4, ch. 10, § 16), in demon- 
strating that God is immaterial, renders it extremely probable that 

the substance which thinks in us is immaterial However 

I have shown (adds the author, p. 68) that the great ends of 
religion and of morals are assured by the immortality of the soul, 
without its being necessary to suppose its immateriality. 

The learned Bishop in his reply to this letter, in order to show 
that our author was of another opinion when he wrote his second 
book of the Essay, quotes, p. 51, the passage (taken from the same 
book, ch. 23, § 15) where it is said, that by the simple ideas which 
we have deduced from the operations of our mind, we can form 
the complex idea of a mind. And that putting together the ideas 
of thought, of perception, of liberty and of power of moving our 
body, we have as clear a notion of immaterial substances as of 
material. He quotes still other passages to show that the author 
opposed mind to body. And he says (p. 54) that the ends of relig- 
ion and of morals are the better assured by proving that the soul is 
immortal by its nature, that is, immaterial. He quotes also 



JSTEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 187 

(p. 70) this passage, that all the ideas which we have of particular 
and distinct hinds of substances are nothing but different combina- 
tions of simple ideas; and that thus the author believed that the 
idea of thinking and of willing- gives another substance different 
from that which the idea of solidity and of impulse gives ; and that 
(§17) he observes that these ideas constitute the body as opposed 
to mind. 

The Bishop of Worcester might have added that from the fact 
that the general idea of substance is in the body and in the mind, 
it does not follow that their differences are modifications of one 
and the same thing, as our author has just said in the passage 
which I have adduced from his first letter. It is necessary to 
distinguish carefully between modifications and attributes. The 
faculties of having perception and of acting, extension, solidity, 
are attributes or perpetual and principle predicates ; but thought, 
impetuosity, figures, motions are modifications of these attributes. 
Furthermore, we must distinguish between physical (or rather 
real) genus, and logical or ideal genus. Things which are of the 
same physical genus, or which are homogeneous, are of the same 
matter, so to speak; and may often be changed the one into the 
other by the change of the modification, as circles and squares. 
But two heterogeneous things may have a common logical genus, 
and then their differences are not simply accidental modifications 
of the same subject, or of the same metaphysical or physical 
matter. Thus time and space are very heterogeneous things, and 
we should do wrong to imagine I know not what real common 
subject, which had but continuous quantity in general, and the 
modifications of which should make time or space to arise. 

Perhaps some one will mock at these distinctions of philosophers 
of two genera, the one merely logical, the other real ; and of two 
matters, the one physical which is that of bodies, the other only 
metaphysical or general ; as if some one said that two parts of 
space are of the same matter, or that two hours also are of the 
same matter among themselves. Nevertheless these distinctions 
are not merely of terms, but of things themselves, and seem to 
come in here very appropriately, where their confusion has given 
rise to a false conclusion. These two genera have a common notion, 



188 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

and the notion of the real genus is common to the two matter?. so 
that their genealogy -will he as follows : 

J Logical merely, varied hy simple differences. 

Metaphysical only, 
where there is 
homogeneity. 
Physical , where 
there is a solid ho- 
mogeneous mass. 



Genus 



Beal, the differences of which 

are modifications, that is to 
sav. matter. 



I have not seen the second letter from the author to the Bishop : 
and the reply which the prelate makes to it hardly touches on the 
point regarding the thinking of matter. But the reply of our 
author to this second answer, returns to it. God (he says, very 
nearly in these words, p. 307 adds to the essence of matter the 
qualities and perfections which he pleases, simple motion in some 
parts, hut in plants vegetation, and in animals feeling. Those 
who agree up to this point, cry out as soon as one more step is talcen. 
and it is said that God can give to matter thought, reason, mill, 
~ this destroyed the essence of matter. But to prove it. they 
allege that thought or reason is not included in the essence of mai- 
ler, a point of no consequence, since motion and, life are not 
included in it either. They assert also that v:e cannot conceive 
thai matter thirties: hut our conception is not the measure of the 
power of God. After this he cites the example of the attraction of 
matter, p. 99, but especially p. 408. where he speaks of the gravita- 
tion of matter toward matter, attributed to Mr. Xewton (in the 
terms which I have quoted above), confessing that we can never 
conceive the manner of it. This is in reality to return to occult, 
or. what is more, inexplicable, qualities. He adds, p. -±01. that 
nothing is more fit to favor the sceptics than to deny what we do 
not understand : and. p. ±02. that we do not conceive even how the 
soul thinks. He thinks, p. ±03. that since the two substances, 
material and immaterial, are capable of being conceived in their 
bare essence without any activity, ir depends on God to give to the 
one or to the other the power of thinking. And he wishes to take 
advantage of the admission of his opponent, who granted feeliiig 






NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 189 

to brutes, but who would not grant them any immaterial substance. 
It is claimed that liberty and consciousness (p. 408), and the 
power of making abstractions (p. 409), can be given to matter, 
not as matter, but as enriched by a divine power. Finally he 
adduces the remark (p. 434) of a traveller as important and as 
judicious as M. de la Loubere, that the pagans of the east recognize 
the immortality of the soul without being able to comprehend its 
immateriality. 

On all this I will remark, before coming to the explanation of 
my opinion, that it is certain that matter is as little capable of 
mechanically producing feeling as of producing reason, as our 
author agrees ; that in truth I acknowledge that it is not right to 
deny what we do not understand, but I add that we are right in 
denying (at least in the natural, order) what is absolutely neither 
intelligible nor explicable. I maintain also that substances (mate- 
rial or immateripJ) cannot be conceived in their bare essence with- 
out any activity ; that activity belongs to the essence of substance 
in general ; that, finally, the conception of creatures is not the 
measure of the power of God, but that their conceptivity or force 
of conceiving is "the measure of the power of nature : all this, which 
is conformed to the natural order, is capable of being conceived or 
understood by some creature. 

Those who understand my system will think that I cannot 
agree entirely with the one or the other of these two excellent 
authors, whose controversy, however, is highly instructive. But, 
to explain myself distinctly, before all else it is necessary to con- 
sider that the modifications which may belong naturally or with- 
out miracle to a subject, must come to it from the limitations 
or variations of a real genus, or of a constant and absolute original 
nature. For it is thus that philosophers distinguish the modes of 
an absolute being from that being itself ; as it is known that size, 
figure and motion are manifestly limitations and variations of 
corporeal nature. For it is clear in what way a limited extension 
gives figures, and that the change which takes place in it is nothing 
but motion. And every time that we find some quality in a sub- 
ject, we must believe that if we understood the nature of this 
subject and of this quality, we should conceive how this quality 



190 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBXITZ. 

can result therefrom. Thus, in the order of nature (miracles set 
aside . it is not optional with God to give to substan ces indiffe r- 
ently such or such qualities, and he will never give them any but 
those which shall be natural to them : that is. vrhich can be 
derived from their nature as explicable modifications. Thus it 
may be asserted that matter Trill not naturally have the above men- 
tioned attraction, and Trill not move of itself in a curved line, 
because it is not possible to conceive hove this takes place there ; 
that is. to explain it mechanically ; whereas that vrhich is natural, 
must be able to become distinctly conceivable if we were admitted 
into the secrets of things. This distinction between what is 
natural and explicable and what is inexplicable and miraculous, 
removes all the difficulties : and by rejecting it. we should main- 
tain something worse than occult qualities : and in this we 
would renounce philosophy and reason, by opening retreats for 
ignorance and idleness, through a dead system which admits not 
only that there are qualities which we do not understand, of which 
there are only too many, but also that there are some which the 
greatest mind, if God gave it all the compass possible, could not 
comprehend : that is. which would be either miraculous or without • 
rhyme and reason : and also that God should make miracles ordi- 
narily, would be without rhyme and reason, so that this useless 
hypothesis would destroy equally our philosophy which seeks rea- 
sons, and divine wisdom which furnishes them. 

Xow as to thought, it is certain, and the author recognizes it 
more than once, that it could not be an intelligible modification 
of matter or one which could be comprised therein and explained : 
that is to say. that the feeling or Thinking being is not a mechan- 
ical thing like a clock or a mill, such that we might conceive 
sizes, figures and motions, the mechanical conjunction of which 
might produce something thinking and even feeling in a mass 
in which there was nothing of the sort, which should cease also in 
the same way by the derangement of this mechanism. It is not 
then natural for matter to feel and to think; and this can only 
take place within it in two ways, one of which will be that God 
should join to it a substance, to which it is natural to think, and the 
other that God should put Thought in it by miracle. In this. then. 



NEW ESSAYS : PREFACE. 



191 



I am entirely of the opinion of the Cartesians, except that I extend 
it even to brutes, and that I believe that they have feeling and 
immaterial souls (properly speaking) , and are also as imperishable 
as the atoms of Democritus or Gassendi ; whereas the Cartesians, 
groundlessly embarrassed by the souls of brutes and not knowing 
what to do with them if they are preserved (for want of having 
bethought themselves of the preservation of the same animal 
reduced to miniature), have been forced, contrary to all appear- 
ances and to the judgment of the human race, to deny even feeling 
to brutes. But if some one should say that God at least may add the 
faculty of thinking to the prepared mechanism, I would reply 
that if this were done and if God added this faculty to matter, 
without depositing in it at the same time a substance which was the 
subject of inhesion of this same faculty (as I conceive it), that is 
to say, without adding to it an immaterial soul, it would be 
necessary that matter should be miraculously exalted in order to 
receive a power of which it is not naturally capable; as some 
scholastics claim that God exalts fire even to the point of giving 
it the power to burn immediately spirits separated from matter, a 
thing which would be a miracle, pure and simple. And it is 
enough that it cannot be maintained that matter thinks without 
putting in it an imperishable soul, or rather a miracle, and that 
thus the immortality of our souls follows from that which is 
natural ; since their extinction could be effected only by a miracle, 
either by exalting matter or by annihilating the soul. For we well 
know that the power of God could render our souls mortal, how- 
ever immaterial (or immortal by nature alone) they may be, for 
he can annihilate them. 

Now this truth of the immateriality of the soul is undoubtedly 
of importance. For it is infinitely more advantageous to religion 
and to morals, especially in the times in which we live (when 
many people hardly respect revelation alone and miracles), to show 
that souls are naturally immortal, and that it would be a miracle if 
they were not, than to maintain that our souls ought naturally to 
die, but that it is by virtue of a miraculous grace, founded in the 
promise alone of God, that they do not die. Also for a long time 
it has been known that those who have wished to destroy natural 



192 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBXITZ. 

religion and reduce all to revealed religion, as if reason taught ns 
nothing concerning it, have been regarded with suspicion ; and not 
always without reason. But our author is not of this number ; he 
maintains the demonstration of the existence of God, and he attrib- 
utes to the immateriality of the soul a probability in the highest 
degree, which could pass consequently for a moral certainty; so 
that I imagine that, having as much sincerity as penetration, he 
could accommodate himself easily to the doctrine which I have just 
stated and which is fundamental in every rational philosophy ; for 
otherwise I do not see how one can prevent himself from falling 
back into the fanatical philosophy, such as the Philosophia llosaica 
of Fludd, which saves all phenomena by attributing them to 
God immediately and by miracle, or into the barbaric philosophy, 
like that of certain philosophers and physicians of the past, which 
still bore the marks of the barbarity of their century and which is 
to-day with reason despised, who saved appearances by forging 
expressly occult qualities or faculties which they imagined to be 
like little demons or goblins capable of producing unceremoniously 
that which is demanded, just as if watches marked the hours by a 
certain horodeictic faculty without having need of wheels, or as if 
mills crushed grains by a tractive faculty without needing any 
thing resembling mill-stones. As to the difficulty which many 
people have had in conceiving an immaterial substance, it will 
easily cease (at least in good part) when they do not demand sub- 
stances separated from matter; as indeed I do not believe there 
ever are anv naturallv ainons creatures. 



Book I. — Of Ixxate Ideas. 

CHAPTER I. [il IX LOCEE.] 

Are there Innate Principles in the Hind of Man? 

It is necessary that I tell you, as news, that I am no longer a 
Cartesian, and that, nevertheless, I am farther removed than ever 
from your Gassendi, whose knowledge and merit I otherwise 
recognize. I have been impressed by a new system, of which I have 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK I. 193 

read something in the philosophical journals of Paris, of Leipsic, 
and of Holland, and in the marvellous Dictionary of M. Bayle, 
article Borarius; and since then I believe I see a new aspect of the 
interior of things. This system appears to unite Plato with 
Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes, the scholastics with the 
modems, theology and ethics with reason. It seems to take the 
best from every side, and then afterwards to go farther than any 
one has yet gone. I 'find in it an intelligible explanation of the 
union of the soul and body, a thing of which I had before 
despaired. I find the true principles of things in the Unities of 
Substance which this system introduces, and in their harmony 
preestablished by the Primitive Substance. I find in it a sur- 
prising simplicity and uniformity, so that it may be said that this 
substance is everywhere and always the same thing, differing only 
in degrees of perfection. I see now what Plato' meant when he 
took matter for an imperfect and transitory entity; what Aris- 
totle meant by his entelechy ; what the promise which Democritus 
himself made of another life is, as recorded in Pliny ; just how far 
the Sceptics were right in inveighing against the senses ; how the 
animals are in reality automata according to Descartes, and how 
they have, nevertheless, souls and feeling, according to the opinion 
of the human race ; how it is necessary to explain rationally those 
who have lodged life and perception in all things, like Cardan, 
Campanella, and better than they, the late Countess of Connaway, 
a Platonist, and our friend, the late M. Francois Mercure van 
Helmont (although elsewhere bristling with unintelligible para- 
doxes), with his friend, the late Mr. Henry More. How the laws 
of nature (a large part of which were unknown before this system) 
have their origin in principles superior to matter, and how, never- 
theless, everything takes place mechanically in matter ; in which 
respect the spiritualistic authors, whom I have just mentioned, had 
failed with their Archsei, and even the Cartesians, in believing 
that immaterial substances changed if not the force, at least the 
direction or determination, of the motions of bodies ; whereas the 
soul and body perfectly retain their laws, each its own, according 
to the new system, and yet one obeys the other as far as is neces- 
sary. Finally, it is since I have meditated on this system that I 
13 



194 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

have found out how the souls of brutes and their sensations are 
not at all prejudicial to the immortality of human souls, or, rather 
how nothing is more adapted to establish our natural immortality 
than to conceive that all souls are imperishable (morte carent ani- 
mae), without, however, there being metempsychoses to be feared, 
since not only souls but also animals remain and will remain liv- 
ing, feeling, acting. It is everywhere as here, and always and 
everywhere as with us, according to what I* have already said to 
you ; unless it be that the states of animals are more or less per- 
fect and developed without there ever being need of souls alto- 
gether separate, while, nevertheless, we always have minds as pure 
as possible, notwithstanding our organs, which cannot disturb by 
any influence, the laws of our spontaneity. I find the vacuum and 
atoms excluded very differently than by the sophism of the Car- 
tesians, founded on the pretended coincidence between the idea 
of body and of extension. I see all things regulated and 
adorned, beyond anything conceived of up to this time ; organic 
matter everywhere ; no sterile, neglected vacuum ; nothing too uni- 
form, everything varied but with order; and, what surpasses the 
imagination, the whole universe in epitome, but with a different 
aspect in each of its parts and even in each of its unities of sub- 
stance. In addition to this new analysis of things, I have better 
understood that of notions or ideas and of truths. I understand 
what is a true, clear, distinct, adequate idea, if I dare adopt this 
word. I understand what are primitive truths, and true axioms, 
the distinction between necessary truths and those of fact, between 
the reasoning of men and the consecutions of brutes which are 
a shadow of it. Finally, you will be surprised, sir, to hear all 
that I have to say to you, and especially to understand how knowl- 
edge of the greatness and perfection of God is thereby exalted. 
For I cannot conceal from you, from whom I have had nothino- 
secret, how much I am imbued now with admiration and (if we 
may venture to make use of this term) with love for this sovereign 
source of things and of beauties, having found that those which 
this system reveals, surpass everything hitherto conceived. You 
know that I had gone a little too far formerly, and that I began 
to incline to the side of the Spinozists, who leave only infinite 



new essays: BOOK I. 



195 



power to God, without recognizing either perfection or wisdom as 
respects him, and, scorning the search after final causes, derive 
everything from brute necessity. But these new lights have cured 
me of this. 

§ 1. I have always favored, as I do still, the innate idea of 
God, which M. Descartes maintained, and consequently other 
innate ideas which cannot come to us from the senses. Now, I go 
still farther in conformity with the new system, and I even believe 
that all the thoughts and actions of our soul come from its own 
depths and cannot be given to it by the senses, as you shall see in 
the sequel. But at present I shall set aside this investigation, and 
accommodating myself to the received expressions, since in truth 
they are good and maintainable, and since in a sense it may be said 
that the external senses are in part causes of our thoughts, I shall 
examine how in my opinion it must be said, even in the common 
system (speaking of the action of bodies on the soul, as the Coper- 
nicans speak with other men of the motion of the sun, and with 
reason), that there are ideas and principles which do not come to us 
from the senses, and which we find in us without forming them, 
although the senses give us occasion to become conscious of them. 
I imagine that your able author has remarked that under the name 
of innate principles one often maintains his prejudices, and wishes 
to exempt himself from the trouble of discussions, and that this 
abuse has animated his zeal > against this supposition. He has 
wished to combat the indolence and the superficial manner of think- 
ing of those who, under the specious pretext of innate ideas and 
truths engraved naturally on the mind, to which we easily give 
assent, do not concern themselves with seeking and examining the 
sources, connections and certainty of this knowledge. In this I 
am altogether of his opinion, and I even go farther. I would that 
our analysis should not be limited, that definitions of all terms 
capable thereof should be given, and that all the axioms which are 
not primitive, should be demonstrated or the means of demon- 
strating them be given ; without distinguishing the opinion .which 
men have thereof, and without caring whether they give their con- 
sent thereto or not. This would be more useful than is thought. 
But it seems that the author has been carried too far on the other 



PHTLOSOPBOLCAI. STORKS OF UEZBXITZ. 

side by Ms zeal, otherwise highly praiseworthy. He has not 
sufficiently disTinguished. in niy opinion, the origin of necessary 
Truths whose source is in the understanding, from that of the truths 
of fact, drawn from the experiences of the senses, and even from 
the confused perceptions which are in us. Xou see therefore, sir. 
that I do not admit what you lay down as fact, that we can acquire 
all our knowledge without having need of innate impressions. 
And the sequel will show which of us is right. 

§§ 2. 3. 4. I do not base the certainty of innate principles hi 
universal consent, for I have already told you that my opinion is 
that we ought to labor to be able to prove all the axioms which are 
not primitive. I grant also that a consent very general, but which 
is not universal, may come from a tradition diffused throughout 
the human race, as the practice of smoking tobacco has been 
received by almost all nations in less than a century, although some 
islanders have been found who. not knowing even lire were unable to 
smoke. Thus some able people, even among theologians, but of the 
partv of Arminius. have believed that the knowledge of the Divin- 
ity came from a very ancient and general tradition : and I believe 
indeed, that instruction has confirmed and rectified this knowledge. 
It appears, however, that nature has aided in reaching it without 
instruction: the marvels of the universe have made us think of a 
superior power. A child born deaf and dumb has been seen to 
show veneration for the full moon, and nations have been found, 
who seemed not To have learned anyt hi ng else of other people, fear- 
ing invisible powers. I grant that this is not yet the idea of G . 
such as we have it and as we demand ; but this idea itself does not 
cease to be in The depths of our souls, wiThouT being placed there, 
as we shall see. and The eternal h - I are in part engraved 

thereon in a way still more legible, and by a sort of instincT. But 
They are pracrical principles of which we shall also have occasion To 
speak. It niusT be admitted, however. that The inclination which 
we have to recognize The idea of God. lies in human nature. And 
even if The firsT instruction therein should be attribuTed to Eevela- 
Tic»n. The readiness which men have always shown To receive This 
doctrine comes from The nature of Their souls. I conclude That a 
sufficiently general consenT among men is an indication and n : 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK I. 



197 



demonstration of an innate principle ; but that the exact and deci- 
sive proof of these principles consists in showing that their 
certainty comes only from what is in us. To reply again to what 
you say against the general approbation given to the two great 
speculative principles, which are nevertheless the best established, 
I may say to you that even if they were not known, they would 
none the less be innate, because they are recognized as soon as 
heard ; but I will add further, that at bottom everyone knows 
them and makes use at every moment of the principle of contra- 
diction (for example) without examining it distinctly, and there 
is no barbarian, who, in a matter which he considers serious, would 
not be shocked at the conduct of a liar who contradicts himself. 
Thus these maxims are employed without being expressly con- 
sidered. And it is very much so that we have virtually in the mind 
the propositions suppressed in . enthymemes, which are set aside 
not only externally, but also in our thought. 

§ 5. [Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known 
to children, idiots, &c.~\ If you are so prejudiced as to say that 
there are truths imprinted on the soul which it does not perceive, I 
am not surprised that you reject innate knowledge. But I am 
astonished that it has not occurred to you that we have an infinity 
of knowledge of which we are not always conscious, not even when 
we have need of it. It is for memory to retain it and for reminis- 
cence to represent it to us, as it often does, but not always when 
needed. This is very well called remembrance (subvenire) , for 
reminiscence requires some help. And it must be that in this mul- 
tiplicity of our knowledge we are determined by something to 
renew one portion rather than another, since it is impossible to 
think distinctly and at once of all that we know. 

In a sense it must be said that all arithmetic and all geometry 
are innate and are in us virtually, so that they may be found 
there if we consider attentively and arrange what is already in the 
mind, without making use of any truth learned by experience or 
by the tradition of others, as Plato has shown in a dialogue, where 
he introduces Socrates leading a child to abstract truths by mere 
questions, without telling him anything. We may therefore invent 
these sciences in our libraries and even with closed eyes, without 



198 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

learning by sight or even by touch, the truths which we need; 
although it is true that we would not consider the ideas in question 
if we had never seen or touched anything. .... 

Since an acquired knowledge may be concealed in the soul by the 
memory, as you admit, why could not nature have also hidden there 
sonie original knowledge? Must everything which is natural to a 
substance which knows itself, be known there actually in the begin- 
ning? Can not and must not this substance (such as our soul) 
have many properties and modifications, all of which it is impos- 
sible to consider at first and altogether ? It was the opinion of the 
Platonists that all our knowledge was reminiscence, and that thus 
the truths which the soul has brought along at the birth of the 
man, and which' are called innate, must be the remains of an 
express anterior knowledge. But this opinion has no foundation. 
And it is easy to judge that the soul must already have innate 
knowledge in the preceding state (if preexistence were a fact), 
however distant it might be, just as here ; it, therefore, would have 
to come also from another preceding state, or it would be finally 
innate, or at least concreate; or it would be necessary to go to 
infinity and make souls eternal, in which case this knowledge would 
be innate in truth, from the fact that it would never have a begin- 
ning in the soul ; and if someone claimed that each anterior state 
has had something from another more anterior, which it has not 
left to the succeeding, the reply will be made, that it is manifest 
that certain evident truths must have been in all these states. And 
in whatever way it may be taken, it is always clear in ail the states 
of the soul that necessary truths are innate, and are proved by what 
is internal, it not being possible to establish them by experiences as 
we establish truths of fact. Why should it be necessary also that 
we could possess nothing in the soul of which we had never made ' 
use? And is to have a thing without making use of it the same 
thing as to have merely the faculty of acquiring it ? If it were so, 
we should never possess anything except the things which we 
enjoy; whereas we know that in addition to the faculty and the 
object, there must often he some disposition in the faculty or in 
the object or in both, in order that the faculty be exercised upon 
the object. 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK I. 



199 



If the mind had only the simple capacity of receiving knowledge 
■or passive power for it, as indeterminate as that which the wax 
has for receiving figures, and the blank tablet for receiving letters, 
it would not be the source of necessary truths, as I have just shown 
it to be ; for it is incontestable that the senses do not suffice to show 
their necessity, and that thus the mind has a disposition (as much 
active as passive) to draw them itself from its depths ; although 
the senses are necessary in order to give it the occasion and, atten- 
tion for this, and to carry it to some rather than to others. You see 
therefore, sir, that these people, otherwise very able, who are of a 
different opinion, seem not to have sufficiently meditated on the 
consequences of the difference which there is between necessary or 
eternal truths and the truths of experience, as I have already 
remarked, and as all our discussion shows. The original proof 
of necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and the 
other truths come from experiences or from the observations of the 
senses. Our mind is capable of knowing both, but it is the source 
of the former ; and whatever number of particular experiences we 
may have of a universal truth, we could not be assured of it forever 
by induction, without knowing its necessity through the reason. 

§ 11. It is the particular relation of the human mind to these 
truths which renders the exercise of the faculty easy and natural as 
respects them, and which causes them to be called innate. It is 
not, therefore, a naked faculty which consists in the mere possi- 
bility of understanding them ; it is a disposition, an aptitude, a 
preformation, which determines our soul and which brings it about 
that they may be derived from it. Just as there is a difference 
between the figures which are given to the stone or marble indiffer- 
ently, and those which its veins already mark out, or are disposed 
to mark out, if the workman profits by them. 

The intellectual ideas, which are the source of necessary truths, 
do not come from the senses ; and you recognize that there are 
ideas which are due to the reflection of the mind when it reflects 
upon itself. For the rest, it is true that the express knowledge of 
truths is posterior (tempore vel natura) to the express knowledge 
of ideas ; as the nature of truths depends on the nature of ideas, 
before we expressly form one or the other; and the truths, into 



200 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

which the ideas which come from the senses enter, depend on the 
senses, at least in part. But the ideas which come from the senses 
are confused, and the truths which depend upon them are confused 
also, at least in part ; whereas the intellectual ideas and the truths 
which depend on them, are distinct, and neither the one class nor 
the other has its origin in the senses, although it may be true that 
we would never think of them without the senses. 

§ 18. [If such an assent be a mark of innate, then, that one and 
two are equal to three, that sweetness is not bitterness, and a thou- 
sand the like, must be innate.] I do not see how this : what is the 
same thing is not different, can be the origin of the principle of 
contradiction, and easier ; for it seems to me that you give yourself 
more liberty by advancing that A is not B, than by saying that A 
is not non-A. And the reason which prevents A from being B, is 
that B includes non-A. For the rest, the proposition : the sweet is 
not the bitter, is not innate, according to the meaning which we 
have given to the term innate truth. For the sensations of sweet 
and of bitter come from the external senses. Thus it is a mixed 
conclusion (hybrida conclusio), where the axiom is applied to a 
sensible truth. But as for this proposition: the square is not a 
circle, it may be said to be innate, for, in considering it, you make 
a subsumption or application of the principle of contradiction to 
what the understanding itself furnishes as soon as you are con- 
scious of innate thoughts. 

§ 19. [Such less general propositions known before these uni- 
versal maxims.] We build on these general maxims, as we build 
on majors which are suppressed when we reason by enthymemes ; 
for although very often we do not think distinctly of what we do 
in reasoning, any more than of what we do in walking and jump- 
ing, it is always true that the force of the conclusion consists partly 
in what is suppressed and could not come from elsewhere, as will 
be found if you should wish to prove it. 

§ 20. [One and one equal to two, &c, not general nor useful, 
answered.] It is true that we begin sooner to perceive particular 
truths, when we begin with more composite and. gross ideas; but 
this does not prevent the order of nature from beginning with the 
luost simple, and the reason of more particular truths from depend- 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK I. 201 

ing on the more general, of which they are only examples. And 
when we wish to consider what is in ns virtually, and before all 
apperception, we are right in beginning with the most simple. 
Tor the general principles enter into our thoughts, of which they 
form the soul and the connection. They are as necessary thereto 
as the muscles and sinews are for walking, although we do not 
think of them. The mind leans upon these principles at all times, 
but it does not so easily come to distinguish them and to represent 
them to itself distinctly and separately, because that requires great 
attention to what it does, and most people, little accustomed to 
meditate, have hardly any. Have not the Chinese, like ourselves, 
articulate sounds ? and yet being attached to another way of writ- 
ing, they have not yet thought of making an alphabet of these 
sounds. It is thus that one possesses many things without 
knowing it. 

§ 21. [These maxims not being Tcnoivn sometimes till proposed, 
proves them not innate.] The nature of things and the nature of 
the mind agree. And since you oppose the consideration of the 
thing to the apperception of that which is engraved on the mind, 
this objection itself shows, sir, that those whose side you take, 
understand by innate truths only those which would be approved 
naturally as by instinct, and even without knowing it, unless con- 
fusedly. There are some of this nature, and we shall have occasion 
to speak of them. But that which is called natural light supposes 
a distinct knowledge, and very often the consideration of the 
nature of things is nothing else than the knowledge of the nature 
of our mind and of these innate ideas which we do not need to 
seek outside. Thus I call innate, those truths which need only 
this consideration in order to be verified. I have already replied, 
§ 5, to the objection, § 22, which claimed that when it is said 
that innate ideas are implicitly in the mind, this must mean 
simply that it has the faculty of knowing them ; for I have shown 
that in addition to this, it has the faculty of finding them in itself, 
and the disposition to approve them when it thinks of them as it 
should. 

§ 23. [The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a 
false supposition of no precedent teaching.'] I would name as 



202 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

propositions whose ideas are innate, the propositions of arithmetic 
and geometry, which are all of this nature; and, as regards 
necessary truths, no others could be found. 

§ 25. [These maxims not the first hnown.~] The apperception 
of that which is in us, depends upon attention and order. ISTow, it 
is not only possible, but it is also proper, that children pay more 
attention to the ideas of the senses, because the attention is regu- 
lated by the need. The result, however, shows in the sequel, that 
nature has not uselessly given herself the trouble of impressing 
upon us innate knowledge, since without it there would be no 
means of arriving at actual knowledge of the truths necessary in 
the demonstrative sciences, and at the reasons of facts ; and we 
should possess nothing above the brutes. 

§ 26. [And so not innate.] Not at all, for thoughts are 
activities ; and knowledge or truths, in so far as they are in us, 
even when we do not think of them, are habits or dispositions ; and 
we know very many things of which we hardly think. 

[It is very difficult to conceive that a truth he in the mind, if the 
mind has never thought of this truth.'] 

It is as if someone said that it is difficult to conceive that there 
are veins in marble before they are discovered. This objection 
also seems to approach a little too much the petitio principii. All 
those who admit innate truths without basing them upon the Pla- 
tonic reminiscence, admit those of which they have not yet thought. 
Moreover, this reasoning proves too much; for if truths are 
thoughts, we should be deprived not only of the truths of which we 
have never thought, but also of those of which we have thought 
and of which we no longer actually think; and if truths are not 
thoughts but habits, and aptitudes, natural or acquired, nothing 
prevents there being some in us of which we have never thought, 
nor will ever think. 

§ 27. [Not innate, because they appear least where what is 
innate shows itself clearest.] I believe that we must reason here 
very differently. Innate maxims appear only through the atten- 
tion which is given them ; but these persons [children, idiots, sav- 
ages J , have very little of it, or have it for entirely different things. 
They • think of hardly anything except the needs of the body ; 



NEW ESSAYS '. BOOK II. 203 

and it is reasonable that pure and detached thoughts should 
be the prize of nobler pains. It is true that children and savages 
have the mind less altered bj customs, but they also have it less 
exalted by the teaching which gives attention. It would not be 
very just that the brightest lights should burn better in minds 
which deserve them less, and which are enveloped in thicker clouds. 
I would not, then, that one give too much honor to ignorance and 
savagery, when one is as learned and as clever as you are ; that 
would be to depreciate the gifts of God. Some one will say, that 
the more ignorant one is, the nearer he approaches to the advantage 
of a block of marble or of a piece of wood, which are infallible 
and sinless. But unfortunately, it is not in this way that one 
approaches thereto; and as far as we are capable of knowledge, 
we sin in neglecting to acquire it, and we shall fail so much the 
more easily as we are less instructed. 



Book II. — Of Ideas. 

chapter I. 

Of Ideas in general and whether the soul always thinks. 

§ 1. [Idea is the object of thinking.'] I admit it, provided that 
you add that it is an immediate internal object, and that this object 
is an expression of the nature or of the qualities of things. If the 
idea were the form of thought, it would come into existence and 
would cease with the actual thoughts which correspond to it ; but 
being its object it might be anterior and posterior to the thoughts. 
External sensible objects are but mediate, because they cannot 
act immediately upon the soul. God alone is the immediate exter- 
nal object. It might be said that the soul itself is its own immedi- 
ate internal object; but it is so in so far as it contains ideas or 
what corresponds to things ; for the soul is a microcosm in which 
distinct ideas are a representation of God, and in which confused 
ideas are a representation of the universe. 

§ 2. [All ideas come from sensation or reflection.^ This tabula 
rasa, of which so much is said, is, in my opinion, only a fiction, 
which nature does not admit of, and which has its foundation in 



204 



PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 



the incomplete notions of philosophers, like the vacuum, atoms, and 
rest, absolute or relative, of two parts of a whole, or like the 
materia prima which is conceived as without form. Uniform 
things and those which contain no variety, are never anything but 
abstractions, like time, space, and the other entities of pure mathe- 
matics. There is no body, the parts of which are at rest, and there 
is no substance which has nothing by which to distinguish it from 
every other. Human souls differ not only from other souls, but 
also among themselves, although the difference is not of the nature 
which is called specific. And according to the demonstrations, 
which I think I have, everything substantial, whether soul or body, 
has its relation, which is peculiar to itself, to each of the others; 
and the one must always differ from the other by intrinsic charac- 
teristics; not to mention that those who speak so much of this 
tabula rasa, after having taken away from it ideas are not able 
to say what is left to it, like the scholastic philosophers who leave 
nothing to their materia ■prima. It may, perhaps, be answered 
that this tabula rasa of the philosophers means that the soul has 
naturally and originally only bare faculties. But faculties without 
some act, in a word, the pure powers of the school, are also but 
'fictions unknown to nature, and which are obtained only by 
abstraction. For where in the world will there ever be found a 
faculty which confines itself to the mere power, without exercising 
any act? There is always a particular disposition to action, and 
to one action rather than to another. And besides the disposition, 
there is a tendency to action, of which tendencies there is always 
an infinity at once in each subject ; and these tendencies are never 
without some effect. Experience is, I admit, necessary in order 
that the soul be determined to such or such thoughts, and in order 
that it take notice of the ideas which are in us ; but by what means 
can experience and the senses give ideas ? Has the soul windows ? 
does it resemble tablets ? is it like wax \ It is evident that all who 
think of the soul thus, make it at bottom corporeal. This axiom 
received among the philosophers, will be opposed to me, that there 
is nothing in the soul which does not come from the senses. But 
the soul itself and its affections must be excepted. Nihil est in 
intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, exipe: nisi ipse intellectus. 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 



205 



]^ow the soul comprises being, substance, unity, identity, cause, 
perception, reason, and many other notions which the senses cannot 
give. .... 

In order to avoid a discussion upon what has delayed us too long, 
I declare to you in advance, sir, that when you say that ideas come 
to us from one or the other of these causes [sensation or reflection] , 
I understand it of their actual perception, for I think that I have 
shown that they are in us before they are perceived, so far as they 
have anything distinct about them. 

§§9 and 10. [The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to 
perceive. The soul thinks not always.'] Action is no more- con- 
nected with the soul than with body ; a state without thought in the 
soul and an absolute repose in body, appear to me equally con- 
trary to nature, and without example in the world. A substance 
once in action will be so always, for all the impressions remain and 
are merely mixed with other new ones. By striking a body we 
excite or rather determine an infinity of vortices, as in a liquid, 
for at bottom every solid has a degree of liquidity and every liquid 
a degree of solidity, and there is no means of ever arresting entirely 
these internal vortices. jSTow we may believe that if the body is 
never in repose, the soul, which corresponds to it, will never be 
without perception either. 

It is certain that we slumber and sleep, and that Grod is exempt 
from this. But it does not follow that while sleeping we are with- 
out perception. Rather just the opposite is found to be the case, 
if it is well considered. 

Real powers are never simple possibilities. There is always ten- 
dency and action. 

I do not say that it is self-evident that the soul always thinks. A 
little attention and reasoning is needed to discover it. The com- 
mon people perceive it as little as the pressure of the air or the 
roundness of the earth. 

It is decided as it is proved that there are imperceptible bodies 
and invisible movements, although certain persons ridicule them. 
There are likewise, numberless perceptions which are not suffi- 
ciently distinguished for them to be perceived or remembered, but 
they are made known by certain consequences. 



206 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBNITZ. 

I have not read the hook which contains this objection [that it is 
an inference from Locke's position, that a thing is not, because we 
are not sensible of it in our sleep], but it would not have been 
wrong merely to object to you, that it does uot follow because the 
thought is not perceived that it ceases for that reason ; for other- 
wise it could be said, for the same reason, that there is no soul 
during the time when it is not perceived. And in order to refute 
this objection it is necessary to point out in particular of the 
thought that it is essential to it that it be perceived. 

§ 11. [It is not always conscious of it.] There [that it is not 
easy to conceive that a thing can think and not be conscious that it 
thinks] is, undoubtedly, the knot of the affair and the difficulty 
which has embarrassed able men. But here is the means of getting 
out of it. We must consider that we think of many things at once, 
but we attend only to the thoughts which are most important ; and 
it could not be otherwise, for if we attend to all it would be 
necessary to think attentively of an infinity of things at the same 
time, all of which we feel and which make an impression upon our 
senses. I say even more : there remains something of all our past 
thoughts and none can ever be entirely effaced. Now when we 
sleep without dreaming and when we are stunned by some blow, 
fall, symptom or other accident, there is formed within us an 
infinite number of minute confused sensations ; and death itself 
can produce no other effect upon the souls of animals who, without 
doubt, ought, sooner or later, to acquire important perceptions, 
for all goes on in an orderly manner in nature. I acknowledge, 
however, that in this state of confusion, the soul would be without 
pleasure and without pain, for these are noticeable perceptions. 

§ 12. [If a sleeping man thinks without hnowing it, the sleep- 
ing and looking man are two persons.] I, in turn, will make you 
another supposition which appears more natural. Is it not true 
that it must always be admitted that after some interval or some 
great change, one may fall into a condition of general forgetful- 
ness ? Sleidan, it is said, before his death, forgot all that he knew; 
and there are numbers of other examples of this sad occurrence. 
Let us suppose that such a man became young again and learned 
all de novo; would he be another man for all that? It is not then, 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 



207 



memory which, properly, makes the same man. Nevertheless, the 
fiction of a soul which animates different bodies by turns, without 
what happens to it in one of these bodies interesting it in the other, 
is one of those fictions contrary to the nature of things, which 
come from the incomplete notions of the philosophers, like space 
without body, and body without motion, and which disappear 
when one penetrates a little farther; for it must be known that 
each soul preserves all its preceding impressions and cannot divide 
itself equally in the way just mentioned. The future in each 
substance has a perfect connection with the past. It is this which 
constitutes the identity of the individual. Moreover, memory is 
not necessary nor even always possible, on account of the multi- 
tude of present and past impressions which cooperate toward our 
present thoughts ; for I do not believe there are in man thoughts 
of which there is not some effect at least confused, or some remnant 
mixed with subsequent thoughts. Many things can be forgotten, 
but they could also be remembered long afterward if they were 
recalled as they should be. 

§ 13. [Impossible to conceive those that sleep without dream- 
ing, that they think.] One is not without some feeble feeling while 
asleep, even when the sleep is dreamless. Waking itself shows it, 
and the easier it is to awaken one, the more feeling one has of what 
is going on without him, although this feeling is not always suffi- 
ciently strong to cause the awakening. 

§ 15. [Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man 
ought to be the most rational.] All impressions have their effect, 
but all the effects are not always noticeable. When I turn to one 
side rather than to the other, it is very often through a series of 
minute impressions of which I am not conscious, and which render 
one movement a little more uncomfortable than the other. All our 
unpremeditated actions are the result of a concurrence of minute 
perceptions, and even our customs and passions, which have such 
influence in our deliberations, come therefrom ; for these habits 
grow little by little, and, consequently, without the minute percep- 
tions, we should not arrive at these noticeable dispositions. I have 
already remarked that he who would deny these effects in morals, 
would imitate the poorly instructed persons who deny insensible 



208 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

corpuscles in physics : and yet I see that there are, among those 
who speak of liberty, those who, taking no notice of these insensible 
impressions, capable of inclining the balance, imagine an entire 
indifference in moral actions, like that of the ass of Bnridan 
divided equally between two meadows. And of this we shall speak 
more fully in what follows. I acknowledge, however, that these 
impressions incline without necessitating. 

^ 23. [When does a man begin to have ideas?] I am of the 
same opinion [namely, that it is when he has some sensation] ; 
but it is by a principle a little peculiar, for I believe that we are 
never without thoughts and also never without sensation. I dis- 
guish only between ideas and thoughts ; for we have always all 
pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses; but thoughts 
always correspond to some sensation. 

>: 25. [In the perception of simple ideas the soul is for the most 
part piassive.] How can it be that it is merely passive with regard 
to the perception of all simple ideas, since, according to your own 
avowal, there are simple ideas the perception of which comes from 
reflection, and since the mind gives itself thoughts from reflection, 
for it is itself which reflects \ Whether it can refuse them is 
another question: and it cannot do it undoubtedly without some 
reason which turns it aside from them, when there is some occasion 
for this. 

CHAPTEE IV. 

Of solidity. 

\ 1. [We receive this idea from touch.] And at bottom solid- 
ity, in so far as the notion is distinct, is conceived by the pure 
reason, although the senses furnish to the reason the proof that it 
is in nature. 

CHAPTEP l V. 

Of simple ideas of divers senses. 

These ideas which are said to come from more than one sense, as 
those of space, figure, motion, rest, are given us rather by the com- 
mon sense, that is to say. the mind itself, for these are ideas of the 
pure understanding, but which have relation to externalitv and 



new essays : book ii. 



209 



which the senses make us perceive ; also they are capable of defini- 
tions and demonstrations. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Of ideas which come from sensation and from reflection. 

§ 1. [Pleasure and pain, power, existence, etc.] It seems to 
me that the senses could not convince us of the existence of sensible 
things without the aid of the reason. Thus I believe the consid- 
eration of existence conies from reflection. Those of power and of 
unity come also from the same source and are of an entirely differ- 
ent nature from the perceptions of pleasure and of pain. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Other considerations concerning simple ideas. 

§2. [Privative qualities.] I had not believed that the privative 
nature of rest could be doubted. It suffices for it that motion in 
body be denied; but it does not suffice for motion that rest be 
denied, and something more must be added in order to determine 
the degree of motion, since it receives essentially more or less, 
while all rest is equal. , It is another thing when we speak of 
the cause of rest, which must be positive in secondary matter or 
mass. I should further believe that the very idea of rest is priva- 
tive, that is, that it consists only in negation. It is true that the 
act of denying is a positive thing. 

§ 10. [Secondary qualities.] I believe that it can be said that 
power, when it is intelligible and can be distinctly explained, ought 
to be counted among primary equalities; but when it is only sensi- 
ble and gives but a confused idea, it ought to be put among second- 
ary qualities. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Of perception. 

§ 1. [Perception the first simple idea of reflection.] It might, 

perhaps, be added that brutes have perception, and that it is not 

necessary that they have thought, that is to say, that they have 

reflection or what may be its object. Also we ourselves have 

14 



210 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP HEIBXTTZ. 

minute perceptions of which we are not conscious in our present 
state. It is true that- we could very well perceive them and reflect 
on them, if we were not turned aside by their multitude, which dis- 
tracts our minds, or if they were not effaced or rather obscured by 
the greater ones. 

§4. I should prefer to distinguish between perception and con- 
sciousness (sapercevoir). The perception of light or of color, for 
example, of which we are conscious, is composed of many minute 
perceptions of which we are not conscious ; and a noise of which 
we have a perception but to which we do not attend, becomes ap per- 
ceptible by a little addition or augmentation. Tor if what pre- 
cedes made no impression on the soul, this small addition would 
also make none and the whole would make no more. 

§ 8. ["The problem of Molirieux'"] I think that supposing 
that the blind man knows that these two figures which he sees are 
those of the cube and of the globe, he would be able to discern 
them and to say without touching them, this is the globe, this is 
the cube. 

Perhaps ALolineux and the author of the Essay are not so far 
from my opinion as at first appears, and that the reasons of their 
opinion, contained apparently in the letter of the former, who has 
employed them with success in order to convince people of their 
error, have been suppressed purposely by the latter in order to give 
more exercise to the mind of his readers. If you will weigh my 
answer, you will find that I have put a condition in it which can be 
considered as comprised in the question ; it is, that the only thing 
in question is that of distinguishing, and that the blind man knows 
that the two figured bodies which he must distinguish are there, 
and that thus each of the appearances which he sees is that of the 
cube or that of the globe. In this case, it seems to me beyond doubt 
that the blind man who ceases to be blind, can distinguish them by 
the principles of the reason joined to what touch has provided him 
with beforehand of sensible knowledge. For I do not speak of 
what he will do perhaps in fact and immediately, being stunned 
and confounded by the novelty, or otherwise little accustomed 
to drawing consequences. The foundation of my opinion is that 
in the globe there are no points distinguishable on the side of the 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 211 

globe itself, all being there level and without angles, whereas in 
the cube there are eight points distinguished from all the others. 
If there were not this means of distinguishing the figures, a blind 
man could not learn the rudiments of geometry by touch. Never- 
theless, we see that those born blind are capable of learning geome- 
try, and have even always some rudiments of natural geometry, 
and that most often geometry is learned by the sight alone, with- 
out employing touch, as a paralytic, or other person to whom touch 
has been almost interdicted, might and even must do. And it must 
be that these two geometries, that of the blind man and that of the 
paralytic, meet and coincide, and even reduce to the same ideas, 
although there are no common images. This again shows how 
necessary it is to distinguish images from exact ideas, which con- 
sist in definitions. It would certainly be very interesting and even 
instructive to examine well the ideas of one born blind to hear his 
descriptions of figures. For he might come to this and he might 
even understand the doctrine of optics in so far as it depends upon 
distinct and mathematical ideas, although he would not be able 
to reach a conception of what is clear-confused, that is to say, the 
image of light and of colors. ... It would also be very 
important to examine the ideas that a deaf and dumb man might 
have of non-figured things. . . Men are very negligent in not 
getting an exact knowledge of the modes of thought of such persons. 

§ 11. [Perception puts the difference between animals and 
inferior beings.] I am inclined to believe that there is also among 
plants some perception and desire, because of the great analogy 
there is between plants and animals ; and if there is a vegetable 
soul, as is the common opinion, it must have perception. However, 
I do not cease to ascribe to mechanism all that takes place in the 
body of plants and animals, except their first formation. Thus 
I agree that the movement of the plant called sensitive comes from 
mechanism, and I do not approve of having recourse to the soul 
when the detail of the phenomena of plants and animals is to be 
explained. 

§ 13. Very good ; and I think almost as much could be said of 
plants. But as to man, his perceptions are accompanied by the 
power of reflection which passes to the act when there is occasion. 



212 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

But when he is reduced to a state in which he is like one in a leth- 
argy and almost without feeling, reflection and consciousness cease 
and universal truths are not thought of. Nevertheless, the innate 
and acquired faculties and dispositions, and even the impressions 
which are received in this state of confusion, do not cease for that 
reason, and are not effaced, although they are forgotten; they will 
even have their turn to contribute some day toward some noticeable 
effect; for nothing is useless in nature; all confusion must 
develop itself; animals even, having passed through a condition 
of stupidity, ought to return some day to more exalted perceptions ; 
and since simple substances last forever, it will not do to judge 
of eternity by some years. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Of the faculty of discerning ideas. 

§ 10. [Brutes abstract not.] I am of the same opinion. They 
know apparently whiteness and notice it in chalk as in snow ; but 
this is not yet abstraction, for that requires a consideration of what 
is common, separated from what is particular, and consequently 
there enters therein the knowledge of universal truths, which is not 
given to brutes. It is well observed also that the brutes that speak 
do not make use of words to express general ideas, and that men 
deprived of the use of speech and of words do not fail to invent 
other general signs. 

§ 11. The brutes pass from one imagination to another by the 
connection which they have felt here before; for example, when 
the master takes a stick the dog is apprehensive of being struck. 
And on many occasions children, as likewise other men, have no 
other procedure in their passages from thought to thought. This 
might be called consecution and reasoning in a very broad sense. 
But I prefer to conform to the received usage in confining these 
words to man and in restricting them to the knowledge of some 
reason of the connection of perceptions which sensations alone 
could not give ; their effect being but to cause us naturally to expect 
another time the same connection which has been noticed before, 
although perhaps the reasons are no longer the same ; a fact which 
often deceives those who govern themselves merely by the senses. 



new essays: book ii. 213 

§17. \_Darh room.~\ [Of. opening remarks of the next 
chapter.] 

CHAPTER XII. 

Of complex ideas. 

In order to render the resemblance greater it would be necessary 
to suppose that there was in the dark room to receive the images a 
cloth, which was not smooth, but diversified by folds representing 
innate knowledge; that, furthermore, this cloth or canvas being 
stretched had a sort of elasticity or power of acting, and even an 
action or reaction accommodated as much to past folds, as to newly 
arrived impressions of the images. And this action would consist 
in certain vibrations or oscillations, such as are seen in a stretched 
cord when it is touched, of such a kind that it gives forth a sort of 
musical sound. For not only do we receive images or traces in the 
brain but we also form them anew when we consider complex ideas. 
Thus the cloth, which represents our brain, must be active and 
elastic. This comparison would explain tolerably well what takes 
place in the brain ; but as to the soul, which is a simple substance 
or monad, it represents without extension these same varieties of 
extended masses and has perception of them. 

§ 3. [Complex ideas are either modes, substances, or relations.] 
This division of the objects of our thoughts into substances, modes 
and relations is satisfactory to me. I believe that qualities are 
but modifications of substances, and that the understanding adds 
thereto the relations. This is of more consequence than is thought. 

§ 5. [Simple and mixed modes.] Perhaps a dozen or score are 
but relations and are constituted by connection with the under- 
standing. Units are separate, and the understanding puts them 
together however dispersed they may be. Nevertheless, although 
relations are from the understanding they are not without founda- 
tion and reality. For, in the first place, understanding is the 
origin of things ; and even the reality of all things, except simple 
substances, consists ultimately only of the perceptions of the phe- 
nomena of simple substances. It is often the same thing with 
regard to mixed modes ; that is to say, that they must be referred 
back to relations. 



•2H PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

CHAPTEB Xm. 

Of simple modes, and first of those of space. 

§17. [Whether space is substance or accident, not bourn,] I 
have reason to fear that I shall be accused of vanity in wishing to 
determine what you. sir. acknowledge not to know. But there is 
room, for believing that you know more on this point than you say 
or believe you do. Some have believed that God is the place of 
things. Lessius and Guerike. if I am not mistaken, were of this 
opinion : but then place contains something more than we attribute 
I -ace which we strip of all action : and in this way it is no more 
a substance than time, and if it has parts it could not be God. It is 
a relation, an order, not only among existing things, but also among 
possible things as they may exist. But its truth and reality is 
founded in God. like all the eternal truths. 

It is best then to say that space is an order, but that God is its 
source. 

I 19. [Substance and accident of little use in philosophy.] I 
acknowledge that I am of another opinion, and that I believe that 
the consideration of substance is a point of philosophy of the great- 
- importance and of the greatest fruitfulne- - . 

CHAPTPE XIV. 

Of duration and its simple modes. 

> 16. [It is not motion but the constant train of ideas in our 
minds while awake thai furnishes us with the idea of duration.] 
A train of perceptions awakens in us the idea of duration, but it- 
does not make it. Our perceptions never have a train sufficiently 
constant and regular to correspond to that of time, which is a uni- 
form and simple continuum, like a straight line. The change :: 
perceptions gives us occasion to think of time, and it is measured 
by uniform changes; but if there should be nothing uniform in 
nature, time would not cease to be determined, just as place would 
not cease to be determined also if there should be no fixed or 
immovable body. 

§ '24:. The void which can be conceived in time, indicates, like 
that in space, that time and space apply as well to possible as to 

:-:ing things. 



KEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 215 

§ 26. Time and space are of the nature of eternal truths which 
concern equally the possible and the existing. 

§ 27. [Eternity.] But in order to derive the notion of eternity 
it is necessary to conceive more, viz., that the same reason subsists 
always for going farther. It is this consideration of the reasons 
which completes the notion of the infinite or of the indefinite in 
possible progress. Thus the senses alone cannot suffice to make us 
form these notions. And at bottom it may be said that the idea of 
the absolute is anterior in the nature of things to that of the limits 
which are added. But we do not notice the first save in beginning 
with what is limited and which strikes our senses. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Of infinity. 

§ 1. [Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to space, 
duration and number.] The true infinite, strictly speaking, is only 
in the Absolute, which is anterior to all composition and is not 
formed by the addition of parts. 

§ 3. [Hence we come by the idea of infinity.] Take a straight 
line and prolong it in such a way that it is double the first. ISTow 
it is clear that the second, being perfectly similar to the first, can 
be doubled in the same way in order to give a third, which is also 
similar to the preceding; and the same ratio always holding it 
will never be possible to stop ; thus the line can be prolonged ad 
infinitum; in such a way that the consideration of the infinite 
comes from that of similarity or of the same ratio, and its origin 
is the same as that of universal and necessary truths. This shows 
how what gives completion to the conception of this idea is found 
in us and could not come from the experiences of the senses ; just 
as necessary truths could not be proved by induction nor by the 
senses. The idea of the absolute is in us internally, like that of 
being. These absolutes are nothing but the attributes of God and 
it can be said that they are no less the source of ideas than God 
is himself the principle of beings. The idea of the absolute in 
relation to space, is no other than that of the immensity of God, 
and so of the others. But we deceive ourselves in wishing to 



216 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBES OF LEIBNITZ. 

imagine an absolute space, which would be an infinite whole, com- 
posed of parts. There is no such thing. It is a notion which 
involves a contradiction, and these infinite wholes, and their 
opposites. the infinitely minutes, are only admissible in the calcula- 
tions of geometers, just like the imaginary roots of algebra. 

£ 16. [We have no positive idea of infinity nor of infinite dura- 
tion.] I believe that we have a positive idea of both, and this idea 
will be true provided it is not conceived as an infinite whole but as 
an absolute or attribute without limits, which is the ease as regards 
the eternity in the necessity of the existence of God, without 
depending on parts and without forming the notion by an addition 
of times. From this is also seen, as I have already said, that the 
origin of the notion of the infinite comes from the same source 
as that of necessary truths. 

CHAPTEB SIX. 

Of the modes of thinking. 

§ 1. [Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, rf-c] It is well 
to clear irp these notions, and I shall try to aid in it. I will say 
then that it is sensation when we perceive an external object; that 
re me mb ranee is its repetition without the object returning; but 
when we know that we have had it, it is memory. Contempla- 
tion is commonly employed in a sense different from yours, namely, 
for a condition where we free ourselves from business in order to 
apply ourselves to some meditation. But since there is no word 
that I know of which fits your notion, sir. the one you employ may 
be applied to it. We give attention to the objects which we dis- 
tinguish and prefer to others. When attention continues in the 
mind, whether the external object continues or not. and even 
whether it is present or not. this is consideration : which tending 
to knowledge without reference to action, will be contemplation. 
Attention, the aim of which is to learn (that is to say. to acquire 
knowledge in order to preserve it), is study. To consider in 
order to form some plan, is to meditate; but revery appears to be 
nothing but the pursuing of certain thoughts through the pleasure 
taken in them without having; other end : this is whv revery inav 



jstew essays : book ii. 217 

lead to insanity: one forgets self, forgets the die cur hie, 
approaches dreams and chimeras, builds castles in Spain. We can- 
not distinguish dreams from sensations except because they are 
not connected with them ; they are, as it were, a world apart. 
Sleep is a cessation of sensations, and so trance is a very profound 
sleep from which one can be aroused with difficulty, which comes 
from a transient internal cause, which distinguishes it from the 
profound sleep which comes from a narcotic or from some lasting 
injury to the functions, as in lethargy. Trances are sometimes 
accompanied by visions; but there are some without trance; and 
vision, it seems, is nothing but a dream which passes for a sensa- 
tion, as if it taught us the truth of the objects. And when these 
visions are divine, there is in fact truth; which may be known, 
for example, when they contain particularized prophecies which 
the event justifies. 

§ 4. [Hence it is probable that thinking is the action, not the 
essence of the soul.~\ Undoubtedly thought is an action and could 
not be the essence ; but it is an essential action, and all substances 
have such. I have shown above, that we have always an infinity 
of minute perceptions without our being conscious of them. We 
are never without perceptions but it is necessary that we be often 
without apperceptions, namely, when there are no distinct percep- 
tions. It is for want of having considered this important point, 
that a philosophy, loose and as little noble as solid, has prevailed 
among so many men of good minds, and that we have hitherto 
almost ignored what there is most beautiful in souls. This has 
also caused men to find so much plausibility in the error which 
teaches that souls are of a perishable nature. 

CHAPTER xx. 

Of modes of pleasure and pain. 

§ 1. \_Pleasure and pain, simple ideas. ~\ I believe that there are 
no perceptions which are entirely indifferent to us, but it is enough 
that their effect be not noticeable in order that they may be called 
so, for pleasure and pain appear to consist in an aid or in a notice- 
able impediment. I assert that this definition is not nominal and 
that one cannot be given. 



218 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ, 

§ 2. {Good and evil, what.~\ I am also of this opinion. The 
good is divided into the praiseworthy, agreeable, and useful ; but 
at bottom I believe that it must be either itself agreeable or con- 
tributing to something else vrhieh can give us an agreeable feeling ; 
that is to say, the good is agreeable or useful and the praiseworthy 
itself consists in a pleasure of the mind. 

§§4,5. [Love. Hatred.] I gave very nearly this same defini- 
tion of love when I explained the principles of justice in the pre- 
face to my Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, namely, that to 
love is to be led to take pleasure in the perfection, well-being or 
happiness of the beloved object. And for this reason we do not 
consider or demand any other pleasure for self than just that 
which is found in the well-being or pleasure of the one loved ; but 
in this sense v\*e do not properly love what is incapable of pleasure 
or of happiness, and we enjoy things of this nature without, for 
that reason, loving them, unless by a prosopopoeia, and as if we 
imagine that they themselves enjoy their perfection. It is not, 
then, properly love when we say that v\-e love a beautiful picture 
because of the pleasure we take in thinking of its perfections. But 
it is permissible to extend the meaning of the terms, and usage 
varies here. Philosophers and theologians even distinguish two 
kinds of love, namely, the love which they call love of complacency, 
which is nothing else than the desire or feeling we have for the 
one who gives us pleasure without our interesting ourselves as to 
whether he receives pleasure; and the love of benevolence, which 
is the feeling we have for him who, by his pleasure or 'happiness, 
gives the same to us. The first causes us to have in view our 
pleasure and the second that of others, but as making or rather 
constituting ours, for if it should not react upon us in some sort 
we could not interest ourselves in it, since it is impossible, what- 
ever may be said, to be indifferent to one's own good. And this is 
how disinterested or non-mercenary love must be understood, in 
order to conceive well its nobleness and yet not to fall into the 
chimerical. 

§ 6. [Desire.] This consideration of uneasiness is a capital 
point, in which this author has particularly shown his penetrating 
and profound spirit. This is why I have given it some attention, 



, NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 219 

and after having considered the matter well, it appears to me that 
the French word inquietude (restlessness), if it does not suffi- 
ciently express the meaning of the author, fits nevertheless, in my 
opinion, the nature of the thing ; and the English word uneasiness, 
if it stands for a displeasure, fretfulness (chagrin), inconvenience, 
and in a word some effective pain, would be inappropriate. For 
I should prefer to say that in desire in itself there is rather a 
disposition and preparation for pain than pain itself. It is true 
that this perception sometimes does not differ from that which is in 
pain than as less does from more, but this is because the degree is 
the essence of pain, for it is a. noticeable perception. This is also 
seen by the difference which there is between appetite and hunger ; 
for when the irritation of the stomach becomes too strong it incom- 
modes ; so that it is necessary also to apply here our doctrine 
of perceptions too minute to be apperceptive; for if what takes 
place in us when we have an appetite and desire were sufficiently 
magnified it would cause pain. This is why the infinitely wise 
author of our being has acted for our good, when he ordained that 
we should be often in ignorance and in confused perceptions. This 
is in order to act more promptly by instinct and not to be incom- 
moded by the too distinct sensations of many objects, which do 
not altogether come back to us, and which nature has not been able 
to do without in order to obtain its ends. How many insects do 
we not swallow without our being conscious of it ? how many 
persons do we see who having too fine a sense of smell are thereby 
incommoded ? and how many disgusting objects should we see if 
our vision were sufficiently piercing? It is also by this skill that 
nature has given us the incitements of desire, like the rudiments 
or elements of pain or, so to speak, semi-pains, or (if you wish 
to speak so as to express yourself more forcibly) minute inapper- 
ceptible pains, to the end that we may enjoy the advantage of evil 
without being incommoded thereby. For otherwise if this percep- 
tion were too distinct we would always be miserable in waiting for 
the good, whereas this continual victory over these semi-pains 
which are felt in following one's desire and satisfying in some sort 
this appetite or this longing, gives us many semi-pleasures, the 
continuation and collection of which (as in the continuation of 



220 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

the impulse of a heavy "body which descends and acquires force I 
becomes in the end an entire and real pleasure. And at bottom 
without these semi-pains there would be no pleasure, and there 
would be no means of perceiving that something, by being an 
obstacle which prevents us from putting ourselves at our ease. 
assists us and aids us. It is also in this that the affinity of pain 
and of pleasure is recognized, which Socrates noticed, in the 
Phaedo of Plato, when his feet itched. This consideration of 
the minute aids or small deliverances and imperceptible disen- 
gagements of the arrested tendency from which noticeable pleasure 
finally results, serves also to give some more distinct knowledge 
of the confused idea which we have and ought- to have of pleasure 
and of pain: just as the sensation of heat or of light results from 
many minute motions which express those of objects, as I have said 
above (eh. 9, § 13). and do not differ therefrom save in appearance 
and because we are not conscious of this analysis : whereas many 
to-day believe that our ideas of sensible qualities differ toto genere 
from motions and from what takes place in the objects, and are 
something primitive and inexplicable, and even arbitrary, as if 
God made the soul feel what seems good to him in place of what 
takes place in the body : an opinion very far removed from the 
true analysis of our ideas. But to return to uneasiness, that is to 
say. to the minute imperceptible solicitations which keep us always 
in suspense : these are confused determinations such that we often 
do not know what we lack, whereas in inclinations and passions, 
we at least know what we need, although the confused perceptions 
enter also into their manner of acting, and the same passions also 
cause this uneasiness or longing. These impulses are like so many 
small springs which try to unbend, and which cause our machine to 
act. And I have already remarked thereon, that it is through this 
that we are never indifferent, when we appear to be most so, for 
example, to turning to the right rather than to the left at the end 
of a path. For the side which we take comes from these insensible 
determinations, mingled with the actions of objects and of the 
interior of the body, which cause us to find ourselves more at ease 
in one than in the other way of moving ourselves. The pendulum 
of a clock is called in German Unrvhe, that is to sav. uneasiness. 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 



221 



It can be said that it is the same in our body, which can never be 
perfectly at its ease ; because if it should be so, a new impression 
of objects, a slight change in the organs, in the vessels, and in the 
viscera would change at once the balance and would cause them to 
make some slight effort in order to regain the best state which they 
can be in ; which produces a continual strife, which causes, so to 
speak, the uneasiness of our clock ; so that this term is satisfactory 
to me. 

§ 7. [Joy.] There are no words in languages, sufficiently 
appropriate to distinguish kindred notions. Perhaps the Latin 
gaudium approaches nearer this definition of joy that laetitia, 
which is also translated by the word joy; but then it seems to me 
to signify a state in which pleasure predominates in us, for during 
the profoundest sorrow and amidst the most piercing griefs one 
can take some pleasure, as in drinking or in listening to music, 
but the pain predominates ; and likewise amid the sharpest pains, 
the mind can be in joy, as happened to the martyrs. 

§ 8. [Sorrow.] Not only the actual presence, but also the fear 
of an evil to come can make one sad, so that I believe the defini- 
tions of joy and of sorrow, which I have just given, agree best with 
usage. As to uneasiness, there is in pain, and consequently in 
sorrow, something more; and there is uneasiness even in joy, for 
it makes men wide awake, active, full of hope for going farther. 
Joy has been able to cause death by excess of emotion, and then 
there was in it even more than uneasiness. 

§§9, 10. [Hope and Fear.] If uneasiness signifies a pain, I 
acknowledge that it always accompanies fear; but taking it for 
this insensible incitement which urges us on, it can also be applied 
to hope. The Stoics took the passions for thoughts [opinions] ; 
thus hope, for them, was the thought of a future good, and fear, the 
thought of a future evil. But I prefer to say that the passions are 
neither satisfactions nor displeasures, nor thoughts, but tendencies 
or rather modifications of the tendencies, which come from thought 
or from feeling, and which are accompanied by pleasure or dis- 
pleasure. 

§ 11. [Despair.] Despair taken for the passion will be a sort 
of strong tendency which finds itself wholly arrested, causing a 



222 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

violent struggle and much displeasure. But when the despair is 
accompanied by repose and indolence, it will be a thought rather 
than a passion. 

§12. [Anger.'] Anger seems to be something more simple and 
more general, since brutes, to whom no injury has been done, are 
susceptible of it, There is in anger a violent effort which strives to 
get free from the evil. The desire of vengeance may remain when 
one is cool and when one experiences hatred rather than anger. 

§ 13. [Envy.] According to this [Locke's] notion, envy would 
be always a praiseworthy passion and always founded upon justice, 
at least in my opinion. But I do not know but that envy. is often 
entertained toward recognized merit, which one would not hesitate 
to misuse if one were master. Envy is even entertained of people 
who have a good which one would not care to have one's self. One 
would be content to see them deprived of it without thinking to 
profit by their spoils, and even without being able to hope it. For 
some goods are like pictures painted in fresco, which can be 
destroyed, but which cannot be taken away. 

§11. [Shame.] If men took more pains to observe the exterior 
movements which accompany the passions, it would be difficult to 
conceal them. As to shame, it is worthy of consideration that 
modest persons, when they are simply witnesses of an improper 
action, sometimes feel movements resembling those of shame. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

Of -power and of liberty. 

§ 1. [The idea of power, how got.] If power corresponds to 
the Latin potentia, it is opposed to act, and the passage from power 
to act is change. This is what Aristotle understands by the word 
motion, when he says that it is the act or perhaps the actuation of 
what is in power. We can say then that power in general is the 
possibility of change. ISTow change or the act of this possibility, 
being action in one subject and passion in another, there will be 
also two powers, one passive the other active. The active could be 
called faculty and perhaps the passive could be called capacity or 
receptivity. It is true that active power is sometimes taken in a 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 223 

more perfect sense, when in addition to the simple faculty there is a 
tendency ; and it is thus that I employ it in my dynamical con- 
siderations. The word force might be appropriated to it in par- 
ticular ; and force would be either entelechy or effort; for entelechy 
(although Aristotle employs it so generally that it comprises also 
all action and all effort) appears to me more appropriate to primi- 
tive acting forces, and that of effort to derivative forces. There 
is even also a species of passive power more particular and more 
endowed with reality ; it is this which is in matter when there is 
not only mobility, which is the capacity or receptivity for motion, 
but also resistance, which embraces impenetrability and inertia. 
Entelechies, that is to say, primitive or substantial tendencies, 
when -they are accompanied by perception, are souls. 

§TL \The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.] I am 
thoroughly in accord with you, that the clearest idea of active 
power comes to us from spirit. It is also only in things which 
have an analogy with spirit, that is to say, in entelechies, for 
matter properly only indicates passive power. 

§ 8. [Liberty.] The term liberty is very ambiguous. There is 
liberty of right and of fact. According to that of right a slave is 
not free, a subject is not entirely free, but a poor man is as free as 
a rich man. Liberty of fact consists either in the power to will as 
one ought, or in the power to do what one wills. It is the liberty of 
doing of which you speak, and it has its degrees and varieties. 
Generally he who has most means is most free to do what he 
wills : but, in particular, liberty is understood of the use of things 
which are wont to be in our power and especially of the free use of 
our body. Thus the prison or sicknesses which prevent us from 
giving to our body and to our limbs the motion which we wish 
and which we are ordinarily able to give, lessens our liberty. It 
is thus that a prisoner is not free, and that a paralytic has not the 
free use of his limbs. Liberty to will is also taken in two different 
senses. One is when it is opposed to the imperfection or to the 
slavery of the spirit, which is a coaction or constraint, but internal 
like that which comes from the passions. The other sense appears 
when liberty is opposed to necessity. In the first sense the Stoics 
said that the wise man only is free; and in fact the sjDirit is not 



'224: PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

free "when it is occupied with a great passion, for one cannot then 
will as he ought to. that is to say. with the deliberation which is 
requisite. It is thus that God alone is perfectly free, and that 
created spirits are so only in so far as they are superior to the 
passions. And this liberty concerns properly our understanding. 
But the liberty of the spirit, opposed to necessity, concerns the 
naked will, and in so far as it is distinguished from the under- 
standing. This it is which is called free-will; and it consists in 
this, that one wills that the strongest reasons or impress k>ns which 
the understanding presents to the will do not prevent the act of 
the will from being contingent, and do not give it an absolute, or, 
so to say. metaphysical, necessity. And it is in this sense that I 
am accustomed to say that the understanding can determine the 
will, in accordance with the prevalence of perceptions and reasons, 
in such a way that even when it is certain and infallible, inclines 
"without necessitating. 

§ 13. [Necessity, v:l\at.~\ It seems to me that, properly speak- 
ing, although volitions are contingent, necessity ought not to be 
opposed to volition but to contingency, and that necessity ought not 
to be confounded "with determination, for there is not less of con- 
nection or of determination in thoughts than in motions (to be 
determined being quite different from being pushed or forced with 
constraint). And if we do not always notice the reason which 
determines us. or rather by which we determine ourselves, it is 
because we are as little capable of being conscious of the whole 
extent of our spirit and of its thoughts, most often imperceptible 
and confused, as we are of disentangling all the mechanisms which 
nature makes play in the body. Thus, if by necessity is understood 
the certain determination of man. which a perfect knowledge of all 
the circumstances of what takes place within and without, the man 
could enable a perfect mind to foresee, it is certain that thoughts 
being just as determined as the motions which they represent, every 
free act would be necessary. But the necessary must be distin- 
guished from the contingent though determined; and not only 
contingent truths are not necessary, but even their connections are 
not always of an absolute necessity ; for it must be acknowledged 
that there is a difference in the manner of determination between 



NEW essays : BOOK II. 225 

the consequences which exist in necessary matter and those which 
exist in contingent matter. Geometrical and metaphysical con- 
sequences necessitate, but physical and moral incline without 
necessitating; the physical even having something moral and 
voluntary in relation to God, since the laws of motion have no 
other necessity than that of [the principle of] the best. JSTow God 
chooses freely although he is determined to choose the best; and 
as bodies themselves do not choose (God having chosen for 
them), usage has settled that they be called necessary agents; to 
which I am not opposed, provided the necessary and the deter- 
mined be not confounded, and that it be not imagined that free 
beings act in an indetermined manner; an error which has pre- 
vailedTin certain minds and which destroys the most important 
truths^_yven this fundamental axiom, that nothing occurs without 
reason, without which neither the existence of God nor other 
great truths could be well demonstrated. As to constraint, it is 
well to distinguish two species of it. The one physical, as when a 
man is taken to prison in spite of himself, or is thrown over a preci- 
pice ; the other moral, as, for example, the constraint of a greater 
evil, and this action although in some manner forced, is neverthe- 
less voluntary. One can also be forced by the consideration of a 
greater good, as when a man is tempted by having proposed to him 
a too great advantage, although this is not customarily called con- 
straint. 

§ 21. [Liberty belongs to the agent, or man.] When we reason 
about the liberty of the will, or about the free will, we do not ask 
if the man can do what he wills, but if there is enough independ- 
ence in his will itself. We do not ask if he has his limbs free or has 
elbow-room, but if he has his spirit free, and in what this consists. 
In this respect one intelligence could be more free .than another, 
and the supreme intelligence will enjoy perfect liberty of which the 
creatures are not capable. 

§§ 41, 42. [All desire happiness. Happiness, ivhat.] I do not 
know whether the greatest pleasure is possible. I believe rather 
that it can grow ad infinitum; for we do not know how far our 
knowledge and our organs can be extended in all that eternity 
which awaits us. I believe then that happiness is a lasting 
15 



PHXLOSOPHICAX WOEES OF UETBXITZ. 

pleasure: which could not - without there being a continual 
prog: sst new pleasures. Therefore, )ftwc persons, me >fwhom 

will go incomparably quicker and through greater pleasures than 
the other, each will be happy in himself and apart by himself, 
although their happiness will be very unequal. Happines- is 
then, s t speak, a road through pleasures : and pleasure is merely 
a step and an advancement towards happiness, the shortest which 
can be made according to the present impressions, but not always 
the best. The right road may be missed in the desire to follow the 
shorre-:. as The stone which g s si ight may encounter obstacles 
; >:>n. which prevent it from advancing quite to the center of the 
earth. This shows that it is the reason and the will which trans- 
port us toward happiness, but that feeling and desire merely lead us 
to pleasure. Wow, although pleasure can not receive a nominal 
definition, any more than light or color, it can however receive, 
like them, a causal definition; and I believe that at bottom 
pleasure is a feeling of perfection and pain a feeling of imper- 
fection, provided it is noticeable enough to cause us to be conscious 
of it. 

> 47. [The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire 
makes way for consideration., and : ~ ; freedom of irill consists/] 
The execution of our desire is suspended or arrested when this 
desire is not strong enough to move us, and to overcome the trouble 
and inconvenience of satisfying it. But when the desire is strong; 
enough in itself to move us. if nothing prevents, it can be arreste . 
by contrary inclinations : be it that they consist in a simple pro- 
pensity which is like the element or the beginning of desire, be it 
that they extend to desire itself. Nevertheless as these inclina- 
tions, these propensities, and these contrary desires must he found 
already in the soul, it does not have them in its power, and conse- 
quently it cannot resist in a free and voluntary way in which the 
reason can share, if it had not also another means which is that of 
turning the mind elsewhere. But how can we think of doing it 
when there is need ' for there is the point, especially when we are 

ssessed by a srrong passion. There is need, therefore, that the 
mind be prepared beforehand, and find itself already ready fcc _ 
from thought to thought, in order not to stop too long in a slippery 
and dangerous place. 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 227 

For this, it is well to accustom one's self generally not to think 
except in passing of certain things, in order the better to preserve 
the freedom of the mind. Bnt the best way is to accustom one's 
self to proceed methodically, and to attach one's self to a train of 
thoughts the connection of which reason and not chance (that is to 
say, insensible and casual impressions) establishes. And in order 
to do this, it is well to accustom one's self to collect one's self from 
time to time, and to raise one's self above the present tumult of 
impressions, to go forth, so to say, from the place where one is, to 
say to one's self "die cur hie ? respice finem, or where are we ? let 
us come to the point." Men would often have need of some one, 
established with an official title (as Philip, the father of Alexander 
the Great, had), to interrupt them and to recall them to their duty. 
But, for lack of such an officer, it is well for us to be accustomed 
to perform for ourselves this office. JSTow being once in a condition 
to arrest the effect of our desires and of our passions, that is to say, 
to suspend action, we can find the means of combating them, be it 
by the contrary desires or inclinations, be it by diversion, that is to 
say, by occupations of another nature. It is by these methods and 
these artifices that we become, as it were, masters of ourselves, and 
that we can make ourselves think and do at the time what we 
should wish to will and what reason commands. Nevertheless, it 
is always by determined ways, and never without ground or by the 
imaginary principle of a perfect indifference or equilibrium, in 
which some would make the essence of liberty to consist ; as if one 
could determine himself groundlessly and even against all ground, 
and go directly counter to the prevalence of the impressions and the 
propensities. 

§ 51. [The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation 
of liberty. ,] True happiness ought always to be the object of our 
desires, but there is ground for doubting whether it is. For often 
we hardly think of it, and I have remarked here more than once 
that the less desire is guided by reason the more it tends to present 
pleasure and not to happiness, that is to say, to lasting pleasure, 
although it tends to make it last. 



228 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Of our complex ideas of substances. 

§ 1. [Ideas of substances, how nmde.~\ On the contrary, it is 
rather the concretum as odorous, as warm, as glittering, which 
conies into our minds, than the abstractions or qualities (for it is 
they which are in the substantial object and not the ideas) as, 
namely, heat, light, etc., which are much more difficult to com- 
prehend. It may even be doubted whether these accidents are real 
existences, as in fact they are very often only relations. It is 
known also that it is the abstractions which occasion most difficulty 
when it is desired to examine them minutely, as those who are 
acquainted with the subtilties of the scholastics, whose most intri- 
cate speculations fall at one blow if we will banish abstract entities 
and resolve not to speak ordinarily except by concretes, and not to 
admit any other terms in the demonstrations of the sciences, but 
those which represent substantial subjects. Thus it is nodum 
quaerere in- scirpo, if I dare say it, and to invert things, if we take 
the qualities or other abstract terms for what is easiest and the 
concrete ones for something very difficult. 

§ 2. [Our idea of substance in general.^ In distinguishing two 
things in substance, attributes or predicates and the common sub- 
ject of these predicates, it is not strange that nothing in particular 
can be conceived in this subject. It must necessarily be so, since 
we have already separated from it all the attributes in which some 
detail could be conceived. Therefore to demand something more 
in this pure subject in general than what is necessary in order 
to conceive that it is the same thing (e. g., which understands and 
wills, which imagines and reasons), this is to demand the impossi- 
ble and to run counter to one's own supposition, made in abstract- 
ing and in conceiving separately the subject and its qualities or 
accidents. The same pretended difficulty could be applied to the 
notion of being and to all that is most clear and most primitive; 
for we could ask philosophers what they conceive in conceiving 
pure being in general; for all detail, being thereby excluded, 
there would be as little to say as when it is asked what pure 
substance in general is. I think, therefore, that the philosophers 
do not deserve to be ridiculed, as is done here in comparing them 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 229 

to the Indian philosopher, who when asked what the earth rested 
on, replied that it was a large elephant, and when asked what the 
elephant rested on, said that it was a great tortoise, and, finally, 
when pressed to tell what the tortoise rested on, was reduced to 
saying that it was something , I hnoiv not what. However, the 
consideration of substance, very inconsiderable as it seems to be, 
is not so void and sterile as is thought. Certain consequences 
come from it which are most important to philosophy, and which 
are capable of giving it a new aspect. [Cf. ch. 13, § 19.] 

§ 4. [No clear idea of substance in general.'] For my part, I 
believe that this opinion of our ignorance comes from our demand- 
ing a kind of knowledge which the object does not permit of. The 
true mark of a clear and distinct notion of an object is the means 
we have of knowing many truths of it by a 'priori proofs, as I have 
jDointed out in an essay on truths and ideas inserted in the Acta of 
Leipsic of the year 1684. [Cf. Art. III.] 

§ 5. [Ideas of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily sub- 
stances.] It is well said, and it is very true, that the existence of 
the mind is more certain than that of sensible objects. 

CHAPTER. XXV. 

Of relation. 

§ 1. [Relation, what.] Relations and orders are like entities of 
reason, although they have their foundation in things ; for it may 
be said that their reality, like that of eternal truths and possibili- 
ties comes from the supreme reason. 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

Of identity and diversity. 

§ 1. [Wherein identity consists.] There must always be, in 
addition to the difference of time and of place, an internal principle 
of distinction; and although there are many things of the same 
species, it is nevertheless true that none of them are ever perfectly 
alike: thus although time and place (that is, the relation to the 
external) serve us in distinguishing things which we do not well 
distinguish through themselves, things are none the less distin- 



230 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEHS OF LEIBXITZ. 

guishable in themselves. The characteristic of identity and o£ 
isity does not consist, therefore, in time and in place. 

§ 3. [Principium individuationis.] The principle of indi- 
viduation corresponds in individuals to the principle of distinction 
of which I have just spoken. If two individuals were perfectly 
alike and equal, and (in a word) indistinguishable in themselves, 
there would be no principle of individuation : and I even venture 
to say that there would be no individual distinction, or different 
individuals, on this condition. 

> 9. [Personal identity.'] I am also of the opinion that con- 
sciousness, or the feeling of the ego, proves a moral or personal 
identity. And it is in this that I distinguish the unceasingness of 
the soul of a brute from the immortality of the soul of man: both 
retain 'physical and real identity; but as for man, it is conformed 
to the rules of divine providence that the soul preserve in addition 
moral identity, apparent to ourselves, in order to constitute the 
same person, capable consequently of feeling punishments and 
rewards. It appears that you. sir. hold that this apparent identity 
might be preserved, even if there should be no real identity. I 
should think that this might perhaps be possible by the absolute 
power of God ; but according to the order of things the identity 
apparent to the person himself, who himself feels the same, sup- 
poses the real identity at each following stage, accompanied by 
reflection or by the feeling of the ego : an intimate and immediate 
perception not naturally able to deceive. If man could be only 
a machine and have in addition consciousness, it would be nec- 
essary to be of your opinion, sir : but I hold that this case is not 
possible, at least naturally. I do not mean to say either that per- 
sonal identity and even the ego do not remain in us, and that I am 
not that ego which was in the cradle, under the pretext- that I no 
longer remember anything which I then did. It is sufficient in 
order to find moral identity by itself that there be a common bond 
of consciousness from a neighboring state, or even one a little 
removed, to another, even if some leap or forgotten interval should 
be mingled with it. Thus, if an illness had caused an interruption 
of the continuity of the connection of consciousness, so that I 
should not know how I had come into the present state, although 



new essays: book ii. 23 L 

I might remember more distant things, the testimony of others 
might fill the gap of my remembrance. I might even be punished 
on this testimony, if I had done some evil of deliberate purpose in 
an interval which I had forgotten a little while afterwards through 
this illness. And if I came to forget all past things, so that I 
should be obliged to let myself be taught anew, even to my name 
and to reading and writing, I could always learn from others my 
past life in my preceding state, as I have preserved my rights 
without its being necessary to divide myself into two persons, and 
to make myself my own heir. All this suffices for maintaining 
moral identity, which makes the same person. It is true that if 
others conspired to deceive me (as I might even be deceived by 
myself, by some vision, dream or illness, believing that what I 
dreamed had happened to me) , the appearance would be false ; but 
there are cases in which we may be morally certain of the truth 
upon the report of others ; and in relation to God, whose bond of 
nnion with us makes the principal point of morality, error cannot 
enter. As regards the ego, it will be well to distinguish it from the 
appearance of the ego and from consciousness. The ego forms 
the real and physical identity, and the appearance of the ego, 
accompanied by truth, joins to it personal identity. Thus not 
wishing to say that personal identity does not extend farther than 
memory, I would say still less that the ego or physical identity 
depends on it. Real and personal identity is proved, as certainly 
.as is possible in matter of fact, by present and immediate reflec- 
tion ; it is proved sufficiently for common use by our remembrance 
of the interval, or by the corroborating testimony of others. But 
if God changed extraordinarily real identity, personal identity 
would remain, provided that man should preserve the appearances 
of identity, as well the internal (that is, of consciousness) as the 
external, like those which consist in what is evident to others. Thus 
consciousness is not the only means of establishing personal 
identity, and the report of others or even other marks may take its 
place. But there is difficulty if contradiction is found between 
these different evidences. Consciousness may be silent as in for- 
getfulness ; but if it said very distinctly things which were con- 
trary to the other evidences, we should be embarrassed in the 



'23'2 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBES OF LEIBXTTZ. 

decision and sometimes as if suspended between two possibilities : 
that of the error of our memory and that of some deception in the 
external evidences. 

§ li. An immaterial being or spirit cannot be despoiled of all 
perception of its past existence. There remain to it impressions of 
everything which has formerly happened to it, and it has even pre- 
sentiments of everything which will happen to it ; but these feel- 
ings are most often too slight to be distinguishable and for us to be 
conscious of them, although they may be developed some day. 
This continuation and connection of perceptions forms the same 
individual really: but apperceptions (that is. when we are con- 
scious of past feelings ) prove, farther, a moral identity and make 

the real identity appear The late M. Van Helmont, the 

younger, believed, with certain rabbis, in the passing of the soul of 
Adam into the AEessiah as into the new Adam. And I do not know 
whether he did not believe that he himself had been one of the 
ancients, very able man as he was otherwise. Xow, if this passing 
of souls was true, at least in the possible way which I have 
explained above (but which does not appear probable) , that is, that 
souls, retaining subtile bodies, should pass suddenly into other 
gross bodies, the same individual would subsist always, in Xestor, 
in Socrates, and in some modern, and he might even make known 
his identity to that one who should sufficiently penetrate into his 
nature, by reason of the impressions or characters which would 
there remain of all that Xestor or Socrates has done, and which 
any sufficiently penetrating genius might read there. However, if 
the modem man had no internal or external means of knowing 
what he has been, it would be. so far as ethics is concerned, as if 
he had not been at all. But the probability is that nothing is 
neglected in the world, even in relation to morals, because God 
is its monarch, and his government is perfect. — Thus if souls 
passed into a new body, gross or sensitive, they would always retain 
the expression of all of which they have had perception in the old, 
and it would even be necessary that the new body should feel it all, 
so that the individual continuity will always have its real marks. 

> 18. [Object of reward and punishment.^ I confess that if 
God caused consciousnesses to be transferred to other souls, it 
would be necessarv to treat them, accordine; to ethical ideas, as if 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK II. 233 

they were the same; but this would be to disturb the order of 
things groundlessly, and to make a divorce between the appercep- 
tive and truth, which is preserved by insensible perceptions. This 
would not be rational, because perceptions, at present insensible, 
may be developed some day; for there is nothing useless, and 
eternity presents a large field for changes. 

§ 29. [Continued existence makes identity.] I have pointed 
out to you the source of true physical identity ; I have shown you 
that morals do not contradict it, any more than memory ; that they 
cannot always mark out physical identity to the person himself 
in question, nor to those who are in communication with him ; but 
that nevertheless they never contradict physical identity, and never 
are divorced from it ; thai there are always created spirits which 
know or may know what is the truth respecting it ; but that there 
is reason for thinking that what is indifferent as regards persons 
themselves can be so only for a time. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Of other relations. 

§ 5. [Moral good and evil.] I should prefer, for myself, to 
take as the measure of moral good and of virtue the invariable 
rule of reason that God has charged himself to maintain. Also we 
may be assured that by his means every moral good becomes physi- 
cal, or as the ancients said, all that is praiseworthy is useful; 
whereas, in order to express the idea of the author, it would be 
necessary to say that moral good or evil is a good or evil of imposi- 
tion or instituted, which he who has the power tries to bring about 
or to prevent by pains or recompenses. Good is that which by the 
general institution of God is conformed to nature or to reason. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

Of clear and obscure, distinct and confused ideas. 

§ 2. In a short essay on ideas, true or false or obscure, dis- 
tinct or confused, inserted in the Acta of Leipsic in the year 1684, 
I have given a definition of clear ideas which is common to simple 
ideas and to composite ones, and which accounts for what is said 
thereon here. 



231 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBXS OP LEIBXITZ. 

§ 13. [Complex ideas may oe distinct in one part and confused 
in another.] This example [a chiliagon] shows that idea is here 
confounded with image. If someone proposes to me a regular 
polygon, sight and imagination could not make me understand 
the thousand sides which are in it : I have only a confused idea 
both of the figure and of its number, until I distinguish the number 
by counting. But having found it. I know very well the nature 
and the properties of the proposed polygon, in so far as they are 
those of a ch ili agon, and consequently I have the idea of it ; but I 
could not have the image of a chiliagon, and it would be necessary 
to have senses and imagination more delicate and better exercised 
in order to thereby distinguish it from a polygon which should have 
one side less. But knowledge of figures does not depend upon the 
imagination, any more than that of numbers, although it is of use 
thereto : and a. mathematician may know exactly the nature of an 
enneagon or of a decagon because he has the means of making 
and examining them, although he cannot distinguish them by sight. 
It is true then that a workman or an engineer, who should not 
perhaps know the nature of the figures sufficiently, might have this 
advantage over a great geometrician, that he could distinguish 
them by merely seeing them without measuring them: as there 
are porters who will tell the weight of what they are to carry with- 
out the mistake of a pound, in which they will surpass the most 
skillful statistician in the world. This empirical knowledge, 
acquired by long practice, may have great advantages for acting 
promptly, as an engineer very often needs to do by reason of the 
danger to which he exposes himself by hesitating. However this 
clear image, or this feeling which we may have of a regular 
decagon or of a weight of ninety-nine pounds, consists only in a 
confused idea, since it is of no use in discovering the nature and 
the properties of this weight or of the regular decagon, which 
requires a distinct idea. And this example serves to show better 
the difference between ideas, or rather that between idea, and image. 

> 15. [Instance in eternity.'] This example does not seem to 
me to fit your purpose any better: but it is very appropriate to 
mine, which is to disabuse you of your notions on this point. For 
there reiens here the same confusion between ima^e and idea. We 



new essays : book iv. 235 

have a complete and proper idea of eternity, since we have a defini- 
tion of it, although we have no image of it ; but the idea of infinites 
is not formed by the composition of parts, and the errors which are 
committed in reasoning concerning the infinite do not come from 
the lack of image. 

Book IV. Of Knowledge. 

chapter I. 

Of knowledge in general. 

§§ 1 and 2. [1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas. 
2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of two ideas.] Knowledge is employed still more generally, in 
such a way that it is found also in ideas or terms, before we come to 
propositions or truths. And it may be said that he who shall have 
seen attentively more pictures of plants and of animals, more 
figures of machines, more descriptions or representations of houses 
or of fortresses, who shall have read more ingenious romances, 
heard more curious narratives, he, I say, will have more knowledge 
than another, even if there should not be a word of truth in all 
which has been portrayed or related to him ; for the practice which 
he has in representing to himself mentally many express and 
actual conceptions or ideas, renders him more fit to conceive what 
is proposed to him; and it is certain that he will be better 
instructed and more capable than another, who has neither seen 
nor read nor heard anything, provided that in these stories and 
representations he does not take for true that which is not true, 
and that these impressions do not hinder him otherwise from dis- 
tinguishing the real from the imaginary, or the existing from the 
possible .... But taking knowledge in a narrower meaning, 
that is, for knowledge of truth, as you do here, sir, I say that it 
is very true that truth is always founded in the agreement or 
disagreement of ideas, but it is not true generally that our knowl- 
edge of truth is a perception of this agreement or disagreement. 
For when we know truth only empirically, from having experienced 
it, without knowing the connection of things and the reason which 
there is in what we have experienced, we have no perception of 



236 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXTTZ. 

this agreement or disagreement, unless it be meant that we feel 
it confusedly without being conscious of it. But your examples, 
it seems, show that you always require a knowledge in which one 
is conscious of connection or of opposition, and this is what cannot 
be conceded to you. 

§ § 3—7. [3. Tliis agreement fourfold. 4.- First, Of identity or 
diversity. 5. Secondly, Relative. 6. Thirdly, Of co-existence. 
7. Fourthly, Of real existence.^ I believe that it may be said that 
connection is nothing else than accordance or relation, taken 
generally. And I have remarked on this point that every rela- 
tion is either of comparison or of concurrence. That of com- 
parison gives diversity and identity, either complete or partial; 
that which makes the same or the diverse, the like or unlike. Con- 
currence contains what you call co-existence, that is, connection of 
existence. But when it is said that a thing exists or that it has 
real existence, this existence itself is the predicate ; that is, it has 
a notion joined with the idea in question, and there is connection 
between these two notions. One may conceive also the existence of 
the object of an idea, as the concurrence of this object with the 
Ego. So I believe that it may be said that there is only comparison 
or concurrence; but that comparison, which marks identity or 
diversity, and the concurrence of the thing with the Ego, are rela- 
tions which deserve to be distinguished among others. More exact 
and more profound researches might perhaps be made; but I 
content myself here with making remarks. 

CHAPTER II. 

Of the degrees of our Icnowledge. 

§ 1. [Intuitive.~\ Primitive truths, which are known by intui- 
tion, are of two kinds, like the derivative. They are either truths 
of reason, or truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary, and 
those of fact are contingent. Primitive truths of reason are those 
which I call by the general name of identical, because it seems 
that they do nothing but repeat the same thing without giving us 
any information. They are affirmative or negative 

As respects primitive truths of fact, they are the immediate 
internal experiences of an immediateness of feeling. And here it is 



new essays : book iv. 237 

that the first truth of the Cartesians or of St. Augustine : i" think, 
hence I am, that is, I am a thing which thinks, holds good. But it 
should be known that just as the identicals are general or particu- 
lar, and that the one class is as clear as the other (since it is just 
as clear to saj that A is A, as to say that a thing is what it is), so 
it is also with first truths of fact. For not only is it clear to me 
immediately that I think; but it is just as clear-to me that I have 
different thoughts; that sometimes / think of A, and that some- 
times / think of B, etc. Thus the Cartesian principle is good, but 
it is not the only one of its kind. You see by this that all primitive 
truths of reason or of fact have this in common, that they cannot 
be proved by anything more certain. 

§ 14. [Sensitive knowledge of particular existence.'] But let 
us come to this controversy which the sceptics carry on with the 
dogmatists over the existence of things outside of us. We have 
already touched upon it, but it is necessary to return to it here. I 
have formerly discussed it thoroughly, both verbally and in writ- 
ing, with the late Abbe Foucher, Canon of Dijon, a learned and 
subtle man. — ]STow I made him admit that the truth of sensible 
things consisted only in the connection of phenomena, which must 
have its reason, and that it is this which distinguishes them from 
dreams ; but that the truth of our existence and of the cause of 
phenomena is of another kind, because it establishes substances ; 
and that the sceptics spoiled whatever they say that is good, by 
carrying it too far, and by wishing even to extend their doubts 
to immediate experiences and to geometrical truths (a thing which 
M. Foucher, however, did not do) , and to the other truths of reason, 
which he did a little too much. But to return to you, sir ; you are 
right in saying that there is ordinarily a difference between feel- 
ings and imaginations ; but the sceptics will say that more or less 
does not change the kind. Besides, although feelings are wont to 
be more vivid than imaginations, it is a fact nevertheless that there 
are cases where an imaginative person is impressed by his imagina- 
tions as much or perhaps more than another is by the truth of 
things ; so that I believe that the true criterion as regards the 
objects of the senses is the connection of phenomena, that is, the 
connection of that which takes place in different places and times, 



238 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

and in the experience of different men, who are themselves, each 
to the others, very important phenomena on this score. And the 
connection of phenomena, which guarantees truths of fact in 
respect to sensible things outside of us, is verified by means of 
truths of reason; as the phenomena of optics are explained by 
geometry. However it must be confessed that all this certainty 
is not of the highest degree, as you have well recognized. For it 
is not impossible, speaking metaphysically, that there may be a 
dream, continuous and lasting, like the life of a man ; but it is 
a thing as contrary to reason as would be the fiction of a book which 
should be formed at haphazard by throwing the type together pell- 
mell. For the rest, it is also true that, provided the phenomena be 
connected, it does not matter whether they are called dreams or 
not, since experience shows that we are not deceived in the 
measures taken concerning phenomena when they are understood, 
according to the truths of reason. 

CHAPTER III. 

Of the extent of human knoivledge. 

§ 6. "Whether any mere material being thinks or no." j In 
the first place, I declare to you, sir, that when one has only con- 
fused ideas of thought and of matter, as one ordinarily has, it is 
not to be wondered at if one does not see the means of solving such 
questions. It is as I have remarked before, that a person who has 
not ideas of the angles of a triangle except in the way in which one 
has them generally, will never think of finding out that they are 
always equal to two right angles. We must consider that matter, 
taken as a complete being (that is, secondary matter as opposed to 
primary, which is something simply passive and consequently 
incomplete), is only a mass, or that which results therefrom, and 
that every real mass supposes simple substances or real unities; and 
when we farther consider what belongs to the nature of these real 
unities, that is, perception and its consequences, we are transported, 
so to speak, into another world, that is to say, into the intelligible 
world of substances, whereas before we have been only among the 
phenomena of the senses. And this knowledge of the interior of 
matter sufficiently shows us of what it is naturally capable, and 



NEW essays : BOOK IV. 239 

that every time that God shall give it organs fitted to express 
reasoning, the immaterial substance which reasons will not fail to 
be also given to it, by virtue of that harmony which is again a 
natural consequence of substances. Matter cannot subsist without 
immaterial substances, that is, without unities ; after which it 
ought no longer to be asked whether God is at liberty to give them 
to it or not. And if these substances did not have in themselves the 
correspondence or harmony, of which I have just spoken, God would 
not act according to the natural order. To speak quite simply 
of giving or of according powers, is to return to the naked faculties 
of the schoolmen, and to imagine minute subsisting entities, which 
may come and go like the pigeons of a pigeon-house. It is making 
substances of them without thinking of it. The primitive powers 
constitute substances themselves ; and the derivative powers, or, 
if you like, the faculties, are only modes of being, which must be 
derived from substances, and are not derived from matter, as a 
machine merely, that is, in so far as we consider it abstractly only 
as the incomplete being of primary matter, or the simply passive. 
Here I think that you will agree with me, sir, that it is not in the 
power of a mere mechanism to cause perception, sensation, reason, 
to arise. They must therefore spring from some other substantial 
thing. To wish God to act differently and give to things accidents 
which are not modes of being, or modifications derived from sub- 
stances, is to resort to miracles and to what the schoolmen called 
the obediential power, by a sort of supernatural exaltation, as 
when certain theologians claim that the fire of hell burns disem- 
bodied souls ; in which case it might be even doubted if it were the 
fire which acted, and if God did not himself produce the effect, 
by acting in place of the fire. ..... 

The difficulty which remains is only in respect to those who wish 
to imagine what is only intelligible, as if they wanted to see sounds, 
or hear colors. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Of the reality of human knowledge. 

§§ 1-5. [Knowledge placed in ideas may be all bare vision. 
Answer. ~\ Our certainty would be slight or rather none, if it had 



240 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

•no other foundation for simple ideas than that which comes from 
the senses. Have yon forgotten, sir, how I showed that ideas are 
originally in onr mind and that even our thoughts come to us from 
our own depths, without its being possible for other creatures to 
have an immediate influence upon the soul. Moreover the ground 
of our certainty in regard to universal and eternal truths lies 
in the ideas themselves, independently of the senses ; as also pure 
and intelligible ideas do not depend upon the senses, for example, 
that of being, of unity, of identity, etc. But the ideas of sensible 
qualities, as of color, of flavor, etc. (which in reality are only 
appearances), come to us from the senses, that is, from our con- 
fused perceptions. And the ground of the truth of contingent and 
particular things is in the succession, whereby the phenomena 
of the senses are connected just as the intelligible truths require. 
This is the difference which should be made between them ; whereas 
that which you make here between simple and complex ideas, and 
complex ideas belonging to substances and to accidents, does not 
seem to me well founded, since all intelligible ideas have their 
archetypes in the eternal possibility of things. 

chapter v. 
Of truth in general. 

§§ 1 and 2. [1. What truth is. 2. A right joining or separat- 
ing of signs; i. e., ideas or ivords.'] But what* I find least to my 
taste in your definition of truth, is that truth is there sought in 
words. Thus the same meaning, being expressed in Latin, Ger- 
man, English, French, will not be the same truth, and it will be 
necessary to say with Hobbes, that truth depends on the good 
pleasure of men ; which is speaking in a very strange way. Truth 
is even attributed to God, who you will admit (I think) has no 
need of signs. Finally, I have been already more than once sur- 
prised at the humor of your friends, who take pleasure in making 
essences and species, nominal truths. 

We shall then have, also, literal truths, which may be dis- 
tinguished into the truths of paper or of parchment, of the black of 
ordinary ink, or of printer's ink, if truths must be distinguished by 
signs. It is better, therefore, to place truths in the relation between 



new essays: BOOK IV. 



241 



the objects of ideas, which causes one to be included or not to be 
included in the other. This does not depend on languages and is 
common to us with God and the angels ; and when Grod manifests 
a truth to us we acquire that which is in his understanding, for 
although there is an infinite difference between his ideas and ours 
as respects perfection and extent, it is always true that they agree 
in the same relation. It is therefore in this relation that truth 
must be placed, and we may distinguish between truths, which are 
independent of our good pleasure, and expressions, which we invent 
as seems good to us. 

§ 11. [Moral and metaphysical truth.] Moral truth is called 
veracity by some, and metaphysical truth is taken commonly by 
metaphysicians for an attribute of being, but it is a very useless 
attribute and one almost void of meaning. Let us content our- 
selves with seeking truth in the correspondence of propositions 
which are in the mind with the things in question. It is true that 
I have also attributed truth to ideas in saying that ideas are true 
or false ; but in that case I understand it in fact of the proposi- 
tions which affirm the possibility of the object of the idea. And in 
this same sense it may be said farther that a being is true, that is 
to say, the proposition which affirms its actual, or at least, possible 
existence. 

CHAPTER VII. 

Of maxims. 

§ 1. [They are self-evident.] This investigation is very useful 
and even important. But you must not imagine, sir, that it has 
been entirely neglected. You will find in a hundred places that 
the scholastic philosophers have said that these propositions are 
evident ex terminis, as soon as their terms are understood ; so that 
they were persuaded that the force of conviction was founded on 
the apprehension of the terms, that is, in the connection of the 
ideas. But the geometricians have done much more : for they have 

undertaken very often to demonstrate them As regards 

maxims, they are sometimes taken for established propositions, 
whether they are evident or not. This might be well for beginners, 
whom scrupulousness arrests ; but when the establishing of science 
16 



242 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

is in question, it is another matter. They are also often taken thus 
in ethics and even by the logicians in their Topics, in which there 
is an abundance of them, but a part of this contains some which are 
sufficiently vague and obscure. For the rest, I said publicly and 
privately a long while ago that it would be important to demon- 
strate all the secondary axioms of which we ordinarily make use, 
by reducing them to primitive, or immediate and undemonstrable,. 
axioms, which are those which I called recently and elsewhere,. 
identical ones. 

§ 7. It may always be said that this proposition, I exist, 
is most evident, being a proposition which cannot be proved by 
any other, or an immediate truth. And to say, I think therefore 
I am, is not properly to prove existence by thought, since to think 
and to be thinking are the same thing ; and to say, I am thinking 
is already to say, / am. Nevertheless you may exclude this 
proposition from the number of axioms with some justice, for it 
is a proposition of fact, founded upon an immediate experience, 
and it is not a necessary proposition, whose necessity is seen in the 
immediate agreement of ideas. . On the contrary, there is no one but 
God who sees how these two terms I and existence are connected,, 
that is, why I exist. But if the axiom is taken more generally for 
an immediate or non-provable truth, it may be said that the proposi- 
tion / am is an axiom, and in any case we may be assured that it 
is a primitive truth or unum ex primis cognitis inter terminos 
complexos, that is, that it is one of the first known statements, 
which is understood in the natural order of our knowledge; for 
it is possible that a man may never have thought of forming 
expressly this proposition, which is yet innate in him. 

§§ 8, 9. I had further added that in the natural order to say 
that a thing is what it is, is prior to saying that it is not another ; 
for here it is not a question of the history of our discoveries, 
which is different in different men, but of the connection and 
natural order of truths, which is always the same. But your 
remark, namely, that what the child sees is only fact, deserves still 
more reflection ; for the experiences of the senses do not give abso- 
lutely certain truths (as you yourself observed, sir, not long ago),. 
nor such as are free from all danger of illusion. For if it is per- 



NEW ESSAYS '. BOOK IV. 243 

mitted to make metaphysically possible fictions, sugar might be 
changed imperceptibly into a rod to punish a child if it has been 
naughty, just as water is changed into wine with us on Christmas 
Eve, if it has been well rectified [_morigene~]. But the pain (you 
will say) which the rod inflicts will never be the pleasure which the 
sugar gives. I reply that the child will think of making an express 
proposition concerning it as little as of remarking the axiom that it 
cannot be said truly that what is, at the same time is not, although 
it may very well perceive the difference between pleasure and pain, 
as well as the difference between perceiving and not perceiving. 

§ 10. Thus you must not here oppose the axiom and the 
example as different truths in this respect, but regard the axiom as 
incorporated in the example and rendering the example true. It is 
quite another thing when the evidence is not remarked in the 
example itself and when the affirmation of the example is a conse- 
quence and not merely a subsumption of the universal proposition, 
as may happen also in respect to axioms. 

CHAPTER IX. 

Of our knowledge of existence. 

§§2 and 3. [2. A threefold knowledge of existence. 3. Our 
knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. ~\ I am fully in accord 
with all this. And I add that the immediate apperception of our 
existence and of our thoughts furnishes us the first truths a poste- 
rior^, or of fact, that is, the first experiences; as identical propo- 
sitions contain the first truths a priori, or of reason, that is, the 
first lights. Both are incapable of being proved, and may be called 
immediate; the former, because there is immediation between the 
understanding and its object, the latter, because there is immedia- 
tion between the subject and predicate. 

chapter x. 

Of our knowledge of the existence of a God. 

§ 1. I do not wish to repeat what has been discussed between us 
concerning innate ideas and truths, among which I reckon the idea 
of God and the truth of his existence. 



244 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

§§ 2-6. [2. Man 'knows that he himself is. 3. He knows also 
that nothing cannot 'produce a being, therefore something is eternal. 
4. That eternal being must b& most powerful. 5. And most know- 
ing. 6. And therefore God.^\ I assure you, sir, with perfect sin- 
cerity, that I am extremely sorry to be obliged to say anything 
against this demonstration: but I do it in order to give you an 
opportunity to fill up the gap in it. It is principally in the passage 
where you conclude (§3) that something has existed from all 
eternity. I find ambiguity in it. If it means that there has never 
been a time when nothing existed, I agree to this ; and it follows 
truly from the preceding propositions by a wholly mathematical 
sequence. For if there never had been anything, there would 
always have been nothing, nothing not being able to produce 
being ; hence we ourselves would not be, which is contrary to the 
first truth of experience. But what follows shows at once that in 
saying that something has existed from all eternity, you mean an 
eternal thing. Nevertheless it does not follow, in virtue of what 
you have advanced up to this time, that if there has always been 
something, it has always been a certain thing, that is, that there is 
an eternal being. For some opponents will say that I myself have 
been produced by other things and these things again by others. 
Farther, if some admit eternal beings (as the Epicureans their 
atoms) they will not believe themselves thereby obliged to grant 
an eternal being which is alone the source of all others. For even 
if they should admit that that which gives existence gives also the 
other qualities and powers of a thing, they will deny that a single 
thing gives existence to the others, and they will even say that for 
each thing several others must concur. Thus we will not arrive in 
this way alone at one source of all powers. However it is very 
reasonable to judge that there is one, and even that the universe 
is governed with wisdom. But if one believes matter susceptible 
of thought, one may be disposed to believe that it is not impossible 
that it may produce it. At least it will be difficult to bring forward 
a proof of it which should not show at the same time that matter 
is altogether incapable of it ; and supposing that our thought comes 
from a thinking being, can it be taken for granted without preju- 
dice to the demonstration, that this must be God ? 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK IV. 



245 



§ 1. [Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of 
a God.] Although I hold to iunate ideas, and particularly to that 
of God, I do not believe that the demonstrations of the Cartesians 

drawn from the idea of God, are perfect This [ontological 

argument] is not a paralogism, but it is an imperfect demonstra- 
tion which supposes something which has still to be proved in order 
to render it mathematically evident. This is, that it is tacitly 
supposed that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possi- 
ble, and implies no contradiction The other argument of 

M. Descartes which undertakes to prove the existence of God 
because his idea is in our soul and it must have come from the 
original, is still less conclusive. For, in the first place, this argu- 
ment has this defect, in common with the preceding, that it 
supposes that there is in us such an idea, that is, that God is possi- 
ble And, secondly, this same argument does not sufficiently 

prove that the idea of God, if we have it, must come from the 
original. But I do not wish to delay here at present. You will 
say to me, sir, that recognizing in us the innate idea of God, I 
ought not to say that we may question whether there is one. But 
I permit this doubt only in relation to a strict demonstration, 
founded upon the idea alone. For we are sufficiently assured other- 
wise of the idea and of the existence of God. And you will remem- 
ber that I have shown how ideas are in us, not always in such 
a way that we are conscious of them, but always so that we may 
draw them from our own depths and render them perceptible. And 
this is also what I believe of the idea of God, whose possibility and 
existence I hold to be demonstrated in more than one way. And 
the Preestablished Harmony itself furnishes a new and incon- 
testable means of doing so. I believe besides that almost all the 
means which have been employed to prove the existence of God 
are good, and might serve, if they were perfected ; and I am not 
at all of the opinion that the one which is drawn from the order 
of things is to be neglected. 

§§9, 10. [9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative. 
10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.] I think the 
present reasoning the strongest in the world, and not only exact but 
also profound and worthy of its author. I am entirely of his 



246 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

opinion that no combination and modification of parts of matter, 
however small they may be, can produce perception; any more 
than the gross parts could give it (as is clearly evident), and 
as everything in the small parts is proportional to what may take 
place in the large ones. It is another important remark upon 
matter, which the author here makes, that it must not be taken 
for a thing single in number, or (as I am accustomed to say) for 
a true and perfect monad or unity, since it is but a mass of an 
infinite number of beings. Here this excellent author needed 
but one more step to reach my system. For in fact I give percep- 
tion to all these infinite beings, each one of which is as an animal, 
endowed with a soul (or with some analogous active principle, 
which forms its true unity), together with what is necessary to 
this being in order to be passive and endowed with an organic 
body. ]STow these beings have received their nature, active and 
passive (that is, what they possess of immaterial and material), 
from a general and supreme cause, because otherwise, as the author 
well remarks, being independent each of the others, they could 
never produce that order, that harmony, that beauty, which we 
observe in nature. But this argument, which appears to be only 
of moral certainty, is brought to a necessity altogether metaphysi- 
cal by the new kind of harmony which I have introduced, which 
is the p reestablished harmony. Eor each one of these souls express- 
ing in its manner that which takes place outside it and not being 
able to have any influence on other particular beings, or rather, 
being obliged to draw this expression from the depths of its own 
nature, each one must necessarily have received this nature (or 
this internal reason of the expressions of what is outside) from a 
universal cause on which all these beings depend, and which causes 
one to be perfectly in accord and correspondent with another ; a 
thing which is not possible without an infinite knowledge and 
power, and by an artifice great as regards especially the sponta- 
neous agreement of the mechanism with the actions of the rational 
soul. In regard to this, the illustrious author who made objections 
against it in his wonderful Dictionary, doubted whether it did 
not surpass all possible wisdom : saying that the wisdom of God 



NEW ESSAYS '. BOOK IV. 



■247 



did not appear to him too great for such an effect, and he at least 
recognized that never had the feeble conceptions which we are able 
to have of the divine perfection, been so set in relief. 

CHAPTER XI. 

Of our hnoivledge of the existence of other things. 

§§ 1-10. [It is to be had only by sensation, etc.] I have 
already remarked in our preceding conversations that the truth 
of sensible things is proved by their connection;, which depends on 
the intellectual truths founded in reason, and on the constant 
observations in sensible things themselves, even when the reasons 
do not appear. And as these reasons and observations give us the 
means of judging of the future in relation to our interests, and as 
success answers to our rational judgment, we could not ask 
nor even have a greater certainty concerning these objects. We 
can account also even for dreams and for their slight connection 
with other phenomena. ^Nevertheless, I believe that the appellation 
of knowledge and of certainty might be extended beyond actual 
sensations, since clearness and manifestness extend beyond, which 
I consider as a kind of certainty: and it would undoubtedly be 
folly to seriously doubt whether there are men in the world when 
we do not see any. To doubt seriously is to doubt in relation to 
practice, and certainty might be taken for a knowledge of truth, 
of which one cannot doubt in relation to practice without madness ; 
and sometimes it is taken still more generally and applied to 
cases where we cannot doubt without deserving to be greatly 
blamed. But evidence would be a luminous certainty, that is to 
say, where we do not doubt on account of the connection which 
we see between ideas. According to this definition of certainty, 
we are certain that Constantinople is in the world, that Constan- 
tine and Alexander the Great and Julius Csesar have lived. It is 
true that some peasant of Ardennes might with reason doubt of 
these, for want of information ; but a man of letters and of the 
world could not do so without great derangement of mind. 

§ 11. [Past existence Tcnown by memory.'] It has already been 
remarked that our memory sometimes deceives us. And we 
believe it or not according as it is more or less vivid, and more or 



248 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

less connected with the things which we know. And even when 
we are assured of the principal fact we may often question the 
circumstances. 

§§ 13, 14. [13. Particular propositions concerning existence 
are knowable. 14. And general propositions concerning abstract 
ideas.^\ Yonr division appears to amount to mine, of propositions 
of fact and propositions of reason. Propositions of fact also may 
become general in a way, but it is by induction or observation; 
such that it is only a multitude of similar facts, as when it is 
observed that all quicksilver is evaporated by the force of fire; 
and this is not a perfect generalization because we do not see its 
necessity. General propositions of reason are necessary, although 
the reason also furnishes some which are not absolutely general 
and are only probable, as, for example, when we presume that an 
idea is possible until the contrary is discovered by a more exact 
research. There are, finally, mixed propositions, drawn from 
premises, some of which come from facts and observations, and 
others are necessary propositions: and such are a number of 
geographical and astronomical conclusions concerning the globe 
of the earth and the course of the stars, which spring from the 
combination of the observations of travelers and astronomers with 
the theorems of geometry and arithmetic. But as, according to 
the usage of logicians, the conclusion follows the weakest of the 
premises and cannot have more certainty than they, these mixed 
propositions have only the certainty and universality which belong 
to the observations. As regards eternal truths, it must be observed 
that at bottom they are all conditional and say ..in effect: such a 
thing posited, such another thing is. For example, in saying, every 
figure ivhich has three sides will also have three angles, I do noth- 
ing but suppose that if there is a figure with three sides, this same 
figure will have three angles 

The scholastics have disputed hotly de constantia subjecti, as 
they called it, that is, how the proposition made upon a subject can 
have a real truth, if this subject does not exist. The fact is that 
the truth is only conditional, and says, that in case the subject 
ever exists, it will be found such. But it will be asked further, 
in what is this connection founded, since there is in it some reality 



NEW ESSAYS : BOOK IV. 249 

which does not deceive ? The reply will be that it is in the connec- 
tion of ideas. But in answer it will be asked, where would these 
ideas be if no mind existed, and what then would become of the 
real foundation of this certainty of the eternal truths ? This 
leads us finally to the ultimate ground of truths, namely, to that 
Supreme and Universal Mind, which cannot fail to exist, whose 
understanding, to speak truly, is the region of eternal truths, 
as St. Augustine has recognized and expresses in a sufficiently 
vivid way. And in order that it be not thought that it is unneces- 
sary to recur to this, we must consider that these necessary truths 
contain the determining reason and the regulative principle of 
existences themselves, and, in a word, the laws of the universe. 
Thus these necessary truths, being anterior to the existence of 
contingent beings, it must be that they are founded in the existence 
of a necessary substance. Here it is that I find the original of the 
ideas and truths which are graven in our souls, not in the form of 
propositions, but as the sources from which application and occa- 
sion will cause actual enunciations to arise. 

CHAPTER XII. 

Of the improvement of our Jcnoivledge. 

§§ 4-6. [Dangerous to build upon precarious principles. But 
to compare clear complete ideas under steady names.'] I am sur- 
prised, sir, that you turn against maxims, that is, against evident 
principles, that which can and must be said against the principles 
assumed gratis. When one demands praecognita in the sciences, 
or anterior knowledges, which serve to ground science, he demands 
known principles and not arbitrary positions, the truth of which is 
not known ; and even Aristotle understands that the inferior and 
subaltern sciences borrow their principles from other higher 
sciences where they have been demonstrated, except the first of the 
sciences, which we call metaphysics, which, according to him, asks 
nothing from the others, and furnishes them the principles of 
which they have need ; and when he says 8el 7nareveiv top fxav- 
Odvovra , the apprentice must believe his master, his thought is 
that he must do it only while waiting, while he is not yet instructed 
in the higher sciences, so that it is only provisionally. Thus one 



250 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

is very far from receiving gratuitous principles. To this must be 
added, that even principles whose certainty is not complete may 
have their use if we build upon them only by demonstration ; for 
although all the conclusions in this case are only conditional and 
are valid solely on the supposition that this principle is true, 
nevertheless, this connection itself and these conditional enuncia- 
tions would at least be demonstrated ; so that it were much to be 
desired that we had many books written in this way, where there 
would be no danger of error, the reader or disciple being warned 
of the condition. And practice will not be regulated by these con- 
clusions except as the supposition shall be found verified otherwise. 
This method also serves very often itself to verify suppositions or 
hypotheses, when many conclusions arise from them, the truth 
of which is known otherwise, and sometimes this gives a perfect 
proof sufficient to demonstrate the truth of the hypothesis. 

§ 13. [The true use of hypotheses.'] The art of' discovering 
the causes of phenomena, or true hypotheses, is like the art 
of deciphering, where an ingenious conjecture often short- 
ens the road very much. Lord Bacon began to put the art of 
experimenting into precepts, and Sir Robert Boyle had a great 
talent for practising it. But if the art of employing experiments 
and of drawing consequences therefrom is not joined to it, we shall 
never with the utmost cost attain to what a man of great penetra- 
tion might discover at first sight. Descartes, who was assuredly 
such, has made a similar remark, in one of his letters, in regard 
to the method of the Chancellor of England ; and Spinoza (whom 
I do not hesitate to quote when he says something good), in one 
of his letters to the late Mr. Oldenburg, Secretary of the Royal 
Society of England, printed among the posthumous works of this 
subtle Jew, makes a like reflection concerning a work by Mr. Boyle, 
who, to speak the truth, stops a little too much to draw from a 
great number of fine experiments no other conclusion than this 
which he might take for a principle, namely, that everything takes 
place in nature mechanically ; a principle which can be rendered 
certain by reason alone, and never by experiments however numer- 
ous they may be. 



XXVII. 

Considerations on the Principles of Life, and on Plastic 

Natures ; by the Author of the System of Preestablished 

Harmony. 1705. 

[From the French.] 

As the dispute which has arisen on plastic natures and on the 
principles of life has given celebrated persons who are interested 
in it occasion to speak of my system, of which some explanation 
seems to be demanded (see Biolioth. Chois., vol. 5, art. 5, p. 301, 
and also VHistoire des Ouvrages des Savants, of 1704, art. 7, p. 
393), I have thought it would be in place to add something on the 
subject to what I have already published in various passages of 
the Journals quoted by Bayle in his dictionary, article Borarius. 
I really admit principles of life diffused throughout all nature, and 
immortal since they are indivisible substances, or units ; just as 
bodies are multitudes liable to perish by dissolution of their parts. 
These principles of life, or these souls, have perception and desire. 
When I am asked if they are substantial forms, I reply in making 
a distinction. For if this term is taken as Descartes takes it, when 
he maintains against Regis that the rational soul is the substantial 
form of man, I will answer, Yes. But I answer, JSTo, if the term 
is taken as those take it who imagine that there is a substantial 
form of a piece of stone, or of any other non-organic body; for 
principles of life belong only to organic bodies. It is true 
(according to my system) that there is no portion of matter in 
which there are not numberless organic and animated bodies ; 
under which I include not only animals and plants, but perhaps 
also other kinds which are entirely unknown to us. But for all 
this, it must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, 
just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated 
body, although a fish is. 

However, my opinion on the principles of life is in certain 
points different from that hitherto taught. One of these points is 
that all have believed that these principles of life change the course 
of the motion of bodies, or at least give occasion to God to change 



252 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

it, whereas, according to my system, this course is not changed at 
all in the order of nature, God having preestablished it as it 
ought to be. The Peripatetics believed that souls had an influ- 
ence on bodies and that according to their will or desire they 
gave some impression to bodies. And the celebrated authors who 
have given occasion for the present dispute, by their principles of 
life and their plastic natures, have held the same view, although 
they are not Peripatetics. We cannot say as much of those who 
have employed ap^ai, or hylarchic principles, or other immaterial 
principles under different names. Descartes having well recog- 
nized that there is a law of nature, according to which the same 
quantity of force is preserved (although he was deceived in its 
application in confounding quantity of force with quantity of 
motion), believed that we ought not to ascribe to the soul the power 
of increasing or diminishing the force of bodies, but simply that of 
changing their direction, by changing the course of the animal 
spirits. And those Cartesians, who have introduced the doctrine 
of Occasional Causes, believed that the soul not being able to 
exert any influence on body, it was necessary that God should 
change the course or direction of the animal spirits according to 
the volitions of the soul. But if at the time of Descartes the 
new law of nature, which I have demonstrated, had been known, 
which affirms that not only the same quantity of total- force of 
bodies which are in communication, but also their total direction, is 
preserved, he would probably have discovered my system of Pre- 
established Harmony. For he would have recognized that it .is as 
reasonable to say that the soul does not change the quantity of the 
direction of bodies, as it is reasonable to deny to the soul the power 
of changing the quantity of their force, both being equally contrary 
to the order of things 'and to the laws of nature, as both are equally 
inexplicable. Thus, according to my system, souls or the principles 
of life, do not change anything in the ordinary course of bodies, 
and do not even give to God occasion to do so. Souls follow their 
laws, which consist in a certain development of perceptions, accord- 
ing to the goods and the evils ; and bodies also follow their laws, 
which consist in the laws of motion; and nevertheless these two 
beings of entirely different kind are in perfect accord, and corres- 



ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LIFE. 



253 



pond like two clocks perfectly regulated on the same basis, although 
perhaps of an entirely different construction. This is what I call 
Preestablished ■ Harmony, which removes all notion of miracles 
from purely natural actions, and makes things run their course 
regulated in an intelligible manner; whereas the common system 
has recourse to absolutely inexplicable influences, and in that of 
Occasional Causes, Gocl, by a sort of general law and as if by 
agreement, is obliged to change at each moment the natural course 
of the thoughts of the soul to accomodate them to the impressions 
of the body, and to disturb the natural course of the motions of 
bodies according to the volitions of the soul ; that which can only 
be explained by a perpetual miracle, while I explain it quite intel- 
ligibly by the natures which Gocl has established in things. 

My system of Preestablished Harmony furnishes a new proof, 
hitherto unknown, of the existence of God, since it is quite manifest 
that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no 
. influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause, 
on which all of them depend, ■ and that this must have infinite 
power and wisdom to preestablish all these harmonies. M. Bayle 
himself has thought that there never has been an hypothesis which 
so sets in relief the knowledge which we have of the divine wisdom. 
The system has moreover the advantage of preserving in all its 
rigor and generality the great principle of physics, that a body 
never receives change in its motion except by another body in 
motion which impels it. Corpus non moveri nisi impulsum a 
corpore contiguo et moto. This law has been violated hitherto by 
all those who have admitted souls or other immaterial principles, 
all Cartesians even included. The followers of Democritus, Hobbes, 
and some other thorough-going materialists, who have rejected all 
/ immaterial substance, having alone up to this time preserved this 
law, have believed that they found therein ground for insulting 
other philosophers, as if they thus maintained a very irrational 
opinion. But the ground of their triumph has been but apparent 
and ad hominem ; and far from serving them, it serves to confound 
them. And now, their illusion being discovered and their advan- 
tage turned against them, it seems that it may be said that it is the 
first time that the better philosophy shows itself also the most con- 



254 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

formed in all respects to reason, nothing remaining which' can 
be opposed to it. This general principle, although it excludes 

^particular prime movers, by making us deny this quality to 
souls, or to immaterial created principles, leads us so much the 
more surely and clearly to the universal Prime Mover, 
from whom comes equally the succession and harmony 
of perceptions. There are, as it were, two kingdoms, the one 
of efficient causes, the other of final; each of which separ- 
ately suffices in detail for explaining all as if the other did not 
exist. But the one does not suffice without the other in what is 
general of their origin, for they both emanate from one source in 

I which the power which constitutes efficient causes and the wisdom 
which regulates final causes are found united. This maxim also, 
that there is no motion which has not its origin in another motion, 
according to laws of mechanics, leads us again to the Prime Mover ; 
because matter being indifferent in itself to all motion or rest, 
and nevertheless always possessing motion with all its force and 
direction, it could not have been put in motion except by the author 
himself of matter. 

There is still another difference between the opinions of other 
authors who favor the principles of life, and mine. It is that I 
believe at the same time both that these principles of life are 

r immortal and that they are everywhere; whereas according to 
the common opinion the souls of brutes perish, and according to the 
Cartesians, man only has really a soul and even perception and 
desire; an opinion which will never be approved, and which has 
only been embraced because it was seen that it was necessary either 
to accord to brutes immortal souls or to avow that the soul of man 
might be mortal. But it ought rather to have been said that, every 
simple substance being imperishable and every soul being con- 
sequently immortal, that which could not be reasonably refused 
to brutes, cannot fail also to subsist always, although in a way very 
different from our own, since brutes, as far as can be judged, are 
lacking in that reflection which makes us think of ourselves. And 
we do not see why men have been so loath to accord to the bodies 
of other organic creatures immaterial, imperishable substances, 
since the defenders of atoms have introduced material substances 



ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EIEE. 



255 



which do not perish, and since the soul of the brute has no more 
reflection than an atom. For there is a broad difference between 
feeling which is common to these souls and the reflection which 
accompanies reason, since we have a thousand feelings without 
reflecting upon them ; and I do not think that the Cartesians have 
ever proved or can prove that every perception is accompanied 
by consciousness. It is reasonable also that there may be sub- 
stances capable of perception below us as there are above ; and that 
our soul far from being the last of all is in a middle position from 
which one may descend and ascend ; otherwise there would be a 
defect of order which certain philosophers call vacuum formarum. 
Thus reason and nature lead men to the opinion I have just pro- 
pounded ; but prejudices have turned them aside from it. 

This view leads us to another in which I am again obliged to 
diverge from the received opinion. Those who are of my opinion 
will be asked, what the souls of brutes will do after the death 
of the animal, and the dogma of Pythagoras, who believed in the 
transmigration of souls, will be imputed to us, which not only 
the late M. Van Helmont, the younger, but also an ingenious 
author of certain Metaphysical Meditations, published at Paris, 
have wished to revive. But it must be known that I am far from 
this opinion, because I believe that not only the soul but also the 
animal itself subsists. Persons very accurate in experiments have 
already in our day perceived that it may be doubted whether an 
altogether new animal is ever produced, and whether animals 
wholly alive as well as plants are not already in miniature in germs 
before conception. This doctrine being granted, it will be reason- 
able to think that what does not begin to live also does not cease 
to live, and that death, like generation, is only the transformation 
of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes 
diminished. This again reveals to us hitherto unthought-of 
marvels of divine contrivance. This is, that the mechanisms of 
nature being mechanisms even to their smallest parts, are inde- 
structible, by reason of the envelopment of one little mechanism 
in a greater ad infinitum. Thus one finds one's self obliged at the 
same time to maintain the preexistence of the soul as well as 
of the animal, and the substance of the animal as well as of the 
soul. 



256 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

I have insensibly been led on to explain niy view of the forma- 
tion of plants and animals, since it appears from what I have just 
said that they are never formed altogether anew. I am therefore 
of the opinion of Cudworth (the greater part of whose excellent 
work pleases me extremely) that the laws of mechanics alone conld 
not form an animal where there is nothing yet organized; and I 
find that, with reason, he is opposed to what some of the ancients 
have imagined on this subject, and even Descartes in his L'Homme, 
the formation of which costs him so little, but which is also very 
far from being a real man. And I reinforce this opinion of Cud- 
worth by presenting for consideration the fact that matter arranged 
by divine wisdom must be essentially organized throughout, and 
that thus there is mechanism in the parts of the natural mechanism 
ad infinitum, and so many envelopes and organic bodies enfolded 
one within another, that an organic body never could be produced 
altogether new and without any preformation; nor could an 
animal already existing be entirely destroyed. Thus I have 
no need to resort with Cudworth to certain immaterial plastic 
natures, although I remember that Julius Scaliger and other 
Peripatetics, and also certain partisans of the Helmontian doc- 
trine of Archai-i. have believed that the soul manufactures its own 
body. I may say of it no a mi hisogna. e non mi basta, for the 
very reason of the preformation and organism ad infinitum, which 
furnishes me the material plastic natures suited to the require- 
ments of the case ; whereas the immaterial plastic principles are 
as little necessary as they are little capable of satisfying the case. 
For since animals are never formed naturally of a non-organic 
mass, the mechanism incapable of producing de novo these 
infinitely varied organs can very well derive them through the 
development and through the transformation of a preexisting 
organic body. ALeanwhile those who employ plastic natures, 
whether material or immaterial, in no wise weaken the proof of the 
existence of God drawn from the marvels of nature, which appear 
particularly in the structure of animals, provided that these 
defenders of immaterial plastic natures, add a particular direction 
from God, and provided that those who with me make use of a 
material cause in assenting to plastic mechanism, maintain not 



ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LIFE. 257 

only a continual preformation, but also an original divine pre- 
establishment. Thus whatever view we take, we cannot over- 
look the divine existence in -wishing to explain these marvels, 
which have always been admired, but which have never been more 
apparent than in my system. 

We see by this, that not only the soul but also the animal must 
subsist always, in the ordinary course of things. But the laws of 
nature are made and applied with so much order and so much wis- 
dom that they serve more than one end, and God, who occupies 
the position of inventor and architect as regards the mechanism 
and works of nature, occupies the position of king and father to 
substances possessing intelligence ; and of these the soul is a spirit 
formed after his image. And as regards spirits, his kingdom, of 
which they are the citizens, is the most perfect monarchy which 
can be discovered; in which there is no sin which does not bring 
upon itself some punishment, and no good action without some 
recompense ; in which everything tends finally to the glory of the 
monarch and the happiness of the subjects, by the most beautiful 
combination of justice and goodness which can be desired. Never- 
theless I dare not assert anything positively either as regards pre- 
existence or as regards the details of the future condition of human 
souls, since God, as regards this, might make use of extraordinary 
ways in the kingdom of grace; nevertheless that which natural 
reason favors ought to be preferred, at least if Revelation does not 
teach us the contrary, a point which I do not here undertake to 
decide. 

Before ending, it will perhaps be well to note, among the other 
advantages of my system, that of the universality of the laws 
which I employ, which are always without exception in my general 
philosophy: and it is just the opposite in other systems. For 
example, I have already 'said that the laws of mechanics are never 
violated in natural motions, that the same force is always pre- 
served as also the same direction, and that everything takes place 
in souls as if there were no body, and that everything takes place 
in bodies as if there were no souls ; that there is no part of space 
which is not full ; that there is no particle of matter which is not 
actually divided, and which does not contain organic bodies ; that 
17 



258 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

there are also souls everywhere, as there are bodies everywhere; 
that souls and animals even, always subsist; that organic bodies 
are never without souls, and that souls are never separated from all 
organic body; although it is nevertheless true that there is no 
portion of matter of which it can be said that it is always affected 
by the same soul. I do not admit then that there are naturally 
souls entirely disembodied, nor that there are created spirits 
entirely detached from all body ; in which I am of the opinion of 
several ancient Church Fathers. God only is above all matter, 
since he is its author; but creatures, free or freed from matter, 
would be at the same time detached from the universal concatena- 
tion, and like deserters from the general order. This universality 
of laws is confirmed by its great facility of explanation, since the 
uniformity, which I think is observed in all nature, brings about 
that everywhere else, in all time and in every place, it can be said 
that all is as it is here, to the degrees of greatness and of perfection 
nearly; and that thus those things which are fartherest removed 
and most concealed are perfectly explained by the analogy of what 
is visible and near to us. 



XXVIII. 

Lettek to M. Coste on Necessity and Contingency. 1707. 

[From the French.] 

Hanover, Dec. 19, 1707. 
To M. Coste, London: 

I thank yon very much for communicating to me the last addi- 
tions and corrections of Locke, and I am pleased also to learn what 
you tell me of his last dispute with Limborch. The liberty of 
indifference, about which the dispute turns, and my opinion of 
which you, sir, ask, consists in a certain subtilty which few people 
trouble themselves to understand, and of which many people never- 
theless reason. This carries us back to the consideration of 
necessity and of contingency. 

A truth is necessary when the opposite implies contradiction, 
and when it is not necessary it is called contingent. That God 
exists, that all right angles are equal, etc., are necessary truths ; but 
that I myself exist, and that there are bodies in nature which show 
an angle actually right, are contingent truths. For the whole uni- 
verse might be otherwise ; time, space, and matter being absolutely 
indifferent to motion and forms. And God has chosen among an 
infinite number of possibles what he judged most fit. But since he 
has chosen, it must be affirmed that everything is comprised in his 
choice and that nothing could be changed, since he has once for all 
foreseen and regulated all ; he who could not regulate things piece- 
meal and by fits and starts. Therefore the sins and evils which 
he has judged proper to permit for greater goods, are comprised in 
his choice. This is the necessity, which can now be ascribed to 
things in the future, which is called hypothetical or consequent 
necessity (that is to say, founded upon the consequence of the 
hypothesis of the choice made), which does not destroy the con- 
tingency of things, and does not produce that absolute necessity 
which contingency does not allow. And nearly all theologians and 
philosophers (for we must except the Socinians) acknowledge the 
hypothetical necessity, which I have just explained, and which can- 



260 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

not be combated without overthrowing the attributes of God and 
even the nature of things. 

Nevertheless, although all the facts of the universe are now cer- 
tain in relation to God, or (what amounts to the same thing) are 
determined in themselves and even linked among themselves, it 
does not follow that their connection is always truly necessary; 
that is to say, that the truth, which pronounces that one fact follows 
another, is necessary. And this must be applied particularly to 
voluntary actions. When a choice is proposed, for example to go 
out or not to go out, it is a question whether, with all the circum- 
stances, internal and external, motives, perceptions, dispositions, 
impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am still in a 
contingent state, or whether I 'am necessitated to make choice, for 
example, to go out ; that is to say, whether this proposition true 
and determined in fact, In all these circumstances taken together I 
shall choose to go out, is contingent or necessary. To this I reply 
that it is contingent, because neither I nor anv other mind more 
enlightened than I, could demonstrate that the opposite of this 
truth implies contradiction. And supposing that by liberty of 
indifference is understood a liberty opposed to necessity (as I have 
just explained it), I acknowledge this liberty for I am really of 
opinion that our liberty, as well as that of God and of the blessed 
spirits, is exempt not only from co-action, but, furthermore, from 
absolute necessity, although it cannot be exempt from determina- 
tion and from certainty. 

But I find that there is need of great precaution here in order 
not to fall into a chimera which shocks the principles of good 
sense, and which would be what I call an absolute indifference or 
an indifference of equilibrium; which some conceive in liberty, and 
which I believe chimerical. It must be observed then that that 
connection, of which I just spoke, is not necessary, speaking 
absolutely, but that it is none the less certainly true, and that in 
general every time that in all the circumstances taken together the 
balance of deliberation is heavier on the one side than on the other, 
it is certain and infallible that that side will carry the day. God 
or the perfect sage would always choose the best that is known, and 
if one thing was no better than another, they would choose neither. 



OJST NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. 261 

In other intelligent subjects, passions often take the place of 
reason ; and it can always be said in regard to the will in general 
that the choice follows the greatest inclination, under which I 
understand passions as well as reasons, true or apparent. 

Nevertheless I see that there are people who imagine that we are 
determined sometimes for the side which is the less weighted ; that 
God chooses sometimes the least good, everything considered ; and 
that man chooses sometimes without object and against all his 
reasons, dispositions, and passions ; finally, that one chooses some- 
times without any reason which determines the choice. But this I 
hold to be false and absurd, since it is one of the greatest principles 
of good sense that nothing ever occurs without cause or determin- 
ing reason. Thus, when God chooses, it is by reason of the Best ; 
when man chooses, it will be the side which shall have struck him 
most. If, moreover, he chooses that which he sees to be less useful 
and less agreeable, it will have become perhaps to him the most 
agreeable through caprice, through a spirit of contradiction, and 
through similar reasons of a depraved taste, which would none the 
less be determining reasons, even if they should not be conclusive 
reasons. And never can any example to the contrary be found. 

Thus, although we have a liberty of indifference which saves us 
from necessity, we never have an indifference of equilibrium 
which exempts us from determining reasons ; there is always some- 
thing which inclines us and makes us choose, but without being able 
to necessitate us. And just as God is always infallibly led to the 
best although he is not led necessarily (other than by a moral 
necessity), so we are always infallibly led to that which strikes 
us most, but not necessarily. The contrary not implying any con- 
tradiction, it was not necessary or essential that God should 
create, nor that he should create this world in particular, 
although his wisdom and goodness has led him to it. 

It is this that M. Bayle, very subtle as he has been, has not 
sufficiently considered when he thought that a case similar to the 
ass of Buridan was possible, and that a man placed in circum- 
stances of perfect equilibrium could none the less choose. For it 
must be said that the case of a perfect equilibrium is chimerical 
and never occurs, the universe not being able to be parted or cut 



262 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

into parts equal and alike. The universe is not like an ellipse or 
other such oval, which the straight line drawn through its centre 
can cut in two congruent parts. The universe has no center and 
its parts are infinitely varied ; thus it will never happen that all 
will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side and 
from the other ; and, although we are not always capable of per- 
ceiving all the little impressions which contribute to determine us, 
there is always something which determines us between two con- 
tradictories, without the case ever being perfectly equal on the one 
side and on the other. 

jSTevertheless, although our choice ex datis on all the internal and 
external circumstances taken together, is always determined, and 
although for the present it does not depend upon us to change the 
will, it is none the less true that we have great power over our 
future wills by choosing certain objects of our attention and by 
accustoming ourselves to certain ways of thinking; and by this 
means we can accustom ourselves the better to resist impressions 
and the better make the reason act, to the end that we can con- 
tribute toward making ourselves will what we ought to. 

For the rest, I have elsewhere shown, that, regarding matters in 
a certain metaphysical sense, we are always in a state of perfect 
spontaneity, and that what is attributed to the impressions of 
external things comes only from confused perceptions in us which 
correspond to them, and which cannot but be given us at the start 
in virtue of the preestablished harmony which establishes the con- 
nection of each substance with all others. 

If it were true, sir, that your Sevennese were prophets, that 
event would not be contrary to my hypothesis of the Preestablished 
Harmony and would even be in thorough agreement with it. I 
have always said that the present is big with the future and that 
there is a perfect connection between things however distant they 
may be one from another, so that one of sufficient penetration 
might read the one in the other. I should not even oppose one 
who should maintain that there are globes in the universe where 
prophecies are more common than on our own, as there will per- 
haps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to 
scent their game at a thousand leagues ; perhaps also there are 



ON NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY. 263 

globes in which genii have more freedom than here below to mix 
in the actions of rational animals. Bnt when the question is to 
reason on what is actually practised here, our presumptive judg- 
ment must be founded on the custom of our globe, where prophetic 
views of this sort are very rare. We cannot swear that there are 
none, but we could wager that these in question are not such. One 
of the reasons which would most lead me to judge favorably of 
them would be the judgment of M. Fatio, but it would be necessary 
to know his opinion without taking it from the newspaper. If 
you had with all due attention associated yourself with a gentle- 
man with an income of £2000 sterling who prophesies in Greek, 
in Latin, and in French, although he only knows English well, 
there would be nothing to be said. So I beg you, sir, to enlighten 
me more on a matter so interesting and important. I am, etc. 



XXIX. 

Kefutatioist of Spinoza, c. 1708. 

[From the Latin.] 

The author [Wachter] passes on (ch. 4) to Spinoza, whom he 
compares with the cabalists. Spinoza (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 10, 
schol.) says: "Every one must admit that nothing is or can be 
conceived without God. Eor it is acknowledged by everyone that 
God is the sole cause of all things, of their essence as well as of 
their existence; that is, God is the cause of things, not only in 
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect 
to their being (secundum esse)." This, from Spinoza, the author 
[Wachter] appears to approve. And it is true that we must speak 
of created things only as permitted by the nature of God. But 
I do not think that Spinoza has succeeded in this. Essences can in 
a certain way be conceived of without God, but existences involve 
God. And the very reality of essences by which they exert an 
influence upon existences is from God. The essences of things are 
co-eternal with God. And the very essence of God embraces all 
other essences to such a degree that God cannot be perfectly con- 
ceived without them. But existence cannot be conceived of with- 
out God, who is the final reason of things. 

This axiom, "To the essence of a thing belongs that without 
which it can neither be nor be conceived," is to be applied in 
necessary things or in species, but not in individuals or contingent 
things. Eor individuals cannot be distinctly conceived. Hence 
they have no necessary connection with God, but are produced 
freely. God has been inclined toward these by a determining 
reason, but he has not been necessitated. 

Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 374) places among fictions the 
dictum, "Something can be produced from nothing/' But, in 
truth, modes which are produced, are produced from nothing. 
Since there is no matter of modes, assuredly neither the mode, nor 
a part of it, has preexisted, but only another mode which has dis- 
appeared and to which this present one has succeeded. 



REFUTATION OF SPINOZA. 



'265 



The cabalists seem to say that matter, on account of the vileness 
of its essence, can neither be created nor can it exist; hence, 
that there is absolutely no matter, or that spirit and matter, as 
Henry More maintains in his cabalistic theses, are one and the 
same thing. Spinoza, likewise, denies that God conld h.ave created 
any corporeal and material mass to be the subject of this world, 
"because," he says, "those who differ do not know by what divine 
power it could have been created." There is som© truth in these 
words, but I think it is not sufficiently understood. Matter does, 
in reality, exist, but it is not a substance, since it is an aggregate or 
resultant of substances : I speak of matter as far as it is secondary 
or of extended mass, which is not at all a homogeneous body. But 
that which we conceive of as homogeneous and call primary matter 
is something incomplete, since it is merely potential. Substance, 
on the contrary, is something full and active. 

Spinoza believed that matter, as commonly understood, did not 
exist. Hence he often warns us that matter is badly defined by 
Descartes as extension (Ep. 73), and extension is poorly explained 
as a very vile thing which must be divisible in space, "since (de 
Emend. Intel., p. 385) matter ought to be explained as an attribute 
expressing an eternal and infinite essence." I reply that extension, 
or if you prefer, primary matter, is nothing but a certain indefi- 
nite repetition of things as far as they are similar to each other or 
indiscernible. But just as number supposes numbered things, so 
extension supposes things which are repeated, and which have, in 
addition to common characteristics, others peculiar to themselves. 
These accidents, peculiar to each other, render the limits of size 
and shape, before only possible, actual. Merely passive matter is 
something very vile, that is, wanting in all force, but such a thing 
consists only in the incomplete or in abstraction. 

Spinoza (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 13, corol. and prop. 15, schol.) says: 
"ISTo substance, not even corporeal substance, is divisible." This 
statement is not surprising according to his system, since he admits 
but one substance ; but it is equally true in mine, although I admit 
innumerable substances, for, in my system, all are indivisible or 
monads. 

He says (Eth., pt. 3, prop. 2, schol.) that "the mind and the 
body are the same thing, only expressed in two ways," and (Eth., 



266 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

pt. 2, prop. 7, schol.) that "thinking substance and extended sub- 
stance are one and the same, known now under the attribute of 
thought, now under that of extension." He says in the same scho- 
lium, "This, certain Hebrews seem to have seen as through a cloud, 
who indeed maintain that God, the intellect of God, and the things 
known by it, are one and the same." This is not my opinion. 
Mind and body are not the same any more than are the principle 
of action and that of passion. Corporeal substance has a soul and 
an organic body, that is, a mass made up of other substances. It 
is true that the same substance thinks and has an extended mass 
joined to it, but it does not consist of this mass, since all this can 
be taken away from it, without altering the substance ; moreover, 
every substance perceives, but not every substance thinks. Thought 
indeed belongs to the monads, especially all perception, but exten- 
sion belongs to compounds. It can no more be said that God and 
the things known by God are one and the same thing than that the 
mind and the things perceived by the mind are the same. The 
author [Wachter] believes that Spinoza posited a common nature 
in which the attributes thought and extension reside, and that this 
nature is spiritual ; but there is no extension belonging to spirits 
unless the word be taken in a broader sense for a certain subtile 
animal such as angels were thought to be by the ancients. The 
author [Wachter] adds that mind and body are the modes of these 
attributes. But how, I ask, can the mind be the mode of thought, 
when it is the principle of thought ? Thus the mind should rather 
be the attribute and thought the modification of this attribute. It 
is astonishing also that Spinoza, as was seen above (de Emend. 
Intel., p. 385), seems to deny that extension is divisible into and 
composed of parts ; which has no meaning, unless, perchance, 
like space, it is not a divisible thing. But space and time are 
orders of things and not things. 

The author [Wachter] rightly says, that God found in himself 
the origins of all things, as I remember Julius Scaliger once said 
that "things are not produced by the passive power of matter but 
by the active power of God." And I assert this of forms or of 
activities or entelechies. 

What Spinoza (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 34) says, that "God is, by the 
same necessity, the cause of himself and the cause of all things," 



REFUTATION' OF SPINOZA. 



267 



and (Polit. Tract., p. 270, c. 2, no. 2) that "the power of things is 
the power of God," I do not admit. God exists necessarily, bnt 
he produces things freely, and the power of things is produced by 
God but is different from the divine power, and things themselves 
operate, although they have received their power to act. 

Spinoza (Ep. 21) says: "That everything is in God and moves 
in God, I assert with Paul and perhaps with all other philosophers, 
although in a different manner. I would even dare to say that this 
was the opinion of all the ancient Hebrews, so far as it can be con- 
jectured from certain traditions, although these are in many ways 
corrupted." I think that everything is in God, not as the part in 
the whole, nor as an accident in a subject, but as place, yet a place 
spiritual and enduring and not one measured or divided, is in that 
which is placed, namely, just as God is immense or everywhere; 
the world is present to him. And it is thus that all things are in 
him; for he is where they are and where they are not, and he 
remains when they pass away and he has already been there when 
they come. 

The author [Wachter] says that it is the concordant opinion of 
the cabalists that God produced certain things mediately and others 
immediately. Whence he next speaks of a certain created first 
principle which God made to proceed immediately from himself, 
and by the mediation of which all other things have been produced 
in series and in order, and this they are wont to salute by various 
names ; Adam Cadmon, Messiah, the Christ, A.0'70?, the word, the 
first-born, the first man, the celestial man, the guide, the shepherd, 
the mediator, etc. Elsewhere he gives a reason for this assertion. 
The fact itself is recognized by Spinoza, so that nothing is wanting 
except the name. "It follows," he says (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 28, 
schol.), "in the second place, that God cannot properly be called 
the remote cause of individual things, except to distinguish these 
from those which God produces immediately or rather which follow 
from his absolute nature." Moreover what those things are which 
are said to follow from the absolute nature of God, he explained 
(prop. 21) thus: "All things which follow from the absolute 
nature of any attribute of God must exist always and be infinite 
or are eternal and infinite through the same attribute." — These 



268 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

propositions of Spinoza, which the author cites, are wholly with- 
out foundation. God produces no infinite creature, nor could it be 
shown or pointed out by any argument in what respect such a 
creature would differ from God. 

The theory of Spinoza, namely, that from each attribute there 
springs a particular infinite thing, from extension a certain some- 
thing infinite in extension, from thought a certain infinite under- 
standing, arises from his varied imagination of certain heterogene- 
ous divine attributes, like thought and extension, and perhaps 
innumerable others. For in reality extension is not an attribute of 
itself since it is only the repetition of perceptions. An infinitely 
extended thing is only imaginary: an infinite thinking being is 
God himself. The things which are necessary and which proceed 
from the infinite nature of God, are the eternal truths. A particu- 
lar creature is produced by another, and this again by another. 
Thus, therefore, by no conception could we reach God even if we 
should suppose a progress ad infinitum, and, notwithstanding, the 
last no less than the one which precedes is dependent upon God. 

Tatian says, in his Oration to the Greeks, that there is a spirit 
dwelling in the stars, the angels, the plants, the waters and men, 
and that this spirit, although one and the same, contains differ- 
ences in itself. But this doctrine I do not approve. It is the error 
of the world-soul universally diffused, and which, like the air in 
pneumatic organs, makes different sounds in different organs. 
Thus when a pipe is broken, the soul will desert it and will return 
into the world-soul. But we must know that there are as many 
incorporeal substances, or if you will, souls, as there are natural, 
organic mechanisms. 

But what Spinoza (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 13, schol.) says: "All 
things, although in different degrees, are animated," rests upon 
another strange doctrine, "for," he says, "'of everything there 
is necessarily in God an idea, of which God is the cause, in the 
same way as there is an idea of the human body." But there is 
plainly no reason for saying that the soul is an idea. Ideas are 
something purely abstract, like numbers and figures, and cannot 
act. Ideas are abstract and numerical : the idea of each animal 
is a possibility, and it is an illusion to call souls immortal because 



REFUTATION OF SPINOZA. 269 

ideas are eternal, as if the soul of a globe should be called eternal 
because the idea of a spherical body is eternal. The soul is not 
an idea, but the source of innumerable ideas, for it has, besides 
the present idea, something active, or the production of new ideas. 
But according to Spinoza, at any moment the soul will be differ- 
ent because the body being changed the idea of the body is differ- 
ent. Hence it is not strange if he considers creatures as transitory 
modifications. — The soul, therefore, is something vital or some- 
thing containing active force. 

Spinoza (Eth., pt, 1, prop. 16) says: "From the necessity of 
the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in 
infinite modes, that is to say, all things which can fall under 
infinite intellect." This is a most false opinion, and this error is the 
same as that which Descartes insinuated, viz., that matter succes- 
sively assumes all forms. Spinoza begins where Descartes ended, 
in Naturalism. He is wrong also in saying (Ep. 58) that "the 
world is the effect of the divine nature," although he almost adds 
that it was not made by chance. There is a mean between what is 
necessary and what is fortuitous, namely, what is free. The world 
is a voluntary effect of God, but on account of inclining or 
prevailing reasons. And even if the world should be supposed 
perpetual nevertheless it would not be necessary. God could either 
not have created it or have created it otherwise, but he was not to 
do it. Spinoza thinks (Ep. 49) that u God produces the world by 
that necessity by which he knows himself." But it must be replied 
that things are possible in many ways, whereas it was altogether 
impossible that God should not know himself. — Spinoza says 
(Eth., pt. 1, prop. 17, schol.) : "I know that there are many who 
believe that they can.prove that sovereign intelligence and free will 
belong to the nature of God ; for they say they know nothing more 
perfect to attribute to God than that which is the highest perfection 
in us Therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indiffer- 
ent to all things, and that he creates nothing except what he has 
decided, by some absolute will, to create. But I think I have 
shown (Prop. 16) sufficiently clearly that all things follow from 
the sovereign power of God by the same necessity ; in the same way 
as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are 



270 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

equal to two right angles." — From the first words it is evident that 
Spinoza does not attribute to God intellect and will. He is right 
in denying that Clod is indifferent and that he decrees anything 
by absolute will : he decrees by a will which is based on reasons. 
That things proceed from God as the properties of a triangle pro- 
ceed from its nature is proved by no argument, besides there is 
no analogy between essences and existing things. 

In the scholium of Proposition 17, Spinoza says that "the 
intellect and the will of God agree with ours only in name, because 
ours are posterior and God's are prior to things" ; but it does not 
follow from this, that they agree only in name. Elsewhere, never- 
theless, he says that "thought is an attribute of God, and that 
particular modes of thought must be referred to it (Eth., pt. 2, 
prop. 1)." But the author [Wachter] thinks that he is speaking 
there of the external word of God, because he says (Eth., pt. 5) 
"that our mind is a part of the infinite intellect." 

"The human mind," says Spinoza (Eth., pt. 5, prop. 23, proof), 
"cannot be entirely destroyed with the body, but there remains 
something of it which is eternal. But this has no relation to time, 
for we attribute' duration to the mind only during the duration of 
the body." In the scholium following, he adds, "This idea which 
expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity [sub 
specie ceternitatis^ is a certain mode of thought which belongs to 
the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal, etc." 
This is illusory. This idea is like the figure of the sphere, the 
eternity of which does not prejudge its existence, since it is but the 
possibility of an ideal sphere. Thus it is saying nothing to say 
that "our mind is eternal in so far as it expresses the body under 
the form of eternity," and it would be likewise eternal because 
it understands eternal truths as to the triangle. "Our soul has no 
duration nor does time relate to anything beyond the actual exist- 
ence of the body." Thus Spinoza, I. c, who thinks that the mind 
perishes with the body because he believes that only a single body 
remains always, although this can be transformed. 

The author [Wachter] adds : "I do not see that Spinoza has 
anywhere said positively that minds migrate from one body into 
another, and into different dwellings and various regions of 



REFUTATION OF SPINOZA. 271 

eternity. Nevertheless it might be inferred from his thought." 
But he errs. The same soul, to Spinoza, cannot be the idea of 
another body, as the figure of a sphere is not the figure of a 
cylinder. The soul, to Spinoza, is so fugitive, that it does 
not exist even in the present moment, and the body too only exists 
in idea. Spinoza says (Eth., pt. 5, prop. 2) that "memory and 
imagination disappear with the body." But I for my part think 
that some imagination and some memory always remain, and that, 
without them, there would be no soul. It must not be believed that 
the mind exists without feeling or without a soul. A reason with- 
out imagination and memory is a conclusion without premises. 
Aristotle, also, thought that vovs, mind, or the active intellect 
remains, and not the soul. But the soul itself acts and the mind 
is passive. 

Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 384) says, "The ancients never, 
to my knowledge, conceived, as we do here, a soul acting according 
to certain laws and like a spiritual automa" (he meant to say 
automaton). The author [Wachter] interprets this passage of the 
soul alone and not of the mind, and says that the soul acts 
according to the laws of motion and according to external causes. 
Both are mistaken. I say that the soul acts spontaneously and yet . 
like a spiritual automaton ; and that this is true also of the mind. 
The soul is not less exempt than the mind from impulses from 
external things, and the soul no more than the mind acts deter- 
minately ; as in bodies everything is done by motions according to 
the laws of force, so in the soul everything is done through effort 
or desire, according to the laws of God. The two realms are in 
harmony. It is true, nevertheless, that there are certain things in 
the soul which cannot be explained in an adequate manner except 
by external things, and so far the soul is subject to the external ; 
but this is not a physical influx, but so to speak by a moral, in so 
far, namely, as God, in creating the mind, had more regard to 
other things than to it itself. Eor in the creation and preservation 
of each thing he has regard to all other things. 

Spinoza is wrong in calling [Eth., pt. 3, 9, schol.] the will the 
effort of each thing to persist in its being ; for the will tends toward 
more particular ends and a more perfect mode of existence. He is 



272 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

wrong also in saying [pt. 3, prop. 7] that the effort is identical 
with the essence, whereas the essence is always the same and efforts 
vary. I do not admit that affirmation is the effort of the mind to 
persist in its being, that is, to preserve its ideas. We have this 
effort even when we affirm nothing. Moreover, with Spinoza, the 
mind is an idea, it does not have ideas. He is also wrong in think- 
ing that affirmation or negation is volition, since, moreover, volition 
involves, in addition, the reason of the Good. 

Spinoza (Ep. 2, ad Oldenb.) says that "the willdiffers from 
this or that volition, just as whitness from this or that white color : 
consequently, will is not the cause of volition, as humanity is not 
the cause of Peter and of Paul. Particular volitions have there- 
fore need of another cause. The will is only an entity of reason." 
So Spinoza. But we take the will for the power of choosing, the 
exercise of which is the volition. Therefore it is indeed by the 
will that we will ; but it is true that there is need of other special 
causes to determine the will, namely, in order that it produce a 
certain volition. It must be modified in a certain manner. The 
will does not therefore stand to volitions as the species or the 
abstract of the species to individuals. Mistakes are not free nor 
. acts of will, although often we concur in our errors by free 
actions. 

Further, Spinoza says (Tract. Polit., c. 2, no. 6), "Men conceive 
themselves in nature as an empire within an empire (Malcuth in 
Malcuth, adds the author) . For they think that the human mind 
is not the product of natural causes, but that it is immediately 
created by God so independent of other things that it has absolute 
power of determining itself and of using rightly its reason. But 
experience proves to us over-abundantly that it is no more in our 
power to have a sound mind than to have a sound body." So 
Spinoza. In my opinion, each substance is an empire within an 
empire; but harmonizing exactly with all the rest it receives no 
influence from any being except it be from God, but, nevertheless, 
through God, its author, it depends upon all the others. It comes 
immediately from God and yet it is created in conformity to the 
other things. For the rest, not all things are equally in our power. 
For we are inclined more to this or to that. Malcuth, or the realm 






REFUTATION OF SPINOZA. 273 

of God, does not suppress either divine or human liberty, but only 
the indifference of equilibrium, as they say who think there are 
no reasons for those actions which they do not understand. 

Spinoza thinks that the mind is greatly strengthened if it knows 
that what happens happens necessarily : but by this compulsion he 
does not render the heart of the sufferer content nor cause him to 
feel his malady the less. He is, on the contrary, happy if he under- 
stands that good results from evil and that those things which 
happen are the best for us if we are wise. 

From what precedes it is seen that what Spinoza says on the 
intellectual love of God (Eth., pt. 4, prop. 28) is only trappings 
for the people, since there is nothing loveable in a God who pro- 
duces without choice and by necessity, without discrimination of 
good and evil. The true love of God is founded not in necessity 
but in goodness. Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 388), says that 
"there is no science, but that we have only experience of particular 
things, that is, of things such that their existence has no connection 
with their essence, and which, consequently, are not eternal 
truths." — This contradicts what he said elsewhere, viz : that all 
things are necessary, that all things proceed necessarily from the 
divine essence. Likewise he combats (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 10, schol.) 
those who pretend that the nature of God belongs to the essence of 
created things, and yet he had established before [Eth., pt. 1, 
prop. 15] that things do not exist and cannot be conceived without 
God, and that they necessarily arise from him. He maintains 
(Eth., pt. 1, prop. 21), for this reason, that finite and temporal 
things cannot be produced immediately by an infinite cause, but 
that (Prop. 28) they are produced by other causes, individual and 
finite. But how will they finally then spring from God ? for they 
cannot come from him mediately in this case, since we could never 
reach in this way things which are not similarly produced by 
another finite thing. It cannot, therefore, be said that God acts 
by mediating secondary causes, unless he produces secondary 
causes. Therefore, it is rather to be said that God produces sub- 
stances and not their actions, in which he only concurs. 



XXX. 

Remarks on the Opinion oe Male bean cue that We See All 
Things in God, with reference to Locke's Examination 
of it. 1708. 

[From the French.] 

There is, in the posthumous works of Locke published at Lon- 
don in 1706, 8vo., an examination of the opinion of Malebranche 
that we see all things in God. It is acknowledged at the start 
that there are many nice thoughts and judicious reflections in the 
book on The Search after Truth, and that this made him hope to 
find therein something satisfactory on the nature of our ideas.- But 
he has remarked at the beginning (§2) that this Father [Male- 
branche] makes use of what Locke calls the argumentum ad 
ignorantiam, in pretending to prove his opinion, because there is 
no other means of explaining the thing : but according to Mr. 
Locke, this argument loses its force when the feebleness of our 
understanding is considered. I am nevertheless of opinion that 
this argument is good if one can perfectly enumerate the means 
and exclude all but one. Even in Analysis, M. Frenicle employed 
this method of exclusion, as he called it. Xevertheless, Locke is 
right in saying that it is of no use to say that this hypothesis is 
.better than others, if it is found not to explain what one would 
like to understand, and even to involve things which cannot 
harmonize. 

After having considered what is said in the first chapter of the 
second part of book third, where Malebranche claims that what the 
soul can perceive must be in immediate contact with it, Mr. Locke 
asks (§§ 3, 4) what it is to be in immediate contact, this not appear- 
ing to him intelligible except in bodies. Perhaps it might be 
replied that one thing acts immediately on the other. And as Male- 
branche, admitting that our bodies are united to our souls, adds 
that it is not in such a way that the soul perceives it, he is asked 
(§5) to explain that sort of union or at least in what it differs 
from that which he does not admit ? Father Malebranche will 
perhaps say that he does not know the union of the soul with the 



on locke's examination' of malebranche. 275 

body except by faith, and that the nature of body consisting in 
extension alone, nothing can be deduced therefrom toward explain- 
ing the soul's action on the body. He grants an inexplicable union, 
but he demands one which shall serve to explain the commerce of 
the soul and body. 

He claims also to explain why material beings could not be 
united with the soul as is demanded ; this is because these beings 
being extended and the soul not being so, there is no similarity 
[proportion] between them. But thereupon Locke asks very 
a propos (§7) if there is any more similarity between God and 
the soul. It seems indeed that the Reverend Father Malebranche 
ought to have urged not the little similarity, but the little connec- 
tion, which appears between the soul and the body, while between 
God and the creatures there is a connection such that they could 
not exist without him. 

When the Father says (§6) that there is no purely intelligible 
substance except God, I declare that I do not sufficiently under- 
stand him. There is something in the soul that we do not distinctly 
understand ; and there are many things in God that we do not at 
all understand. 

Mr. Locke (§8) makes a remark on the end of the Father's 
chapter which is tantamount to my views ; for in order to show 
that the Father has not excluded all the means of explaining the 
matter, he adds : "If I should say that it is possible that God has 
made our souls such, and has so united them to bodies that, at 
certain motions of the body the soul should have such and such 
perceptions but in a manner inconceivable to us, I should have 
said something as apparent and as instructive as that which he 
says." Mr. Locke in saying this seems to have had in mind my 
system of Preestablished Harmony, or something similar. 

Mr. Locke objects (§ 20) that the sun is useless if we see it in 
God. As this argument applies also against my system, which 
claims that we see the sun in us, 1 answer that the sun is not made 
solely for us and that God wishes to show us the truth as to what is 
without us. He objects (§22) that he does not conceive how 
we could see something confusedly in God, where there is no con- 
fusion. One might answer that we see things confusedly when we 
see too many of them at a time. 



276 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

Father Malebranche having said that God is the place of spirits 
as space is the place of bodies, Mr. Locke says (§25) that he does 
not understand a word of this. But he understands at least what 
space, place and body are. He understands also that the Father 
draws an analogy between space, place, body and God, place, spirit. 
Thus a good part of what he here says is intelligible. It may 
merely be objected that this analogy is not proven, although some 
relations are easily perceived which might give occasion for the 
comparison. I often observe that certain persons seek by this 
affectation of ignorance to elude what is said to them as if they 
understood nothing; they do this not to reproach themselves, but 
either to reproach those speaking, as if their jargon was unintelligi- 
ble, or to exalt themselves above the matter and those who tell it, 
as if it was not worthy of their attention. Nevertheless Mr. Locke 
is right in saying that the opinion of Father Malebranche is unin- 
telligible in connection with his other opinions, since with him 
space and body are the same thing. The- truth has escaped him 
here and he has conceived something common and immutable, to 
which bodies have an essential relation and which indeed produces 
their relation to one another. This order gives occasion for making 
a fiction and for conceiving space as an immutable substance ; but 
what there is real in this notion relates to simple substances (under 
which spirits are included) , and is found in God, who unites them. 

The Father saying that ideas are representative beings, Mr. 
Locke asks (§26) if these beings are substances, modes or rela- 
tions ? I believe that it may be said that they are nothing but 
relations resulting from the attitudes of God. 

When Mr. Locke declares (§31) that he does not understand 
how the variety of ideas is compatible with the simplicity of God, 
it appears to me that he ought not raise an objection on this score 
against Father Malebranche, for there is no system which can 
make such a thing comprehensible. We cannot comprehend the 
incommensurable and a thousand other things, the truth of which 
we nevertheless know, and which we are right in employing to 
explain others which are dependent on them. There is something 
approaching to this in all simple substances ; where there is variety 
of affections in unity of substance. 



on locke's examination of malebeanche. 277 

The Father maintains that the idea of the infinite is prior to that 
of the finite. Mr. Locke objects (§ 34) that a child has the idea 
of a number or of a square sooner than that of the infinite. He is 
right, taking the ideas for images; bnt in taking them as the 
foundations of notions, he will find that in the continuum the 
notion of an extended, taken absolutely, is. prior to the notion 
of an extended where the modification is added. This must be 
further applied to what is said in §§42 and 46. 

The argument of the Father which Mr. Locke examines (§ 40), 
that God alone, being the end of spirits, is also their sole object, is 
not to be despised. It is true that it needs something in order to be 
called a demonstration. There is a more conclusive reason which 
shows that God is the sole immediate external object of spirits, 
and that is that there is naught but he which can act on them. 

It is objected (§41) that the Apostle begins with the knowl- 
edge of the creatures in order to lead to God and that the Father 
does the contrary. I believe that these methods harmonize. The 
one proceeds a priori, the other a posteriori ; and the latter is the 
more common. It is true that the best way to know things is 
through their causes ; but this is not the easiest. It requires too 
much attention and men ordinarily give their attention to things 
of sense. 

In replying to § 34, I have noticed the difference there is 
between image and idea. It seems that this difference is combated 
(§38) by finding difficulty in the difference which there is 
between sensation [sentiment^ and idea. But I think that the 
Father understands by sensation \_sentiment] a perception of the 
imagination, whereas there may be ideas of things which are not 
sensible nor imageable. I affirm that we have as clear an idea 
of the color of the violet as of its figure (as is objected here) but 
not as distinct nor as intelligible. 

Mr. Locke asks if an indivisible and unextended substance can 
have at the same time modifications different and even relating 
to inconsistent objects. I reply, Yes. That which is inconsistent 
in the same object is not inconsistent in the representation of 
different objects, conceived at the same time. It is not therefore 
necessary that there be different parts in the soul, as it is not 



278 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

necessary that there be different parts in a point although different 
angles come together there. 

It is asked with reason (§43) how we know the creatures, if 
we do not see immediately aught but God ? Because the objects, 
the representation of which God causes us to have, have something 
which resembles'the idea we have of substance, and it is this which 
makes us judge that there are other substances. 

It is assumed (§46) that God has the idea of an angle which is 
the nearest to the right angle, but that he does not show it to any- 
one, however one may desire to have it. I reply that such an 
angle is a fiction, like the fraction nearest to unity, or the number 
nearest to zero, or the least of all numbers. The nature of con- 
tinuity does not permit any such thing. 

The Father had said, that we know our soul by an inner feeling 
of consciousness, and that for this reason the knowledge of our soul 
is more imperfect than that of things, which we know in God. 
Mr. Locke thereon remarks very a propos (§ 47), that the idea of 
our soul being in God as well as that of other things, we should see 
it also in God. The truth is, that we see all things in ourselves and 
in our souls, and that the knowledge which we have of the soul is 
very true and just provided that we attend to it ; that it is by the 
knowledge which we have of the soul that we know being, sub- 
stance, God himself, and that it is by reflection on our thoughts 
that we know extension and bodies. And it is true, nevertheless, 
that God gives us all there is that is positive in this, and all perfec- 
tion therein involved, by an immediate and continual emanation, 
by virtue of the dependence on him which all creatures have ; and 
it is thus that a good meaning may be given to the phrase that God 
is the object of our souls and that we see all things in him. 

Perhaps the design of the Father in the saying, which is 
examined (§ 53) that we see the essences of things in the per- 
fections of God and that it is the universal reason which enlightens 
us, tends to show that the attributes of God are the bases of the 
simple notions which we have of things, — being, power, knowl- 
edge, diffusion, duration, taken absolutely, being in him and not 
being in creatures save in a limited way. 



XXXI. 

Letter to Wagner on the Active Force of Body, ok the 

Soul and on the Soul of Brutes. IV 10. 

[From the Latin.] 

1. I willingly reply to the inquiries you make as to the nature 
of the soul, for I see from the doubt which you present that my 
view is not sufficiently clear to you, and that this is due to some 
prejudgment drawn from my essay, inserted in the Acta Erudito- 
rum, wherein I treated, in opposition to the illustrious Sturm, of 
the active force of body. You say that I have there sufficiently 
vindicated active force for matter, and while I attribute resistance 
to matter, I have also attributed reaction to the same, and con- 
sequently action; that since therefore there is everywhere in 
matter an active principle, this principle seems to' suffice for the 
actions of brutes, nor is there need in them of an incorruptible soul. 

2. I reply, in the first place, that the active principle is not 
attributed by me to bare or primary matter, which is merely pas- 
sive, and consists only in antitypia and extension ; but to body or 
to clothed or secondary matter, which in addition contains a primi- 
tive entelechy or active principle. I reply, secondly, that the resist- 
ance of bare matter is not action, but mere passivity, inasmuch as it 
has antitypia or impenetrability, by which indeed it resists what- 
ever would penetrate it, but does not react, unless there be added 
an elastic force, which must be derived from motion, and therefore 
the active force of matter must be superadded. I reply, .thirdly, 
that this active principle, this first entelechy, is, in fact, a vital 
principle, endowed also with the faculty of perception, and incor- 
ruptible, for reasons recently stated by me. And this is the very 
thing which in brutes I hold to be their soul. While, therefore, I 
admit active principles superadded everywhere in matter, I also 
posit, everywhere disseminated through it, vital or percipient prin- 
ciples, and thus monads, and so to speak, metaphysical atoms 
wanting parts and incapable of being produced or destroyed 
naturally. 



280 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

3. You next ask my definition of soul. I reply that soul may be 
employed in a broad and in a strict sense. Broadly speaking, soul 
will be the same as life or vital principle, that is, the principle of 
internal action existing in the simple thing or monad, to which 
external action corresponds. And this correspondence of internal 
and external, or representation of the external in the internal, of 
the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes in 
reality perception. But in this sense, soul is attributed not only to 
animals, but also to all other percipient beings. In the strict sense, 
soul is employed as a noble species of life, or sentient life, where 
there is not only the faculty of perceiving, but in addition that of 
feeling, inasmuch, indeed, as attention and memory are joined to 
perception. Just as, in turn, mind is a nobler species of soul, that 
is, mind is rational soul, where reason, or ratiocination from uni- 
versality of truths, is added to feeling. As therefore mind is 
rational soul, so soul is sentient life, and life is perceptive prin- 
ciple. I have shown, moreover, by examples and arguments, that 
not all perception is feeling, but that there is also insensible per- 
ception. For example, I could not perceive green unless I per- 
ceived blue and yellow, from which it results. At the same time, 
I do not feel blue and yellow, unless perchance a microscope is 
employed. 

4. You will remember, moreover, that according to my opinion, 
not only are all lives, all souls, all minds, all primitive entelechies, 
everlasting, but also that to each primitive entelechy or each vital 
principle there is perpetually united a certain natural mechanism, 
which comes to us under the name of organic body : which mechan- 
ism, moreover, even although it preserves its form in general, 
remains in flux, and is, like the ship of Theseus, perpetually 
repaired. Nor, therefore, can we be certain that the smallest par- 
ticle of matter received by us at birth, remains in our body, even 
although the same mechanism is by degrees completely trans- 
formed, augmented, diminished, involved or evolved. Hence, not 
only is the soul everlasting, but also some animal always remains, 
although no particular animal ought to be called everlasting, since 
the animal species does not remain ; just as the caterpillar, and the 
butterfly are not the same animal, although the same soul is in both. 



OiST THE NATTJKE OF THE SOUL. 281 

Every natural mechanism, therefore, has this quality, that it is 
never completely destructible, since, however thick a covering may 
be dissolved, there always remains a little mechanism not yet 
destroyed, like the costume of Harlequin, in the comedy, to whom, 
after the removal of many tunics, there always remained a fresh 
one. And we ought to be the less astonished at this for this reason, 
that nature is everywhere organic and ordered by a most wise 
author for certain ends, and that nothing in nature ought to be 
criticized as unpolished, although it may sometimes appear to our 
senses as but a rude mass. Thus, therefore, we escape all the 
difficulties which arise from the nature of a soul absolutely sep- 
arated from all matter ; so that, in truth, a soul or an animal before 
birth or after death differs from a soul or an animal living the 
present life only in condition of things and degrees of perfections, 
but not by entire genus of being. And likewise I think that genii 
are minds endowed with bodies very penetrating and suitable for 
action, which perhaps they are able to change at will ; whence 
they do not deserve to be called even animals. Thus all things in 
nature are analogous, and the subtile may be understood from the 
coarse, since both are constituted in the same way. God alone is 
substance really separated from matter, since he is actus purus, 
endowed with no passive power, which, wherever it is, constitutes 
matter. And, indeed, all created substances have antitypia, by 
which it happens naturally that one is outside another, and so 
penetration is excluded. 

5. But although my principles are very general and hold not 
less in man than in brutes, yet man stands out marvellously 
above brutes and approaches the genii, because from the use of 
reason he is capable of society with God, and thus of reward and 
of punishment in the divine government. And, therefore, he pre- 
serves not only life and soul like the brutes, but also self -conscious- 
ness and memory of a former state, and, in a word, personality. 
He is immortal, not only physically, but also morally ; whence, in 
the strict sense, immortality is attributed only to the human soul. 
For if a man did not know that in the other life rewards or 
punishments would be awarded him for this life, there would 
really be no punishment, no reward ; and as regards morals, it 



282 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

would be just as if I were extinguished and another, happier or 
unhaj)pier, should succeed me. And thus I hold that souls, latent 
doubtless in seminal animalcules from the beginning of things, 
are not rational until, by conception, they are destined for human 
life; but when they are once made rational and rendered capable 
of consciousness and of society with God, I think that they never 
lay aside the character of citizens in the Republic of God; and 
since it is most justly and beautifully governed, it is a consequence 
that by the very laws of nature, on account of the parallelism of 
the kingdom of grace and of nature, souls by the force of their 
own actions are rendered more fit for rewards and punishments. 
And in this sense it may be said that virtue brings its own reward 
and sin its own punishment, since by a certain natural consequence, 
before the last state of the soul, according as it departs atoned for 
or unatoned for, there arises a certain natural divergence, pre- 
ordained by God in nature and with divine promises and threats, 
and consistent with grace and justice ; the intervention also being 
added of genii, good or bad according as we have associated with 
either, whose operations are certainly natural although their nature 
is sublimer than ours. We see, indeed, that a man awaking from 
a profound sleep, or even recovering from apoplexy, is wont to 
recover the memory of his former state. The same must be said of 
death, which can render our perceptions turbid and confused but 
cannot entirely blot them from memory, the use of which return- 
ing, rewards and punishments take place. Thus the Saviour com- 
pared death to sleep. Moreover the preservation of personality and 
moral immortality cannot be attributed to brutes incapable of the 
diyine society and law. 

6. IsTo one, therefore, need fear dangerous consequences from 
this doctrine, since rather a true natural theology, not only not at 
variance with revealed truth but even wonderfully favorable to it, 
may be demonstrated by most beautiful reasoning from my prin- 
ciples. Those indeed who deny souls to brutes and all perception 
and organism to other parts of matter, do not sufficiently recognize 
the Divine Majesty, and introduce something unworthy of God, 
unpolished, that is, a void of perfections or forms, which you may 
call a metaphysical void, which is no less to be rejected than a 



OlST THE NATURE OE THE SOUL. 283 

material or physical void. But those who grant true souls and per- 
ception to brutes, and yet affirm that their souls can perish 
naturally, take away thus from us the demonstration which shows 
that our minds cannot perish naturally, and fall into the dogma 
of the Socinians, who think that souls are preserved only miracu- 
lously or by grace, but believe that by nature they ought to 
perish ; which is to rob natural theology of its most important part. 
Besides, the contrary can be completely demonstrated, since a sub- 
stance wanting parts cannot naturally be destroyed. 
Wolfenbiittel, June 4, 1710. 



XXXII. 

The Theodicy. 
Abridgment of the Argument reduced to syllogistic form. 

1710. 

[From the French.] 

Some intelligent persons have desired that this supplement 
be made [to the Theodicy] , and I have the more readily yielded to 
their wisiies as in this way I have an opportunity to again remove 
certain difficulties and to make some observations which were not 
sufficiently emphasized in the work itself. 

I. Objection. Whoever does not choose the best is lacking in 
power, or in knowledge, or in goodness. 

God did not choose the best in creating this world. (^ 

Therefore, God has been lacking in power, or in knowledge, or in 
goodness. 

Answer. I deny the minor, that is, the second premise of this 
syllogism; and our opponent proves it by this 

Prosyllogism. Whoever makes things in which there is evil, . 
a jtAt^y which could have been made without any evil, or the making of 
which could have been omitted, does not choose the best. 

God has made a world in which there is evil ; a world, I say, 
which could have been made without any evil, or the making of 
which could have been omitted altogether. 

Therefore, God has not chosen the best. 

Answer. I grant the minor of this prosyllogism ; for it must be 
confessed that there is evil in this world which God has made, and 
that it was possible to make a world without evil, or even not to 
create a world at all, for its creation has depended on the free will 
of God ; but I deny the major, that is, the first of the two premises 
of the prosyllogism, and I 'might content myself with simply 
demanding its proof; but in order to make the matter clearer, I 
have wished to justify this denial by showing that the best plan is 
not always that which seeks to avoid evil, since it may happen, that-. 
tlie evil be accompanied by a greater good. For example, a general 



THE THEODICY. 



285 



of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a con- 
dition without wound and without victory. We have proved this 
more fully in the large work by making it clear,, by instances taken 
from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the part 
may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. In this I 
have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, who has said a hun- 
dred times, that God has permitted evil in order to bring about 
good, that is, a greater good ; and that of Thomas Aquinas (in libr. 
II. sent. dist. 32, qu. I, art. 1), that the permitting of evil tends 
to the good of the universe. I have shown that the ancients called 
Adam's fall felix culpa, a happy sin, because it had been retrieved 
with immense advantage by the incarnation of the Son of God, 
who has given to the universe something nobler than anything that 
ever would have been among creatures except for it. And in 
order to a clearer understanding, I have added, following many 
good authors, that it was in accordance with order and the general 
good that God' allowed to certain creatures the opportunity of 
exercising their liberty, even when he foresaw that they would turn 
to evil, but which he could so well rectify ; because it was not fit- 
ting that, in order to hinder sin, God should always act in an extra- 
ordinary manner. To overthrow this objection, therefore, it is 
sufficient to show that a world with evil might be better than a 
world without evil ; but I have gone even farther, in the work, and 
have even proved that this universe must be in reality better than 
every other possible universe. 

II. Objection. If there is more evil than good in intelligent 
creatures, then there is more evil than good in the whole work of 
God. 

]STow, there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures. 

Therefore, there is more evil than good in the whole work of 
God. 

Answer. , I deny the major and the minor of this conditional 
syllogism. As to the major, I do not admit it at all, because this 
pretended deduction from a part to the whole, from intelligent 
creatures to all creatures, supposes tacitly and without proof that 
creatures destitute of reason cannot enter into comparison nor into 
account with those which possess it. But why may it not be that 



286 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

the surplus of good in the non-intelligent creatures which fill the 
world, compensates for, and even incomparably surpasses, the sur- 
plus of evil in the rational creatures ? It is true that the value of 
the latter is greater ; but, in compensation, the others are beyond 
comparison the more numerous, and it may be that the proportion 
of number and of quantity surpasses that of value and of quality. 

As to the minor, that is no more to be admitted ; that is, it is not 
at all to be admitted that there is more evil than good in the intelli- 
gent creatures. There is no need even of granting that there is 
more evil than good in the human race, because it is possible, and 
in fact very probable, that the glory and the perfection of the 
blessed are incomparably greater than the misery and the imper- 
fection of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good 
in the smaller number exceeds the total evil in the greater number. 
The blessed approach the Divinity, by means of a Divine Media- 
tor, as near as may suit these creatures, and make such progress in 
good as is impossible for the damned to make in evil, approach as 
nearly as they may to the nature of demons. God is infinite, and 
the devil is limited; the good may and does go to infinity, while 
evil has its bounds. It is therefore possible, and is credible, that 
in the comparison of the blessed and the damned, the contrary 
of that which I have said might happen in the comparison of 
intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, takes place ; namely, it is 
possible that in the comparison of the happy and the unhappy, the 
proportion of degree exceeds that of number, and that in the com- 
parison of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, the proportion 
of number is greater than that of value. I have the right to sup- 
pose that a thing is possible so long as its impossibility is not 
proved ; and indeed that which I have here advanced is more than 
a supposition. 

But in the second place, if I should admit that there is more evil 
than good in the human race, I have still good grounds for not 
admitting that there is more evil than good in all intelligent crea- 
tures. For there is an inconceivable number of genii, and perhaps 
of other rational creatures. And an opponent could not prove that 
in all the City of God, composed as well of genii as of rational ani- 
mals without number and of an infinity of kinds, evil exceeds good. 



THE THEODICY. 



287 



And although in order to answer an objection, there is no need of 
proving that a thing is, when its mere possibility suffices ; yet, in 
this work, I have not omitted to show that it is a consequence of 
the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the universe, that the 
kingdom of God be the most perfect of all possible states or gov- 
ernments, and that consequently the little evil there is, is required 
for the consummation of the immense good which is there found. 

III. Objection. If it is always impossible not to sin, it is 
always unjust to punish. 

]STow, it is always impossible not to sin ; or, in other words, every 
sin is necessary. 

Therefore, it is always unjust to punish. 

The minor of this is proved thus : 
V^ 1. Prosyllogism. All that is predetermined is ' necessary. >v v^o 

Every event is predetermined. 
' Therefore, every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary. 

Again this second minor is proved thus : 

2. Prosyllogism. That which is future, that which is fore- 
seen, that which is involved in the causes, is predetermined. 
v Every event is such. 
^Uv-Therefore, every event is predetermined. A/ &* % 

Answer. I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the 
second prosyllogism, which is the minor of the first; but I shall 
deny the major of the first prosyllogism, namely, that every thing 
predetermined is necessary; understanding by the necessity of 
sinning, for example, or by the impossibility of not sinning, or of 
not performing any action, the necessity with which we are 
here concerned, that is, that which is essential and absolute, and 
which destroys the morality of an action and the justice of punish- 
ments. Eor if anyone understood another necessity or impossibil- 
ity, namely, a necessity which should be only moral, or which was 
only hypothetical (as will be explained shortly) ; it is clear that I 
should deny the major of the objection itself. I might content 
myself with this answer and demand the proof of the proposition 
denied ; but I have again desired to explain my procedure in this 
work, in order to better elucidate the matter and to throw more 
light on the whole subject, by explaining the necessity which ought 



288 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

to be rejected and the determination which must take place. That 
necessity which is contrary to morality and which ought to be 
rejected, and which wonld render punishment unjust, is an insur- 
mountable necessity which would make all opposition useless, even 
if we should wish with all our heart to avoid the necessary action, 
and should make all possible efforts to that end. ISTow, it is mani- 
fest that this is not applicable to voluntary actions, because we 
would not perform them if we did not choose to. Also their pre- 
vision and predetermination is not absolute, but it presupposes the 
will : if it is certain that we shall perform them, it is not less cer- 
tain that we shall choose to perform them. These voluntary actions 
and their consequences will not take place no matter what we do 
or whether we wish them or not; but, through that which we shall 
do and through that which we shall wish to do, which leads to 
them. And this is involved in prevision and in predetermination, 
and even constitutes their ground. And the necessity of such an 
event is called conditional or hypothetical, or the necessity of con- 
sequence, because it supposes the will, and the other requisites ; 
whereas the necessity which destroys morality and renders punish- 
ment unjust and reward useless, exists in things which will be 
whatever we may do or whatever we may wish to do, and, in a 
word, is in that which is essential ; and this is what is called an 
absolute necessity. Thus it is to no purpose, as regards what is 
absolutely necessary, to make prohibitions or commands, to pro- 
pose penalties or prizes, to praise or to blame ; it will be none the 
less. On the other hand, in voluntary actions and in that which 
depends upon them, precepts armed with power to punish and to 
recompense are very often of use and are included in the order 
of causes which make an action exist. And it is for this reason 
that not only cares and labors but also prayers are useful; God 
having had these prayers in view before he regulated things and 
having had that consideration for them which was proper. This 
is why the precept which says ora et labora (pray and work), holds 
altogether good ; and not only those who (under the vain pretext 
of the necessity of events) pretend that the care which business 
demands may be neglected, but. also those who reason against 
prayer, fall into what the ancients even then called the lazy 



THE THEODICY. 289 

sophism. Thus the predetermination of events by causes is just 
what contributes to morality instead of destroying it, and causes 
incline the will, without compelling it. This is why the deter- 
mination in question is not a necessitation — it is certain (to him 
who knows all) that the effect will follow this inclination; but 
this effect does not follow by a necessary consequence, that is, one 
the contrary of which implies contradiction. It is also by an 
internal inclination such as this that the will is determined, with- 
out there being any necessity. Suppose that one has the greatest 
passion in the world (a great thirst, for example), you will admit 
to me that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, if it were 
only that of showing its power. Thus, although one may never be 
in a perfect indifference of equilibrium and there may be always 
a preponderance of inclination for the side taken, it, nevertheless, 
never renders the resolution taken absolutely necessary. 

IV. Objection. Whoever can prevent the sin of another and 
does not do so, but rather contributes to it although he is well 
informed of it, is accessory to it. 

God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures ; but he does not 
do so, and rather contributes to it by his concurrence and by the 
opportunities which he brings about, although he has a perfect 
knowledge of it. 

Hence, etc. 

Answer.. I deny the major of this syllogism. For it is possible 
that one could prevent sin, but ought not, because he could not do 
it without himself committing a sin, or (when God is in question) 
without performing an unreasonable action. Examples have been 
given and the application to God himself has been made. It is 
possible also that we contribute to evil and that sometimes we even 
open the road to it, in doing things which we are obliged to do; 
and, when we do our duty or (in speaking of God) when, after 
thorough consideration, we do that which reason demands, we are 
not responsible for the results, even when we foresee them. We 
do not desire these evils ; but we are willing to> permit them for 
the sake of a greater good which we cannot reasonably help pre- 
ferring to other considerations. And this is a consequent will, 
which results from antecedent wills by which we will the good. I 
19 



290 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and conse- 
quent will of God, have understood by the antecedent that which 
wills that all men should be saved ;' and by the consequent, that 
which wills, in consequence of persistent sin, that some should be 
damned. But these are merely illustrations of a more general 
idea, and it may be said for the same reason that God, by his 
antecedent will, wills that men should not sin ; and by his con- 
sequent or final and decreeing will (that which is always followed 
by its effect), he wills to permit them to sin, this permission being 
the result of superior reasons. And we have the right to say in 
general that the antecedent will of God tends to the production of 
good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself and as if alone 
(particulariter et secundum quid, Thorn. I, qu. 19, art 6), accord- 
ing to the measure of the degree of each good and of each evil ; but 
that the divine consequent or final or total will tends toward the 
production of as many goods as may be put together, the combina- 
tion of which becomes in this way determined, and includes also 
the permission of some evils and the exclusion of some goods, as 
the best possible plan for the universe demands. Ar'minius, in his 
Anti-perhinsus, has very well explained that the will of God may 
be called consequent, not only in relation to the action of the 
creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, but 
also in relation to other anterior divine acts of will. But this con- 
sideration of the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that 
from Scotus (I. dist. 46, qu. XI), is enough to show that they make 
this distinction as I have done here. Nevertheless, if anyone 
objects to this use of terms let him substitute deliberating will, in 
place of antecedent, and final or decreeing will, in place of con- 
sequent. For I do not wish to dispute over words. 

V. Objection. Whoever produces all that is real in a thing, is 
its cause. 

God produces all that is real in sin. 

Hence, God is the cause of sin. 

Answer. I might content myself with denying the major or the 
minor, since the term real admits of interpretations which would 
render these propositions false. But in order to explain more 
clearly, I will make a distinction. Real signifies either that which 



THE THEODICY. 291 

is positive only, or, it includes also privative beings : in the first 
case, I deny the major and admit the minor ; in the second case, I 
do the contrary. I might have limited myself to this, but I have 
chosen to proceed still farther and give the reason for this dis- 
tinction. I have been very glad therefore to draw attention to the 
fact that every reality purely positive or absolute is a perfection ; 
and that imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the priv- 
ative: for to limit is to refuse progress, or the greatest possible 
progress. JSTow God is the cause of all perfections and conse- 
quently of all realities considered as purely positive. But limita- 
tions or privations result from the original imperfection of crea- 
tures, which limits their receptivity. And it is with them as with 
a loaded vessel, which the river causes to move more or less slowly 
according to the weight which it carries : thus its speed depends, 
upon the river, but the retardation which limits this speed comes 
from the load. Thus in the Theodicy, we have shown how the 
creature, in causing sin, is a defective cause ; how errors and evil 
inclinations are born of privation ; and how privation is accident- 
ally efficient; and I have justified the opinion of St. Augustine 
(lib. I. ad Simpl. qu. 2) who explains, for example, how God 
makes the soul obdurate, not by giving it something evil, but 
because the effect of his good impression is limited by the soul's 
resistance and by the circumstances which contribute to this resis- 
tance, so that he does not give it all the good which would over- 
come its evil. Nee (inquit) ab illo erogatur aliquid qua homo fit 
deterior, sed tantum^ quo fit melior non erogatur. But if God had 
wished to do more, he would have had to make either other natures 
for creatures or other miracles to change their natures, things 
which the best plan could not admit. It is as if the current of the 
river must be more rapid than its fall admitted or that the boats 
should be loaded more lightly, if it were necessary to make them 
move more quickly. And the original limitation or imperfection of 
creatures requires that even the best plan of the universe could 
not receive more good, and could not be exempt from certain evils, 
which, however, are to result in a greater good. There are cer- 
tain disorders in the parts which marvellously enhance the beauty 
of the whole; just as certain dissonances, when properly used, 



292 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

render harmony more beautiful. But this depends on what has 
already been said in answer to the first objection. 

VI. Objection. Whoever punishes those who have done as well 
as it was in their power to do, is unjust. 

God does so. 

Hence, etc. 

Answer. I deny the minor of this argument. And I believe 
that God always gives sufficient aid and grace to those who have a 
good will, that is, to those who do not reject this grace by new sin. 
Thus I do not admit the damnation of infants who have died with- 
out baptism or outside of the church ; nor the damnation of adults 
who have acted according to the light which God has given them. 
And I believe that if any one has followed the light which has been 
given him, he will undoubtedly receive greater light when he has 
need of it, as the late M. Hulseman, a profound and celebrated 
theologian at Leipsic, has somewhere remarked ; and if such a man 
has failed to receive it during his lifetime he will at least receive 
it when at the point of death. 

VII. Objection. Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the 
means which produces in them effectively a good will and salutary 
final faith, has not sufficient goodness. 

God does this. 

Hence, etc. 

Answer. I deny the major of this. It is true that God could 
overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart ; and does it, 
too, sometimes, be it by internal grace, be it^by external circum- 
stances which have a great effect on souls ; but he does not always 
do this. Whence comes this distinction ? it may be asked, and why 
does his goodness seem limited ? It is because, as I have already 
said in answering the first objection, it would not have been in 
order always to act in an extraordinary manner, and to reverse 
the connection of things. The reasons of this connection, by means 
of which one is placed in more favorable circumstances than 
another, are hidden in the depths of the wisdom of God : they 
depend upon the universal harmony. The best plan of the uni- 
verse, which God could not fail to choose, made it so. We judge 
from the event itself; since God has made it, it was not possible 



THE THEODICY. 293 

to do better. Far from being true that this conduct is contrary to 
goodness, it is supreme goodness which led him to it. This objec- 
tion with its solution might have been drawn from what was said 
in regard to the first objection ; but it seemed useful to touch upon 
it separately. 

VIII. Objection. Whoever cannot fail to choose the best, is 
not free. 

God cannot fail to choose the best. 

Hence, God is not free. 

Answer. I deny the major of this argument; it is rather true 
liberty, and the most perfect, to be able to use one's free will for 
the best, and to always exercise this power, without ever being 
turned aside either by external force or by internal passions, the 
first of which causes slavery of the body, the second, slavery of 
the soul. There is nothing less servile, and nothing more in accor- 
dance with the highest degree of freedom, than to be always led 
toward the good, and always by one's own inclination, without any 
constraint and without any displeasure. And to object therefore 
that God had need of external things, is only a sophism. He 
created them freely ; but having proposed to himself an end, which 
is to exercise his goodness, wisdom has determined him to- choose 
the means best fitted to attain this end. To call this a need, is to 
take that term in an unusual sense which frees it from all imper- 
fection, just as when we speak of the wrath of God. 

Seneca has somewhere said that God commanded but once but 
that he obeys always, because he obeys laws which he willed to pre- 
scribe to himself : semel jussit, semper paret. But he might better 
have said that God always commands and that he is always obeyed ; 
for in willing, he always follows the inclination of his own nature, 
and all other things always follow his will. And as this will is 
always the same, it cannot be said that he obeys only that will 
which he formerly had. ISTevertheless, although his will is always 
infallible and always tends toward the best, the evil, or the lesser 
goodrwhich he rejects, does not cease to be possible in itself ; other- 
wise the necessity of the good would be geometrical (so to speak), 
or metaphysical, and altogether absolute ; the contingency of things 
would be destroyed, and there would be no choice. But this sort 



294 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

of necessity, which does not destroy the possibility of the contrary, 
has this name only by analogy; it becomes effective, not by the 
pure essence of things, but by that which is outside of them, above 
them, namely, by the will of God. This necessity is called moral, 
because, to the sage, necessity and what ought to he are equivalent 
things ; and when it always has its effect, as it really has in the per- 
fect sage, that is, in God, it may be said that it is a hap'py necessity. 
The nearer creatures approach to it, the nearer they approach to 
perfect happiness. Also this kind of necessity is not that which 
we try to avoid and which destroys morality, rewards and praise. 
For that which it brings, does not happen whatever we may do or 
will, but because we will well. And a will to which it is natural to 
choose well, merits praise so much the more ; also it carries its 
reward with it, which is sovereign happiness. And as this consti- 
tution of the divine nature gives entire satisfaction to him who 
possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable for the crea- 
tures who are all dependent on God. If the will of God did not 
have for a rule the principle of the best, it would either tend 
toward evil, which would be the worst ; or it would be in some way 
indifferent to good and to evil, and would be guided by chance : 
but a will which would allow itself always to act by chance, would 
not be worth more for the government of the universe than the 
fortuitous concourse of atoms, without there being any divinity 
therein. And even if God should abandon himself to chance only 
in some cases and in a certain way (as he would do, if he did not 
always work entirely for the best and if he were capable of pre- 
ferring a lesser good to a greater, that is, an evil to a good, since 
that which prevents a greater good is an evil), he would be imper- 
fect, as well as the object of his choice ; he would not merit entire 
confidence; he would act without reason in such a case, and the 
government of the universe would be like certain games, equally 
divided between reason and chance. All this proves that this 
objection which is made against the choice of the best, perverts the 
notions of the free and of the necessary, and represents to us the 
best even as evil : which is either malicious or ridiculous. 



XXXIII. 

On Wisdom — The Art of Seasoning- Well, the Art of Dis- 
covery, the Art of Remembering. 
[From the French.] 

Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the 
sciences and of the art of applying them. I call principles all the 
fundamental truths which suffice for drawing thence all conclusions 
in case of need, after some exercise and with some little application. 
In a word, that which serves to lead the mind to regulate the 
manners, to subsist honestly, and everywhere, even if one were 
amid barbarians, to preserve the health, to perfect one's self in 
every kind of thing of which one may have need, and to provide, 
finally, the conveniences of life. The art of applying these prin- 
ciples to exigencies, embraces the art of judging well or reasoning, 
the art of discovering unknown truths, and finally, of remembering 
what one knows, in the nick of time and when one has need of it. 

The Art of Reasoning Well consists in the following 
maxims : 

1. Nothing is ever to be recognized as true but what is so mani- 
fest that no ground for doubt can be found. This is why it will be 
well, in beginning one's investigations, to imagine one's self inter- 
ested in sustaining the contrary, in order to see if this incitement 
could not arouse one to find that the matter has something solid to 
be said in its favor. For prejudices must be avoided and nothing 
be ascribed to things but what they include. But also one must 
never be opinionated. 

2. When there appears to be no means of attaining this assur- 
ance, we must, in waiting for greater light, content ourselves with 
probability. But we must distinguish the degrees of. probability 
and we must remember that all that we infer from a principle 
which is but probable must bear the marks of the imperfection of 
its source, especially when several probabilities must be supposed 
in order to reach this conclusion, for it thereby becomes still less 
certain than was~ each probability which serves it as basis. 



296 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

3. To infer one trnth from another, a certain connection, which 
shall be without interruption, must be observed. For as one may 
feel sure that a chain will hold when he is assured that each 
separate link is of good material and that it clasps the two neigh- 
boring links, viz., the one preceding and the one following it, so 
we may be sure of the accuracy of the reasoning when the matter 
is good, that is to say, when nothing doubtful enters into it, and 
when the form consists in a perpetual concatenation of truths 
which allows of no gap. For example, A is B and B is C and C 
is D, hence A is D. This concatenation will always teach us never 
to put in the conclusion more than there was in the premises. 

The Art of Discovery consists in the following maxims : 

1. In order to know a thing we must consider all the requisites 
of that thing, that is to say, all that which suffices to distinguish it 
from every other thing. This is what is called definition, nature, 
reciprocal property. 

2. Having once found a means of distinguishing it from every 
other thing, this same first rule must be applied to the considera- 
tion of each condition or requisite which enters into this means, 
and all the requisites of each requisite must be considered. And 
this is what I call true analysis or distribution of the difficulty into 
several parts. 

3. When we have pushed the analysis to the end, that is to say, 
when we have considered the requisites which enter into the con- 
sideration of the thing proposed and even the requisites of the 
requisites, and when we have finally come to the consideration of 
some natures which are understood only through themselves, which 
are without requisites and which need nothing outside of them- 
selves in order to be conceived, we have reached a perfect hnoivl- 
edge of the thing proposed. 

4. When the thing deserves it, we must try to have this perfect 
knowledge present in the mind all at once, and this is done by 
repeating the analysis several times until it seems to us that we see 
the whole of it at a single glance of the mind. And for this 
result a certain order in repetition must be observed. 

5. The mark of perfect knowledge is when nothing presents 
itself in the thing in question for which we cannot account and 



OjST wisdom. 



297 



when there is no conjuncture the outcome of which we cannot pre- 
dict beforehand. It is very difficult to carry through an analysis of 
things, but it is not so difficult to complete the analysis of truths 
of which we have need. Because the analysis of a truth is com- 
pleted when its demonstration has been found, and it is not 
always necessary to complete the analysis of the subject or predi- 
cate in order to find the demonstration of a proposition. Most 
often the beginning of the analysis of a thing suffices for the 
analysis or perfect knowledge of the truth which we know of the 
thing. 

6. We must always begin our investigations with the easiest 
thing, such as the most general and the simplest, likewise those on 
which it is easy to make experiments and to find their reason, such 
as numbers, lines, motions. 

7. We must proceed in order, and from easy things to those 
which are difficult, and we must try to discover some progression 
in the order of our meditations, so that we may have nature itself 
as our guide and voucher. 

8. We must try to omit nothing in all our distributions or enu- 
merations. For this, dichotomies by opposite members are very 
useful. 

9. The fruit of several analyses of different particular matters 
will be the catalogue of simple thoughts, or those which are not far 
removed from simple. 

10. Having the catalogue of simple thoughts, we shall be in 
position to recommence a priori and to explain the origin of things, 
beginning at their source, in a perfect order and in a combination 
or synthesis absolutely complete. And this is all that our mind 
can do in the state in which it is at present. 

The Art of Remembering in the nick of time and when it is 
needed what one knows, consists in the following observations : 

1. We must accustom ourselves to be present-minded, that is to 
say, to be able to meditate just as well in a tumult, on occasion, 
and in danger, as in our cabinet. This is why we must test our- 
selves on occasions and even seek them; with this precaution, 
however, that we do not expose ourselves without good reason to 
irreparable evil. In the meanwhile it is good to exercise ourselves 



298 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

on occasions when the danger is imaginary or small, as in onr 
sport, conversations, conferences, exercises, and comedies. 

2. We must accustom ourselves to enumerations. This is why it 
is well to exercise ourselves in collecting all possible cases of the 
matter in question, all the species of a genus, all the conveniences 
or inconveniences of a means, all possible ways of aiming at some 
end. 

3. We must accustom ourselves to distinctions ; namely, two or 
more very similar things being given, to find on the spot all their 
differences. 

4. We must accustom ourselves to analogies; namely, two or 
more very different things being given to find their resemblances. 

5. We must be able to adduce on the spot things which closely 
resemble the given thing or which are very different from it. For 
example, when one denies some general maxim, it is well if I can 
adduce on the spot some examples. And when another quotes 
some maxim against me, it is well if 1 can forthwith oppose an 
instance to him. When one tells me a story, it is well if I can 
adduce then and there a similar one. 

6. When there are truths or knowledges in which the natural 
connection of the subject with its predicate is not known to us, as 
happens in matters of fact and in truths of experience, in order to 
retain them we must make use of certain artifices, as for example, 
for the specific properties of simples, natural, civil and ecclesias- 
tical history, geography, customs, laws, canons, languages. I see 
nothing so fitted to make us retain these things as burlesque verses 
and sometimes certain figures ; also hypotheses invented to explain 
them in imitation of natural things (as an appropriate etymology, 
true or false, for languages, Begula mundi, in imagining certain 
orders of providence for history). 

7. Finally, it is well to make an inventory in writing of the 
knowledges which are the most useful, with a register or alpha- 
betical table. And finally a portable manual must be drawn there- 
from of what is most necessary and most ordinary. 



XXXIV. 

The Peijstciples of Nature and of Grace. 1714. 
[From the French.] 

1. Substance is a being capable of action. It is simple or com- 
pound. Simple substance is that which has no parts. Compound 
substance is the collection of simple substances or monads. Monas 
is a Greek word which signifies unity, or that which is one. 

Compounds, or bodies, are multitudes ; and simple substances, 
lives, souls, spirits are unities. And there must be simple sub- 
stances everywhere, because without simple substances there would 
be no compounds; and consequently all nature is full of life. 

2. Monads, having no parts, cannot be formed or decomposed. 
They cannot begin or end naturally ; and consequently last as long 
as the universe, which will be changed but will not be destroyed. 
They cannot have shapes ; otherwise they would have parts. And 
consequently a monad, in itself and at a given moment, could 
not be distinguished from another except by its internal qualities 
and actions, which can be nothing else than its perceptions (that 
is representations of the compound, or of what is external, in the 
simple), and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to pass from one 
perception to another), which are the principles of change. For 
the simplicity of substance does not prevent multiplicity of modi- 
fications, which must be found together in this same simple sub- 
stance, and must consist in the variety of relations to things which 
are external. Just as in a centre or point, although simple as it is, 
there is found an infinity of angles formed by the lines which 
there meet. 

3. All nature is a plenum. There are everywhere simple sub- 
stances, separated in reality from each other by activities of their 
own which continually change their relations ; and each important 
simple substance, or monad, which forms the centre of a compound 
substance (as, for example, of an animal) and the principle of its 
unity, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other 
monads, which constitute the body proper of this central monad ; 



300 PHILOSOPHICAL VOBES OF LEIBXITZ. 

and in accordance with the affections of its body the monad 
represents, as in a centre, the things which are ontside of itself. 
And this body is organic, though it forms a sort of automaton or 
natural machine, which is a machine not only in its entirety, but 
also in its smallest perceptible parts. And as, because the 
world is a plenum, everything is connected and each body acts 
upon every other body, more or less, according to the distance, and 
by reaction is itself affected thereby, it follows that each monad 
is a living mirror.' or endowed with internal activity, representa- 
tive according to its point of view of the universe, and as regu- 
lated as the universe itself. And the perceptions in the monad 
spring one from the other, by the laws of desires [appetits] 
or of the final causes of good and evil, which consist in 
observable, regulated or unregulated, perceptions: just as the 
changes of bodies and external phenomena, spring one from 
another, by the laws of efficient causes, that is, of motions. Thus 
there is a perfect harmony between the perceptions of the monad 
and the motions of bodies, p reestablished at the beginning between 
the system of efficient causes and that of final causes. And in 
this consists the accord and physical union of the soul and the body, 
although neither one can change the laws of the other. 

■i. Each monad, with a particular body, makes a living sub- 
stance. Thus there is not only life everywhere, accompanied with 
members or organs, but there is also an infinity of degrees in the 
monads, some dominating more or less over others. But when the 
monad has organs so adjusted that by means of them there is clear- 
ness and distinctness in the impressions which they receive, and 
consequently in the perceptions which represent these (as, for 
example, when by means of the shape of the humors of the eyes, 
the rays of light are concentrated and act with more force), this 
may lead to feeling [sentiment], that is. to a perception accom- 
panied by memory, namely, one a certain echo of which remains 
a long time, so as to make itself heard upon occasion. And such 
a living being is called an animal, as its monad is called a soul. 
And when this soul is elevated to reason, it is something more 
sublime and is reckoned among spirits, as will soon be explained. 
It is true that animals are sometimes in the condition of simple 



PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE. 301 

living beings, and their souls in the condition of simple monads, 
namely, when their perceptions are not sufficiently distinct to be 
remembered, as happens in a deep dreamless sleep, or in a swoon. 
But perceptions which have become entirely confused must be 
re-developed in animals, for reasons which I shall shortly (§12) 
enumerate. Thus it is well to make distinction between the per- 
ception, which is the inner state of the monad representing 
external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the 
reflective knowledge of this inner state; the latter not being 
given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul. And it is for 
want of this distinction that the Cartesians have failed, taking 
no account of the perceptions of which we are not conscious as 
people take no account of imperceptible bodies. It is this also 
which made the same Cartesians believe that only spirits are 
monads, that there is no soul of brutes, and still less other prin- 
ciples of life. And as they shocked too much the common opinion 
of men by refusing feeling to brutes, they have, on the other 
hand, accommodated themselves too much to the prejudices of the 
multitude, by confounding a long swoon, caused by a great con- 
fusion of perceptions, with death strictly speaking, where all 
perception would cease. This has confirmed the ill-founded belief 
in the destruction of some souls, and the bad opinion of some 
so-called strong minds, who have contended against the immortal- 
ity of our soul. 

5. There is a connection in the perceptions of animals which 
bears some resemblance to reason; but it is only founded in the 
memory of facts or effects, and not 1 at all in the knowledge of 
causes. Thus a dog shuns the stick with which it has been beaten, 
because memory represents to it the pain which the stick has caused 
it. And men, in so far as they are empirics, that is to say, in 
three-fourths of their actions, act simply as the brutes do. For 
example, we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow because 
we have always had the experience; only an astronomer foresees 
it by reason, and even this prediction will finally fail when the 
cause of day, which is not eternal, shall cease. But true reasoning 
depends upon necessary or eternal truths, such as those of logic, 
of numbers, of geometry, which establish an indubitable connection 



302 



PTTTT.OSOPHICAI. WOEXS OF LEIBNITZ. 



of ideas and unfailing inferences. The animals in -vrhom these 
inferences are not noticed, are called brutes: but those which know 
these necessary truths are properly those which are called rati 

'mals, and their souls are called spirits. These souls are capable 
of performing acts of reflection, and of considering that which is 
called the ego, substance, monad, soul, spirit, in a word, immaterial 
things and truths. And it is this which renders us capable of 
the sciences and of demon- _ : i knowledge. 

6. Modern researches have taught us. and reason approves of it, 
that living beings whose organs are known to us. that is to say, 
plants and animals, do not come from putrefaction or from chaos, 
as the ancients believed, but from p re-formed seeds, and conse- 
quently by the transformation of preexisting living beings. There 
are animalcules in the seeds of large animals, which by means of 
conception assume a new dress, which they make their own. and by 
means of which they can nourish themselves and increase their size^ 
in order to pass to a larger theatre and to accomplish the propaga- 
tion of the large aninial. Iz is true that the souls of spermatic 
human animals are not rational, and do not become so until con- 
ception destines [dei :\ these animals to human nature. 
And as in general animals are not born entirely in conception or 
generation, neither do they perish entirely in what we call death; 
for it is reasonable that what does not begin naturally, should not 
end either in the order of nature. Therefore, quitting their mask 
or their rags, they merely return to a more minute theatre, where 
they can, nevertheless, be just as sensitive and just as well ordered 
as in the larger. And what we have just said of the large animals, 
takes place also in the generation and death of spermatic animals 
themselves, that is to say. they are growths of other smaller sper- 
matic animals, in comparison with which they may pass for large : 
for everything extends ad infinitum in nature. Thus not only 
souls, but also animals, are ingenerable and imperishable: they 
are only developed, enveloped, reclothed, unclothed, transformed: 
souls never quit their entire body and do not pass from one body 
into another which is entirely new to them. There is therefore 
no metempsychosis, but there is metamorphosis : animals chang 
take and leave only parts : the same thing which happens little 



PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE. 303 

by little and by small invisible particles, but continually, in nutri- 
tion ; and suddenly, visibly, but rarely, in conception or in death, 
which cause a gain or loss of much at one time. 

7. Thus far we have spoken as simple physicists: now we must 
advance to metaphysics, making use of the great principle, little 
employed in general, which teaches that nothing happens without 
a sufficient reason; that is to say, that nothing happens without 
its being possible for him who should sufficiently understand 
things, to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so and 
not otherwise. This principle laid down, the first question which 
should rightly be asked, will be, Why is there something rather 
than nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something. 
Further, suppose that things must exist, we must be able to give 
a reason why they must exist so and not otherwise. 

8. ISTow this sufficient reason for the existence of the universe 
cannot be found in the series of contingent things, that is, of 
bodies and of their representations in souls; for matter being 
indifferent in itself to motion and to rest, and to this or another 
motion, we cannot find the reason of motion in it, and still less 
of a certain motion. And although the present motion which is 
in matter, comes from the preceding motion, and that from still 
another preceding, yet in this way we make no progress, go as far 
as we may ; for the same question always remains. Thus it must 
be that the sufficient reason, which has no need of another reason, 
be outside this series of contingent things and be found in a sub- 
stance which is its cause, or which is a necessary being, carrying 
the reason of its existence within itself ; otherwise we should still 
not have a sufficient reason in which we could rest. And this 
final reason of things is called God. 

9. This primitive simple substance must contain in itself emi- 
nently the perfections contained in the derivative substances which 
are its effects ; thus it will have perfect power, knowledge and will : 
that is, it will have supreme omnipotence, omniscience and good- 
ness. And as justice, taken very generally, is only goodness, con- 
formed to wisdom, there must too be supreme justice in God. The 
reason which has caused things to exist by him, makes them still 
dependent upon him in existing and in working: and they con- 



304 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBXITZ. 

tinuaily receive from him that which gives them any perfection; 
but the imperfection which remains in them, comes from the 
essential and original limitation of the creature. 

10. It follows from the supreme perfection of God, that in 
creating the universe he has chosen the best possible plan, in which 
there is the greatest variety together with the greatest order; the 
best arranged ground, place, time; the most results produced in 
the most simple ways; the most of power, knowledge, happiness 
and goodness in the creatures that the universe could permit. For 
since all the possibles in the understanding of God laid claim to 
existence in proportion to their perfections, the result of all these 
claims must be the most perfect actual world that is possible. And 
without this it would not be possible to give a reason why things 
have turned out so rather than otherwise. 

11. The supreme wisdom of God led him to choose the laws of 
motion best adjusted and most suited to abstract or metaphysical 
reasons. There is preserved the same quantity of total and 
absolute force, or of action ; the same quantity of respective force or 
of reaction ; lastly the same quantity of directive force. Farther, 
action is always equal to reaction, and the whole effect is always 
equivalent to its full cause. And it is not surprising that we could 
not by the mere consideration of the efficient causes or of matter, 
account for those laws of motion which have been discovered in 
our time, and a part of which have been discovered by myself. 
For I have found that it was necessary to have recourse to final- 
causes, and that these laws do not depend upon the principle of 
necessity, like logical, arithmetical and geometrical truths, but 
upon the principle of fitness, that is, upon the choice of wisdom. 
And this is one of the most effective and evident proofs of the 
existence of God. to those who can examine these matters 
thoroughly. 

12. It follows, farther, from the perfection of the supreme 
author, that not only is the order of the entire universe the most 
perfect possible, but also that each living mirror representing the 
universe in accordance with its point of view, that is to say, that 
each monad, each substantial centre, must have its perceptions and 
its desires as well regulated as is compatible with all the rest. 



PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE. 305 

Whence it follows, still farther, that souls, that is, the most domi- 
nating monads, or rather, animals themselves, cannot fail to 
awaken from the state of stupor in which death or some other 
accident may put them. 

13. For all is regulated in things, once for all, with as much 
order and harmony as is possible, supreme wisdom and goodness 
not being able to act except with perfect harmony. The present 
is big with the future, the future could be read in the past, the 
distant is expressed in the near. One could become acquainted 
with the beauty of the universe in each soul, if one could unfold 
all its folds, which only develop perceptibly in time. But as each 
distinct perception of the soul includes innumerable confused per- 
ceptions, which embrace the whole universe, the soul itself knows 
the things of which it has perception only so far as it has distinct 
and clear perceptions of them ; and it has perfection in proportion 
to its distinct perceptions. Each soul knows the infinite, knows all, 
but confusedly; as in walking on the sea-shore and hearing the 
great noise which it makes, I hear the particular sounds of each 
wave, of which the total sound is composed, but without distin- 
guishing them. Our confused perceptions are the result of the 
impressions which the whole universe makes upon us. It is the 
same with each monad. God alone has a distinct knowledge of 
all, for he is the source of all. It has been well- said that he is as 
centre everywhere, but his circumference is nowhere, since every- 
thing is immediately present to him without any distance from 
this centre. 

14. As regards the rational soul, or spirit, there is something in 
it more than in the monads, or even in simple souls. It is not only 
a mirror of the universe of creatures, but also an image of the 
Divinity. The spirit has not only a perception of the works of 
God, but it is even capable of producing something which resem- 
bles them, although in miniature. For, to say nothing of the mar- 
vels of dreams, in which we invent without trouble (but also invol- 
untarily) things which, when awake, we should have to think a 
long time in order to hit upon, our soul is architectonic also in its 
voluntary actions, and, discovering the sciences according to which 
God has regulated things (pondere, mensura, numero, etc.), it 

20 



pbxlosophica: > of leibxitz. 

imitates, in its department and in its little world, where it is per- 
mitted to exercise itself, what God does in the large world. 

15. This is why all spirits, whether of men or of genii, entering 
by virtue of reason and of eternal truths into a sort :■: society 
with God. are meml - the City of God. that is to say. of the 
mosi :: state, formed and governed by the greatest and best 

^xr monarchs : "where there is no crime without punishment, no 
good actions without proportionate recompense: and. finally, as 
much virtue and happiness as is possible : and this is not by a 
derangement of nature, as if what God prepares for souls disturbed 
the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things, in 
virtue of the harmony Disestablished for all time between the 
realms of and of grace, between God as Architect and God 

as Monarch: so that nature itself leads to grace, and grace, in 
making use of nature, perfects it 

16. Thus although reason cannot teach us the details, reserved to 
Revelation, of the great future, we can be assured, by this same 
reason that things are made in a manner surpassing our desires, 

I also being the most perfect and most happy, and consequently, 
the most lovable of substances, and truly pure love consisting in 
the state which finds pleasure in the perfections and happine— : 
the loved object, this love ought, to give us the greatest pleasure of 
which we are capable, when God is its object. 

17. And it is easy to love him as we ought, if we know him as 
I have just described. For although God is not visible to our 
sxternal senses, he does not cease to be very lovable ami i give 
very great pleasure. ^Ve see how much pleasure honors give men. 
although they do not at all consist in the qualities of the external 
senses. Martyrs and fanatics (although the emotion of the latter 
is ill-regulated I . show what pleasure of the spirit can accomplish : 
and. "what is more, even sensuous pleasures are really confusedly 
known intellectual pleasures. Music charms us. although its beauty 
only consists in the harmonies of numbers and in the reckoning 
of the beats or vibrations of sounding bodies, which meet at certain 
intervals, reckonings of which we are not conscious and which 
the soul nevertheless does make. The pleasures which sight finds 
in pi rti ns are of the same nature; and those caused bv the 



PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF GRACE. 30 7 

other senses amount to almost the same thing, although we may not 
be able to explain it so distinctly. 

IS. It may even be said that from the present time on, the love 
of God makes us enjoy a foretaste of future felicity. And although 
it is disinterested, it itself constitutes our greatest good and interest 
even if we should not seek these therein and should consider only 
the pleasure which it gives, without regard to the utility it pro- 
duces ; for it gives us perfect confidence in the goodness of our 
author and master, producing a true tranquillity of mind ; not as 
with the Stoics who force themselves to patience, but by a present 
content which assures to us also a future happiness. And besides 
the present pleasure, nothing can be more useful for the future; 
for the love of God fulfills also our hopes, and leads us in the road 
of supreme happiness, because by virtue of the perfect order estab- 
lished in the universe, everything is done in the best possible way, 
as much for the general good as for the greatest individual good 
of those who are convinced of this and are content with the divine 
government ; this conviction cannot be wanting to those who know 
how to love the source of all good. It is true that supreme felicity, 
by whatever beatific vision or knowledge of God it be accompanied, 
can never be full; because, since God is infinite, he cannot be 
wholly known. Therefore our happiness will never, and ought 
not, consist in full joy, where there would be' nothing farther to 
desire, rendering our mind stupid; but in a perpetual progress^"' 
to new pleasures and to new perfections. 



XXXV. 

The ACoxadology. 1714. 
[From the French.] 

1. The monad of which we shall here speak is merely a simple 
substance, which enters into compounds: simple, that is to say, 
without parts." 

2. And there must be simple substances, since there are com- 
pounds: for the compound is only a collection or aggregatum of 
simple substances. 

3. Xow where there are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, 
nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms 
of nature, and, in a word, the elements of all things. 

1. Their dissolution also is not at all to be feared, and there is 
no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish 
naturally, t 

5. Tor the same reason there is no conceivable way in which 
a simple substance can begin naturally, since it cannot be formed 
by composition. 

6. Thus it may be said that the monads can only begin or end 
all at once, that is to say, they can only begin by creation and end 
by annihilation : whereas that which is compound begins or ends 
by parts. 

7. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be 
altered or changed in its inner being by any other creature, for 
nothing can be transposed within it, nor can there be conceived in 
it any internal movement which can be excited, directed, aug- 
mented or diminished within it, as can be done in compounds, 
where there is change among the parts. The monads have no 
windows through which anything can enter or depart. The 
accidents cannot detach themselves nor go forth from the sub- 
stances, as did formerly the sensible species of the Schoolmen. 
Thus neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from 
without. 

* Theodieee. § 10. f § 89. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 309 

S. Nevertheless, the monads must have some qualities, otherwise 
they would not even be entities. And if simple substances did not 
differ at all in their qualities there would be no way of perceiving 
any change in things, since what is in the compound can only 
come from the simple ingredients, and the monads, if they had. no 
qualities, would be indistinguishable from one another, seeing also 
they do not differ in quantity. Consequently, a plenum being 
supposed, each place would always receive, in any motion, only 
the equivalent of what it had had before, and one state of things 
would be indistinguishable from another. 

9. It is necessary, indeed, that each monad be different from 
every other. For there are never in nature two beings which are 
exactly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal 
difference, or one founded upon an intrinsic quality. 

10. I take it also for granted that every created being, and con- 
sequently the created monad also, is subject to change, and even 
that this change is continual in each. 

11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural 
changes of the monads proceed from an internal principle, since 
an external cause could not influence their interior.* 

12. But, besides the principle of change, there must be a detail 
of changes, which forms, so to speak, the specification and variety 
of the simple substances. 

13. This detail must involve multitude in the unity or in that 
which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by 
degrees, something changes and something remains ; and conse- 
quently, there must be in the simple substance a plurality of affec- 
tions and of relations, although it has no parts. 

14. The passing state, which involves and represents multitude 
in unity or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what 
is called perception, which must be distinguished from appercep- 
tion or consciousness, as will appear in what follows. Here it is 
that the Cartesians especially failed, having made no account of 
the perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also 
which made them believe that spirits only are monads and that 
there are no souls of brutes or of other entelechies. They, with 

"' §§ 396 and 400. 



310 PHILOSOPHICAL TVOEKS OF LPIBXITZ. 

the vulgar, have also confounded a long state of unconsciousness 
[etourdissemerri] with death .strictly speaking, and have therefore 
agreed with the old scholastic prejudice of entirely separate souls, 
and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief in the 
mortality of the soul. 

15. The action of the internal principle which causes the change 
or the passage from one perception to another, may be called a-p peti- 
tion: it is true that the desire cannot always completely attain to 
the whole perception which it strives for, but it always attains 
something of it and reaches new perceptions. 

16. We experience in ourselves a multiplicity in a simple sub- 
stance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are 
conscious involves a variety in the object. Thus all those who 
admit that the soul is a simple substance ought to admit this 
multiplicity in the monad, and AL Bayle ought not to have found 
any difficulty in it. as he has done in his Dictionary, article 
Borar ?. 

17. TTe must confess, moreover, that perception and that which 
depends on it are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is. by 
figures and motions. And. supposing that there were a machine so 
constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we could con- 
ceive of it as enlarged and yet preserving the same proportions. 
so that we might enter it like a mill. And this granted, we should 
only find on visiting it. pieces which push one against another, but 
never anything by which to explain a perception. This must be 
sought for. therefore, in the simple substance and not in the com- 
pound or in a machine. Turthermore. nothing but this (namely, 
perceptions and their changes) can be found in the simple sub- 
stance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of 
simple substances can consist.* 

IS. The name of entelechies might be given to all simple sub- 
stances or created monads, for they have within themselves a cer- 
tain perfection ( eyovat ~b ivreXe^ ) : there is a certain sufficiency 
- airdp/ceia ) which makes them the sources of their internal activi- 
ties, and so to speak, incorporeal automata. + 

19. If we choose to give the name soul to everything that has 
perceptions and desires in the general sense which I have just 
■'Preface., p. 37. f § B7. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 311 

explained, all simple substances or created monads may be called 
souls, but as feeling is something more than a simple perception, 
I am willing that the general name of monads or entelechies shall 
suffice for those simple substances which have only perception, 
and that those substances only shall be called souls whose percep- 
tion is more distinct and is accompanied by memory. 

20. For we experience in ourselves a state in which we remem- 
ber nothing and have no distinguishable perception, as when we 
fall into a swoon or when we are overpowered by a profound and 
dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ sensibly 
from a simple monad ; but as this state is not continuous and as 
the soul frees itself from it, the soul is something more than a 
mere monad.* 

21. And it does not at ail follow that in such a state the simple 
substance is without any perception. This is indeed impossible, 
for the reasons mentioned above; for it cannot perish, nor can it 
subsist without some affection, which is nothing else than its per- 
ception ; but when there is a great number of minute perceptions, 
in which nothing is distinct, we are stunned ; as when we turn con- 
tinually in the same direction many times in succession, whence 
arises a dizziness which may make us swoon, and which does not 
let us distinguish anything. And death may produce for a time 
this condition in animals. 

22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally 
the consequence of its preceding state, so its present is big with its 
future, f 

23. Therefore, since on being awakened from a stupor, we are 
aware of our perceptions, we must have had them immediately 
before, although we were entirely unconscious of them ; for one 
perception can come in a natural way only from another percep- 
tion, as a motion can come in a natural way only from a motion. J 

24. From this we see that if there were nothing distinct, 
nothing, so to speak, in relief and of a higher flavor, in our percep- 
tions, we should always be in a dazed state. This is the condition 
of the naked monads. 

25. We also see that nature has given to animals heightened 
perceptions, by the pains she has taken to furnish them with organs 

* § 64. f § 360. t §§ 401 to 403. 



312 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

which collect many rays of light or many undulations of air, in 
order to render these more efficacious by their union. There is 
something- of the same kind in odor, in taste, in touch and perhaps 
in a multitude of other senses which are unknown to us. And I 
shall presently explain how that which takes place in the soul 
represents that which occurs in the organs. 

26. Memory furnishes souls with a sort of consecutiveness 
which imitates reason, but which ought to be distinguished from 
it. We observe that animals, having the perception of something 
which strikes them and of which they have had a similar percep- 
tion before, expect, through the representations of their memory, 
that which was associated with it in the preceding perception, and 
experience feelings similar to those which they had had at that 
time. For instance, if we show dogs a stick, they remember the 
pain it has caused them and whine and run.* 

27. And the strong imagination which impresses and moves 
them, arises either from the magnitude or the multitude of preced- 
ing perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at 
once the effect of a long-continued habit, or of many oft-repeated 
moderate perceptions. 

28. Men act like the brutes, in so far as the consecutiveness 
of their perceptions results from the principle of memory 
alone, resembling the empirical physicians who practice without 
theory ; and we are simple empirics in three-fourths of our actions. 
For example, when we expect that there will be daylight 
to-morrow, we are acting as empirics, because that has up to this 
time always taken place. It is only the astronomer who judges of 
this by reason. 

29. But the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what 
distinguishes us from mere animals and furnishes us with reason 
and the sciences, raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of 
God. This is what we call in us the rational soul or spirit. 

30. It is also by the knowledge of necessary truths, and by their 
abstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection-, which make us think 
of that which calls itself "I," and to observe that this or that is 
within us: and it is thus that, in thinking of ourselves, we think of 
being, of substance, simple or compound, of the immaterial and of 

* Prelim., § 65. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 



313 



God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him with- 
out limits. And these reflective acts furnish the principal objects 
of our reasonings.* 

31. Our reasonings are founded on two great principles, that of 
contradicti&n, in virtue of which we judge that to be false which 
involves contradiction, and that true, which is opposed or contra- 
dictory to the false, f 

32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold 
that no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there 
be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although 
most often these reasons cannot be known to us. J 

33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and 
those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their oppo- 
site is impossible, and those of fact are contingent and their oppo- 
site is possible. When a truth is necessary its reason can be found 
by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we 
reach those which are primitive. || 

34. It is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce specula- 
tive theorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms and. 
postulates. 

35. And there are finally simple ideas, definitions of which can- 
not be given ; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, 
primary principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed need no 
proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite 
involves an express contradiction. 

36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent 

truths, or those of fact, — that is, for the sequence of things diffused 

through the universe of created objects — where the resolution into 

particular reasons might run into a detail without limits, on 

account of the immense variety of the things in nature and the 

division of bodies ad infinitum. There is an infinity of figures and 

of movements, present and past, which enter into the efficient cause 

of my present writing, and there is an infinity of slight inclinations 

and dispositions, past and present, of my soul, which enter into 

the final cause. ]\ 

* Pref., p. 27. f §§ 44, 169. % ^ 44, 196. 

I §§ 170, 174, 189. 280-282, 367, Abridgment, Objection 3. 
IT §§ 36, 37. 44, 45, 49, 52, 121, 122, 337, 340, 344. 



314 PHTLOSOPHICAI. WORKS OB rEIBXITZ. 

37. And as all this detail only involves other contingents, ante- 
rior or more detailed, each one of which needs a like analysis I i 
its explanation, we make no advance: and the sufficient or final 
reason must be outside of the sequei: i - \:> of this detail of 
contingencies, however infinite it may be. 

38. And thus it is that the final reason of things must be found 
in a necessary substance, in which the detail of changes exists only 
eminently, as in their source : and this is what vre call God.* 

39. Now this substance, being a sufficient reason of all this 
detail, which also is linked together throughout, tliere is but one 
God. and this God is sufficient. 

40. TTe may also conclude that this supreme substance, which is 
unique, universal and necessary, having nothing outside of itself 
which is independent of it. and being a pure sequence of possible 
being, must be incapable of limitations and must contain as much 
of reality as is possible. 

41. TThence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, perfection 
being only the magnitude of positive reality taken in its strictest 
meaning, setting aside the limits or bounds in things which have 
them. And where there are no limits, that is. in God. perfee:: m 
is absolutely infinite. ^ 

42. It follows also that the creatures have their perfections from 
the influence of God. but that their imperfections arise from their 
own nature, incapable of existing without limits. For it is by this 
that they are distinguished from God.t 

43. It is also true that in God is the source not only of existences 
but also of essence-, so far as they are real, or of that which is real 
in the possible. This is because the understanding of God is the 
region of eternal truths, or of the ideas on which they depend, and 
because, without him. there would be nothing real in the possibili- 
ties, and not only nothing existing but also nothing possible. 

44. Tor. if there is a reality in essences or possibilities or indeed 
in the eternal truths, this reality must be founded in something 
existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the 

~ ? 7. - ? 22; Preface, p. 27. 

: ?? 20, 27-31, 153. 167. 377 seqq. [In the first copy, revised by Leibnitz, the 
following is added: ' "•This original imperfection of ereatnres is noticeable in the 
natural inertia of bodies. §§ 30. 380: Abridgment. Objection 5. '"J 

I § 20- 






TITE MONADOLOGY. 



315 



necessary being, in whom essence involves existence, or with whom 
it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual.* 

45. Hence God alone (or the necessary being) has this preroga- 
tive, that he must exist if he is possible. And since nothing can 
hinder the possibility of that which possesses no limitations, no 
negation, and, consequently, no contradiction, this alone is suffi- 
cient to establish the existence of God a priori. We have also 
proved it by the reality of the eternal truths. But we have a little 
while ago [§§ 36-39], proved it also a posteriori, since contingent 
beings exist, which can only have their final or sufficient reason 
in a necessary being who has the reason of his existence in himself. 

46. Yet we must not imagine, as some do, that the eternal 
truths, being dependent upon God, are arbitrary and depend upon 
his will, as Descartes seems to have held, and afterwards M. 
Poiret. This is true only of contingent truths, the principle of 
which is fitness or the choice of the best, whereas necessary truths 
depend solely on his understanding and are its internal object. f 

47. Thus God alone is the primitive unity or the original simple 
substance; of which all created or derived monads are the prod- 
ucts, and are generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations 
of the Divinity, from moment to moment, limited by the receptiv- 
ity of the creature, to whom limitation is essential.! 

48. In God is Power, which is the source of all ; then Knowl- 
edge, which contains the detail of ideas ; and finally Will, which 
effects changes or products according to the principle of the best. 
These correspond to what in created monads form the subject or 
basis, the perceptive faculty, and the appetitive faculty. But in 
God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect ; and in the 
created monads or in the entelechies (or perfectihabies, as Harmo- 
laus Barbaras translated the word), they are only imitations pro- 
portioned to the perfection of the monads. 1 1 

49. The creature is said to act externally in so far as it has 

perfection, and to suffer from another in so far as it is imperfect. 

Thus action is attributed to the monad in so far as it has distinct 

perceptions, and passivity [passion] in so far as it has confused 

perceptions. ]\ 

* §§ 184, 189, 335. f §§ 180, 184, 185, 335, 351, 380. 

% §§ 382-391, 398, 395. || §§ 7, 149, 150, 87. 

IT §§ 22, 66, 386. 



316 PHH.OSOPHICAI. WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

. And one creature is more perfect than another, in this 
that there is fonnd in it that which serves to account a priori for 
what takes place in the other, and it is in this way that it is said 
t aet npon the other. 

51. But in simple substances the influence of one monad upon 
another is purely ideal and it can have its effect only through the 
intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God a monad 
may demand with reason that God in regulating the others from 
the commencement of things, have regard to it. For since a ere 
monad can have no physical influence upon the interior of another, 
it is only in this way that one can be dependent upon another.* 

" _. And hence it is that the actions and passions of creatures are 
mutual. For God. in comparing two simple substances, finds in 
each one reasons which compel him to adjust the other to it. and 
consequently that which in certain respects is active, is according 
to another point of view, passive : in so far as that what is 

known distinctly in it, ser - c-eount for that which takes place 
in another : and passive in so far as the reason for what takes place 
in it. is found in that which is distinctly known in another. f 

_ . is there is an infinity of possible universes in the ideas 

1 t od. and as only one of them can exist, there must be a sunicient 
reason for the choice of God. which determines him to select one 
rather than anotL 

54. And this reason can only be found in the fitness, or in the 
degrees of perfection, which these worlds contain, each possible 
"world having a right to claim existe:. 'ling to the measure 

of perfection which it possesses. 

' ■ . And this is the cause of the existence of the Best : namely. 

that his wisdom makes it known to ( k .. his goodness makes him 

choose it. and his power makes him produce i ~. r 

. - nis connection, or this adaptation, of all created things 

;ch and of each to all, brings it about that each simple sub- 

-§§9,54 " 201: Abridgment. Objection 3. 

; §§ 8, 10. 44. 173. 196 seqq., 225, 414-416. 
- - - 101 \ 201, ISO, 352. 345 seqq 54. [In the first copy revised by 
Leibnitz the folhvwiQg is found added here: "Thus there is nothing abso- 
lutely arbitral 

Tg§8, 78, 8 84,119,204,2 208; Abridgment. Objections 1 and 8. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 317 

stance has relations which express all the others, and that, conse- 
quently, it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.* 

57. And as the same city regarded from different sides appears 
entirely different, and is as if multiplied perspectively ; so also it 
happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple sub- 
stances, there are as it were so many different universes, which are 
nevertheless only the perspectives of a single one, according to the 
different points of view of each monad. f 

58. And this is the way to obtain as great a variety as possible, 
but with the greatest possible order ; that is, it is the way to obtain 
as much perfection as possible.! 

59. Moreover, this hypothesis (which I dare to call demon- 
strated) is the only one which brings into relief the grandeur of 
God. M. Bayle recognized this, when in his Dictionary (Art. 
Borarius) he raised objections to it ; in which indeed he was dis- 
posed to think that I attributed too much to God and more than 
is possible, But he can state no reason why this universal har- 
mony, which brings it about that each substance expresses exactly 
all the others through the relations which it sustains to them, is 
impossible. 

60. Besides, we can see, in what I have just said, the a priori 
reasons why things could not be otherwise than they are. Because 
God, in regulating all, has had regard to each part, and particularly 
to each monad, whose nature being representative, nothing can 
limit it to representing only a part of things ; although it may be 
true that this representation is but confused as regards the detail of 
the whole universe, and can be distinct only in the case of a small 
part of things, that is to say, in the case of those which are nearest 
or greatest in relation to each of the monads ; otherwise each 
monad would be a divinity. It is not in the object but only in 
the modification of the knowledge of the object, that monads are 
limited. They all tend confusedly toward the infinite, toward 
the whole ; but they are limited and differentiated by the degrees 
of their distinct perceptions. 

61. And compound substances resemble in this respect simple 

substances. For since the world is a plenum, rendering all matter 

* §§ 130, 360. f § 147. 

% §§ 120, 124, 241 seqq., 214, 243, 275. 



3 1 8 PHTLOSOPHICAjL WC EKS JE T.KI BJVI 1Z. 

connected, and since in a plenum evei m >tion has s ome effect on 
distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body is 
affected not only by those in contact with it. and feels in st ne 
wav all that happens to theni. bnt also by their means is affected 
by those "which are in contact with the former, with -which it 
itself is in immediate contact, it follows that this inter lornmuni- 
cation esxends to any distance whatever. And consequently, each 
body feels all that passes in the universe, so that he who sees all, 
could reasl in each that which pass - erywhere. and even that 
which has been or shall be. discovering in the present that which 
is removed in time as -well as in space : crv/jurvoia irdvra . said 
Hippocrates. But a soul can read in itself only that which is dis- 
tinctly represented in it. It cannot develop its laws all at once, 
for they reach into the infinite. 

-. Thus, although each created monad re resents the entire 
universe, it represents more distinctly the body which is particu- 
larly appropriated to it. and of which it forms the enteleehy; 
and as this body expresses the whole universe through the 
nection of all matter in a plenum, the soul also represents the 
whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in 
a particular way.* 

. The body belonging to a monad, which is its enteleehy or 
soul. . nstitutes together with the enteleehy what may be called 
an 1 - g ether with the soul what may be called 
an animal. ISTow this t: i : living being or of an animal is 

always organic, for since every monad is in its way a mirror of 
the universe, and since the universe is regulated in perfect order, 
there must Is rder in the representative, that is. in the per- 

s of the soul, and hence in the body, through which the 
universe is represented in the soul.v 

-. Thus each organic body of a living being is a kind of divine 
machine or natural automat : . —men infinitely surpasses all artifi- 
cial automata. Because a machine which is made by man's art 
is not a machine in each one of its parts: for example, the teeth 
of a brass wheel have parts or fragments which to us are no longer 
artificial and have nothing in themselves to show the use to which 
the wheel was destined in the machine. But nature's machines. 
"MOO. - %4 .; 



THE MONADOLOGY. 



319 



that is, living bodies, are machines even in their smallest parts 
ad infinitum. Herein lies the difference between nature and art, 
that is, between the divine art and ours. 

65. And the anther of nature has been able to employ this 
divine and infinitely marvellous artifice, because each portion of 
matter is not only divisible ad infinitum, as the ancients recog- 
nized, but also each part is actually endlessly subdivided into parts, 
of which each has some motion of its own : otherwise it would be 
impossible for each portion of matter to express tfie whole 
universe.* 

66. Whence we see that there is a world of creatures, of living 
beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the smallest particle 
of matter. 

67. Each portion of matter may be conceived of as a garden full 
of plants, and as a pond full of fishes. But each branch of the 
plant, each member of the animal, each drop of its humors is also 
such a garden or such a pond. 

68. And although the earth and air which lies between the 
plants of the garden, or the water between the fish of the pond, 
is neither plant nor fish, they yet contain more of them, but for the 
most part so tiny as to be to us imperceptible. 

69. Therefore there is nothing uncultivated, nothing sterile, 
nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion except in 
appearance ; somewhat as a pond would appear from a distance, 
in which we might see the confused movement and swarming, 
so to speak, of the fishes in the pond, without discerning the fish 
themselves, f 

70. We see thus that each living body has a ruling entelechy, 
which in the animal is the soul ; but the members of this living 
body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which 
has also its entelechy or governing soul. 

71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some peo- 
ple who have misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a mass 
or portion of matter belonging to it or attached to it forever, and 
that consequently it possesses other inferior living beings, destined 
to its service forever. For all bodies are, like rivers, in a per- 

* Prelim., § 70 ; Theod., § 195. f Preface, pp. 40, 41. 



320 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

petual flux, and parts are entering into them and departing from, 
them continually. 

72. Thus the sonl changes its body only gradually and by 
degrees, so that it is never deprived of all its organs at once. 
There is often a. metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsy- 
chosis nor transmigration of souls. There are also no entirely 
separate souls, nor genii without bodies. God alone is wholly with- 
out body." 

73. For which reason also, it happens that there is, strictly 
speaking, neither absolute generation nor entire death, consisting 
in the separation of the soul from the body. AVhat we call genera- 
tion is development or growth, as what we call death is envelop- 
ment and diminution. 

74. Philosophers have been greatly puzzled over the origin of 
forms, entelechies, or souls; but to-day, when we know by exact 
investigations upon plants, insects and animals, that the organic 
bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but 
always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some 
pre-formation, it has been thought that not only the organic body 
was already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, 
and, in a word, the animal itself ; and that by means of conception 
this animal has merely been prepared for a great transformation, 
in order to become an animal of another kind. Something similar 
is seen outside of generation, as when worms become flies, and 
caterpillars become butterflies. f 

75. The animals, some of which are raised by conception to the 
grade of larger animals, may be called spermatic ; but those among 
them, which remain in their class, that is, the most part, are 
born, multiply, and are destroyed like the larger animals, and it 
is only a small number of chosen ones which pass to a larger 
theatre. 

76. But this is only half the truth. I have, therefore, held 
that if the animal never commences by natural means, no more 
does it end by natural means ; and that not only will there be no 
generation, but also no utter destruction or death, strictly speaking. 

* TheocL, § 90, 124. 

f§§86, 89, 90, 187, 188, 403, 397; Preface, p. 40, seq. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 



321 



And these reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experi- 
ence, harmonize perfectly with my principles deduced a priori, 
as above [cf. 3, 4, 5].* 

77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an 
indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal 
itself, although its mechanism often perishes in part and takes on 
or puts off organic coatings. 

78. These principles have given me the means of explaining nat- 
urally the union or rather the conformity of the soul and the 
organic body. The soul follows its own peculiar laws and the body 
also follows its own laws, and they agree in virtue of the preestab- 
lished harmony between all substances, since they are all represen- 
tations of one and the same universe. f 

79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by appeti- 
tions, ends and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of 
efficient causes or of motion. And the two realms, that of effi- 
cient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each 
other. 

80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to 
bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in 
matter. Nevertheless he believed that the soul could change the 
direction of bodies. But this was because, in his day, the law 
of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total 
direction in matter, was not known. If he had known this, he 
would have lighted upon my system of preestablished harmony.! 

81. According to this system, bodies act as if (what is impossi- 
ble) there were no souls, and that souls act as if there were no 
bodies, and that both act as if each influenced the other. 

82. As to spirits or rational souls, although I find that the same 
thing which I have stated (namely, that animals and souls begin 
only with the world and end only with the world) holds good at 
bottom with regard to all living beings and animals, yet there is 
this peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic animal- 
cules, as long as they remain such, have only ordinary or sensitive 
souls ; but as soon as those which are, so to speak, elected, attain 

* § 90. f Preface, p. 36; Theod., §§ 340, 352, 353, 358. 

tPref., p. 44; Theod., §§ 22, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 345, 346 seqq., 354, 355. 
21 



322 PHILOSOPHICAL STORES OF LEIBXITZ. 

by actual conception to human nature, their sensitive souls are 
elevated to the rank of reason and to the perogative of spirits." 

83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls 
and spirits, some of which I have already mentioned, there is also, 
this, that souls in general are the living mirrors or images of the 
universe of creatures, but spirits are in addition images of the 
Divinity itself, or of the author of nature, able to know the system 
of the universe and to imitate something of it by architectonic 
samples, each spirit being like a little divinity in its own depart- 
ment, f 

84. Hence it is that spirits are capable of entering into a sort 
of society with God, and that he is, in relation to them, not only 
what an inventor is to his machine (as God is in relation to the 
other creatures), but also what a prince is to his subjects, and 
even a father to his children. 

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits 
must compose the City of God, that is, the most perfect state which 
is possible, under the most perfect of monarchs.t 

86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral 
world within the natural world, and the highest and most divine of 
the works of God ; it is in this that the glory of God truly consists, 
for he would have none if his greatness and goodness were not 
known and admired by spirits. It is, too, in relation to this 
divine city that he properly has goodness ; whereas his wisdom 
and his power are everywhere manifest. 

ST. As we have above established a perfect harmony between 
two natural kingdoms, the one of efficient, the other of final causes, 
we should also notice here another harmony between the physical 
kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace ; that is, 
between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the 
universe and God considered as monarch of the divine city of 
spirits. 1 1 

88. This harmony makes things progress toward grace by 
natural methods. This globe, for example, must be destroyed and 
repaired by natural means, at such times as the government of 

* §§ 91, 397. f § 147. t § 146; Abridgment, Objection 2. 

|1 §§62, 72, 118, 24S, 112, 130, 247. 



THE MONADOLOGY. 323 

spirits may demand it, for the punishment of some and the reward 
of others.* 

89. It may be said, farther, that God as architect satisfies in 
every respect God as legislator, and that therefore sins, by the 
order of nature and in virtue even of the mechanical structure of 
things, must carry their punishment with them ; and that in the 
same way, good actions will obtain their rewards by mechanical 
ways through their relations to bodies, although this cannot and 
ought not always happen immediately. 

90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no 
good action unrewarded, no bad action unpunished ; and every- 
thing must result in the well-being of the good, that is, of those 
who are not disaffected in this great State, who, after having 
done their duty, trust in providence, and who love and imitate, as 
is meet, the author of all good, pleasing themselves with the con- 
templation of his perfections, according to the nature of truly 
pure love, which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. 
This is what causes wise and 'virtuous persons to work at all which 
seems conformable to the divine will, presumptive or antecedent, 
and nevertheless to content themselves with that which God in 
reality brings to pass by his secret, consequent and decisive will, 
recognizing that if we could sufficiently comprehend the order 
of the universe, we should find that it surpasses all the wishes of 
the wisest, and that it is impossible to render it better than it is, 
not only for all in general, but also for ourselves in particular, if 
we are attached, as we should be, to the author of all, not only 
as to the architect and efficient cause of our being, but also as to 
our master and final cause, who ought to be the whole aim of our 
will, and who, alone, can make our happiness. f 

* §§ 18 seqq., 110, 244, 245, 340. 

f §§ 134 fin., 278; Preface, pp. 27, 28. 



XXXVI. 

On the Doctrine of Maeebranche. A Letter to M. Remond 
de Montmort, containing Remarks on the Book of Father Tertre 
against Father Malebranche. 1715. 

[From the French.] 

Sir, I have just received your package, and I thank you for the 
interesting articles which you have sent me. I say nothing on the 
continuation of Homer; but as, after the sacred books, he is the 
most ancient of all the authors whose works remain to us, I wish 
that some one would undertake to clear up the historical and geo- 
graphical difficulties which remote antiquity has produced in these 
works, and principally in the Odyssey, relating to ancient geog- 
raphy ; for, however fabulous the travels of Ulysses may be, it is 
nevertheless certain that Homer carried him into countries then 
spoken of but which it is difficult now to recognize. 

I pass to the philosophical articles which relate to the Reverend 
Father Malebranche (whose loss I greatly regret), and which tend 
to elucidate the natural theology of the Chinese. The Refutation 
of the system of this Father, divided into three small volumes, is 
without doubt from a man of ability, for it is clear and ingenious. 
I even approve of a part of it, but part of it is too extreme. Too 
much divergence is here shown from the views of Descartes and of 
Father Malebranche, even when they receive a good meaning. It 
should be time to give up these enmities, which' the Cartesians 
have perhaps drawn upon themselves by showing too much con- 
tempt for the ancients and. for the schoolmen, in whom there is 
nevertheless solidity meriting our attention. Thus justice ought to 
be shown on both sides, and we are to profit by the discoveries 
of both, as it is right to reject that which each advances without 
foundation. 

1. It is right to refute the Cartesians when they say that the 
soul is nothing but thought; as also when they say that matter is 
nothing but extension. For the soul is a subject or concretum 
which thinks, and matter is an extended subject or subject endowed 



ON THE DOCTRINE OF MALEBRANCIIE. 325 

with extension. This is why I hold that space must not be con- 
founded with matter, although I agree that naturally there is no 
void space ; the scholastics are right in distinguishing the concretes 
and the abstracts, when it is a matter of exactness. 

2. I concede to the Cartesians that the soul actually always 
thinks, but I do not grant that it is conscious of all these thoughts. 
For our great perceptions and our great appetites of which we are 
conscious, are composed of innumerable little perceptions and little 
inclinations of which we cannot be conscious. And it is in the 
insensible perceptions that the reason is found of what passes in 
us ; as the reason of what takes place in sensible bodies consists in 
insensible movements. 

3. There is good reason also for refuting Reverend Father 
Malebranche especially when he maintains that the soul is purely 
passive. I think I have demonstrated that every substance is 
active, and especially the soul. This is also the idea which the 
ancients and the moderns have had of it ; and the entelechy of 
Aristotle, which has made so much noise, is nothing else but force 
or activity; that is, a state from which action naturally flows if 
nothing hinders it. But matter-, primary and pure, taken without 
the souls or lives which are united to it, is purely passive; prop- 
erly speaking also it is not a substance, but something incomplete. 
And secondary matter, as for example, body, is not a substance, 
but for another reason ; which is, that it is a collection of several 
substances, like a pond full of fish, or a flock of sheep ; and conse- 
quently it is what is called unum per accidens, in a word, a 
phenomenon. A true substance, such as an animal, is composed of 
an immaterial soul, and an organized body; and it is the com- 
pound of these two which is called unum per se. 

4. As to the efficiency of second causes, it is again right to main- 
tain it against the opinion of this Father. I have demonstrated 
that each simple substance, or monad (such as souls), follows its 
own laws in producing its actions, without being capable of being 
troubled therein by the influence of another created simple sub- 
stance ; and that thus bodies do not change the ethico-logical laws 
of souls, any more than souls change the physico-mechanical laws 
of bodies. This is why second causes really act, but without any 



326 PHILOSOPHICAL WOftlvS OF LEIBNITZ. 

influence of one created simple substance upon another ; and souls 
harmonize with bodies and among themselves, in virtue of the 
preestablished harmony, and not at all by a mutual physical influ- 
ence ; except in the case of the metaphysical union of the soul and 
its body which makes them compose unum per se, an animal, a 
living being. It has been right, therefore, to refute the opinion of 
those who deny the action of second causes ; but it must be done 
without renewing false influences, such as the species of the school. 

5. Father Malebranche made use of this argument: That exten- 
sion not being a mode of being of matter, must be its substance. 
The author of the Refutation (Vol. I, p. 91), distinguishes 
between the positive modes of being; and he claims that extension 
is one of the modes of being of the second sort, which he thinks can 
be conceived by themselves. But these are not positive modes of 
being; they all consist in the variety of limitations, and none of 
them can be conceived save by the being of which they are the 
modes and ways. And as to extension it may be said that it is 
not a mode of being of matter, and nevertheless is not a substance 
either. What is it, then ? you will ask, sir. I reply that it is an 
attribute of substances, and there is a clear difference between 
attributes and modes of being. 

6. It appears to me, also, that the author of the Refutation does 
not combat well the opinion of the Cartesians on the infinite, 
which they with reason consider as prior to the finite, and of which 
the finite is but a limitation. He says (p. 303 of Vol. I), that if 
the mind had a clear and direct view of the infinite, Father Male- 
branche would not have had need of so much reasoning to make us 
think of it. But by the same argument he would reject the very 
simple and very natural knowledge we have of the Divinity. 
These kinds of objections amount to nothing, for there is need of 
labor and application in order to give to men the attention neces- 
sary for the simplest notions, and this end will only be reached by 
recalling them from their dissipation to themselves. It is also for 
this reason that the theologians who have composed works on 
eternity, have much need of discourse, of comparison and of 
examples to make it well understood ; although there is nothing 
more simple than the notion of eternity. But it is because, in such 



01ST THE DOCTRINE OF MALEBKANCTIE. 327 

matters, all depends on attention. The author adds (Vol. I, p. 
307), that in the pretended knowledge of the infinite, the mind 
sees merely that lengths may be pnt end to end and repeated as 
many times as is wished. Very good ; but this author should con- 
sider that to know this repetition can always be made, is already to 
know the infinite. 

7. The same author examines in his second volume the natural 
theology of Father Malebranche ; but his performance appears to 
me overdone, although he declares that he merely presents the 
doubts of others. The Father saying that God is being in general, 
this is taken for a vague and notional being,, as is the genus in 
logic ; and little more is needed to accuse Malebranche of atheism. 
But I think that the Father did not understand a vague and inde- 
terminate being, but absolute being, which differs from particular 
limited beings as absolute and boundless space differs from a cir- 
cle or square. 

8. There is more likelihood of combating the opinion of Male- 
branche on ideas. For there is no necessity (seemingly) for 
taking them for something external to us. It is sufficient to regard 
ideas as notions, that is to say, as modifications of our soul. It is 
thus that the schoolmen, Descartes and Arnauld, regard them. 
But as God is the source of possibilities and consequently of ideas, 
the Father may be excused and even praised for having changed the 
terms and given to ideas a more exalted signification, in distin- 
guishing them from notions and in taking them for perfections in 
God which we participate in by our knowledge. This mystical 
language of the Father was not then necessary ; but I find it use- 
ful, for it better brings before the mind our dependence on God. 
It even seems that Plato, speaking of ideas, and St. Augustine, 
speaking of truth, had kindred thoughts, which I find very remark- 
able ; and this is the part of Malebranche's system which I should 
like to have retained, with the phrases and formulas which depend 
on it, as I am very glad that the most solid part of the theology of 
the mystics is preserved. And far from saying with the author of 
the Refutation (Vol. 2, p. 304), that the system of St. Augustine 
is a little infected with the language and opinions of the Plato- 
nists, I would say that it is thereby enriched and set in relief. 



32S PHTEOSOPHICAE WOBKS OF EEIBXITZ. 

9. I say almost as much of the opinion of Father AEalebranche 
when he affirms that we see all tilings in God. I say that it is an 
expression which may be excused and even praised, provided it be 
rightly taken : for it is easier to fall into mistake in this than in the 
preceding article on ideas. It is. therefore, well to observe that not 
only in Malebranche's system but also in mine. God alone is the 
immediate external object of souls, exercising upon them a real 
influence. And although the current school seems to admit other 
influences, by means of certain species, which it believes that 
objects convey into the soul, it does not fail to recognize that all 
our perfections are a continual gift of God, and a limited participa- 
tion in his infinite perfection. This suffices to show that what 
there is true and good in our knowledge is still an emanation from 
the light of God. and that it is in this sense that it may be said, 
that v:e see all tilings in God,. 

10. The third volume refutes the system of revealed theology of 
Father Malebranche. in reference especially to grace and predesti- 
nation. But as I have not sufficiently studied the particular theo- 
logical opinions of the author, and as I think I have sufficiently 
elucidated the matter in my essay La Tlieodicee, I excuse myself 
from entering upon it at present. 

It would now remain to speak to you, sir, of the natural theology 
of the Lettres Cliinois, according to what the Jesuit Father Longo- 
bardi and Father Antoine de St. Marie, of the Minorite order, 
report to us thereon, in the treatises which you have sent me, in 
order to have my opinion of them : as well as of the mode which 
Reverend Father Iilalebranche has employed to give to a cultivated 
Chinaman some insight into our theology. But this requires a sep- 
arate letter : this which I have just written being already suffi- 
ciently long. Pieferring for the rest to my preceding letter, 
I am zealously, sir. your very humble and very obedient servant, 

Leibxitz. 
Hanover, XoA-ember -4. 1715. 



XXXVII. 

Letters to Sam. Clarke. 

Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper : Being an Extract of a Letter 
written in November, 1715. 

1. Natural religion itself seems to decay [in England'] very 
much. Many will have human souls to be material : others make 
God himself a corporeal Being. 

2. Mr. Locke, and his followers, are uncertain at least, whether 
the soul be not material, and naturally perishable. 

3. Sir Isaac Newton says, that space is an organ, which God 
makes use of to perceive things by. But if God stands in need of 
any organ to perceive things by, it will follow, that they do not 
depend altogether upon him, nor were produced by him. 

4. Sir Iaaac Newton, and his followers, have also a very odd 
opinion concerning the work of God. According to their doctrine, 
God Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to time: 
otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient 
foresight to make it a perpetual motion. 1ST ay, the machine of 
God's making, is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that 
he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary con- 
course, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work ; who 
must consequently be so much the more unskillful a workman, as 
he is oftener obliged to mend his work and to set it right. Accord- 
ing to my opinion, the same force and vigor remains always in 
the world, and only passes from one part of matter to another, 
agreeably to the laws of nature, and the beautiful preestablished 
order. And I hold, that when God works miracles, he does not do 
it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Who- 
ever thinks otherwise, must needs have a very mean notion of the 
wisdom and power of God. 



330 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

A[r. Leibxitz's Secoxd Paper : Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 

First Reply. 

1. It is rightly observed in the paper delivered to the Princess 
of 'Wales, which her Royal Highness has been pleased to com- 
municate to me, that, next to corruption of manners j the principles 
of the materialists do very much contribute to keep up impiety. 
But I believe the author had no reason to add, that the mathemati- 
cal 'principles of philosophy are opposite to those of the materialists. 
On the contrary, they are the same ; only with this difference, that 
the materialists, in imitation of Democritus, Epicurus, and 
Hobbes, confine themselves altogether to mathematical principles, 
and admit only bodies; whereas the Christian mathematicians 
admit also immaterial substances. AYherefore, not mathematical 
principles (according to the usual sense of that word) but meta- 
physical principles ought to be opposed to those of the materialists. 
Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle in some measure, had a knowl- 
edge of these principles ; but I pretend to have established them 
demonstratively in my Theodiccea, though I have done it in a 
popular manner. The great foundation of mathematics is the 
principle of contradiction or identity, that is, that a proposition 
cannot be true and false at the same time ; and that therefore A 
is A, and cannot be not A. This single principle is sufficient to 
demonstrate every part of arithmetic and geometry, that is, all 
mathematical principles. But in order to proceed from mathe- 
matics to natural philosophy , another principle is requisite, as I 
have observed in my Theodiccea: I mean, the principle of a suffi- 
cient reason, viz: that nothing happens without a reason why it 
should be so, rather than otherwise. And therefore Archimedes 
being desirous to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy , 
in his book De Aequilibrio, was obliged to make use of a particular 
case of the great principle of a sufficient reason. He takes it for 
granted, that if there be a balance, in which every thing is alike 
on both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of 
that balance, the whole will be at rest, 'Tis because no reason 
can be given, why one side should weigh down, rather than the 
other. ISTow, by that single principle, viz: that there ought to be 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 331 

a sufficient reason why things should be s,o, and not otherwise, one 
may demonstrate the being of a God, and all the other parts of 
metaphysics or natural theology; and even, in some measure, those 
principles of natural philosophy, that are independent upon mathe- 
matics: I mean, the dynamic principles, or the principles of force. 

2. The author proceeds and says, that according to the mathe- 
matical principles, that is, according to Sir Isaac Newton s philos- 
ophy (for mathematical principles determine nothing in the pres- 
ent case), matter is the most inconsiderable part of the universe. 
The reason is, because he admits empty space, besides matter; and 
because, according to his notions, matter fills up only a very small 
part of space. But Democritus and Epicurus maintained the 
same thing : they differed from Sir Isaac Newton, only as to the 
quantity of matter; and perhaps they believed there was more 
matter in the world, than Sir Isaac Newton will allow : wherein I. 
think their opinion ought to be preferred ; for, the more matter 
there is, the more God has occasion to exercise his wisdom and 
power. Which is one reason, among others, why I maintain that 
there is no vacuum at all. 

3. I find, in express words, in the Appendix to Sir Isaac New- 
tons Optics, that space is the sensorium of God. But the word 
sensorium hath always signified the organ of sensation. He, and 
his friends, may now, if they think fit, explain themselves quite 
otherwise : I shall not be against it. 

4. The author supposes that the presence of the soul is sufficient 
to make it perceive what passes in the brain. But this is the very 
thing which Father Malebranche, and all the Cartesians deny; 
and they rightly deny it. More is requisite besides bare presence, 
to enable one thing to perceive what passes in another. Some 
communication, that may be explained ; some sort of influence, is 
requisite for this purpose. Space, according to Sir Isaac Newton, 
is intimately present to the body contained in it, and commensu- 
rate with it. Does it follow from thence, that space perceives what 
passes in a body ; and remembers it, when that body is gone away ? 
Besides, the soul being indivisible, it's immediate presence, which 
may be imagined in the body, would only be in one point. How 
then could it perceive what happens out of that point ? I pretend 



332 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LPIBXITZ. 

to be the first who has shown how the soiil perceives what passes 
in the body. 

5. The reason why God perceives every thing, is not his bare 
presence, but also his operation. 'Tis because he preserves things 
by an action, which continually produces whatever is good and 
perfect in them. But the soul having no immediate influence 
over the body, nor the body over the soul, their mutual corres- 
pondence cannot be explained by their being present to each other. 

6. The true and principal reason why we commend a machine, 
is rather grounded upon the effects of the machine, than upon its 
cause. We don't enquire so much about the power of the artist, 
as we do about his skill in his workmanship. And therefore the 
reason alleged by the author for extolling the machine of God's 
making, grounded upon his having made it entirely, without want- 
ing any materials to make it of: that reason, I say. is not suffi- 
cient. 'Tis a mere shift the author has been forced to have recourse 
to: and the reason why God exceeds any other artist is not only 
because he makes the whole, whereas all other artists must have- 
matter to work upon. This excellency in God. would be only on 
the account of power. But God's excellency arises also from 
another cause, viz; wisdom, whereby his machine lasts longer, and 
moves more regularly, than those of any other artist whatsoever. 
He who buys a watch, does not mind whether the workman made 
every part, of it himself, or whether he got the several parts made 
by others, and did only put them together; provided the watch 
goes right. And if the workman had received from God even the 
gift of creating the matter of the wheels : yet the buyer of the 
watch would not be satisfied, unless the workman had also received 
the gift of putting them well together. In like manner, he who 
will be pleased with God's workmanship, cannot be so. without 
some other reason than that which the author has here alleged. 

7. Thus the skill of God must not be inferior to that of a work- 
man : nay. it must go infinitely beyond it. The bare production 
of every thing, would indeed show the power of God: but it 
would not sufficiently show his wisdom. They who maintain the 
contrary, will fall exactly into the error of the 'materialists, and of 
Spinoza, from "whom they profess to differ. They would, in such 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



333 



case, acknowledge power, but not sufficient wisdom, in the princi- 
ple or cause of all things. 

8. I do not say, the material world is a machine, or watch, that 
goes without God's interposition; and I have sufficiently insisted, 
that the creation wants to be continually influenced by its Creator. 
But I maintain it to be a watch, that goes ivithout wanting to be 
mended by him : otherwise we must say, that God bethinks himself 
again. JSTo; God has foreseen everything; he has provided a 
remedy for everything beforehand; there is in his works a har- 
mony, a beauty, already ^reestablished. 

9. This opinion does not exclude God's providence, or his 
government of the world : on the contrary, it makes it perfect. A 
true providence of God, requires a perfect foresight. But then it 
requires, moreover, not only that he should have foreseen every- 
thing ; but also that he should have provided for everything before* 
hand, with proper remedies : otherwise, he must want either wis- 
dom, to foresee things, or power to provide against them. He will 
be like the God of the Socinians, who lives only from day to day, 
as Mr. Jurieu says. Indeed God, according to the Socinians, does 
not so much as foresee inconveniences ; whereas, the gentlemen I 
am arguing with, who put him upon mending his work, say only, 
that he does not provide against them. But this seems to me to 
be still a very great imperfection. According to this doctrine, 
God must want either power, or good will. 

10. I don't think I can be rightly blamed, for saying that God 
is intelligentia supramundana. Will they say, that he is intelli- 
gentia mundana; that is, the soid of the ivorld? I hope not. 
However, they will do well to take care not to fall into that notion 
unawares. 

11. The comparison of a king, under whose reign everything 
should go on without his interposition, is by no means to the 
present purpose ; since God preserves everything continually, and 
nothing can subsist without him. His kingdom therefore is not a 
nominal one. 'Tis just as if one should say, that a king, who 
should originally have taken care to have his subjects so well 
educated, and should, by his care in providing for their substance, 
preserve them so well in their fitness for their several stations, and 



334 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

in their good affection towards him, as that he should have no 
occasion ever to he amending anything amongst them, would he 
only a nominal king. 

12. To conclude. If God is obliged to mend the course of 
nature from time to time, it must he done either supernaturally 
or naturally. If it be done supernaturally, we must have recourse 
to miracles, in order to explain natural things: which is reducing 
an hypothesis ad absurd urn: for, everything may easily be 
accounted for by miracles. But if it be done naturally, then God 
will not be intelligentia supramundana : he will be compre- 
hended under the nature of things; that is. he will be the soul of 
the world. 



Me. Leibxitz's Thibd Papee : Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 

Second Reply. 

1. According to the usual way of speaking, mathematical 
principles concern only mere mathematics, viz : numbers, figures, 
arithmetic, geometry. But metaphysical principles concern more 
general notions, such as are cause and effect 

2. The author grants me this important principle; that nothing 
happens without a sufficient reason, why it should be so, rather 
than otherwise. But he grants it only in icords and in reality 
denies it. "Which shows that he does not fully perceive the 
strength of it. And therefore he makes use of an instance, which 
exactly falls in with one of my demonstrations against real absolute 
space, which is an idol of some modem Englishmen. I call it an 
idol, not in a theological sense, but in a philosophical one; as 
Chancellor Bacon says, that there are idola trihus, idola specus. 

3. These gentlemen maintain therefore, that spa-ce is a real 
absolute being. But this involves them in great difficulties; for 
such a being must needs be eternal and infinite. Hence some have 
believed it to be God himself, or, one of his attributes, his immen- 
sity. But since space consists of parts, it is not a thing which 
can belong to God. 

1. As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I 
hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; that I hold 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 335 

it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. 
For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which 
exist at the same time, considered as existing together; without 
inquiring into their particular manner of existing. And when 
many things are seen together, one perceives that order of things 
among themselves. 

5. I have many demonstrations, to confute the fancy of those 
who take space to be a substance, or at least an absolute being. 
But I shall only use, at the present, one demonstration, which the 
author here gives me occasion to insist upon. I say then, that if 
space was an absolute being, there would something happen, for 
which it would be impossible there should be a sufficient reason. 

Which is against my Axiom. And I can prove it thus. Space is 
something absolutely uniform; and, without the things placed in 
it, one point of space does not absolutely differ in any respect 
whatsoever from another point of space. Now from hence it fol- 
lows, (supposing space to be something in itself, besides the order 
of bodies among themselves,) that 'tis impossible there should be a 
reason, why God, preserving the same situations of bodies among 
themselves, should have placed them in space after one certain par- 
ticular manner, and not otherwise; why everything was not placed 
the quite contrary way, for instance, by changing east into west. 
But if space is nothing else, but that order or relation; and is 
nothing at all without bodies, but the possibility of placing them; 
then those two states, the one such as it now is, the other sup- 
posed to be the quite contrary way, would not at all differ from one 
another. Their difference therefore is only to be found in our 
chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in 
truth the one would exactly be the same thing as the other, they 
being absolutely indiscernible ; and consequently there is no room 
to enquire after a reason of the preference of the one to the other. 

6. The case is the same with respect to time. Supposing any 
one should ask, why God did not create everything a year sooner; 
and the same person should infer from thence, that God has done 
something, concerning which 'tis not possible there should be a 
reason, why he did it so, and not otherwise : the answer is, that his 
inference would be right, if time was any thing distinct from things 



336 PHXLOSOPHICAI. ^VOEKS OP LELBXITZ. 

existing in rime. For it would be impossible there should be any 
:n, why things should be applied to such particular instants, 
rather than to others, their succession continuing the same. But 
then the same argument proves, that instants, considered without 
the things, are nothing at all; and that they consist only in the 
successive order of things : which order remaining the same, one of 
the two states, viz. that of a supposed anticipation, would not at all 
diner, nor could be discerned from, the other which now is. 

7. It appears from what I have said, that my axiom has not been 
well understood: and that the author denies it. tho' he seems to 
grant it. 'Tis true, says he. that there is nothing without a suf- 
rd reason why it is. and why it is thus, rather than otherwise: 
but he adds, that this sufficient reason, is often the simple or mere 
will of God: as. when it is asked why matter was not placed other- 
wise in space : the same situations of bodies among themselves 
being preserved. But this is plainly maintaining, that God wills 
something, without any suffici I ■son for his will: against the 
axiom, or the general rule of whatever happens. This is falling 
back into the loose indifference, which I have confuted at large, 
and showed to be absolutely chimerical even in creatures, and con- 
trary to the wisdom of God. as if he could operate without acting 
by reason. 

S. The author objects against me. that if we don't admit this 
simple and mere will, we take away from God the power of choos- 
and bring in a fatality. But the quite contrary is true. I 
maintain that God has the power of choosing, since I ground that 
power upon the reason of a choice agreeable to his wisdom. And 
"tis not this fatality, (which is only the wisest order of Provi- 
dence) but a blind fatality or necessity, void of all wisdom and 
choice, which we ought to avoid. 

9. I had observed, that by lessening the quantity of matter, the 
quantity of objects, upon which God may exercise his goodness, 
will be lessen'd. The author answers, that instead of matter, there 
are other things in the void space, on which God may exercise 
his goodness. Be it so : tho" I don't grant it ; for I hold that every 
created substance is attended with matter. However, let it be so: 
I answer, that more matter was consistent with those same things : 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



337 



and consequently the said objects will be still lessened. The 
instance of a greater number of men, or animals, is not to the pur- 
pose; for they would fill up place, in exclusion of other things. 

10. It will be difficult to make me believe, that sensorium does 
not, in its usual meaning, signify an organ of sensation. See the 
words of Rudolphus Goclenius, in his Dictionarium Philosoph- 
icum; v. sensiterium. Barb arum Scholasticorum, says he, qui 
interdum sunt Simice Grcecorum. Hi dicunt ' AtOrjrrjpLov. Ex 
quo illi fecerunt sensiterium pro sensorio, id est, organo sensationis. 

11. The mere presence of a substance, even an animated one, is 
not sufficient for perception. A blind man, and even a man whose 
thoughts are wandering, does not see. The author must explain, 
how the soul perceives what is without itself. 

12. God is not present to things by situation, but by essence: 
his presence is manifest by his immediate operation. The pres- 
ence of the soul is quite of another nature. To say that it is dif- 
fused all over the body, is to make it extended and divisible. To 
say it is, the whole of it, in every part of the body, is to make it 
divided from itself. To fix it to a point, to diffuse it all over many 
points, are only abusive expressions, idola tribus. 

13. If active force should diminish in the universe, by the nat- 
ural laws which God has established ; so that there should be need 
for him to give a new impression in order to restore that force, like 
an artist's mending the imperfections of his machine ; the disorder 
would not only be with respect to us, but also with respect to God 
himself. He might have prevented it, and taken better measures 
to avoid such an inconvenience: and therefore, indeed, he has 
actually done it. 

14. When I said that God has provided remedies beforehand 
against such disorders, I did not say that God suffers disorders to 
happen, and then finds remedies for them ; but that he has found a 
way beforehand to prevent any disorders happening. 

15. The author strives in vain to criticize my expression, that 
God is intelligentia supramundana. To say that God is above the 
world, is not denying that he is in the world. 

16. I never gave any occasion to doubt, but that God's conser- 
vation is an actual preservation and continuation of the beings, 

22 



338 PHILOSOPHICAL, WORKS OF LEIBXTTZ. 

powers, orders, dispositions, and motions of all things : and I think 
I have perhaps explained it better than many others. But, says 
the author, this is all that I contended for. To this I answer; 
your humble servant for that, sir. Our dispute consists in many 
other things. The question is, whether God does not act in the 
most regular and most perfect manner? whether his machine is- 
liable to disorder, which he is obliged to mend by extraordinary 
means ? whether the will of God can act without reason ? whether 
space is an absolute being ? also concerning the nature of miracles; 
and many such things, which make a wide difference between us. 
17. Divines will not grant the author's position against me, viz. 
that there is no difference, with respect to God, between natural 
and supernatural: and it will be still less approved by most philos- 
ophers. There is a vast difference between these two things ; but it 
plainly appears, it has not been duly consider'd. That which is 
supernatural exceeds all the powers of creatures. I shall give an 
instance, which I have often made use of with good success. If 
God would cause a body to move free in the cether round about a 
certain fixed center, without any other creature acting upon it : I 
say, it could not be done without a miracle; since it cannot be 
explained by the nature of bodies. Tor, a free body does naturally 
recede from a curve in the tangent. And therefore I maintain, 
that the attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous 
thing, since it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies. 



Mr. Leibxttz's Fourth Paper ; Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 

Third Reply. 

1. In things absolutely indifferent, there is no [foundation for] 
choice ; and consequently no election, nor will ; since choice must 
be founded on some reason, or principle. 

2. A mere will without any motive, is a fiction, not only con- 
trary to God's perfection, but also chimerical and contradictory; 
inconsistent with the definition of the will, and sufficiently con- 
futed in my Theodiccea. 

3. 'Tis a thing indifferent, to place three bodies, equal and per- 
fectly alike, in any order whatsoever ; and consequently they will 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 339 

never be placed in any order, by him who does nothing without 
wisdom. But then, he being the author of things, no such things 
will be produced by him at all ; and consequently there are no 
such things in nature. 

4. There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible 'from 
each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discours- 
ing with me, in the presence of her Electoral Highness the Princess 
Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen, thought he could find 
two leaves perfectly alike. The princess defied him to do it, and 
he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some ; but it 
was to no purpose. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed with a 
microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other. This is 
an argument against atoms; which are confuted, as well as a 
vacuum, by the principles of true metaphysics. 

5. Those great principles of a sufficient reason, and of the iden- 
tity of indiscernibles, change the state of metaphysics. That 
science becomes real and demonstrative by means of these princi- 
ples ; whereas before, it did generally consist in empty words. 

6. To supj)ose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same- 
thing under two names. And therefore to suppose that the uni- 
verse could have had at first another position of time and place, 
than that which it actually had ; and yet that all the parts of the 
universe should have had the same situation among themselves, as 
that which they actually had; such a supposition, I say, is an 
impossible fiction. 

7. The same reason, which shows that extramundane space is 
imaginary, proves that all empty space is an imaginary thing ; for 
they differ only as greater and less. 

8. If space is a property or attribute, it must be the property of 
some substance. But what substance will that bounded empty 
space be an affection or property of, which the persons I am argu- 
ing with, suppose to be between two bodies ? 

9. If infinite space is immensity, finite space will be the opposite 
to immensity, that is, 'twill be mensur ability , or limited extension. 
ISTow extension must be the affection of some thing extended. But 
if that space be empty, it will be an attribute without a subject, an 
extension without any thing extended. Wherefore by making 



340 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

space a 'property, the author falls in with my opinion, which makes 
it an order of things, and not any thing absolute. 

10. If space is an absolute reality ; far from being a property or 
an accident opposed to substance, it will have a greater reality than 
substances themselves. God cannot destroy it, nor even change it 
in any respect. It will be not only immense in the whole, but also 
immutable and eternal in every part. There will be an infinite 
number of eternal things besides God. 

11. To say that infinite space has no parts, is to say that it does 
not consist of finite spaces ; and that infinite space might subsist, 
though all finite space should be reduced to nothing. It would be, 
as if one should say, in the Cartesian supposition of a material 
extended unlimited world, that such a world might subsist, though 
all the bodies of which it consists, should be reduced to nothing. 

12. The author ascribes parts to space, p. 19 of the 3d edition of 
his Defense of the Argument against Mr. Dodivell; and makes 
them inseparable one from another. But, p. 30 of his Second 
Defense, he says they are parts improperly so-called: which may 
be understood in a good sense. 

13. To say that God can cause the whole universe to move for- 
ward in a right line, or in any other line, without making other- 
wise any alteration in it, is another chimerical supposition. For, 
two states indiscernible from each other, are the same state; and 
consequently, 'tis a change without any change. Besides, there is 
neither rhyme nor reason in it. But God does nothing without 
reason; and 'tis impossible there should be any here, besides, it 
would be agendo nihil agere, as I have just now said, because of 
the indiscernibility. 

14. These are idola tribiis, mere chimeras, and superficial 
imaginations. All this is only grounded upon the supposition, that 
imaginary space is real. 

15. It is a like fiction, (that is) an impossible one, to suppose 
that God might have created the world some millions of years 
sooner. They who run into such kind of fictions, can give no 
answer to one that should argue for the eternity of the world. For 
since God does nothing without reason, and no reason can be given 
why he did not create the world sooner; it will follow, either that 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 341 

he has created nothing at all, or that he created the world before 
any assignable time, that is, that the world is eternal. But when 
once it has been shown, that the beginning, whenever it was, is 
always the same thing; the question, why it was not otherwise 
ordered, becomes needless and insignificant. 

16. If space and time were anything absolute, that is, if they 
were anything else, besides certain orders of things ; then indeed 
my assertion would be a contradiction. But since it is not so, the 
hypothesis [that space and time are anything absolute] is contra- 
dictory, that is, 'tis an impossible fiction. 

17. And the case is the same as in geometry ; where by the very 
supposition that a figure is greater than it really is, we sometimes 
prove that it is not greater. This indeed is a contradiction; but it 
lies in the hypothesis, which appears to be false for that very 
reason. 

18. Space being uniform, there can be neither any external nor 
internal reason, by which to distinguish its parts, and to make any 
choice among them. For, any external reason to discern between 
them, can only be grounded upon some internal one. Otherwise 
we should discern what is indiscernible, or choose without discern- 
ing. A will without reason, would be the chance of the Epicu- 
reans. A God, who should act by such a will, would be a God only 
in name. The cause of these errors proceeds from want of care to 
avoid what derogates from the divine perfections. 

19. When two things which cannot both be together, are equally 
good; and neither in themselves, nor by their combination with 
other things, has the one any advantage over the other; God will 
produce neither of them. 

20. God is never determined by external things, but always by 
what is in himself ; that is, by his knowledge of things, before any 
thing exists without himself. 

21. There is no possible reason, that can limit the quantity of 
matter; and therefore such limitation can have no place. 

22. And supposing an arbitrary limitation of the quantity of 
matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And 
from the perfection of those things which do already exist ; and 
consequently something must always be added, in order to act 



342 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

according to the principle of the perfection of the divine opera- 
tions. 

23. And therefore it cannot be said, that the present quantity of 
matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And 
supposing it were, it would follow that this present constitution of 
things would not be the fittest absolutely, if it hinders God from 
using more matter. It were therefore better to choose another con- 
stitution of things, capable of something more. 

24. T should be glad to see a passage of any philosopher, who 
takes sensorium in any other sense than Goclenius does. 

25. If Scapula says that sensorium is the place in which the 
understanding resides, he means by it the organ of internal sensa- 
tion. And therefore he does not differ from Goclenius. 

26. Sensorium has always signified the organ of sensation. 
The glandula penealis would be, according to Cartesius, the sen- 
sorium, in the above-mentioned sense of Scapula. 

27. There is hardly any expression less proper upon this subject, 
than that which makes God to have a sensorium. It seems to make 
God the soul of the world. And it will be a hard matter to put a 
justifiable sense upon this word, according to the use Sir Isaac 
Newton makes of it. 

28. Though the question be about the sense put upon that word 
by Sir Isaac Newton, and not by Goclenius; yet I am not to blame 
for quoting the philosophical dictionary of that author, because the 
design of dictionaries is to show the use of words. 

29. God perceives things in himself. Space is the place of 
things, and not the place of God's ideas: unless we look upon 
space as something that makes an union between God and things, 
in imitation of the imagined union between the soul and the body ; 
which would still make God the soul of the ivorld. 

30. And indeed the author is much in the wrong, when he com- 
pares God's knowledge and operation, with the knowledge and 
operation of souls. The soul knows things, because God has put 
into it a principle representative of things without^ But God 
knows things, because he produces them continually. 

31. The soul does not act upon things, according to my opinion, 
any otherwise than because the body adapts itself to the desires of 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



343 



the soul, by virtu© of the harmony, which God has preestablished 
between them. 

32. But they who fancy that the soul can give a new force to the 
body ; and that God does the same in the world, in order to mend 
the imperfections of his machine; make God too much like the 
soul, by ascribing too much to the soul, and too little to God. 

33. For, none but God can give a new force to nature; and he 
does it only supernaturally. If there was need for him to do it in 
the natural course of things ; he would have made a very imper- 
fect work. At that rate, he would be with respect to the world, 
what the soul, in the vulgar notion, is with respect to the body. 

34. Those who undertake to defend the vulgar opinion concern- 
ing the soul's influence over the body, by instancing in God's 
operating on things external ; make God still too much like a soul 
of the world. To which I add, that the author's affecting to find 
fault with the words, intelligentia supramundana, seems also to 
incline that way. 

35. The images, with which the soul is immediately affected, are 
within itself; but they correspond to those of the body. The 
presence of the soul is imperfect, and can only be explained by that 
correspondence. But the presence of God is perfect, and mani- 
fested by his operation. 

36. The author wrongly supposes against me, that the presence 
of the soul is connected with its influence over the body; for he 
knows, I reject that influence. 

37. The soul's being diffused through the brain, is no less inex- 
plicable, than its being diffused through the whole body. The 
difference is only in more and less. 

38. They who fancy that active force lessens of itself in the 
world, do not well understand the principal laws of nature, and the 
beauty of the works of God. 

39. How will they be able to prove, that this defect is a conse- 
quence of the dependence of things ? 

40. The imperfection of our machines, which is the reason why 
they want to be mended, proceeds from this very thing, that they 
do not sufficiently depend upon the workman. ' And therefore the 
dependence of nature upon God, far from being the cause of such 



344 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

an imperfection, is rather the reason why there is no such imper- 
fection in nature, because it depends so much upon an artist, who 
is too perfect to make a work that wants to be mended. 'Tis true 
that every particular machine of nature, is, in some measure, liable 
to be disordered; but not the whole universe, which cannot 
diminish in perfection. 

41. The author contends, that space does not depend upon the 
situation of bodies. I answer: 'Tis true, it does not depend upon 
such or such a situation of bodies ; but it is that order, which 
renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a 
situation among themselves when they exist together; as time is 
that order, with respect to their successive position. But if there 
were no creatures, space and time would be only in the ideas of 
God. 

42. The author seems to acknowledge here, that his notion of a 
miracle is not the same with that- which divines and philosophers 
usually have. It is therefore sufficient for my purpose, that my 
adversaries are obliged to have recourse to what is commonly called 
a miracle. 

43. I am afraid the author, by altering the sense commonly put 
upon the word miracle, will fall into an inconvenient opinion. 
The nature of a miracle does not at all consist in usefulness or 
unusefulness : for then monsters would be miracles. 

44. There are miracles of an inferior sort, which an angel can 
work. He can, for instance, make a man walk upon the water 
without sinking. But there are miracles, which none but God can 
work; they exceeding all natural powers. 'Of which kind, are 
creating and annihilating. 

45. 'Tis also a supernatural thing, that bodies should attract one 
another at a distance, without any intermediate means ; and that a 
body should move around, without receding in the tangent, though 
nothing hinder it from so receding. For these effects cannot be 
explained by the nature of things. 

46. Why should it be impossible to explain the motion of ani- 
mals by natural forces ? Though indeed, the beginning of animals 
is no less inexplicable by natural forces, than the beginning of 
the world. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



345 



P. S. — All those who maintain a vacuum, are more influenced 
by imagination than by reason. When I was a young man, I also 
gave in to the notion of a vacuum and atoms; but reason brought 
me into the right way. It was a pleasing imagination. Men carry 
their inquiries no farther than those two things : they (as it were) 
nail down their thoughts to them : they fancy, they have found out 
the first elements of things, a rum plus ultra. We would have 
nature to go no farther; and to be finite, as our minds are: but 
this is being ignorant of the greatness and majesty of the author 
of things. The least corpuscle is actually subdivided in infinitum, 
and contains a world of other creatures, which would be wanting 
in the universe, if that corpuscle was an atom, that is, a body of 
one entire piece without subdivision. In like manner, to admit 
a vacuum in nature, is ascribing to God a very imperfect work: 
'tis violating the grand principle of the necessity of a sufficient 
reason; which many have talked of, without understanding its 
true meaning; as I have lately shown, in proving, by that prin- 
ciple, that space is only an order of things as time also is, and not 
at all an absolute being. To omit many other arguments against 
a vacuum and atoms, I shall here mention those which I ground 
upon God's perfection, and upon the necessity of a sufficient 
reason. I lay it down as a principle, that every perfection, which 
God could impart to things without derogating from their other 
perfections, has actually been imparted to them. JSTow, let us 
fancy a space wholly empty. God could have placed some matter 
in it, without derogating in any respect from all other things: 
therefore he hath actually placed some matter in that space: 
therefore, there is no space wholly empty: therefore all is full. 
The same argument proves that there is no corpuscle, but what is 
subdivided. I shall add another argument, grounded upon the 
necessity of a sufficient reason. 'Tis impossible there should be 
any principle to determine what proportion of matter there ought 
to be, out of all the possible degrees from a plenum to a vacuum, 
or from a vacuum to a plenum. Perhaps it will be said, that the 
one should be equal to the other : but, because matter is more 
perfect than a vacuum, reason requires that a geometrical pro- 
portion should be observed, and that there should be as much 



346 PHILOSOPHICAL WOBKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

more matter tlian vacuum, as the former deserves to have the 
preference before the latter. But then there must be no vacuum 
at all; for the perfection of matter is to that of a vacuum, as 
something to noth ing. And the case is the same with atoms: What 
reason can any one assign for confining nature in the progression 
of subdivision '. These are fictions merely arbitrary, and 
unworthy of true philosophy. The reasons alleged for a vacuum, 
are mere sophisms. 



aEb. Leibnitz's Fifth Papee : Being an answer to Dr. Clarke's 

Fourth Reply. 

To § 1 and 2, of the foregoing paper [Clarke's Fourth Reply]. 

1. I shall at this time make a larger answer ; to clear the difficul- 
ties ; and to try whether the author be willing to hearken to reason, 
and to show that he is a lover of truth; or whether he will only 
cavil, without clearing anything. 

2. He often endeavors to impute to me necessity and fatality; 
though perhaps no one has better and more fully explained, than I 
have done in my Theodicoea, the true difference between liberty, 
contingency, spontaneity, on the one side; and absolute necessity, 
chance, coaction. on the other. I know not yet, whether the author 
does this, because he will do it, whatever I may say ; or whether he 
does it, (supposing him sincere in those imputations,) because he 
has not yet duly considered my opinions. I shall soon find what I 
am to think of it, and I shall take mv measures accordino-lv. 

3. It is true, that reason in the mind of a wise being, and 
in 'Aires in any mind whatsoever, do that which answers to the 
effect produced by weights in a balance. The author objects, that 
this notion leads to necessity and fatality. But he says so, without 
proving it, and without taking notice of the explications I have 
formerly given, in order to remove the difficulties that may be 
raised upon that head. 

■A. He seems also to play with equivocal terms. There are neces- 
sities, which ought to be admitted. For we must distinguish 
between an absolute and an hypothetical necessity. "We must also 
distinguish between a necessity, which takes place because the 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



347 



opposite implies a contradiction ; (which necessity is called logical, 
metaphysical, or mathematical;) and a necessity which is moral, 
whereby a wise being chooses the best, aiid every mind follows the 
strongest inclination. 

5. Hypothetical necessity is that, which the supposition or 
hypothesis of God's foresight and pre-ordination lays upon future 
contingents. And this must needs be admitted, unless we deny, as 
the Socinians do, God's foreknowledge of future contingents, and 
his providence which regulates and governs every particular thing. 

6. But neither that foreknowledge, nor that pre-ordination, 
derogate from liberty. For God, being moved by his supreme 
reason to choose, among many series of things or worlds possible, 
that, in which free creatures should take such or such resolutions, 
though not without his concourse; has thereby rendered every 
event certain and determined once for all ; without derogating 
thereby from the liberty of those creatures : that simple decree of 
choice, not at all changing, but only actualizing their free natures, 
which he saw in his ideas. 

7. As for moral necessity, this also does not derogate from 
liberty. For when a wise being, and especially God, who has 
supreme wisdom, chooses what is best, he is not the less free upon 
that account : on the contrary, it is the most perfect liberty, not 
to be hindered from acting in the best manner. And when any 
other chooses according to the most apparent and the most strongly 
inclining good, he imitates therein the liberty of a truly wise 
being, in proportion to his disposition. Without this, the choice 
would be a blind chance. 

8. But good, either true or apparent; in a word, the motive, 
inclines without necessitating ; that is, without imposing an 
absolute necessity. * For when God (for instance) chooses the best ; 
what he does not choose, and is inferior in perfection, is neverthe- 
less possible. But if what he chooses, was absolutely necessary; 
any other way would be impossible : which is against the hypothe- 
sis. For God chooses among possibles, that is, among many ways, 
none of which implies a contradiction. 

9. But to say, that God can only choose what is best; and to 
infer from thence, that what he does not choose, is impossible ; 



348 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBNITZ. 

this, I say, is confounding of terms: 'tis blending power and will, 
metaphysical necessity and moral necessity, essences and existences. 
For what is necessary, is so by its essence, since the opposite 
implies a contradiction; but a contingent which exists, owes its 
existence to the principle of what is best, which is a sufficient 
reason for the existence of things. And therefore I say, that 
motives incline without necessitating ; and that there is a certainty 
and infallibility, but not an absolute necessity in contingent things. 
Add to this, what will be said hereafter, Xos. 73 and 76. 

10. And I have sufficiently shown in my Theodiccea, that this 
moral necessity is a good thing, agreeable to the divine perfection; 
agreeable to the great principle or ground of existences, which is 
that of the want of a sufficient reason: whereas absolute and 
metaphysical necessity, depends upon the other great principle of 
our reasonings, viz. that of essences; that is, the principle of iden- 
tity or contradiction : for what is absolutely necessary, is the only 
possible way, and its contrary implies a contradiction. 

11. I have also shown, that our will does not always exactly 
follow the practical understanding ; because it may have or find 
reasons to suspend its resolution till a further examination. 

12. To impute to me after this, the notion of an absolute 
necessity, without having anything to say against the reasons which 
I have just now alleged, and which go to the bottom of things, 
perhaps beyond what is to be seen elsewhere; this, I say, will be 
an unreasonable obstinacy. 

13. As to the notion of fatality, which the author lays also to 
my charge; this is another ambiguity. There is a fatum Maliom- 
etanum, a fatum Stoicum, and a fatum Christianum. The Turkish 
fate will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be 
avoided ; as if there was an absolute necessity. The Stoical fate 
will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience whether 
he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. 
But 'tis agreed, that there is fatum Christianum, a certain destiny 
of every thing, regulated by the foreknowledge and providence of 
God. Fatum is derived from fori; that is to pronounce, to decree; 
and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of providence. And 
those who submit to it through a knowledge of the divine perfec- 
tions, whereof the love of God is a consequence, have not only 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



349 



patience, like the heathen philosophers, but are also contented with 
what is ordained by God, knowing he does every thing for the best ; 
and not only for the greatest good in general, but also for the 
greatest particular good of those who love him. 

14. I have been obliged to enlarge, in order to remove ill- 
grounded imputations once for all ; as I hope I shall be able to do 
by these explications, so as to satisfy equitable persons. I shall 
now come to an objection raised here, against my comparing the 
weights of a balance with the motives of the will. 'Tis objected, 
that a balance is merely passive and moved by the weights ; 
whereas agents intelligent, and endowed with will, are active. To 
this I answer, that the principle of the ivant of a sufficient reason 
is common both to agents and patients: they want a sufficient 
reason of their action, as well as of their passion. A balance does 
not only act, when it is equally pulled on both sides; but the 
equal weights likewise do not act when they are in an equilibrium, 
so that one of them cannot go down without the other's rising up as 
much. 

15. It must also be considered, that, properly speaking, motives 
do not act upon the mind, as weights do upon a balance; but 'tis 
rather the mind that acts by virtue of the motives, which are its 
dispositions to act. And therefore to pretend, as the author does 
here, that the mind prefers sometimes weak motives to 1 strong ones, 
and even that it prefers that which is indifferent before motives: 
this, I say, is to divide the mind from the motives, as if they were 
without the mind, as the weight is distinct from the balance ; and 
as if the mind had, besides motives, other dispositions to act, by 
virtue of which it could reject or accept the motives. Whereas, in 
truth, the motives comprehend all the dispositions, which the mind 
can have to act voluntarily ; for they include not only the reasons, 
but also the inclinations arising from passions, or other preceding 
impressions. Wherefore, if the mind should prefer a weak incli- 
nation to a strong one, it would act against itself, and otherwise 
than it is disposed to act. Which shows that the author's notions, 
contrary to mine, are superficial, and appear to have no solidity in 
them, when they are well considered. 

16. To assert also, that the mind may have good reasons to act, 
when it has no motives, and when things are absolutely indifferent, 



350 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

as the author explains himself here; this, I say, is a manifest con- 
tradiction. For if the mind has good reasons for taking the part 
it takes, then the things are not indifferent to the mind. 

17. And to affirm that the mind will act, when it has reasons to 
act, even though the ways of acting were absolutely indifferent: 
this, I say, is to speak again very superficially, and in a manner 
that cannot be defended. For a man never has a sufficient reason 
to act, when he has not also a sufficient reason to act in a certain 
particular manner; every action being individual, and not general, 
nor abstract from its circumstances, but always needing some par- 
ticular way of being put in execution. Wherefore, when there is 
a sufficient reason to do any particular thing, there is also a suffi- 
cient reason to do it in a certain particular manner; and conse- 
quently, several manners of doing it are not indifferent. As often 
as a man has sufficient reasons for a single action, he has also suffi- 
cient reasons for all its requisites. See also what I shall say below, 
No. 66. 

18. These arguments are very obvious: and 'tis very strange to 
charge me with advancing my principle of the want of a sufficient 
reason, without any proof drawn either from the nature of things, 
or from the divine perfections. For the nature of things requires, 
that every event should have beforehand its proper conditions, 
requisites, and dispositions, the existence whereof makes the suffi- 
cient reason of such event. 

19. And God's perfection requires, that all his actions should be 
agreeable to his wisdom ; and that it may not be said of him, that 
he has acted without reason; or even that he has preferred a 
weaker reason before a stronger. 

20. But I shall speak more largely at the conclusion of this 
paper, concerning the solidity and importance of this great prin- 
ciple, of the want of a sufficient reason in order to every event ; the 
overthrowing of which principle, would overthrow the best part of 
all philosophy. 'Tis therefore very strange that the author should 
say, I am herein guilty of a petitio principii; and it plainly 
appears he is desirous to maintain indefensible opinions, since he is 
reduced to deny that great principle, which is one of the most 
essential principles of reason. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



351 



To § 3 and 4. 

21. It must be confessed, that though this great principle has 
been acknowledged, yet it has not been sufficiently made use of. 
"Which is, in great measure, the reason why the prima philosophia 
has not been hitherto so fruitful and demonstrative, as it should 
have been. I infer from that principle, among other consequences, 
that there are not in nature two real, absolute beings, indiscernible 
from each other ; because if there were, God and nature would act 
without reason, in ordering the one otherwise than the other ; and 
that therefore God does not produce two pieces of matter perfectly 
equal and alike. The author answers this conclusion, without con- 
futing the reason of it; and he answers with a very weak objec- 
tion. . That argument, says he, if it ivas good, would prove that it 
would be impossible for God to create any matter at all. For, the 
perfectly solid parts of matter, if we take them of equal figure and 
dimensions, (which is always possible in supposition), would be 
exactly alike. But 'tis a manifest petitio principii to suppose that 
perfect likeness, which, according to me, cannot be admitted. This 
supposition of two indiscernibles, such as two pieces of matter per- 
fectly alike, seems indeed to be possible in abstract terms ; but it 
is not consistent with the order of things, nor with the divine wis- 
dom, by which nothing is admitted without reason. The vulgar 
fancy such things, because they content themselves with incomplete 
notions. And this is one of the faults of the atomists. 

22. Besides ; I don't admit in matter, parts perfectly solid, or 
that are the same throughout, without any variety or particular 
motion in their parts, as the pretended atoms are imagined to be. 
To suppose such bodies, is another popular opinion ill-grounded. 
According to my demonstrations, every part of matter is actually 
subdivided into parts differently moved, and no one of them is per- 
fectly like another. 

23. I said, that in sensible things, two, that are indiscernible 
from each other, can never be found ; that (for instance) two 
leaves in a garden, or two drops of water, perfectly alike, are not 
to be found. The author acknowledges it as to leaves, and perhaps 
as to drops of water. But he might have admitted it, with- 
out any hesitation, without a perhaps, (an Italian would say, 
senzd forse,) as to drops of water likewise. 



PHH.OSOPHICAI. WOEKS OF TTTTt TTT7. 

M. I believe Thai these .eneral observations in Things sensible, 
hold also in proportion in thing; and thai one niay say. 

in this res] eet. w hat Harlequ says in ilie Emperor of the Moon; 
there, just as 'tis here. And 'tis a great objection against 
indiscernible?; that no instance of them is to be found. But the 
author opposes this consequence, because (says he) sensible bodies 
are compounded; whereas he maintains there are insensible 
bodies vrhich are simple. I answer again that I dont admit 
simple bodies _-iere is nothing simple, in my opinion, but true 
monads, which have neither parr- noi extension Simple bodies, 
and even perfectly similar ones, are a consequence of the false 
hypothesis of a vacuum and of atoms, or of lazy philosophy, which 
does not sufficiently carry on the analysis of things, and fancies 
it san attain to lie first material elements of nature, because our 
imagination would be therewith satisfied. 

25. AVhen I deny that there are two drop- : water perfe: _ - 
alike, or any her bodies indiscernible from each other: I 

don't say. "tis absolutely impossible to suppose xheni: but thaT 'tis 
a thing contrary to the divine wisdom, and which consequently 
doe; n exist. 

T :• -• " . 

I _. that if two things perfectly indiscernible from each 
:• did exist, they would be two; but that supposition is false. 
and contrary to the grand principle of reason. The vulgar phi- 
losophers were mistaken, when they believed that there are things 
different solo numero, or only because they are two; and from 
this error have arisen their perplexities about what they called 
the principle of individuation. Metaphysics have generally been 
handled like a science of mere words, like a philosophical diction- 
ary, without entering into the discussion of things. Superficial 
philosophy, such as is that of the afomists and vacuists, forges 
things, which superior reasons do not admit. I hope my demon- 
- will change the face of philosophy, n twithstanding such 
weak objections as the author raises here against me. 

27. The parts of time or place, considered in themselves, are 
ideal things; and therefore they perfectly resemble one another. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 353 

like two abstract units. But it is not so with two concrete ones, or 
with two real times, or two spaces filled up, that is, truly actual. 

28. I don't say that two points of space are one and the same 
point, nor that two instants of time are one and the same instant, 
as the author seems to charge me with saying. But a man may 
fancy, for want of knowledge, that there are two different instants, 
where there is but one : in like manner as I observed in the 17th 
paragraph of the foregoing answer, that frequently in geometry 
we suppose two, in order to represent the error of a gainsayer, 
when there is really but one. If any man should suppose that 
a right line cuts another in two points ; it will be found after 
all, that those two pretended points must coincide, and make but 
one point. 

29. I have demonstrated, that space is nothing else but an order 
of the existence of things, observed as existing together ; and there- 
fore the fiction of a material finite universe, moving forward in an 
infinite empty space," cannot be admitted. It is altogether unrea- 
sonable and impracticable. For, besides that there is no real space 
out of the material universe ; such an action would be without any 
design in it ; it would be working without doing anything, agendo 
nihil agere. There would happen no change, which could be 
observed by any person whatsoever. These are imaginations of 
philosophers who have incomplete notions, who make space an 
absolute reality. Mere mathematicians, who are only taken up 
with the conceits of imagination, are apt to forge such notions ; 
but they are destroyed by superior reasons. 

30. Absolutely speaking, it appears that God can make the 
material universe finite in extension; but the contrary appears 
more agreeable to his wisdom. 

31. I don't grant, that every finite is movable. According to 
the hypothesis of my adversaries themselves, a part of space, 
though finite, is not movable. What is movable, must be capable 
of changing its situation with respect to something else, and to be 
in a new state discernible from the first: otherwise the change is 
but a fiction. A movable finite, must therefore make part of 
another finite, that any change may happen which can be observed. 

32. Cartesius maintains, that matter is unlimited ; and I don't 
think he has been sufficiently confuted. And though this be 

23 



354 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEXS OF LEIBNITZ. 

granted Mni. vet it does not follow that matter would be necessary. 
nor that it would have existed from all eternity; since that 
unlimited diffusion of matter, would only be an effect of God's 
choice judging that to be the better. 

To § 7. 

33. Since space in itself is an ideal thing, like time; space out 
of the world must needs be imaginary, as the schoolmen them- 
selves have acknowledged. The case is the same with empty space 
within the world; which I take also to be imaginary, for the 
reasons before alleged. 

34. The author objects against me the vacuum discovered by 
Mr. GueriJce of 2Ia-gdeburg, which is made by pumping the air 
out of a receiver; and he pretends that there is truly a. perfect 
vacuum, or a space without matter (at least in part), in that 
receiver. The Aristotelians and Cartesians, who do not admit a 
true vacuum, have said in answer to that experiment of Mr. 
GueriJce. as well as to that of Torricellius of Florence (who 
emptied the air out of a glass-tube by the help of cpiicksilver), 
that there is no vacuum at all in the tube or in the receiver: since 
glass has small pores, which the beams of light, the effluvia of the 
loadstone, and other rerj thin fluids may go through. I am of 
their opinion: and I think the receiver may be compared to 
a box full of holes in the water, having fish or other gross bodies 
shut up in it : which being taken out, their place would never- 
theless be filled up with water. There is only this difference : 
that though water be fluid and more yielding than those 
gross bodies, yet it is as heavy and massive, if not more, than 
they: whereas the matter which gets into the receiver in the 
room of the air. is much more subtile. The new sticklers for 
a vacuum allege in answer to this instauce. that it is not the gross- 
ness of matter, but its mere quantity, that makes resistance: and 
consequently that there is of necessity more vacuum, where there 
is less resistance. They add. that the subtileness of matters has 
nothing to do here; and that the particles of quid-silver are as 
subtile and fine as those of water; and yet that quicksilver resists 
above ten times more. To this I reply, that it is not so much the 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 355 

quantity of matter, as its difficulty of giving place, that makes 
resistance. For instance ; floating timber contains less of heavy 
matter, than an equal bulk of ivater does ; and yet it makes more 
resistance to a boat, than the water does. 

35. And as for quicksilver; 'tis true, it contains about fourteen 
times more of heavy matter, than an equal bulk of water does ; 
but it does not follow, that it contains fourteen times more matter 
absolutely.- On the contrary, ivater contains as much matter ; if 
we include both its own matter, which is heavy ; and the extrane- 
ous matter void of heaviness, which passes through its pores. For, 
both quicksilver and ivater are masses of heavy matter, full of 
pores, through which there passes a great deal of matter void of 
heaviness [and which does not sensibly resist] ; such as is 
probably that of the rays of light, and other insensible fluids ; and 
especially that which is itself the cause of the gravity of gross 
bodies, by receding from the center towards which it drives those 
bodies. For, it is a strange imagination to make all matter 
gravitate, and that towards all other matter, as if each body did 
equally attract every other body according to their masses and 
distances; and this by an attraction properly so called, which is 
not derived from an occult impulse of bodies : whereas the gravity 
of sensible bodies towards the center of the earth, ought to be 
produced by the motion of some fluid. And the case must be 
the same with other gravities, such as is that of the planets 
towards the sun or towards each other. [A body is never moved 
naturally except by another body which impels it by touching 
it; and afterwards it advances until it is stopped by another 
body which touches it. Every other operation on bodies is either 
miraculous or imaginary.] 

To § 8 and 9. 

36. I objected, that space, taken for something real and 
absolute without bodies, would be a thing eternal, impassible, and 
independent upon God. The author endeavors to elude this 
difficulty, by saying that space is a property of God. In answer 
to this, I have said, in my foregoing paper, that the property of 
God is immensity ; but that space (which is often commensurate 
with bodies), and God's immensity, are not the same thing. 



356 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

37. I objected further, that if space be a property, and infinite 
space be the immensity of God; finite space will be the extension 
or m en sur ability of something finite. And therefore the space 
taken up by a body, will be the extension of that body. Which is 
an absurdity: since a body can change space, but cannot leave its 
extension. 

38. I asked also: if space is a property, what thing will an 
empty limited space, (such as that which my adversary imagines 
in an exhausted receiver,) be the property of?" It does not appear 
reasonable to say, that this empty space either round or square, is 
a property of God. "Will it be then perhaps the property of some 
im m aterial, extended, imaginary substances, which the author 
seems to fancy in the imaginary spaces ? 

39. If space is the property or affection of the substance, which 
is in space; the same space will be sometimes the affection of one 
body, sometimes of another body, sometimes of an immaterial sub- 
stance, and sometimes perhaps of God himself, when it is void of 
all other substance material or immaterial. But this is a strange 
property or affection, which passes from one subject to another. 
Thus subjects will leave off their accidents, like clothes ; that other 
subjects may put them on. At this rate, how shall we distinguish 
accidents and substances ? 

40. And if limited spaces are the affections of limited sub- 
stances, which are in them: and infinite space be a property of 
God; a property of God must (which is very strange) be made 
up of the affections of creatures: for all finite spaces taken 
together make up infinite space. 

41. But if the author denies, that limited space is an affection 
of limited things: it will not be reasonable neither, that infinite 
space should be the affection or property of an infinite thing. I 
have suggested all these difficulties in my foregoing paper ; but it 
does not appear that the author has endeavored to answer them. 

4:2. I have still other reasons against this strange imagination, 
that space is a property of God. If it be so, space belongs to the 
essence of God. But space has parts: therefore there would be 
parts in the essence of God. Spectatum admissi. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 357 

43. Moreover, spaces are sometimes empty, and sometimes 
filled up. Therefore there will be in the essence of God, parts 
sometimes empty and sometimes full, and consequently liable to 
a perpetual change. Bodies, filling up space, would fill up part 
of God's essence, and would be commensurate with it ; and in the 
supposition of a vacuum, part of God's essence will be within 
the receiver. Such a God having parts, will very much resemble 
the Stoic's God, which was the whole universe considered as a 
divine animal. 

44. If infinite space is God's immensity, infinite time will be 
God's eternity; and therefore we must say, that what is in space, 
is in God's immensity, and consequently in his essence; and that 
what is in time, is also in the essence of God. Strange expres- 
sions ; which plainly show, that the author makes a wrong use of 
terms. 

45. I shall give another instance of this. God's immensity 
makes him actually present in all spaces. But now if God is in 
space, how can it be said that space is in God, or that it is a prop- 
erty of God ? We have often heard, that a property is in its sub- 
ject; but we never heard, that a subject is in its property. In 
like manner, God exists in all time. How then can time be in 
God ; and how can it be a property of God ? These are perpetual 
alloglossies. 

46. It appears that the author confounds immensity, or the 
extension of things, with the space according to which that exten- 
sion is taken. Infinite space is not the immensity of God ; finite 
space is not the extension of bodies : as time is not their duration. 
Things keep their extension, but they do not always keep their 
space. Everything has its own extension, its own duration; but 
it has not its own time, and does not keep its own space. 

47. I will here show, how men come to form to themselves the 
notion of space. They consider that many things exist at once, 
and they observe in them a certain order of co-existence, according 
to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less simple. 
This order is their situation or distance. When it happens that 
one of those co-existent things changes its relation to a multitude 
of others, which do not change their relation among themselves; 



" v PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF UETBXITZ. 

and that another thing, newly come, acquires the same relation to 
the. others, as the former had; we then say it is come into the 
place of the former: and this change, we call a motion in that 
body, wherein is the immediate cause of the change. And though 
many, or even all the co-existent things, should change according 
to certain known rules of direction and swiftness: yet one may 
always determine the relation of situation, which every co-existent 
acquires with respect to every other co-existent: and even that 
relation, which any other co-existent would have to this, or which 
this would have to any other, if it had not changed, or if it had 
changed any otherwise. And supposing, or feigning, that among 
those co-exist ents there is a suineient number of them, which have 
undergone no change: then we may say. that those which have 
such a relation to those fixed existents. as others had to them 
before, have now the same place which those others had. And 
that which comprehends all those places, is called space. Which 
shows, that in order to have an idea of place, and consequently 
of space, it is sufficient to consider these relations, and the rules 
of their changes, without needing to fancy any absolute reality 
out of the things whose situation we consider, and, to give a kind 
of definition: place is that, which we say is the same to A, and 
to B, when the relation of the co-existence of B, with C, E . F. G, 
&e. } i^ree- perfectly with the relation of the co-existence, which 
A had with the same C, E. F, G .. supposing there has been 
no cause of change in . E, F. G, drc. It might be said also, with- 
out entering into any further particularity, that place is that, 
which is the same in different moments to different existent 
things, when their relations of co-existence with certain other 
existents. which are supposed to continue fixed from one of those 
moments to the other, agree entirely together. And fixed existents 
are those, in which there has been no cause of any change of the 
order of their co-existence with others: or i' which is the same 
thing), in which there has been no motion. Lastly, space is that 
which results from places taken together. And here it may not be 
amiss to consider the difference between place, and the relation of 
situation, which is in the body that fills up the place. For. the 
place of JL and B, is the same; whereas the relation of J. to fixed 



LETTERS TO CLABKE. 



359 



bodies, is not precisely arid individually the same, as the rela- 
tion which B (that comes into its place) will have to the same 
fixed bodies; but these relations agree only. For two different 
subjects, as A and B, cannot have precisely the same individual 
affection; it being impossible, that the same individual accident 
should be in two subjects, or pass from one subject to another. 
But the mind not contented with an agreement, looks for an 
identity, for something that should be truly the same; and con- 
ceives it as being extrinsic to the subject : and this is what we here 
call place and space. But this can only be an ideal thing; con- 
taining a certain order, wherein the mind conceives the applica- 
tion of relations. In like manner, as the mind can fancy to itself 
an order made up of genealogical lines, whose bigness would con- 
sist only in the number of generations, wherein every person 
would have his place : and if to this one should add the fiction of 
a metempsychosis, and bring in the same human souls again ; the 
persons in those lines might change place; he who was a father, 
or a grand-father, might become a son, or a grand-son, &c. And 
yet those genealogical places, lines, and spaces, though they should 
express real truths, would only be ideal things. I shall allege 
another example, to show how the mind uses, upon occasion of 
accidents which are in subjects, to fancy to itself something 
answerable to those accidents, out of the subjects. The ratio or 
proportion between two lines L and M, may be conceived three 
several ways ; as a ratio of the greater L to the lesser M; as a 
ratio of the lesser M to the greater L; and lastly, as something- 
abstracted from both, that is, the ratio between L and M, without 
considering which is the antecedent, or which the consequent; 
which the subject, and which the object. And thus it is, that 
proportions are considered in music. In the first way of con- 
sidering them, L the greater; in the second, M the lesser, is the 
subject of that accident, which philosophers call relation. But, 
which of them will be the subject, in the third way of considering 
them ? It cannot be said that both of them, L and M together, 
are the subject of such an accident ; for if so, we should have 
an accident in two subjects, with one leg in one, and the other 
in the other ; which is contrary to the notion of accidents. There- 



860 - PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LELBXITZ. 

fore we must say that this relation, in this third way of consider- 
ing it. is indeed out of the snbjects ; but being neither a substance. 
nor an accident, it must be a mere ideal thing, the consideration 
of which is nererther— useful. To conclude: I hare here done 
much like Euclid, who not being able to make his readers well 
understand what ratio is absolutely in the sense of geometricians; 
defines what axe the same ratios. Thus, in lite manner, in order 
: :■ explain what place is, I hare been content to define what is the 
s Lastly : I observe, that the traces of movable bodies, 

which they leave sometimes upon the immovable ones on which 
they are moved; have given men occasion to form in their 
imagination such an idea, as if some trace did still remain, even 
when there is nothing unmoved. But this is a mere ideal thing, 
and imports only, that */ there was any unmoved thing there, the 
trace might be marked out upon it. And 'tis this analogy, which 
makes men fancy places, traces and spaces; though these things 
consist only in the truth of relations, and not at all in any absolute 
reali". 

48. To conclude. If the 5 pace (which the author fancies) void 
of all bodies, is not altogether empty: what is it Then full of '. Is 
it full of extended spirits perhaps, or immaterial substances, capa- 
ble of extending and contracting themselves : which move therein, 
and penetrate each other without any inconveniency. as the 
shadows of two bodies penetrate one another upon the surface of 
a wall ( Methinks I see the revival of the odd imaginations of 
Dr. H<: '■". " More (otherwise a learned and well-meaning man), 
and of some others, who fancied that those spirits can make them- 
ss impenetrable whenever they please. i^Tay. some have 
fancied, that man in the state of innocency, had also the gift 
of penetration; and that he became solid, opaque, and impene- 
trable by his fall. Is it hot overthrowing our notions of things, to 
make God have parts, to make spirits have extension i The prin- 
ciple of the want of a sufpc: son does alone drive away all 
these spectres of imagination. Men easily run into fictions, for 
want of making a right use of that great principle. 



LETTERS TO CLAEKE. 



To § 10. 



361 



49. It cannot be said, that [a certain] duration is eternal ; but 
that things, which continue always, are eternal, [by gaining 
always new duration.] Whatever exists of time and of duration, 
[being successive] perishes continually: and how can a thing 
exist eternally, which, (to speak exactly,) does never exist at all? 
For, how can a thing exist, whereof no part does ever exist? 
JSTothing of time does ever exist, but instants; and an instant is 
not even itself a part of time. Whoever considers these observa- 
tions, will easily apprehend that time can only be an ideal thing. 
And the analogy between time and space, will easily make it 
appear, that the one is as merely ideal as the other. [However, 
if by saying that the duration of a thing is eternal, is merely 
understood that it lasts eternally, I have no objection.] 

50. If the reality of space and time, is necessary to the immen- 
sity and eternity of God ; if God must be in space ; if being in 
space, is a property of God ; he will, in some measure, depend 
upon time and space, and stand in need of them. For I have 
already prevented that subterfuge, that space and time are [in 
God and as it were] 'properties of God. [Could the opinion which 
should affirm that bodies move about in the parts of the divine 
essence be maintained ?] 

To § 11 and 12. 

51. I objected that space cannot be in God, because it has parts. 
Hereupon the author seeks another subterfuge, by departing from 
the received sense of words ; maintaining that space has no parts, 
because its parts are not separable, and cannot be removed from 
one another by discerption. But 'tis sufficient that space has 
parts, whether those parts be separable or not; and they may be 
assigned in space, either by the bodies that are in it, or by lines 
and surfaces that may be drawn and described in it. 

To § 13. 

52. In order to prove that space, without bodies, is an absolute 
reality ; the author objected, that a finite material universe might 
move forward in space. I answered, it does not appear reasonable 



362 PHTLOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF JLEIBXtTZ. 

tliat the material universe should be finite; and. though we should 
suppose it to be finite; yet 'tis unreasonable it should have motion 
any otherwise, than as its parts change their situation among 
themselves; because such a motion would produce no change that 
could be observed, and would be without design, '"lis another 
thing, when its parts change their situation among themselves : 
for then there is a motion in space; but it consists in the order of 
relations which are changed. The author replies now. that the 
reality of motion does not depend upon being observed; and that 
a ship may go forward, and yet a man. who is iu the ship, may 
not perceive it. I answer, motion does not indeed depend upon 
being observed; but it does depend upon being possible to be 
observed. There is no motion, ^hen there is no change that can 
be observed. Aud when there is no change that can be observed. 
there is no change at all. The contrary opinion is grounded upon 
the supposition of a real absolute space, which I have demon- 
stratively confuted by the principle of the want of a sufficient 
reason of things. 

53. I find nothing in the eighth definition of the Mathematical 
Principles of Nature, nor in the scholium belonging to it, that 
proves, or can prove, the reality of space in itself. However. I 
grant there is a difference between an absolute true motion of a 
body, and a mere relative change of its situation with respect to 
another body. For when the immediate cause of the change is in 
the body, that body is truly in motion : and then the situation of 
other bodies, with respect to it. will be changed consequently, 
though the cause of that change be not in them. *Tis true that, 
exactly speaking, there is not any one body, that is perfectly and 
entirely at rest : but we will frame an abstract notion of rest, by 
considering the thing mathematically. Thus have I left nothing 
unanswered, of what has been alleged for the absolute reality of 
space. And I have demonstrated the falsehood of that reality, by 
a fundamental principle, one of the most certain both in reason 
and experience: against which, no exception or instance can be 
alleged. TTpon the whole, one may judge from what has been said, 
that I ought not to admit a movable universe; nor any place out 
of the material universe. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



!63 



To § 14. 

54. I am not sensible of any objection, but what I think I have 
sufficiently answered. As for the objection that space and time are 
quantities, or rather things endowed with quantity; and that 
situation and order are not so: I answer, that order also has its 
quantity; there is in it, that which goes before, and that which 
follows; there is distance or interval. Relative things have their 
quantity, as well as absolute ones. For instance, ratios or 'pro- 
portions in mathematics, have their quantity, and are measured 
by logarithms ; and yet they are relations. And therefore though 
time and space consist in relations, yet they have their quantity. 

To § 15. 

55. As to the question, whether God could have created the 
world sooner; 'tis necessary here to understand each other rightly. 
Since I have demonstrated, that time, without things, is nothing 
else but a mere ideal possibility ; 'tis manifest, if any one should 
say that this same world, which has been actually created, might 
have been created sooner, without any other change ; he would say 
nothing that is intelligible. For there is no mark or difference, 
whereby it would be possible to know, that this world was created 
sooner. And therefore, (as I have already said), to suppose that 
God created the same world sooner, is supposing a chimerical 
thing. 'Tis making time a thing absolute, independent upon God ; 
whereas time must co-exist with creatures, and is only conceived 
by the order and quantity of their changes. 

56. But yet absolutely speaking, one may 
conceive that an universe began sooner, than 
it actually did. Let us suppose our uni- 
verse, or any other, to be represented by the 
figure A F ; and that the ordinate A B 
represents its first state ; and the ordinates 
C D, E F, its following states: I say, one 
may conceive that such a world began 
sooner, by conceiving the figure prolonged 
backwards, and by adding to it 8 R A B 8. 
For thus, things being increased, time will 




364 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

be also increased. But whether such an augmentation be reasona- 
ahle and agreeable to God's wisdom, is another question, to which 
we answer in the negative ; otherwise God would have made such 
an augmentation. It would be like as 

Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam 
Jungere si velit. 

The case is the same with respect to the destruction [duration — 
Ger.~\ of the universe. As one might conceive something added 
to the beginning, so one might also conceive something taken off 
towards the end. But such a retrenching from it, would be also 
unreasonable. 

57. Thus it appears how we are to understand, that God 
created things at what time he pleased; for this depends upon the 
things, which he resolved to create. But things being once 
resolved upon, together with their relations; there remains no 
longer any choice about the time and the place, which of them- 
selves have nothing in them real, nothing that can distinguish 
them, nothing that is at all discernible. 

58. One cannot therefore say, as the author does here, that the 
wisdom of God may have good reasons to create this world at 
such or such a particular time: that particular time, considered 
without the things, being an impossible fiction; and good reasons 
for a choice, being not to be found, where everything is indis- 
cernible. 

59. T\ nen I speak of this world, I mean the whole universe of 
material and immaterial creatures taken together, from the begin- 
ning of things. But if any one mean only the beginning of the 
material world, and suppose immaterial creatures before it ; he 
would have somewhat more reason for his supposition. For time 
then being marked by things that existed already, it would be no 
longer indifferent ; and there might be room for choice. And yet 
indeed, this would be only putting off the difficulty. For, suppos- 
ing the whole universe of immaterial and material creatures 
together, to have a beginning : there is no longer any choice about 
the time, in which God would place that beginning. 

60. And therefore one must not say, as the author does here, 
that God created things in what particular space, and at what par- 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 365 

ticular time he pleased. For, all time and all spaces being in 
themselves perfectly uniform and indiscernible from each, other, 
one of them cannot please more than another. 

61. I shall not enlarge here upon my opinion explained else- 
where, that there are no created substances wholly destitute of 
matter. For I hold with the ancients, and according to reason, 
that angels or intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, 
have always subtile bodies, though they themselves be incorporeal. 
The vulgar philosophy easily admits all sorts of fictions : mine 
is more strict. 

62. I don't say that matter and space are the same thing. I 
only say, there is no space, where there is no matter; and that 
space in itself is not an absolute reality. Space and matter differ, 
as time and motion. However, these things, though different, are 
inseparable. 

63. But yet it does not at all follow, that matter is eternal and 
necessary; unless we suppose space to be eternal and necessary; 
a supposition ill-grounded in all respects. 

To § 16 and IT. 

64. I think I have answered everything; and I have particu- 
larly replied to that objection, that space and time have quan- 
tity, and that order has none. See above, Number 54. 

65. I have clearly shown that the contradiction lies in the 
hypothesis of the opposite opinion, which looks for a difference 
where there is none. And it would be a manifest iniquity to infer 
from thence, that I have acknowledged a contradiction in my own 
opinion. 

To § 18. 

66. Here I find again an argument, which I have overthrown 
above, Number 17. The author says, God may have good reasons 
to make two cubes perfectly equal and alike: and then (says he) 
God must needs assign them to their places, though every other 
respect be perfectly equal. But things ought not to be separated 
from their circumstances. This argument consists in incomplete 
notions. God's resolutions are never abstract and imperfect : as if 
God decreed, first, to create the two cubes; and then, made 



366 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP LEIBXTTZ. 

another decree where to place theni. Men, being such limited 
creatures as they are, may act in this manner. They may resolve 
upon a thing, and then find themselves perplexed about means, 
ways, places, and circumstances. But God never takes a resolu- 
tion about the ends, "without resolving at the same time about the 
means, and all the cireunistances. Xay, I have shown in my 
Theodiccza, that properly speaking, there is but one decree for 
the "whole universe, whereby God resolved to bring it out of possi- 
bility into existence. And therefore God "will not choose a cube, 
without choosing its place at the same time; and he will /<: ■ 
choose among indiscernibles. 

7. The parts of space are not determined and distinguished, 
but by the things which are in it : and the diversity of things in 
space, determines God to act differently upon different parts of 
space. But space without things, has nothing whereby it may be 
distinguished : and indeed not anything actual. 

68. If God is resolved to place a certain cube of matter at all, 
he is also resolved in which particular place to put it, But 'tis 
with respect to other parts of matter: and not with respect to 
bare space itself, in which there is nothing to distinguish it. 

69. But wisdom does not allow God to place at the same time 
two cubes perfectly equal and (dike; because there is no way to 
find any reason for assigning them different places. At this rate. 
there would be a will without a. motive. 

'. A will without motive (such as superficial reasoners 
suppose to be in God), I compared to Epicurus 3 s chance. The 
author answers: Epicurus' 's chance is a blind necessity, and not 
a choice of will. I reply, that E picuru-s s chance is not a necessity, 
but something indifferent. Epicurus brought it in on purpose to 
avoid necessity. "Tis true, chance is blind: but a will with out- 
motive would be no less blind, and no less owing to mere chance. 

To § 19. 

71. The author repeats here, what has been already confuted 
above. Number 21: that matter cannot be created, without God's 
choosing among indiscernibles. He would be in the right, if mat- 
ter consisted of atoms, similar particles, or other the like fictions 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 



367 



of superficial philosophy. But that great principle, which proves 
there is no choice among indiscernibles, destroys also these ill-con- 
trived fictions. 

To § 20. 

72. The author objected against me in his third paper (Num- 
bers 1 and 8) ; that God would not have in himself a principle of 
acting, if he was determined by things external. I answered, that 
the ideas of external things are in him: and that therefore he is 
determined by internal reasons, that is, by his wisdom. But the 
author here will not understand, to what end I said it. 

To § 21. 

73. Tie frequently confounds, in his objections against me, 
what God will not do, with what he cannot do. See above, Num- 
ber 9 [and below Number 76]. For example; God can do every- 
thing that is possible, but he will do only what is best. And there- 
fore I don't say, as the author here will have it, that God cannot 
limit the extension of matter ; but 'tis likely he will not do it, 
and that he has thought it better to set no bounds to matter. 

74. From extension to duration, non valet consequentia. 
Though the extension of matter were unlimited, yet it would not 
follow that its duration would be also unlimited ; nay even a 
parte ante, it would not follow, that it had no beginning. If it is 
the nature of things in the whole, to grow uniformly in perfec- 
tion ; the universe of creatures must have had a beginning. And 
therefore, there will be reasons to limit the duration of things, 
even though there were none to limit their extension. Besides, 
the world's having a beginning, does not derogate from the infinity 
of its duration a parte post; but bounds of the universe would 
derogate from the infinity of its extension. And therefore it is 
more reasonable to admit a beginning of the world, than to admit 
any bounds of it; that the character of its infinite author, may 
be in both respects preserved. 

75. However, those who have admitted the eternity of the 
world, or, at least, (as some famous divines have done,) the 
possibility of its eternity; did not, for all that, deny its depen- 
dence upon God ; as the author here lays to their charge, without 
any ground. 



368 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OP LEIBXITZ. 

To § 22, 23. 

76. He lie re further objects, without any reason, that, accord- 
ing to ray opinion, whatever God can do, he must needs have done. 
As if he was ignorant, that I have solidly confuted this notion in 
my 'Theodiccea ; and that I have overthrown the opinion of those, 
who maintain that there is nothing possible but what really hap- 
pens ; as some ancient philosophers did, and among others Dio- 
dorus in Cicero. The author confounds moral necessity, which 
proceeds from the choice of what is best, with absolute necessity: 
he confounds the will of God, with his power. God can produce 
everything that is possible, or whatever does not imply a con- 
tradiction; but he wills only to produce what is the best among 
things possible. See what has been said above, Number 9 [and 
Number 74,] 

77. God is not therefore a necessary agent in producing crea- 
tures, since he acts with choice. However, what the author adds 
here, is ill-grounded, viz. that a necessary agent would not be 
an agent at all. He frequently aihrms things boldly, and without 
any ground; advancing [against me] notions which cannot be 
proved. 

To § 24-28. 

78. The author alleges, it was not affirmed that space is God's 
sensorium, but only as it were his sensorium. The latter seems to 
be as improper, and as little intelligible, as the former. 

To § 29. 

79. Space is not the place of all things; for it is not the place 
of God. Otherwise there would be a thing co-eternal with God, 
and independent upon him; nay, he himself would depend upon 
it, if he has need of place. 

80. Nor do I see, how it can be said, that space is the place of 
ideas; for ideas are in the understanding. 

81. 'Tis also very strange to say, that the soul of man is the soul 
of the images it perceives. The images, which are in the under- 
standing, are in the mind: but if the mind was the soul of the 
images, they would then be extrinsic to it. And if the author 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 369 

means corporeal images, how then will he have a human mind to 
be the soul of those images, they being only transient impressions 
in a body belonging to that soul ? 

82. If 'tis by means of a sensorium, that God perceives what 
passes in the world ; it seems that things act upon him ; and that 
therefore he is what we mean by a soul of the world. The author 
charges me with repeating objections, without taking notice of the 
answers; but I don't see that he has answered this difficulty. 
They had better wholly lay aside this pretended sensorium. 

To § 30. 

83. The author speaks, as if he did not understand, how, 
according to my opinion, the soul is a representative principle. 
Which is, as if he had never heard of my preestablished harmony. 

84. I don't assent to the vulgar notions, that the images of 
things are conveyed by the organs [of sense] to the soul. For, it 
is not conceivable by what passage, or by what means of convey- 
ance, these images can be carried from the organ to the soul. This 
vulgar notion in philosophy is not intelligible, as the new Carte- 
sians have sufficiently shown. It cannot be explained, how 
immaterial substance is affected by matter: and to maintain an 
unintelligible notion thereupon, is having recourse to the scholastic 
chimerical notion of I know not what inexplicable species inten- 
tionales, passing from the organs to the soul. Those Cartesians 
saw the difficulty; but they could not explain it. They had 
recourse to a [certain wholly special] concourse of God, which 
would really be miraculous. But, I think, / have given the true 
solution of that enigma. 

85. To say that God perceives what passes in the world, because 
he is present to the things, and not by [the dependence which the 
continuation of their existence has upon him and which may be 
said to involve] a continual production of them; is saying some- 
thing unintelligible. A mere presence or proximity of co-exist- 
ence, is not sufficient to make us understand, how that which 
passes in one being, should answer to what passes in another. 

86. Besides; this is exactly falling into that opinion, which 
makes God to be the soul of the world; seeing it supposes God to 

24 



B70 PHTT.OSQPHICAI. WOEKS OF rEIBXITZ. 

perceive things, not by their dependence upon him. that is. by a 
continual production of what is good and perfect in them: but 
by a kind of perception, such as that by which men fancy our soul 
perceives what passes in the body. This is a degrading of God's 
knowledge very much. 

ST. In truth and reality, this way of perception is wholly 
chimerical, and has no place even in human souls. They 
perceive what passes without them, by what parses within them, 
answering to the things without : in virtue of the harmony, which 
God has preestablished by the most beautiful and the most admir- 
able of all his productions: whereby every simple substance is 
by its nature (if one may so say . a concentration, and a living 
mirror of the whole universe, according to its point of view. 
Which is likewise one of the most beautiful and most undeniable 
proofs of the existence of God; since none but God. viz. the uni- 
versal cause, can produce such a harmony of things. But God 
himself cannot perceive things by the same means whereby he 
makes other beings perceive them. He perceives them, because 
he is able to produce that means. And other beings would not 
e aused to perceive them, if he himself did not produce them all 
harmonious, and had not therefore in himself a representation 
of them: not as if that represent ation came from the things, but 
because the things proceed from him, and because he is the efficient 
and exemplary cause of them. He perceives them, because they 
proceed from him : if one may be allowed to say. that he perceives 
them: which ought not to be said, unless we divest that word of 
its imperfection ; for else it seems to signify, that things act upon 
him. They exist, and are known to him. because he understands 
and wills them: and because what he wills, is the same, as what 
exists. Which appears so much the more, because he makes them 
to be perceived by one another : and makes them perceive one 
another in consequence of the natures which he has given them 
once for all. and which he keeps up only according to the laws 
of every one of them severally ; which, though different one from 
another, yet terminate in an exact correspondence of the results 
of the whole. This surpasses all the ideas, which men have 
generally framed concerning the divine perfections, and the works 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 371 

of God; and raises [our notion of] them, to the highest degree; 
as Mr. Bayle has acknowledged, though he believed, without any 
ground, that it exceeded possibility. 

88. To infer from that passage of Holy Scripture, wherein God 
is said to have rested from his works, that there is no longer a con- 
tinual production of them ; would be to make a very ill use of 
that text. 'Tis true, there is no production of new simple sub- 
stances : but it would be wrong to infer from thence, that God is 
now in the world, only as the soul is conceived to be in the body, 
governing it merely by his presence, without any concourse being, 
necessary to continue its existence. 

To : § 31. 

89. The harmony, or correspondence between the soul and the 
body, is not a perpetual miracle; but the effect or consequence 
of an original miracle worked at the creation of things ; as all 
natural things are. Though indeed it is a perpetual wonder, as 
many natural things are. 

90. The word, ^reestablished harmony, is a term of art, I con- 
fess ; but 'tis not a term that explains nothing, since it is made out 
very intelligibly ; and the author alleges nothing, that shows there 
is any difficulty in it. 

91. The nature of every simple substance, soul, or true monad, 
being such, that its following state is a consequence of the preced- 
ing one; here now is the cause of the harmony found out. For 
God needs only to make a simple substance become once and from 
the beginning, a representation of the universe, according to its 
point of view ; since from thence alone it follows, that it will be so 
perpetually ; and that all simple substances will always have a 
harmony among themselves, because they always represent the 
same universe. 

To § 32. 

92. 'Tis true, that, according to me, the soul does not disturb 
the laws of the body, nor the body those of the soul;- and that the 
soid and body do only agree together; the one acting freely 
according to the rules of final causes ; and the other acting 
mechanically, according to the laws of efficient causes. But this 



■?-•'> 



PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OP LEIBXITZ. 



does no t derogate from the liberty of our souls, as the author here 
will have it. For, every agent which acts [with choice — Ger.] 
according to final causes, is free, though it happens to agree with 
an agent acting only by efficient causes without knowledge, or 
mechanically; because God. foreseeing what the free cause would 
do. did from the beginning regulate the machine in such manner, 
that it cannot fail to agree with that free cause. Mr. Jaquelot has 
very well resolved this difficulty, in one of his books against Mr. 
Bayle; and I have cited the passage, in my Theodicwa, Part I. 
| 63. I shall speak of it again below. Number 124. 

To § 33. 

93. I don't admit, that every action gives a new force to the 
patient. It frequently happens in the concourse of bodies, that 
each of them preserves its force; as when two equal hard bodies 
meet directly. Then the direction only is changed, without any 
change in the force; each of the bodies receiving the direction of 
the other, and going back with the same swiftness it came. 

94. However, I am far from saying that it is supernatural to 
give a new force to a body; for I acknowledge that one body 
does frequently receive a new force from another, which lose- as 
much of its own. But I say only, 'tis supernatural that the whole 
universe of bodies should receive a new force; and consequently 
that one body should acquire any new force, without the loss of as 
much in others. And therefore I say likewise, 'tis an indefensible 
opinion to suppose the sou 1 gives force to the body; for then the 
whole universe of bodies would receive a new force. 

". The authors dilemma here, is ill-grounded: viz. that 
according to me. either a man must act supematurally. or be a 
mere machine, like a watch. For. man does not act supernatu- 
rally: and his body is truly a machine, acting only mechanic- 
ally; and yet his soul is a free cause. 

To § 34 and 35. 

96. I here refer to what has been or shall be said in this paper. 
Numbers 82, 86, [SS] and 111: concerning the comparison 
between God and a soul of the world; and how the opinion con- 
trary to mine, brings the one of these too near to the other. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 373 

To § 36. 

97. I here also refer to what I have before said, concerning the 
harmony between the soul and the body, Number 89, &c. 

To § 37. 

98. The author tells us, that the soul is not in the brain, but in 
the sensorium ; without saying what that sensorium is. But sup- 
posing that sensorium to be extended, as I believe the author 
understands it ; the same difficulty still remains, and the question 
returns, whether the soul be diffused through that whole extension, 
be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, is nothing to the 
purpose here. 

To § 38. 

99. I don't undertake here to establish my Dynamics, or my 
doctrine of forces: this would not be a proper place for it. How- 
ever, I can very well answer the objection here brought against me. 
I have affirmed that active forces are preserved in the world [with- 
out diminution]. The author objects, that two soft or unelastic 
bodies meeting together, lose some of their force. I answer, no. 
'Tis true, their wholes lose it with respect to their total motion; 
but their parts receive it, being shaken [internally] by the force 
of the concourse. And therefore that loss of force, is only in 
appearance. The forces are not destroyed, but scattered among 
the small parts. The bodies do not lose their forces; but the case 
here is the same, as when men change great money into small. 
However, I agree that the quantity of motion does not remain 
the same; and herein I approve what Sir Isaac Neivton says, 
page 341 of his Optics, which the author here quotes. But I 
have shown elsewhere, that there is a difference between the 
quantity of motion, and the quantity of force. 

To § 39. 

100. The author maintained against • me, that force does 
naturally lessen in the material universe ; and that this arises 
from the dependence of things {Third Reply, § 13 and 14). In 
my third answer, I desired him to prove that this imperfection 



374 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

'is a consequence of the dependence of things. He avoids answer- 
ing my demand; by falling upon an incident, and denying this 
to be an imperfection. But whether it be an imperfection or not, 
he should have proved that 'tis a consequence of the dependence 
of things. 

101. However; that which would make the machine of the 
world as imperfect, as that of an unskillful watchmaker; surely 
must needs be an imperfection. 

102. The author says now, that it is a consequence of the 
inertia of matter. But this also, he will not prove. That inertia, 
alleged here by him, mentioned by Kepler, repeated by Cartesius 
[in his letters] , and made use of by me in my Theodiccea, in order 
to give a notion [and at the same time an example] of the natural 
imperfection of creatures ; has no other effect, than to make the 
velocities diminish, when the quantities of matter are increased : 
but this is without any diminution of the forces. 

To § 40. 

103. I maintained, that the dependence of the machine of the 
world upon its divine author, is rather a reason why there can be 
no such imperfection in it; and that the work of God does not 
want to be set right again ; that it is not liable to be disordered ; 
and lastly, that it cannot lessen in perfection. Let any one guess 
now, how the author can hence infer against me, as he does, that, 
if this be the case, then the material world must be infinite and 
eternal, without any beginning; and that God must always have 
created as many men and other kinds of creatures, as can possibly 
be created. 

To § 41. 

104. I don't say, that space is an order or situation, which 
makes things capable of being situated: this would be nonsense. 
Any one needs only consider my own words, and add them to what 
I said above, {Number 47) in order to show how the mind comes 
to form to itself an idea of space, and yet that there needs not be 
any real and absolute being answering to that idea, distinct from 
the mind, and from all relations. I don't say therefore, that 
space is an order or situation, but an order of situations; or [an 



LETTERS TO CLAEKE. 



375 



order] according to which, situations are disposed; and that 
abstract space is that order of situations, when they are conceived 
as being possible. Space is therefore something [merely] ideal. 
But, it seems the author will not understand me. I have already, 
in this paper, {Number 54) answered the objection, that order is 
not capable of quantity. 

105. The author objects here, that time cannot be an order of 
successive things, because the quantity of time may become greater 
or less, and yet the order of successions continue the same. I 
answer : this is not so. For if the time is greater, there will be 
more successive and like states interposed ; and if it be less, there 
will be fewer ; seeing there is no vacuum, nor condensation, nor 
penetration (if I may so speak), in times, any more than in places. 

106. 'Tis true, [I maintain that] the immensity and eternity of 
God would subsist, though there were no creatures ; but those 
attributes would have no dependence either on times or places. If 
there were no creatures, there would be neither time nor place, and 
consequently no actual space. The immensity of God is indepen- 
dent upon space, as his eternity is independent upon time. These 
attributes signify only [in respect to these two orders of things] , 
that God would be present and co-existent with all the things that 
should exist. And therefore I don't admit what's here alleged, 
that if God existed alone, there would be time and space as there 
is now; whereas then, in my opinion, they would be only in the 
ideas of God as mere possibilities. The immensity and eternity 
of God are things more transcendent, than the duration and exten- 
sion of creatures ; not only with respect to the greatness, but also 
to the nature of the things. Those divine attributes do not imply 
the supposition of things extrinsic to God, such as are actual 
places and times. These truths have been sufficiently acknowl- 
edged by divines and philosophers. 

To § 42. 

107. I maintained, that an operation of God, by which he 
should mend the machine of the material world, tending in its 
nature (as this author pretends) to lose all its motion, would be 
a miracle. His answer was; that it would not be a miraculous 



376 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

operation, because it would be usual, and must frequently happen. 
I replied: that 'tis not usualness or unusualness, that makes a 
miracle properly so called, or a miracle of trie highest sort: but 
its surpassing the powers of creatures: and that this is the 
[general^ opinion of divines and philosophers: and that therefore 
the author acknowledges at least, that the thing he introduces, and 
I disallow, is, according to the received notion, a miracle of the 
highest sort, that is, one which surpasses all created powers : and 
that this is the very thing which all men endeavor to avoid in 
philosophy. He answers now, that this is appealing from reason 
to vulgar opinion. But I reply again, that this vulgar opinion, 
according to which we ought in philosophy to avoid, as much as 
possible, what surpasses the natures of creatures : is a very 
reasonable opinion. Otherwise nothing will be easier than to 
account for anvthing bv bringing in the Deitv, Deum ex machina. 
without minding the natures of things. 

108. Besides; the common opinion of divines, ought not to 
be looked upon merely as vulgar opinion. A man should have 
weighty reasons, before he ventures to contradict it; and I see no 
such reasons here. 

109. The author seems to depart from his own notion, according 
to which miracle ought to be unusual : when, in § 31, he objects 
to me (though without any ground), that the preestahlished har- 
mony would be a perpetual miracle. Here, I say. he seems to 
depart from his own notion; unless he had a mind to argue 
against me ad hominem. 

To § 13. 

110. If a miracle differs from what is natural, only in appear- 
ance and with respect to us; so that we call that only a miracle. 
which we seldom see; there will be no internal real difference, 
between a miracle and what is natural; and at the bottom, every 
thing will be either equally natural, or equally miraculous. "Will 
divines like the former, or philosophers the latter' 

111. Will not this doctrine, moreover, tend to make God the 
soul of the world; if all his operations are natural, like those of 
our souls upon our bodies i And so God will be a part of nature. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 377 

112. In good philosophy, and sound theology, we ought to dis- 
tinguish between what is explicable by the natures and powers of 
creatures, and what is explicable only by the powers of the infinite 
substance. We ought to make an infinite difference between the 
operation of God, which goes beyond the extent of natural 
powers; and the operations of things that follow the law which 
God has given them, and which he has enabled them to follow by 
their natural powers, though not without his assistance. 

113. This overthrows attractions, properly so called, and other 
operations inexplicable by the natural powers of creatures ; which 
kinds of operations, the assertors of them must suppose to be 
effected by miracle; or else have recourse to absurdities, that is, 
to the occult qualities of the schools ; which some men begin to 
revive under the specious name of forces; but they bring us back 
again into the kingdom of darkness. This is, inventa fruge, 
glandibus vesci. 

111. In the time of Mr. Boyle, and other excellent men, who 
flourished in England under Charles the lid, nobody would have 
ventured to publish such chimerical notions. I hope that happy 
time will return under so good a government as the present [and 
that minds a little too much carried away by the misfortune of the 
times will betake themselves to the better cultivation of sound 
learning] . Mr. Boyle made it his chief business to inculcate, that 
everything was done mechanically in natural philosophy. But it 
is men's misfortune to grow, at last, out of conceit with reason 
itself, and to be weary of light. Chimeras begin to appear again, 
and they are pleasing because they have something in them that is 
wonderful. What has happened in poetry, happens also in the 
philosophical world. People are grown weary of rational 
romances, such as were the French Clelia, or the German 
Aramene; and they are become fond again of the tales of fairies. 

115. As for the motions of the celestial bodies, and even the 
formation of plants and animals; there is nothing in them that 
looks like a miracle, except their beginning. The organism of 
animals is a mechanism, which supposes a divine pre- formation. 
What follows upon it, is purely natural, and entirely mechanical. 

116. Whatever is performed in the body of man, and of every 
animal, is no less mechanical, than what is performed in a watch. 



378 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

The difference is only such, as v ought to be between a machine of 
divine invention, and the workmanship of such a limited artist as 
man is. 

To § 44. 

117. There is no difficulty among divines, about the miracles of 
angels. The question is only about the use of that word. It may 
be said that angels work miracles; but less properly so called, or 
of an inferior order. To dispute about this, would be a mere 
question about a word. It may be said that the angel, who carried 
Habakhuk through the air, and he who troubled the water of the 
pool of Betliesda, worked a miracle. But it was not a miracle of 
the highest order ; for it may be explained by the natural powers 
of angels, which surpass those of man. 

To § 45. 

118. I objected, that an attraction, properly so calle,d, or in the 
scholastic sense, would be an operation at a distance, without any 
means intervening. The author answers here, that an attraction 
without any means intervening, would be indeed a contradiction. 
Very well ! But then what does he mean, when he will have the 
sun to attract the globe of the earth through an empty space ? Is 
it God himself that performs it? But this would be a miracle, if 
ever there was any. This would surely exceed the powers of 
creatures. 

119. Or, are perhaps some immaterial substances, or some 
spiritual rays, or some accident without a substance, or some kind 
of species intentionalis, or some other I hnoiv not what, the means 
by which this is pretended to be performed? Of which sort of 
things, the author seems to have still a good stock in his head, with- 
out explaining himself sufficiently. 

120. That means of communication (says he) is invisible, 
intangible, not mechanical. He might as well have added, inex- 
plicable, unintelligible, precarious, groundless, and unexampled. 

121. But it is regular (says the author), it is constant, and con- 
sequently natural. I answer ; it cannot be regular, without being 
reasonable ; nor natural, unless it can be explained by the natures 
of creatures. 



LETTERS TO CLARKE. 379 

122. If the means, which causes an attraction properly so 
called, be constant, and at the same time inexplicable by the 
powers of creatures, and yet be true; it must be a perpetual 
miracle: and if it is not miraculous, it is false. Tis a chimerical 
thing, a scholastic occult quality. 

123. The case would be the same, as in a body going round 
without receding in the tangent, though nothing that can be 
explained, hindered it from receding. Which is an instance I 
have already alleged; and the author has not thought fit to 
answer it, because it shows too clearly the difference between what 
is truly natural on the one side, and a chimerical occult quality of 
the schools on the other. 

To § 46. 

124. All the natural forces of bodies, are subject to mechanical 
laws; and all the natural powers of spirits, are subject to moral 
laws. The former follow the order of efficient causes; and the 
latter follow the order of final causes. The former operate with- 
out liberty, like a watch ; the latter operate with liberty, though 
they exactly agree with that machine, which another cause, free 
and superior, has adapted to them beforehand. I have already 
spoken of this, above, No. 92. 

125. I shall conclude with what the author objected against me 
at the beginning of this fourth reply: to which I have already 
given an answer above (Numbers 18, 19, 20). But I deferred 
speaking more fully upon that head, to the conclusion of this 
paper. He pretended, that I have been guilty of a petitio prin- 
cipii. But, of ivhat principle, I beseech you ? Would to God, 
less clear principles had never been laid down. The principle in 
question, is the principle of the want of a sufficient reason; in 
order to any thing's existing, in order to any event's happening, 
in order to any truth's taking place. Is this a principle, that 
wants to be proved? The author granted it, or pretended to grant 
it, Number 2, of his third paper; possibly, because the denial of 
it would have appeared too unreasonable. But either be has done 
it only in words, or he contradicts himself, or retracts his 
concession. 



380 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

126. I dare say, that without this great principle, one cannot 
prove the existence of God. nor account for many other important 
truths. 

127. Has not everybody made use of this principle, upon a 
thousand occasions ? 'Tis true, it has been neglected, out of care- 
lessness, on many occasions : but that neglect has been the true 
cause of chimeras; such as are (for instance), an absolute real 
time or space, a vacuum, atoms, attraction in the scholastic sense, 
a physical influence of the soul over the body, and a thousand 
other fictions, either derived from erroneous opinions of the 
ancients, or lately invented by modern philosophers. 

128. Was it not upon account of Epicurus's violating this great 
principle, that the ancients derided his groundless declination of 
atoms \ And I dare say. the scholastic attraction, revived in our 
days, and no less derided about thirty years ago, is not at all more 
reasonable. 

129. I have often defied people to allege an instance against 
that great principle, to bring any one uncontested example 
wherein it fails. But they have never done it, nor ever will. 
'Tis certain, there is an infinite number of instances, wherein 
it succeeds, [or rather it succeeds] in all the known cases in which 
it has been made use of. From whence one may reasonably judge, 
that it will succeed also in unknown cases, or in such cases as can 
only by its means become known: according to the method of 
experimental philosophy, which proceeds a posteriori; though 
the jninciple were not perhaps otherwise justified by bare reason, 
or a priori. 

130. To deny this great principle, is likewise to do as Epicurus 
did ; who was reduced to deny that other great principle, viz. the 
principle of contradiction; which is. that every intelligible enun- 
ciation must be either true, or false. Chrysippus undertook to 
prove that principle against Epicurus; but I think I need not 
imitate him. I have already said, what is sufficient to justify 
mine: and I might say something more upon it: but perhaps 
it would be too abstruse for this present dispute. And, I believe, 
reasonable and impartial men will grant me. that having forced 
an adversary to deny that principle, is reducing him ad absurdum. 



]STOTES 



1. Life of Leibnitz. 

No more interesting personage appears in the history of modern philosophy 
than Leibnitz. Frederick of Prussia said of him, "He represents in himself 
a whole academy" ; and by almost universal consent he is admitted to have 
possessed the most comprehensive mind since Aristotle. He was on familiar 
terms with almost every prominent character, political, ecclesiastical, philo- 
sophical, scientific and literary, of his day, and he himself played a promi- 
nent part in each of these spheres. From him as a statesman we have a 
scheme for the unification of Germany, prepared for the Imperial Diet at 
Ratisbon ; and a far-sighted plan for a French conquest of Egypt, by which 
the conquering armies of Louis XIV were to have been turned aside from 
Germany, and the Turks from Austria and Hungary; besides numerous 
schemes for reforming the currency and the laws of the German states and 
improving the condition of the people. As a theologian he has given us an 
essay Against Atheism, a Defense of the Trinity, numerous discussions on 
the arguments for the being of God, a great project for the reunion of the 
Protestant and Latin churches, an irenical Sy sterna Theologicum (translated by 
C. W. Russell, London, 1850) written in the interests of this reunion project, 
and above all his great work La Theodicee. As a mathematician he contests 
with Sir Isaac Newton the honor of discovering the Calculus. As a historian 
he produced an elaborate work on the Annals of the House of Brunswick. To 
the science of Logic, among other notable contributions, he has given us the 
important doctrine of the Quality of Terms. As a physicist he was the first 
to give the correct formula for moving force, and in his Protaglia he became 
a pioneer in geological investigations. His New Essays on the Human Under- 
standing place him alongside of his great contemporary Locke as a psycho- 
logist. And as a speculative philosopher, or metaphysician, he was the first 
man of his age on the continent of Europe and the founder of modern 
German philosophy. 

The standard biography of Leibnitz is : Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von 
Leibnitz. Line Biographie von Dr. G. E. Guhrauer. Zicei Bande, Breslau, 
1842. Guhrauer's two volume work was the basis of the Life of Godfrey 
William von Liebnitz, by John M. Maclcie, 12mo, Boston, 1845. In his pre- 
face Mackie writes : "I have added little, or nothing, to the German work ; 
and have taken away from it nothing that could be appropriately introduced 
into a popular biography, or that might be considered as possessing any his- 
torical interest for readers without the confines of Germany." Excellent 
accounts of the life of Leibnitz are also found in Kuno Fischer's Leibniz 
(Geschichte d. neuem Philosophie. Jubildumsausg., Bd. Ill) and in the little 
work by Merz, Leibniz, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1884. Cf., also, 
E. Pfleiderer, Leibniz als Patriot, Staatsmann u. Bildungstrager, Leipsic, 
1870; and T. Kirelmer's Leibniz: sein Leben n. Denken, Cothen, 1877. 



382 PHILOSOPHICAL VOEKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

2. Leibnitz's Writings, and English Translations of Treat. 

There is no complete edition of the writings of Leibnitz, although one has 
been projected, since 1901, by the academies of science of Berlin and of Paris. 
For an account of the different issues of his works, consult Kuno Fischer's 
Leibniz (Geschichte d. n. Philosophic, Band III., 1902), and the preface to 
Merz's Leibniz; also Rand's Bibliography of Philosophy, and Baruzi's Leibniz 
et L 'Organization Beligieuse de la Terre (1907), pp. 516-518, 513 f. 

The best edition of his philosophical writings is that of C. I. Gerhardt, Die 
philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-90. This, 
however, needs to be supplemented by Erdmann's God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera 
Philosophica quae extant Latina, Gallica, Germanica Omnia, Berlin, 1840, 
and by the theological writings and the correspondence with Wolff. 

The best edition of his mathematical works is that of C. I. Gerhardt, form- 
ing the third series in the edition of Pertz, Leibnisen's mathematische Sclirif- 
ten, herausgegeben ton C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols., London and Berlin, 1850; 
Halle, 1855-63. 

The best issue of his historical and political writings is that by Onno Klopp, 
Die Werke von Leibniz, u. s. to., first series, 10 vols., Hanover, 1864-77. 
With this should be compared Foncher de CareiFs Oeuvres de Leibniz, Paris, 
1859-75, vols. Ill to VI. 

The best edition of his theological icorks is that of Foucher de Careil, vols. 
I and II of his Oeuvres de Leibniz. 

To the above should be added Guhrauers Leibniz's Deutsche Schriften, 2 
vols., Berlin, 1838-40: Foucher de CareiPs Lettres et Opuscules inedits de 
Leibniz, Paris, 1854-57: and Gerhardt's Brief wechsel zivischen Leibniz unci 
Wolff, Halle, 1S60: Mollat's Mittheilungen aus Leibnizens ungedruckten 
Schriften, Leipsic, 1S93; Couturat's Opuscules et Fragments inedits de 
Leibniz, Paris, 1903. 

Translations into English. 

Since the publication of the first edition of this work (1S90) the following 
four important contributions have been made toward rendering Leibnitz into 
English : 

New Essays concerning Human Understandings by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibnitz, -together with an Appendix consisting of some of his shorter pieces, 
translated by Alfred Gideon Langley. Xew York, 1896. 

Leibniz: The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, translated 
with Introduction and Xotes, by Robert Latta. Oxford, 1898. 

Leibniz: Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and 
Monadology, translated by George R. Montgomery, Chicago, 1902. 

A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix 
[pp. 203-299] of Leading Passages, by Bertrand Russell, Cambridge, 1900. 

The following is a full list of English renderings of Leibnitz's writings. 
The figures in [ ] refer to the original text in Gerhardt's edition, unless 
otherwise stated: 

1669. Letter to Thomasius (April 20-30) [I, 15-28], Eng. tr., Langley, 
pp. 631-650. 

c. 1671. A Fragment [VII, 259-260]. Eng. tr.. Langley. pp. 651-2. 



notes. 383 

1676. That the Most Perfect Being is Possible, and Exists [VII, 261-2]. 
Eng. tr., Langley, pp. 714-715. 

c. 1678-9. What is "Idea?" [VII, 263-4]. Eng. tr., Langley, pp. 716-717. 

c. 1679. Notes on Spinoza's Ethics [I, 139 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 11-27. 

1679-1680. On the Philosophy of Descartes [IV, 281 f., 283 f., 297 f.]. Eng. 
tr., this vol., pp. 1-10. 

1684. Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [IV, 422 f.]. Eng. tr., 
this A r ol., pp. 28-33 ; T. S. Baynes, The Port Royal Logic, Appendix, pp. 424- 
430. 

1686. Discourse on Metaphysics [IV, 427 f.]. Eng. tr., Montgomery, pp. 
1-63. ' 

1686. Systema Theologicum. Eng. tr., C. W. Eussell, London, 1850. 
1686-90. Correspondence with Arnauld [II, If.]. Eng. tr., Montgomery, 

pp. 67-248; Leibnitz's last letter, this vol., 38-41. 

1687. On a General Principle useful in the Explanation of the Laws of 
Nature [III, 51 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 34-7. 

1689. Extract from his Phoranomus [Arch. f. G. d. Phil., T. 577]. Eng. 
tr., Latta, pp. 351-4. 

1690. Demonstration against Atoms [VII, 284-2S8]. Eng. tr., Langley, pp. 
652-657. 

1691. Does the Essence of Body consist in Extension? [IV, 464 f.]. Eng. 
tr., this vol., pp. 42-6. 

c. 1691. Essay on Dynamics [Math. Sch., VI, 215-231]. Eng. tr., Langley, 
pp. 657-670. 

1692. Animadversions on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy [IV, 350 f.]. 
Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 47-65. 

1693. On the Notions of Eight and Justice [Erd., 118 f.]. Eng. tr., this 
vol., pp. 66-9; Latta, pp. 282-296. 

1693. Letter to Foucher [I, 415-19]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 70-71. 

1693. On the Philosophy of Descartes [II, 538-48]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 
72-3. • 

1694. On the Reform of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance [IV, 
468 i.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 74-6. 

1695. Essay on Dynamics, Pts. I and II [Math. Sch., VI, 234-246; 246- 
254]. Eng. tr., Langley, pp. 670-684 and 684-692. 

1695. New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances [IV, 
471 f.]. Eng. tr., this A'ol., pp. 77-86; A. E. Kroeger, J. S. Phil., V, 209-19; 
Latta, pp. 297-3IS. 

1695-6. Three Explanations of the New System [IV, 493 f.]. Eng. tr., this 
vol., pp. 91-9; Latta, pp. 319-336 (1st and 3d expls.). 

1696. Observations on Locke's Essay [V, 14 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 100- 
105; Langley, pp. 13-19. 

1697. On the Ultimate Origin of Things [VII, 302 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., 
106-113; Langley, pp. 692-8; Latta, pp. 337-350. 

1697. On Certain Consequences of the Philosophy of Descartes [IV, 336 f.j. 
Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 114-118. 

1698. Thoughts on the First Book of Locke's Essay [IV, 20 f.]. Eng. tr., 
Langley, pp. 20-23. 



384 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

1698. Thoughts on the Second Book of Locke's Essay [TV, 23 t\] Eng. tr.. 
Langlev, pp. 23-5. 

1698. On Nature in Itself [IV, 504 f.J. Eug. tr., this vol., pp. 119-134. 

169S. Letter to Beauval in reply to Bayle [IV. 517-524:]. Eng. tr.. Langlev. 
pp. 706-712. 

1697-8. Ethical Definitions [I. 502 f. : VII. 74 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 
135-139. 

1700-1701. On C'oste"s Freneh Translation of Locke"s Essay [V, 25 f.]. 
Eng. tr.. Langlev. pp. 26-38. 

1700-1701. On the Cartesian Ontological Argument [IV, 292 f.; 401 f.; 
405 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 140-146. 

• 1702. Appendix to a letter to Fabri [IV, 393-400]. Eng. tr., Langlev. pp. 
699-706. 

1702. Consideration on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit [VI. 529 f.]. 
Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 147-156.: A. E. Kroeger, J. 8. Phil., V, pp. 118-129. 

1702. On the Supersensible in Knowledge and on the Immaterial in 
Nature [VI, 488 f.J. Eng. tr.. this vol., pp. 157-166. 

1704. Explanation of Points in his Philosophy [III, 333 f.]. Eng. tr., 
this vol., pp. 167-170. 

1704. Preface to the Souveaux Essais [V, 41 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 
171-192: Langlev, pp. 41-63: Latta, pp. 357-404. 

1704. New Essays [V, 62-509]. Eng. tr.. extracts, this vol., pp. 191-250; 
complete tr., Langlev, pp. 04-629. 

1705. On the Principles of Life [VI, 539 fj. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 251- 
258. 

1707. On the Platonic Philosophy. Eng. tr.. T. Davidson, •/. *S'. Philos.. 
III. pp. 8S-93. 

1707. On Necessity and Contingency [III. 400 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., 
pp. 259-263. 

1707. Fragment [Guhrauer, Lehen]. Eng. tr.. Langlev, pp. 712-714. 

c. 1707. On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena 
[VII, 319-322]. Eng. tr., Langlev, pp. 717-720. 

c. 1708. Eefutation of Spinoza [De Careil]. Eng. tr.. this vol., pp. 264- 
273: O. F. Owen, Edinburgh, 1855. 

1708. Remarks on the Doctrine of Malebranehe [VI, 574 f.]. Eng. tr.. this 
vol., pp. 274-27S. 

1710. On the Active Force of the Body, the Soul, and the Souls of Brutes 
[VII. 52S f.]. Eng. tr., this vol.. pp. 279-283: T. Davidson, •/. 8. Phil., II, 
62-64. 

1710. Abridgment of the Theodicy [VI, 376 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 
284-294: A. E. Kroeger. ■/. 8'. Phil.. V (Oct.). 

1711. On Wisdom — the Art of Reasoning, etc. [VII. 82 f.]. Eng. tr.. this 
vol., pp 295-298. 

1711. Extract from a Letter to Bierling [VII. 500-502]. Eno-. tr.. Lanfflev, 
pp. 721-2. 

1714. The Principles of Nature and of Grace [VI, 59Sf.]. Eng. tr., 
this vol., pp. 299-307; Latta. pp. 405-424. 

1714. The Monadology [VI. 607 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 308-323 ; F. H. 
Hedge. J. .S'. Phil., I, 129-137; Latta, pp. 215-271; Montgomery, pp. 
251-272. 



NOTES. 



385 



1715. On the Doctrine of Malebranche [III, 656 f.]. Eng. tr., this vol., pp. 
324-328. 

1716. Five letters to Sam. Clarke [VII, 347 f.]. Eng tr., by Clarke 
(London, 1717), in this vol., pp. 329-370. 

The Extracts from Leibniz classified according to subjects, given in Russell, 
pp. 205-299, and ranging in length from a single sentence to a page; and 
numerous short extracts found in the notes to Latta's work and elsewhere, 
should he added to the above. 



3. Expositions and Ckiticisms of Leibnitz's Philosophy. 

Among the most important discussions of the Philosophy of Leibnitz are 
the following: 

In German: — Ldw. Feuerbach's Darstellg., Entw. u. Krit. d. L.'schen Phi- 
losophic, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1844. 
A. Trendelenburg's essays on L. in his Historische Beitriige, vols, ii 

and iii, Berlin, 1855, 1867. 
Hartenstein's Veber Locke's u. L.'s Lehre von d. Mensch. Verstand, etc. 

(Several essays in his Hist.-phil Abhandlungen) , Leipsic, 1870. 
T. Jvirchner's Leibniz's Psychologic; also G. W. Leibniz: sein Leben u. 

Denken, Cothen, 1876. 
J. H. v. Kirchmann's Erliluterungen zu L.'s kleineren philosophisch 

icichtigeren Schriften, Leipsic, 1879. Also Erltrgn. zu Leibniz's Theo- 

dicee by Kirchmann, and Erlauterungen zu L.'s .Neue Abhandlungen, 

by Prof. Schaarschmidt. The same. 
L. Stein's Leibniz u. Spinoza, Berlin, 1890. 
Ed. Dillmann, Eine neue Darstellung d. Leibnizischen Monadenlehre, 

Leipsic, 1891. 
E. Cassirer's Leibniz's System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen, 

Berlin, 1902. 
Kuno Fischer's Leibniz (Geschte. d. n. Philosophic Jubilaumsausg., 

Bd. Ill), Heidelberg, 1902. 
In French: — Condillac's Exposition, et Refutation (in his Traite des Sys- 

t ernes) . 
Maine de Biran's Exposition de la Phil, de Leibniz. An English 

translation of this will be found in the American Whig Review, vol. 

IX, p. 575 ff. 
Nourisson's La Philosophie de Leibniz, Paris, 1860. 
Secretan's La Philosophie de Leibniz, Paris, 1840. 
E. Boutroxix's Notice sur la Vie et la Philosophie de Leibniz (Introd. 

to his ed. of the Monadology), Paris, 1881; and Formation et 

Development de la Doctrine de Leibniz sur la Connaissance (in his 

Introduction a I'Etude des Nou. Essais) , Paris, 1886. 
Nolan's Eclaircissements (in his valuable edition of the Monadology) , 

Paris, 1887. Also his earlier work, La Critique de Kant et la Mcta- 

physique de L., Paris, 1875. 
L. Couturat's La Logique de Leibniz, Paris, 1901. 

J. Baruzi's Leibniz et I' Organization Religieuse de la Terre, Paris, 1907. 
25 



386 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

In English: — Samuel Clarke's Letters to Leibnitz (in his Collection of 
Papers ichich Passed between L. and Dr. S. Clarke), London, 1717. 

J. T. Merz's Leibniz (in Blackwood's Phil. Series), Edinburgh, 1884. 

J. Dewey's Leibniz's New Essays concerning the Human Understand- 
ing : a Critical Exposition (in Grigg's Philosoph. Classics), Chicago, 
1888. 

A. G. Langley's Notes to his trans, of The New Essays, New York, 1S96. 
R. Latta's Introduction to his Leibniz: the Monadology and other 

Philosophical Writings, Oxford, 1898. 

B. Russell's A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 
Cambridge, 1900. This important work should be consulted on' all 
questions of interpretation. 

To these should be added the exposition by the eminent Swedish thinker, 
Bostrom, contained in the collected edition of his writings; and Cesca's 
La Metafisica e la Teoria della Conoscenza del Leibniz, Padova, 1888. 

The student may profitably consult for further literature the last edition 
of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, ed. by Prof. M. Heinze; and Rand's 
Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology, and Cognate Subjects. 

The histories of Philosophy containing the best accounts of Leibnitz's phi- 
losophy are those of Ueberweg, Erdmann, and Zeller (Deutsche Phil, seit 
Leibniz, 1873) . 

ARTICLE I. 

4. Leibnitz and Descartes. 

Leibnitz while a mere boy at Leipsic began the study of Descartes' writ- 
ings and they had more than those of any other one philosopher determined 
his thinking. He had access when at Paris to the manuscripts left by 
Descartes and continued the study of his writings, especially those on mathe- 
matics. His own discovery of the Integral Calculus on Oct. 29, 1675, and 
of the Differential Calculus soon after, carried him far beyond the Cartesian 
mathematics, considered by the followers of Descartes as their master's most 
important work. This achievement not improbably led Leibnitz to free him- 
self more and more from the influence of Descartes in metaphysics. After 
his removal to Hanover he took a more openly hostile attitude toward Des- 
cartes. His writings against Descartes and Cartesianism will be found in 
Gerhardt's edition of his philosophical works, vol. iv, pp. 274-406. The most 
important of them are translated here in Articles I, VII, X, XIX and XXII; 
cf. also Articles III, IV, VI, XI, XII, XXXI and passim. His general attitude 
toward Cartesianism is well indicated by his remark that "Cartesianism is 
to be regarded as the ante-chamber of the truth," and by the remarks found 
in the third of the extracts forming Article I. 

5. Literature on the Philosophy of Descartes. 

For the study of the philosophy of Descartes the following additional 
works will be found of service: 

Spinoza's Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophic pars I et II more 
geometrico demonstrate (English trans, by Dr. H. H. Britan, Chicago, 1905). 



NOTES. 387 

Maine de Biran's Commentaire sur les Meditations de Descartes (found in 
Bertrand's Science et Psychologic, oeuvres inedits de De Biran, pp. 73-125), 
Paris, 1887. 

Cousin's Fragments Philosophiques, vol. ii, Paris, 1838, and Fragments de 
Phil. Cartesienne, Paris, 1845. 

Bouillier's Historie de la Philosophic Cartesienne, Paris, 185-1. 

Bordas-Demoulin's he Cartesianisme, 2d ed., Paris, 1874. 

Louis Liard's Descartes, Alcan, Paris, 1882. 

Alf. Fouillee's Descartes, Paris, 1893. 

V. Brochard's editions, with notes, of Les Principes de Phil., pt. 1, and of 
the Discours de la Methode. The same. 

Henri Joly's editions of the same pieces, Delalan Freres, Paris. 

Fonsegive's Les Pretendues Contradictions de Descartes (in the Revue Phil- 
osophique, 1883, pp. 511-532, and 642-656). 

Sehaarschmidt's Descartes u. Spinoza, urkundl. Darstellg. d. Philos. Beider, 
Bonn, 1850. 

Lowe's Das Spec. Syst. des Rene Descartes, seine Vorziige u. Mangel, 
Vienna, 1855. 

Kuno Fischer's Descartes u. seine Schule (the first part, treating of Des- 
cartes and Malebranche, has been translated into English by Prof. Gordy 
and published by the Scribners, New York, 1887), Munich, 1878, 4 ed., Heidel- 
berg, 1902. 

Thilo's Die Religion sphilosophie des Descartes (in Ztschr. f. ex. Phil., Ill, 
121-182), 1862. 

Heinze's Die Sittenlehre des Descartes, Leipsic, 1872. 

Glogau's Darlg. u. Erit. d. Grundgedankens d. Cartesianisch. Metaphysik 
(in Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Kr.) , 1878. 

Koch's Die Psychologic Descartes' ', Munich, 1882. 

Natorp's Descartes' Erkenntnisstheorie, Marburg, 1882. 

T. H. Huxley's Lay Sermons [pp. 320-344], London, 1871. 

Cunningham's Descartes and English Speculation, London, 1875. 

Mahaffy's Descartes (in Blackwood's Series), Edinburgh, 1880. 

H. Sedgwick's The Fundamental Doctrines of Descartes (in Mind, vol. 7, 
pp. 435 f.). 

Khodes's A 'New View of the Phil, of Descartes (in the Jour, of Spec. Phil., 
vol. 17, pp. 225 f.). 

N. Smith's Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, London, 1902. 

E. S. Haldane's Descartes: His Life and Times, London, 1905. 

Consult also the histories of philosophy, especially those of Hegel, Ueber- 
weg, Bo wen, and Erdmann. 

The best and only complete edition of Descartes' own writings, superseding 
that by Cousin, 11 vols., Paris, 1824-26, is the edition by Ch. Adam and P. 
Tannery, 10 vols., Paris, 1897 f. Of the most important philosophical works, 
there is a French edition in one volume edited by Jules Simon; a German 
translation in one volume by Von Kirchmann ; and an English translation, 
also in one volume, by Prof. Veitch (Blackwood, Edinburgh), republished, in 
two small volumes, by the Open Court Co., Chicago, 1903, and a volume of 
extracts from his writings translated into English by Professor H. A. P. 
Torrey, New York, 1892. 



388 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

6. The Search for Final Causes (Page 1). 

It may be well to compare the views of Leibnitz on this important subject 
with those of his philosophical predecessors, Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza. 
For Bacon's views consult his Is! ovum Organum, I, 48, 65; II, 2; Advan. of 
Learning, bk. 2; De Augmentis Sci., bk. 3, chs. 4 and 5; compare also Prof. 
Fowler's note on the subject in his edition of the 'Novum Organum, and 
Kuno Fischer's remarks in his Franz Baco, pp. 143-146. For Descartes' 
views consult his Meditations, IV, and Principles of Philosophy, I, 28; also 
Kuno Fischer's remarks in his Descartes (Hist, of Mod. Phil., Eng. trans., 
vol. I, pp. 364 f. ). For Spinoza's views consult his Ethics, pt. I, props. 32-34 
and the appendix. For Leibnitz's own views, see Articles I, IV, VII, § 28, 
X, XIX, XX, XXXIX. On the whole subject, see Janet's Final Causes. 

7. Philipp (Page 2). 

A native of Saxony, not improbably also of Leipsic, who was a councillor 
and representative of the Saxon government at Hamburg from 1675-1682. 
In 1682 he became librarian of the electoral library at Dresden and died 
shortly afterward. He was much interested in the sciences. 

8. The Epicurus of L^erticts (Page 8). 

This refers to the article on Epicurus by Diogenes Lseertius in his Lives of 
the Philosophers, in ten books. It contains some original letters of Epicu- 
rus and comprises a pretty satisfactory epitome of the Epicurean doctrines. 

ARTICLE II. 
9. Relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza. 

The relation of Leibnitz philosophically to Spinoza has long been a subject 
of dispute. Was Leibnitz ever a Spinozist? How much has he been 
influenced by Spinoza? These and other like questions have given rise to 
numerous essays. The weight of evidence seems to show that he never was 
a real follower of Spinoza but that nevertheless he at first had strong lean- 
ings toward the philosophy of the great Jew (cf. p. 194). Those who wish to 
pursue the subject will find, in addition to the earlier discussions of the ques- 
tion by Trendelenburg, Erdmann, Guhrauer and De Careil, the whole subject 
discussed anew by Prof. Stein in his Leibniz in seinem Verhdltniss zu Spinoza 
auf Grundlage unedirten Materials enticiclclungsgeschichtlich dargestellt ( in 
the Sitzungsberichte der Konigl. preuss. Akademie XXV, 1888, p. 615 ft*. ) 
and in his Leibniz und Spinoza, Berlin, 1890. 

Between the years 1676 and 1680 Leibnitz carefully studied the writings 
of Spinoza. He received a copy of the Opera posthuma, containing the Ethics, 
almost immediately after it appeared in January, 1678, and several manu- 
scripts are extant in which he has given an extended judgment on this the 
masterpiece of Spinoza. One of these, together, with two minor pieces bear- 
ing on Spinoza, Gerhardt has given to the public in bis first volume. This is 
here translated and should be read in connection with Art. XXIX (on which 
see note 60) . 



NOTES. 389 

10. Literature on Spinoza's Philosophy. 

The following references may be of use in the study of Spinoza: 
(1.) Collected editions of Spinoza's -works. The best and now standard 
edition is that of Van Vloten and Land, The Hague, 1882 f. This has sup- 
planted B ruder' s ed., 3 vols., Leipsic, 1843-6. A cheap edition is that of Gins- 
berg, 4 vols., Heidelberg, 1875 f. 

(2.) Translations. There are two in German: Spinoza's Sammtliche 
Werke ilbers. von B. Auerbach, last ed. in 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1872; and 
Spinoza's Sammtliche Werke ilbers. von Von Eirchmann u. Schaarschmidt, 2 
vols., Berlin, 1868, 5th ed., 1893. The standard translation in French is the 
Oeuvres de Spinoza, trad. par. E. Saisset, last ed. 3 vols., Charpentier, Paris, 
1872. Until recently none of the works of Spinoza was accessible in English. 
Now we have the following: Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, geometric- 
ally demonstrated, translated by H. H. Britan, Chicago, 1905; Cogitata 
Metgphysica, translated by H. H. Britan, Chicago, 1905; the Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emondatione, translated by Elwes, 1887; by White, London, 
1895; the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, translated anonymously in 1689, 
by Willis in 1862, by Elwes in 1887; the Tractatus Politicus, translated by 
Maccall in 1854, by Elwes in 1887; the Epistolce (in part) by Willis in 
1870, by Elwes in 1887; the Ethica, translated by Willis, London, 1870; by 
D. D. S., New York, 1876; by Prof. H. Smith, Cincinnati, 1886; by White, 
London, 1887, 2d ed., 1894; by Elwes, London, 1887; by G-. S. Fullerton 
(1st, 2d, and 5th parts, and extracts from 3d and 4th), New York, 1892, 2d 
ed., 1894. Of the translations of the Ethics, those of White and Elwes are the 
best. 

(3.) Expositions and Criticisms of Spinoza: 

In German.- Trendelenburg's Ueber Spinoza's Grundgedanken (in his Hist. 
Beit rage) . 
Erdmann's Die Grundbegriffe des Spinozismus (in his Verm. Aufs.) . 
Schaarschmidt's Descartes u. Spinoza, urkundl. Darstellg. d. Philos. 

Beider, Bonn, 1850. 
Busolt's Die Grundzilge d. Erkenntnisstheorie u. Metaphysik Spinozas, 

Berlin, 1875. 
Camerer's Die Lehre Spinozas, Stuttgart, 1877. 
Von Kirchmann's Erlauterungen zu Spinoza's Werke (in his Philosoph- 

ische Bibliothek) . 
L. Stein's Leibniz und Spinoza, Berlin, 1890. 
Kuno Fischer's Spinoza (Gesch. d. n. Phil.), 4 verm. Auf., Heidelberg, 

1898. 
A. Wenzel's Die Weltanschauung Spinozas, Leipsic, 1907. 
In addition to these, Jacobi's Ueber die Lehre Spinoza's, Herder's Gott, 
einige Gespr'ache ilber Spinoza's System, and Auerbach's Spinoza, a novel, 
may be noticed. 

In French: — Fenelon's Refutation de Spinoza (in his Traite de V Existence 
de Dieu, pt. 2, ch. Ill; the Eng. trans, contains also criticisms by the Jesuit 
Father Toumemine ) . 

Cousin's Rapports du Cartesianisme et du Spinozismc (in his Frag- 
ments de Phil. Cartesienne) . 



390 PHILOSOPHICAL AVOEKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

De Careil's Leibniz, Descartes, et Spinoza, Paris, 1862. 
E. Saisset's Introduction (to his translation of the Oeuvres de Spinoza, 
Charpentier, Paris), also his Modern Pantheism (Eng. trans.), pp. 
92-157. 
Janet's Spinoza et le Spinozisme (in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 
70) and his French Thought and Spinoza (in the Contemp. Review, 
May, 1877). 
P. Worms, La Morale de Spinoza, Paris, 1892. 
L. Brunschvieg's Spinoza, Paris, 1894. 
P. L. Couchoud's Benoit de Spinoza, Paris, 1902. 
In English: — Pollock's Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy, London, 1S80, 
2d ed. 1S99. 
Martineau's Spinoza: a Study, London, 1882, and his Types of Ethical 

Theory, vol. i, pp. 240-393. 
John Caird's Spinoza (in Blackwood's Series), Edinburgh, 1888. 
Prof. Knight's Spinoza: Four Essays (by Fischer, Land, Van Vloten, 

Penan), London, 1882. 
Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, pp. 358-375 and 547-552. 
H. Joachim's A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, Oxford, 1901. 
R. A. Duff's Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, Glasgow, 1903. 
J. Iverach's Descartes, Spinoza and the New Philosophy, Xew York, 

1904. 
J. A. Picton's A Handbook to Spinoza's Ethics, London, 1906. 
E. E. Powell's Spinoza and Religion, Chicago, 1907. 
In addition to these and to the early English notices of Spinoza mentioned 
by Pollock (p. xxxiii), the following may be added: Howe's Living Temple, 
pt. II, ch. 1; Froude's Spinoza (in his Short Studies on Great Subjects, 
vol. i) ; Lewes' Spinoza and his Philosophy (in Westminster Review. Xo. 
77) ; M. Arnold's Spinoza (in his Essays in Criticism) ; Prof. G. S. Morris' 
Life and Teachings of Spinoza (in the Jour, of Spec. Phil., vol. II) ; Dewey's 
The Pantheism of Spinoza (in the same, vol. 16) ; G. S. Fullerton's On 
Spinozistic Immortality, Philadelphia, 1899; and the sections on Spinoza in 
the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg, Erdmann, and Bowen. Consult 
also for literature Rand's Bibliography of Philosophy, etc. 

11. The Conception of Contingent (Page 23, prop. 29). 

Cf. Articles XXVIII, XXXVII (p. 346) and XXVI (p. 224), for fuller 
statements of Leibnitz's view of contingency and necessity. 

12. Xatuea Xaturans axd Xatura Xaturata (Page 24, prop. 31). 

"In the most general meaning of the words, Xatura Xaturans and Xatura 
Xaturata may be described as related to each other thus : Xatura Xaturata 
is the actual condition of a given object or quality, or of the aggregate of all 
objects and qualities, the Universe, at any given time: Xatura Xaturans is 
the immanent cause of this condition, or aggregate of conditions, and is 
regarded as producing it by a continuous process. Thus when we say "How 
wonderfully Xature works,' Ave are speaking of 'Xatura Xaturans'; when we 



NOTES. 391 

say 'How beautiful is Nature,' we are speaking of Natura Naturata. Hence, 
Natura Naturans is related to Natura Naturata as cause to effect. Or, again, 
we may say that Natura Naturans is the active or dynamical, Natura Natur- 
ata the passive or statical aspect of nature." — Fowler's Bacon's Novum 
Organum, II, 1, note 4. 

ARTICLE III. 
13. The Quality of Terms (Page 28). 

Cf. Discours de Metaphysique, §24; TSfouv. Essais, II, c. 29 f.; Art. XXIV, 
p. 158. The distinctions here made by Leibnitz constitute what is known as 
the logical doctrine of the quality of terms and will be found explained in all 
the ordinary text-books on logic. The question is, What constitutes clear, 
distinct and perfect knowledge? The views of Leibnitz's predecessors should 
be noticed. See Descartes' Discourse on Method, pt. 4, and Principles of 
Philosophy, I, 45, 46; Spinoza's Ethics, I, axiom 6 and note to prop. 29, and 
II, deff. 2, 3, and props. 33-43, and De Emend. Intel, pp. 23 f., in Elwes' 
trans. ; Arnauld's Port Royal Logic, pp. 61, 62, in Baynes' trans. Consult 
also Locke's views (published subsequently to this essay) in his Essay, bk. II. 
ch. 29, §§2, 4, and ch. 31, § 1. For the doctrine as presented by modern logi- 
cians and its value, see Bowen's Logic, Davis' Theory of Thought, Ueberweg's 
Logih ( latest ed., by J. Bona Meyer ) . 

Leibnitz's other statements of the doctrine should be compared with those 
in this essay. 

A brief statement of the doctrine is as follows: 

Knowledge is 



Clear. Obscure 



Distinct. Indistinct (Confused), 



Adequate. Inadequate. 



Intuitive = Perfect. Symbolical. 

The whole process consists in the grasping of more and more attributes. 

Clear knowledge is only of the constituted whole. I have clear knowledge 
of a thing when I can distinguish it as a whole from other things. The 
knowledge which common people have of Value, Price, Final Cause, is not 
clear but obscure. The knowledge which a patient has of his ailment, which 
an artist has of a defect in a picture, which a witness has of a prisoner, is 
usually clear but not distinct. 

Distinct knowledge is of the constituent parts. My knowledge of a thing 
is distinct when I not only clearly distinguish it from other things but dis- 
tinguish its different attributes or characteristics. When I define an ele- 
phant as an animal that drinks through its nostrils, my knowledge is 
distinct although quite inadequate. Our knowledge of simple ideas is at once 
distinct and adequate. 



392 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

Adequate knowledge is of the essential attributes. Knowledge may be said 
to be adequate when there is exhaustive knowledge of the attributes. Such 
knowledge is possible to God alone. Again, it may be said to be adequate 
when it suffices for the object in view. In this sense a housewife's knowl- 
edge of fish when she goes to the fish-market may be called adequate. This 
is practical adequacy and is scientifically worthless. Logical adequacy is 
knowledge of the essential attributes, that is, those which (a) contain the 
common and persistent basis for a multitude of others, and on which ( b ) the 
subsistence of the object, its worth and its meaning depend. 

Intuitive knowledge is possessed when we grasp in one act of consciousness 
all the qualities or the essential qualities. Such knowledge, which is at once 
also clear, disinct and adequate, is Perfect Knowledge. Very little of our 
knowledge is such ; most of it may be adequate without being intuitive, and 
hence is but symbolical. 

14. Argument of Descartes for Proving the Existence of God. 
(Page 30.) Cf. note 50. 

15. True and False Ideas (Page 31). 

Cf. Spinoza's De Emend. Intel.; Ethics, I, axiom 6, and II, props. 33-43 ; 
Leibnitz's JS T otes on Spinoza's Ethics; Locke's Essay, bk. II, ch. 32; Arnauld's 
Port Royal Logic. 

16. "Whatsoever is clearly and distinctly conceived is True" 

(Page 32). 
This is Descartes' famous criterion of truth. Cf.'his Discourse on Method, 
pt. IV; Meditations, III; Principles, I, 45 f. ; and cf. Art VII, -p. 56; and 
H. Sidgewick, Mind, vol. 7, pp. 437 f. 

17. Antoine Arnauld's "On the Art of Thinking Well" (Page 32). 

This is the celebrated Port Royal Logic, the best specimen of the logic of 
the Cartesian school, written by Arnauld assisted by Mcole. It has twice 
been translated into English. The last translation, a most admirable one, 
is that by Prof. Baynes, who has added in an appendix an excellent transla- 
tion of this essay by Leibnitz. Arnauld's masterpiece is his work on True 
and False Ideas, 1683, in which he attacks, and in many points anticipates 
Reid's objections to, the theory of representative ideas. He became an inti- 
mate friend of Leibnitz and carried on with him a long correspondence on 
theological and philosophical topics. For this, see Janet's and Gerhardt's 
editions of Leibnitz's works, and Dr. G. R. Montgomery's Leibniz's Meta- 
physics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, Open Court Co., 
Chicago, 1902. 

18. The Question "Whether we See all things in God" (Page 33). 

This refers to the famous doctrine of Malebranche. See next note, and Art. 
XXX. 

19. Malebranche and "The Search after Truth" (Page 34). 
Malebranche has been called by Cousin the French Plato. Next to Des- 
cartes he was the most eminent French metaphysician of the seventeenth 



NOTES. 393 

century. His greatest work is his De la Recherche de la Verite, 1672. Of 
this there are two English translations, the second by Taylor, London, 1712. 
The famous doctrine that we see all things in God is expounded in the third 
book in a brief chapter but in a clear manner. There is a convenient edition 
in four small volumes of the most important works of Malebranche, edited, 
with an introduction, by Jules Simon. Leibnitz's correspondence with 
Malebranche will be found in Gerhardt, vol. I. On his philosophy, see the 
first volume of Kuno Fischer's Hist, of Mod. Phil.; Olle-Laprune's La Philo- 
sophic de Malebranche; Henri Joly's Malebranche; Locke's Examination of 
the Doctrine of Malebranche; Leibnitz's criticisms in Arts. XXXI and XXXVI, 
and in his Examen des Principes du Malebranche, in Erdmann, LXXXV. 

ARTICLE IV. 

20. The Law of Continuity. 

This law of continuity is one of the cardinal points in the system of Leib- 
nitz. For other statements of it and remarks on it by him, see Arts. V, 
VII (p. 61), XXVI (p. 179-180) ; the Theodicee, III, § 348; and Nouv. Ess., 
Ill, c. 6, §12; IV, c. 16, §12. 

ARTICLE V. 

21. Statement of Personal Views on Metaphysics and Physics. 

This letter to Arnauld is of especial interest as it gives an epitome of Leib- 
nitz's system and mentions the monad doctrine in its essential characteristics. 
Yet the letter of Foucher (Art. XIII) shows that Leibnitz, as early as 1685, 
had reached in some of its main features his later published system; and the 
Discours de Metaphysique (the table of contents of which Leibnitz sent to 
Amauld, in his letter to Prince Ernest of Hesse, of February 11, 1686), pub- 
lished first by Grotefond and now again by Gerhardt, vol. 4, and admirably 
translated into English by Dr. G. R. Montgomery. (Open Court Company, 
Chicago, 1902), verifies this. Cf. §§ 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 27, 33, 34 
of it. 

ARTICLE VI. 

22. Does the Essence of Body consist in Extension (Page 42). 

This is the doctrine of Descartes and of Malebranche. Cf. Descartes, 
Princip. of Phil., II, 4, "that the nature of body consists not in weight, 
hardness, color, and the like, but in extension alone"; and Leibnitz's note on 
it, p. 60. After being led by his mathematical and physical studies to reject 
Descartes' Laivs of Motion, Leibnitz was led on to a thorough investigation 
of the nature of body, and on this he separates himself from Descartes. 
Doubtless his youthful studies on the Principle of Individuation, as well as 
his later studies in dynamics, contributed much to convince him that '"some 
higher or metaphysical notion, to wit: that of activity, power, force is 
needed." These pieces in Art. VI — two letters to the editor of the Journ. des 
Sav., June, 1691, and Jan., 1693 — are important in that they throw light on 
the process by which Leibnitz came to reach the corner-stone of his system — 
the notion of Substance. Cf. also Art. XI and Art. XII, §§ 2, 3. 



- PH3XOSOPHICA1. WOEKS OF LEIBXTTZ. 

23. The System of Occasional Caeses (Page i ' 

IMs is the system propounded by Geulrnes and advocated by Male- 
branche, to explain the relation between the body and souL See Leibnitz's 
opinion of the doctrine. Art. XX. § 15. and ef. Kuno Fischer's Ge-schichte 
d. n. Phil^ toI. I. 

aehcle vn. 

_- I >:_lbtes" Principles of Philosophy. 
This work was written by Descartes in 1644. for the Princess Elisabeth, the 
sister of Leibnitz's friend, the Grand Duchess Sophia., and the aunt of Queen 
Sophia Charlotte for whom Leibnitz wrote the Theodicee. Prof. Teitch has 
translated the First Part of the Principles along with selections from the 
Second. Third and Fourth Parts. Parts I and LI are entitled- respective . 
f7ie Principles of Human Knowledge and Of the Principles of Material 
Things, and give an epitome of Descartes-" philosophy. Cf. Spinoza's Renati 
rtes Principiorum Philosophiae pars I et II more geometrieo demons- 
iratae 'trans, into English by Dr. H. H Britan. Open Court Company.. 
Chicago.. 190-5) ; Kirehmanns Erlauterungen zu Spinoza's Descartes 3 Prin- 
cipien: also Jolys and Broehard's editions, with notes, of Descartes' les 
Prineipes de Philosophic 

25. Teeths of Fact and Tbeths of Season (Page 49). 
Cf. Articles XXXV. §§ 33 and 30-36; XXVI pp. 236, 237.. 243). 

The Soebce and Xatube of Ebbob (Pages 52-3). 
Cf. Descartes.. Meditations. IT. Principles of Phil.. I. §§ 29. 30. 33. 3 r - 
43: Bacon. y or um Organum. L 38-68 (and Fowlers notes.: also Kuno 
Fischer's Franz Baco u. seine Sachfolger. last ed.. pp. 159-173 1 . For 
Leibnitz's views see in this Art. \ 11 his notes on articles 5. 6, 13 and especially 
on 31 and 35. and ~Nouv. Ess.. TV c. 20. 

_" The acthob of the Philosophia Mosaica (Page 64). 

Bjobert Mudd (1574-1637 . an English physician and mystical philosopher. 
His Phil. Mosaica appeared in 1638 at Gouda. 

ARTICLE Vffl. 
28. Leibnitz's Preface to his Coder Diplomaticus Juris Gentium (Page 

This Preface is important for an understanding of Leibnitz's ethical views 
(cf. also his letter to Coste of July 4, 1706. and pp. 135 f.) . He often refers to 
it; cf. you. Fi .. 2j ::. §§4, 5: and elsewhere. 

ARTICLE TX. 

_ T 7"/;- ovMonox (Page 70). 

These were written while Leibnitz was at Mayence and dedicated, the one 

to the Royal Society of London, and the other to the Boyal Academy at Paris. 

The subject of this Art.. Indicisibilia, was one which engaged the thought of 

Leibnitz a great deal. 



NOTES. 395 

ARTICLE X. 

30. Descartes' Man (Page 73). 

I. e., his work entitled L' Homme, published after his death, Paris, 1664. 

ARTICLE XI. 

31. The Notion of Substance. 

If there is one conception which may be called central in the philosophy 
of Leibnitz it is the notion of substance. If, therefore, his system is to be 
rightly understood, great attention must be given to his answer to the 
question, "What is substance?" Cf. Articles XII, §§2, 3, XX, XXVII, 
XXXIV, XXXV, and Nouv. Ess., II, c. 13, §19, and c. 23, §2. See also 
Fischer's Leibniz, pp. 325 f., and H. F. Rail's Der Leibnizsche gubstanzbegriff 
(Halle, 1899). 

32. Mersenne (Page 75). 

The intimate friend of Descartes and former fellow- student of his at La 
Fleche. He superintended the publication of some of Descartes' writings, 
especially his Meditations. The writings of Descartes alluded to in this 
sentence is probably the Answers to Objections to his Meditations, especially 
the answer to the Second Objection (cf. Veitch's translation, Appendix). 

ARTICLE XII. 
33. "One of the greatest theologians and philosophers of our time" 

(Page 77). 
He alludes to Arnauld (cf. note 17). 

34. "To find real units" (Page 78). 
Gerhardt's text here reads: "Therefore, in order to find these real unities, 
I was compelled to have recourse to a real or animated point, so to speak, or 
to a substantial atom, which must embrace something formal or active in 
order to constitute a complete being." 

35. Swammerdam, Malpighi, Leewenhoeck, Rigis, Hartsoeker (Page 80). 

gwammerdam (1637-1680), a Dutch anatomist, especially celebrated for 
his investigations in entomology; his General History of Insects (Utrecht, 
1669), and other kindred works contributing to the founding of the science. 

Malpighi (1628-1694), of Bologna, founder of microscopic anatomy. 

Leeivenhoeck (1632-1723), an eminent Dutch microscopist, discoverer of the 
capillary circulation of the blood. 

Rigis or Regius (1632-1707), a celebrated Cartesian philosopher who 
interpreted Descartes in the manner of an empiricist. 

Hartsoeker (1656-1725), a Dutch mathematician and physicist. 

36. The system of Preestablisiied Harmony (Pages 84-85). 
After the publication of this Neio System Leibnitz was fond of calling him- 
self "Author of the System of Preestablisiied Harmony," and it is as such 
that he is popularly known. For other statements of it by him, see Articles 
XIV, XV, XVI, XXVI, XXXIV, XXXV, etc. 



396 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

ARTICLE XIII. 
37. Objections to the Docteixe of Preestablished Habmoxy. 
The objections urged by Foueher in tbis article are unimportant com- 
pared with those presented by others of Leibnitz's contemporaries. See 
especially the objections of Bayle in his Dictionary. Art. Rorarius; Lami 
in his Connaissance de soi-meme. Paris. 1699; Clarke in his Answer to 
Leibnitz's 5th Letter. 

ARTICLE XIY. 

38. Axswees to Objections to the Pbeestablished Hae:moxy. 
For Leibnitz's answers to the more serious objections of Bayle, Lami. and 
Clarke, see Gerhardt's ed., vol. 4. pp. 517-596, and Erdmann's ed., pp. 746- 
788; translated in part by Langley, New Essays (Appendix VIII I . Xew York, 
1896. 

ARTICLES XV AXD XVI. 
39. The Lelustbatiox of the Clocks. 
Erdmann, Gescli. d. Philos.. §267. 8, and H. Ritter before him, pointed 
out that this illustration is not original with Leibnitz. It is found in a note 
to Geulincx's TvQdi creavrbv site Ethica, first published at A Bister dam in 
1665. L. Stein, Zur Genesis des Occasionalismus, Archiv f. Gescli. d. Philos., 
vol. 1, makes it quite clear that the illustration was, indeed, in common use.. 

For Leibnitz's earlier illustration of the two choirs, see his letter to 
Arnauld, April 30, 1687, Montgomeiy's trans., p. 188. 

ARTICLE XVII. 
40. Leibxttz axd Locke. 
Leibnitz's attention was first called to Locke by the epitome of his Essay 
published by LeClerc in the Bibliotheque Universelle, 1688. On the appear- 
ance in 1690 of the Essay itself he wrote these observations (Art. XVII j 
which were sent through Burnett to Locke. Locke gives his opinion of 
them in a letter to Molyneux. April 10, 1697 : "I must confess to you. that 
Mr. Leibnitz's great name had raised in me an expectation which the sight 
of his paper did not answer, nor that discourse of his in the Acta Enidi- 
torum, which he quotes, and I have since read, and had just the same 
thoughts of it, when I read it, as I find you have. From whence I only draw 
this inference, that even great parts will not master any subject without 
great thinking, and even the largest minds have but narrow swallows." When 
Leibnitz heard that Locke did not understand him, he wrote two pieces, 
Echantillon de Reflexions sur lr I. Livre de FEssay de VEntendement de 
VHomme and Echantillon de Reflexions sur le II. Livre. which were also 
sent through Burnett to Locke, but these failed to call forth any direct 
acknowledgement from the latter. When Coste's French translation of the 
Essay appeared in 1700 5 Leibnitz wrote a notice of it for the Monatlicher 
Au.szug. and entered on an extended critique of it — The yen: Essays con- 
cerning Human Understanding — which was completed in 1704, but. on 
account of Locke's death, not published. 



NOTES. 397 

41. LITERATURE ON LOCKE. 

Locke's Essaxj, next to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, has been the 
most influential single work in modern philosophy. It has called forth a 
literature which would itself make a good-sized library. The standard edition 
now is that by Professor A. C. Fraser, Oxford, 1894, with valuable 
Prolegomena and Notes. The following are among the most important works 
on the Essay : 

Henry Lee's Anti-Scepticism; or Notes upon each Chapter of Locke's Essay 
concerning Human Understanding. London, 1702. 

Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur I'Entendement Humain. (Vol. 4, in Ger- 
hardt's ed.) English translation by Alfred Gideon Langley, New York, 1896. 

Cousin's La Philosophic de Locke, 1S29. English translations by Henry 
and by Wight. 

Webb's Intellectualism of Locke. London, 1858. 

Hartenstein's Locke's Lehre v. d. menschl. Erkenntness in Vergleichung mit 
Leibniz's Kritik derselben. Leipsic, 1865. 

Marion's Locke, sa Vie, son Oeuvre. (Alcan), Paris, 1878. 

Thos. Fowler's Locke. London, 1880. 

Green's Introduction to the Phil. Works of Hume. London, 1874. 

McCosh's Locke's Theory of Knowledge, with a notice of Berkeley. New 
York, 1884. 

Kirchmann's Erlauterungen zu Locke's Versuch iiber den menschlichen 
Verstand (cf. also Schaarschmidt's Erlauterungen zu Leibniz's Neue 
Abhandlungen) . 

Fraser's Locke (in Blackwood's Series), Edinburgh, 1890; also his 
Prolegomena and Notes to his edition of the Essay. 

42. The function della Crusca (Page 105). 
La Crusca, a celebrated academy of Florence, founded in 1582, for the 
purpose of maintaining the purity of the Italian language, that is to say, of 
separating the bran (crusca) from the flour: hence the name. 

ARTICLE XVIII. 
43. The Law of Sufficient Reason. 
This Article XVIII was written by Leibnitz on Nov. 23, 1697, and was first 
published by Erdmann in 1841. It deals with the cosmological argument for 
the being of God and the problem of the Theodicee. The third sentence gives 
the key-note to the whole : "The sufficient reason of existence can be found 
neither in any particular thing nor in the whole aggregate or series." The 
principle of sufficient reason is fundamental in the philosophy of Leibnitz. 
His system, from one end to the other, is inspired by an unshaken and 
immovable faith in the authority of this principle. At the very end of his 
life he writes: "Pint a Dieu qu'on n'eiit jamais suppose des principes moins 
claires! Ce principe est celui du besoin d'une raison suffisante, pour qu'une 
chose existe, qu'un evenement arrive, qu'une verite ait lieu" (5th Let. to 
Clarke, § 125). For other statements of the principle, cf. Monadology, §§ 32 f., 
Theodicee, §§44, 196. Cf. Nolan's La Monadologie de Leibniz, p. 39 f . : 
Ueberweg's Logik, p. 270. 



398 



PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 



ARTICLE XIX. 
44. On the Consequences of Certain Passages in Descartes. 
The occasion of the piece, to which this is a reply, was a passage in a letter 
to Xicaise, in which Leibnitz speaks of the evil consequences of Descartes' 
denial of final cause and of his view that matter takes successively all forms 
of which it is capable; and in which he also remarks: "Aussi peut-on dire, 
que Spinoza n'a fait que cultiver certaines semences de la Philosophie de 
Descartes, de sorte que je crois qu'il importe effectivement pour la Religion, 
et pour la piete, que cette philosophie soit chatiee par le retranchment des 
erreurs qui sont melees avec la verite." 

ARTICLE XX. 
45. On Nature in Itself. 
The two questions handled in this essay are stated in. § 2, What is nature 
in itself f and Is there any energy or force residing in things? The first he 
answers (§§ 2-8) by saying that Nature is the handiwork of an all- wise 
creator — the expression of the truths and ends of Absolute Reason. The 
second question, he answers (§§ 9 f. ) by his doctrine that to be is to act. 

46. Aristotle's Definition of Motion (Page 120). 
Found in his Physics, bk. Ill, 1, 201, a, 10, b. 4. Cf. Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. 
tr. I, 380 f., 422 f. 

47. Imaging and Intellectual Conception (Pages 123-4). 
The important distinction between imaging and intellectual conception, 
where imaging is impossible, was emphasized by Descartes (Prin. Phil., I, 73, 
and Med. VI), Spinoza (Emend. Intel.) , and Leibnitz (p. 277 and Nouv. Essais, 
II, c. 9, § 8, and c. 29) . What absurdities one may be led into by a failure to 
keep this distinction in mind, may be seen by consulting Spencer's First 
Principles, pt. I, chs. 2-4. 

48. The Principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles" (Pages 130-1) . 

This, as Leibnitz here remarks, is among his "new and most important 
axioms." He says in writing to Clarke (4, § 5) : "Ces grands principes de la 
Raison suffisante et de YIdentite des indiscernables, changent l'etat de la 
metaphysique, qui devient reelle et demonstrative par leur moyen: au lieu 
qu'autrefois elle ne consistait presque qu'en termes vuides." Cf. also § 4 ff. ; 
Letter V, §§ 21 f.; Nouv. Ess., II, c. 27. 

ARTICLE XXL 
49. Ethical Definitions. 
Cf. Article VIII, and New Essays, bk. II, eh. 20, §§ 4, 5. 

ARTICLE XXII. 
50. The Ontological Argument for the Being of God. 
On this celebrated argument consult Anselm's Proslogium and Liber contra 
Insipientem, i. e., Liber Apologeticus (English Translations published by Open 



notes. 399 

Court Co., Chicago; see also the French translation with notes, by Bouchitte, 
Le Rationalisme Chretien, Paris, 1842) ; Gaunilo's Liber pro Insipiente; 
Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologia; Descartes' Meditations, V; Replies 
to Objections, especially those to objections 1 and 2; Principles of Philosophy, 
I, §§ 14 f. 

The Anselmic form of the argument may be stated thus: We have as a 
fact the idea of the greatest possible or perfect being; an actually existing 
being {in re esse) has more perfection than an ideally existing one {in 
intellectu esse) ; therefore God exists. In other words, the most perfect 
conceivable being must be actual: otherwise a property — that of actuality, 
or objective being — is wanting. 

Descartes' additions to this argument consist in showing tb/at the idea of 
God is a necessary idea of the reason; that it is an idea of a real infinite 
and could not have originated in us or from any finite source; that when we 
think of God, we must think of him not merely as existing, which we do 
with everything while we are thinking of it, but as necessarily existing. 
Descartes' argument may therefore be stated thus: We have among the 
necessary ideas of the reason the idea of Absolute or All-perfect Being; this 
idea contains as one of its elements necessary existence; therefore, God exists. 

Spinoza (letter to DeVries) has stated the basis of the ontological argu- 
ment thus : "The more reality a being or thing has, the more attributes must 
be assigned to it and the more attributes I assign to a thing, the more I am 
forced to conceive it as existing." 

For remarks by Leibnitz bearing on the argument, see Articles III, p. 30; 
VII, p. 51; XXII, XXVI, p. 245; and the Letters to Jacquelot (Gerhardt, 
vol. 3, pp. 442 f.). 

He claims: (1) That the idea of God is peculiar in this, that if it is of a 
being possible in fact, then that being must actually exist. But is the idea 
of God the idea of a being possible in fact? 

(2) That merely because we have the idea of God it does not therefore fol- 
low that he actually exists. We have ideas of things which cannot actually 
exist. It must therefore be shown that the idea of God ijs a true idea, that 
is, the idea of a possible being. Descartes failed to do this. [That Leibnitz 
is in error here may be seen by examining Descartes' Reply to the Second 
Objection, where Descartes allows that it must first of all be proved that the 
conception of an infinite being is possible, and does not contain a contradic- 
tion; but shows that such a proof need occasion no difficulties.] 

(3) Everything is to be held possible until its impossibility is proved. 
Hence there is a presumption in favor of the actual existence of God. 

(4) This presumption is more than a presumption: it is a fact that God is 
possible. This is shown, pp. 144-146; see also Langley's translation of the 
New Essays, appendix X. 

For Locke's examination of Descartes' argument, see Lord King's Life of 
Locke, Vol. II, pp. 134 seq. On the worth of the argument itself, cf. Kant's 
Critique, Flint's Theism, Darner's System of Christian Doctrine, and the 
essays of Huber, Elvenich, Jahnke, and the works named in note 5. For 
somewhat elaborate studies on the theism of Descartes and on the theism of 
Leibnitz, consult Saisset's Modern Pantheism. 



400 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBNITZ. 

ARTICLE XXIII. 
51. The Doctrine of a Universal Spirit. 
This essay was written at Charlottenburg, near Berlin, for the instruction 
of Queen Sophia Charlotte. This accounts for its popular tone. 

52. Molinos, Angelus Silesius and Weigel (p. 147). 

Molinos (c. 1627-1696), celebrated Quietist, born in Spain, lived and died at 
Rome. Author of the celebrated Guida Spirituale. Cf.- Bigelow's Molinos 
the Quietist, New York, 1882, and Shorthouse's novel, John Inglesant. 

Angelus Silesius, John Angelus of Silesia, to whom Leibnitz refers several 
times, author of a number of devotional pieces. 

Weigel (1531-1588), a Protestant pastor and author of several theological 
works. 

ARTICLE XXIV. 
53. The Non-Sensuous Element in Knowledge (p. 157). 
This interesting letter to Queen Charlotte, now for the first time published 
by Gerhardt, shows in a popular way the impossibility of pure empiricism 
and presents in brief Leibnitz's views on this most important subject. It is 
interesting to notice in how many respects Leibnitz anticipates Kant. His 
views are more fully given in the Nouveaux Essais. See also Kirohner's 
Leibniz's Psychologie, Cothen, 1876. 

ARTICLE XXV. 

54. Lady Masham. 

Lady Masham was the daughter of Cudworth and the friend of Locke. In 

her house, at Oates, Locke spent his last years. She was the author of one 

or two religious books. The letters which passed between her and Leibnitz 

are given in full by Gerhardt. 

ARTICLE XXVI. 
55. The Nouveaux Essais. 

For the occasion of Leibnitz's writing the Nouveaux Essais and for the lit- 
erature bearing on it, see notes -40, 41, 3. The work itself is a dialogue 
between Philalethe, representing Locke, and Theophile, representing Leib- 
nitz. Locke's Essay is followed chapter by chapter and almost paragraph by 
paragraph. The French style of the work is so poor as to render a readable 
translation almost impossible. The extracts translated here are from the 
remarks of Theophile alone, and it is hoped that they mil convey some general 
idea of the nature and value of the work. An excellent translation of the 
entire work by Mr. A. G. Langley was begun in the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy, in 1885, and completed and published in book form by The Mac- 
millan Co., New York, in 1896 (cf. note 2, above). 

In Gerhardt's text, §§ 5-18 of the first chapter are placed between § 26 and 
§ 27. In the translation, the order adopted by Erdmann and Janet has been 
followed as it accords with the order of Locke's Essay. The headings in [ ] 
of the §§ are inserted from Locke's Essay; they are not in Leibnitz's text. 



NOTES. 401 

56. Analysis of the Second Chapter of Bk. I. of the Nouvecmoe Essais. 

"The controversy between Locke and Leibnitz in the first book of the 
Nouveaux Essais sur I'Entendement Humain relates to the famous question 
of the origin of ideas. Locke represents the empirical school, Leibnitz 
the rationalistic school. The first maintains the hypothesis of the tabula 
rasa, the second the hypothesis of innate ideas. It can be said that they 
have each exhausted the question and that they have said all that could be 
said at their time, at least in the terms in which the question was then 
stated: for since then it has been presented under different forms. In order 
to leave to the arguments of the two authors all their force we shall repro- 
duce them as far as possible under their form and in their order, afterwards 
we shall give a resume, in condensing the whole discussion: 

Locke's 1st Objection. — If innate principles existed all men ought to agree 
on them; now this universal consent does not exist even for the principles of 
identity and of contradiction ; for there is a large part of the human race to 
whom these principles are unknown. And, further, did this consent exist it 
would prove nothing, could another way be shown than that of innateness 
by which men might have arrived at this uniformity of opiniom 

Leibnitz's Reply.- — I do not base the certainty of innate principles upon 
universal consent, which, moreover, might in fact arise in another way. This 
consent is an intimation and not a demonstration of the innate principle; 
but the exact and decisive proof of these principles consists in showing that 
their certainty comes only from what is in us. Even should they not be 
known, they would not cease to be innate, because they would be recognized 
as soon as they have been understood. But fundamentally everybody knows 
them and they are at each moment employed without being expressly 
recognized; it is very much the same as when one has virtually in the mind 
the propositions suppressed in enthymemes. 

2d Obj. — To say that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it does 
not perceive is a real contradiction: 

Reply. — I think that we have a multitude of knowledges of which we are 
not always aware even when we have need of them. 

3d Obj. — It could then be said that all reasonable propositions are innate. 

Reply. — I acknowledge this as regards pure ideas. In this sense it can be 
said that the whole of arithmetic and of geometry is innate, although it is 
true to say that one would not be aware of the ideas under consideration 
unless one saw or touched something . . . . for we could not have abstract 
thoughts which do not have need of something sensible. This does not pre- 
vent the mind from deriving necessary truths only from itself. Only there 
are degrees in the difficulty of perceiving what is in us. 

4th Obj. — Latent perceptions suppose at least memory: undoubtedly there 
may be in the soul what is not perceived there; but it must always be that 
this has been learned and been formerly known. 

Reply. — Why could it not have still another cause? For, since acquired 
knowledge can be concealed there by the memory, may not nature also have 
concealed there some original knowledge? This would be natural habits, 
active and passive dispositions and aptitudes, rather than a tabula rasa. 

26 



- .'- PTTTT.OSOPHTC A T WORKS F LETBVTTZ. 

5th Obj. — But innateness does not differ from tlie simple capacity of know- 
ing. 

Reply. — The mind is not only capable of knowing them but also of finding 
them in itself, and if it had but the simple capacity, or passive power, it would 
not be the source of ry truths. The mind has a disposition to take 

itself from its own depr •. 

1 - _" sta - — But do the words to oe in the understanding signify anything else 
than to be perceived by the understanding? 

Reply. — They mean something entirely different. It is enough that what is in 
the understanding can be found there and that the sources or original proofs of 
these truths are in the understanding alone. 

2d Insto — I li tie consent which the mind gives without effort to these truths 
depends on the faculty of the human mind. 

Trne : but it is the particular relation of the human mind to these 
:: "t; —~z± :'.. : -•_ '-_--_• ■■--: . . -■ : "'.. : .— -~ : i ; i :.:■::..". iz. : -:.: i : . :_-:_ 
and •which causes them to be called innate. 

6th Obj. — Truths are posterior to ideas: now the ideas come from the 
senses. 

Reply. — The intellectual ideas which are the source of necessary truth do 
not come from* tie senses. 

- Obj. — Particular propositions are more evident than general proposi- 
tions; and ne~ the! - they come from the senses; for example., to say that 
to he yellow is not to t 3 is as evident., if not more so, as to say. that 

impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time. Shall we 
say then that all our sensations are inn 

_ : ply. — The one is the principle (namely, the general maxim* ; and the 
other is but the application. As for The rest, this proposition, -street is not 
bitter, is not innate: for the sensatiom : - — eet and of bitter come from the 
external senses; but it is a mixed conclusion (hybrida eonelusio) where the 
axiom is applied to a sensible truth. As for the general maxim, it is there- 
Kith understood., just as the major which is suppressed in enthymemes. 
We do not always t hi nk distinctly of that which we do. 

Instance. — But it seems that general and abstract ideas are more foreign to our 
_:: _i; ~jz.iz. i :.:".: v". :.: -:~t:~; ?_~i ":::_- 

Reply. — It is true that -we begin sooner to perceive particolar truths ; but this 
does not prevent the order of nature from beginning "with the most simple, and the 
reason of the more particular truths from depending on the more general. 

8th Obj. — Does not immediate acquiescence in certain truths come from the 
very nature of the things themselves, rather than from the propositions being 
graven naturally in the mind ! 

Ay. — Both are true. The nature of things and the nature of the mind 
agree here; and xery often the consideration of the nature of things is noth- 
ing else than knowledge of the nature of our mind. 

9th Obi- — It seems that if there are innate Truths it is not necessary to learn 
them since they are known in advance. But it is necessary at least to learn 
the names and the words by which the truths are expressed. 

ply. — I agree to this; but I could not admit the proposition that all that 
is learned is not innate. The truth of numbers is in us., and yet- we do not 
omit learninsr them. 



NOTES. 403 

10th 0~bj. — But how does it happen that children have no knowledge of 
these truths which are supposed to be innate and to make part of their 
minds? If this were so, nature would have taken the trouble for nothing. 

Reply. — The perception of what is in us depends on attention and order. 
Now, not only is it possible, but it is even befitting, that children pay more 
attention to the notions of the senses, because attention is regulated by need. 

Same objection, § 27. — "If general maxims were innate they ought to appear with 
more clearness in the minds of certain people. I speak of infants, idiots and savages ; 
for of all men they have the mind least altered and corrupted by custom." 

Reply. — I believe we must reason otherwise. Innate maxims appear only through 
the attention which is given to them ; but these persons exert none or exert it for 
very different objects : they think of almost nothing save of the needs of the body, 
and it is reasonable that pure and detached thoughts should be the prize of more 
noble pains. I should not like so much honor to be paid to barbarism and ignorance. 

11th Obj.—Ii there are innate truths, must there not be innate thoughts? 

Reply. — Not at all, for thoughts are actions; and truths are habits or dis- 
positions; and we know many things of which we scarcely think. To say 
that a truth cannot be in the mind without it having thought of it, is to say 
that there cannot be veins in marble before they are discovered there. 

Leibnitz had already employed this comparison of the marble in a pas- 
sage with, which we close this analysis of the chapter; for it is the best 
resume of his whole doctrine (Preface to the Nouveaux Essais, p. 175) : "If 
the soul resembled these blank tablets [tabula rasa), truths would be in us as 
the figure of Hercules is in a block of marble when the marble is wholly indif- 
ferent to receiving this figure or some other. But if there were veins in the 
stone which indicated the figure of Hercules in preference to other figures, 
this stone would be more determined to it, and Hercules would be there as 
innate in some sort, although it would be necessary to labor to discover the 
veins and to cleanse and polish them, by cutting away that which prevents 
them from appearing. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us, as 
inclinations, dispositions, habits or natural capacities and not as actions." 
■ — Prof. Paul Janet, Nouveaux Essais, livre I, Paris, 1886. 

ARTICLE XXVII. 

57. Proof of the Existence of God from the Doctrine of Preestablished 

Harmony (p. 253). 
Leibnitz often urges this "new argument for the existence of God." "The 
agreement of so many substances, one of which has no influence upon another, 
could only come from a general cause, on which all of them depend, and this 
Cause must have infinite power and wisdom to pre-establish all these 
harmonies." Cf. New Essays, bk. 4, ch. 10, §§ 7, 9, 10. 

ARTICLE XXVIII. 

58. Contingency and Necessity. 
On this important subject see further remarks in the Letters to Clarke and 
in the Nouveaux Essais, II, c. 21. Cf. note 11. 



4:04 PHILOSOPHICAL WOEES OF LEIBNITZ. 

59. Seyexxese Prophets (p. 262). 
This last paragraph, is an allusion to a passage ii\ the letter of Coste to 
Leibnitz (Gerhardt, vol. 3.. p. 393).. in which he tells of certain Sevennese 
mystics who were then creating a sensation in London by their pretended 
prophecies.: one of them being a gentleman of good character and possessed 
of an income of £2000. Fatio was a cultivated Swiss gentleman residing in 
London. 

ARTICLE XXLX. 
60. "'The Refctatiox of Spexoza by Leebxetz.'-' 
Among the manuscripts of Leibnitz in the royal library at Hanover is one 
entitled Animadversiones ad J oh. Georg. Wachteri librum de recondita 

Hebrceorum philosophic. This, accompanied by a French translation and 
an introduction, was published at Paris in 1S54 by Foucher de Careil under 
the title Refutation Inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz. The editors preface 
and the introduction treat of the relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza. The por- 
tion of the work (about two-thirds of the whole; which treats of Spinoza, and 
which led the editor to give to the whole such a pretentious title, is here 
translated. 

61. Maece/th ix Malcete (p. 272 . 
Cf. Theodieee, III. § 372. 

ARTICLE XXX. 
62. Re mar ks ox Locke's Examination of Malebranche. 
The work by Locke which is here examined was published in 1706. after his 
death, and will be found in the second volume of Bohn's edition of Locke's 
works. Locke and Malebranche stood at the opposite poles of thought and 
Leibnitz would naturally be interested in a criticism of the latter by the 
former. This Article XXX seems to consist of first-hand jottings made 
while reading Locke's work. The date at which they were made is uncer- 
tain., but it must have been after 1706. and was not improbably 170S. 

ARTICLE XXXI. 
63. Leebxetz ox the Xatetre of the Sovl. 
This article is one of very great importance for the understanding of the 
Leibnitzian doctrine. He explains here his conception of the soul and the 
nature of perception. 

64. The Deffeeext Classes of Mostads (p. 2S0). 

This article assists us in characterizing the various distinguishable classes 
of monads, or different degrees of monad development, which are especially 
recognized by Leibnitz: see, also, the Monadology, §§ 19-30. It should be 
remembered, however, that Leibnitz teaches, as his principle of continuity 
demands, that there is an unbroken hierarchy of monads from the lowest to 
the Supreme Monad. 

I. All monads are alike : 



NOTES. 405 

( 1 ) In being simple, ultimate, veritable unities ; ingenerable and indestruc- 
tible realities. 

(2) In that each is essentially energizing power, force, active principle. 

(3) In that each possesses the power of perception and reflects (mirrors) 
in its way the whole universe. "The representation of the external in the 
internal, of the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes 
in realty perception (§ 3)." 

II. According as they are or are not monades reines ou dominantes, have 
or have not organising power over others, they are divided thus: 

( Simple ( 1 ) . 
Monads -j I Bare monades vivantes (2). 

( Dominating or ruling -' „ . f Animal souls ( 3 ) . 

( ' ' { Rational souls, or spirits ( 4 ) . 

III. According as they possess or do not possess sentiency, they are divided 
thus: 



Monads 



Non-sentient \ ® im P le mon 7 ads .< 1 > \ , „ , 
( Bare monades vivantes (2), 



, Sentient ' Animal souls ( 3 ) 

^ ' \ Rational souls, or spirits ( 4 ) . 

IV. According as they do or do not possess self -consciousness, they are 
divided : 

I Lacking memory ( Simple monads ( 1 ) . 
{ Merely perceptive -j / Bare monades vivantes ( 2 ) . 

Monads \ ( Possessing memory -j Animal souls (3). 

( Self-conscious -\ Rational souls, or spirits (4). 

V. Results. There are four distinguishable kinds of monads: 

1. Simple monads, lacking self -consciousness, memory and organic capacity. 

2. Dominating or organizing monads (monades reines ou ames vivantes), 
lacking memory and self-consciousness. These and the simple monads are 
the sleeping monads; they perceive unconsciously and without feeling. 

3. Animal souls. These organize and possess memory, but lack self-con- 
sciousness. They are dreaming monads. 

4. Rational souls. These have organizing capacity, memory, and, in addi- 
tion, self-consciousness and the power of recognizing necessary truth; in a 
word, they are personalities. They are leaked up monads. 

Does a monad of the lower class ever pass into the higher classes? One of 
Leibnitz's correspondents, Remond, writes to him on Jan. 9, 1715, and asks, among 
others, the following questions : "Comment (physiquement parlant et sans emploier 
des termes abstraits ni metaphoriques), par quels moiens, par quels degrez une 
monade centrale et dominante qui constitue dans un certain terns un animal, peut 
venir dans un autre a faire ou plustot a estre un Monsieur de Leibniz?" To this 
Leibnitz replies as follows : "Puisqu'on peut concevoir que par le developpement 
et changement de la matiere, la machine qui fait le corps d'un animal spermatique, 
peut devenir une machine telle qu'il faut pour former le corps organique d'un 
homme : il faut qu'en meme temps 1'ame de sensitive seulement soit devenue 
raisonnable, a cause de- l'harmonie parfaite entre l'ame et la machine. Mais comme 
cette harmonie est pre<§tablie, l'etat futur etoit deja dans le present, et une parfaite 
intelligence reconnoissait il y a long temps dans l'animal present l'homme futur, 
tant dans son ame a part, que dans son corps a part. Ainsi jamais un pur animal 
ne deviendra homme, et les animaux spermatiques humains, qui ne viennent pas 
a la grande transformation par la conception, sont de purs animaux." Cf. also, 
the Monadology, §§ 74, 75 and 82. 

65. Genii (Page 2S1). 
By genii Leibnitz means angels and arch-angels. 



406 PHILOSOPHICAL VOEES OF LEIBX/ITZ. 

ARTICLE XXXII. 

66. Letexitz's Theodicee. 

This 'work, as is well known, was written by Leibnitz in memory of Queen 
Sophia Charlotte of Prussia, and grew out of conversations and discussions 
with her on the problems of liberty and of evil, occasioned by the objections 
she found in Bayle's Dictionary. It is the only large work by Leibnitz pub- 
lished in his life-time. Although written in a popular style and diffuse, 
it is unquestionably the most celebrated work on the subject. The work 
itself consists of (1) a Preface: (2) an Introductory Discourse on the Conform- 
ity of Faith with Reason; (3) the body of the work, in three parts, the first 
on the nature of evil in general, the second on moral evil, the third on physi- 
cal evil; (4) an Index; (5) the Abridgment, here translated; (6) an 
Examination of Hobbes' work, Questions concerning Liberty. Necessity and 
Chance; (7) Remarks on a work by King on The Origin of Evil; (8) a more 
extended abridgment of the work in Latin. 

An excellent abridgment of the body of the work, with critical and explana- 
tory notes, has been issued by Th. Desdouits: Essais de Theodicee de Leibniz. 
Extraits relies entre eux par de courtes analyses, precedes d'une introduction 
et d'une analyse gene-rale, et accompagnes d ! appreciations critiques, Paris, 1878. 

Two excellent articles on Leibnitz's Theodicy will be found in the Andover 
Review, vol. 4. 

67. Leebxitz's Optimism. 

The last word of the Leibnitzian philosophy is that, all things considered, 
the actual is the best possible world. The doctrine as it bears upon the prob- 
lem of human existence is well set forth in the apologue of the Theodicee 
(§§ 405-417) in the story of Sextus. Consult on this subject in general, 
besides the {Theodicee, the Monadology (§ 53 seq. ), The Principles of Nature 
and of Grace, the Letters to Clarke. Xolan's La Monadologie, onzieme eclair- 
cissement, Fischer's Leibniz, and Erdrnann, Xourisson, and Feuerbach. 

ARTICLE XXXIII. 

68. Leebxitz's Rules foe the Coxdl'ct of the Mixd axd the Ixcrease of 

kxoweedge. 

Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, p. 180, assigns this Article XXXIII to 
Leibnitz's early years. 

Compare with this article Erdmanns edition of Leibnitz's phil. works, 
Articles XVI, De vero methodo philosophia; et theologies; LIII, Preceptes pour 
avancer les Sciences; and LTV, Discours touchant la Methode de la Certitude 
et I'Art d'Inventer, pour finir les Disputes et pour faire en pen de Terns de 
grands Progres; and the Nouveaux Essais, IV, chap. 12, Des Moyens d'Aug- 
menter nos Connaissances. And on the whole subject, consult Couturat's 
book. 

Leibnitz's thoughts on this subject may be compared with Descartes' (Dis- 
cours de la Methode; Regies pour la Direction de V Esprit) ; Spinoza's (De 
Emendatione Intellectus) ; and Locke's (Conduct of the Understanding, and 
tne Essay, bk. 4, c. 12, Of the Improvement of Our Knowledge) . 



KOTES. 407 

ARTICLE XXXIV. 

69. The Principles of Nature and of Grace. 
During Leibnitz's residence in Vienna (1712-1714) he was asked by Prince 
Eugene of Savoy to give in a short compendium his philosophical system as 
an aid to the understanding of the Theodicee. With this object in view he 
composed The Principles of Nature and of Grace, founded on Reason. A 
copy of the essay, which was prepared with the utmost care, he sent to 
Nic. Reniond, at Paris, with a letter (Vienna, Aug. 26, 1714), in which he 
writes : "J' ay espere que ce petit papier contribuerait a mieux f aire entendre 
mes meditations en y joignant ce que j'ay mis dans les Journaux de Leip- 
zig, de Paris, et de Hollande. Dans ceux de Leipzig je m'accommode 
davantage au style des Cartesiens, et dans' cette derniere piece je tache de 
m'exprimer d'une maniere qui puisse etre entendue de ceux qui ne sont pas 
encore trop accoutumes au style des uns et des autres." 

ARTICLE; XXXV. 

70. The Monadology. 
This epitome of Leibnitz's philosophy was written very shortly after the 
Principles of Nature and of Grace, and has, until recently, been confounded 
with it as the work written for Prince Eugene. It is the most complete 
statement of Leibnitz's system and merits the most careful study. Erdmann 
calls it librum Leibnicii omnium gravissimum. There are a number of anno- 
tated separate editions of it, especially in French. The best of these are 
Nolan's La Monadologie de Leibniz, avec des eclaircissements et des notes 
historiques et philosophiques, Alcan, Paris, 1887 ; and Boutroux's La Monad- 
ologie de Leibniz, etc., Delagrave, Paris, 1881. Zimmerman's German trans- 
lation, with notes, may also be profitably consulted. It should be said that 
the original manuscript is without a title and that the title, The Monadology, 
was given it by Erdmann, who published for the first time the original French 
text in his Leibnitii Opera Philosophica, Berlin, 1840; before that time it had 
been known only in a German translation. 

71. Analysis of the Monadology. 
The following analysis may assist in understanding the Monadology. Latta, 
in his edition, pp. 216-217, gives an analysis which the student should consult. 
It should, however, be remembered that the thought is so condensed that no 
very satisfactory analysis of it can be given. 

Part I. 
Substance (or Monad), §§ 1-30. 

1. Existence and Simplicity, 1-3. 

2. Indestructibility, 4-6. 

3. Inner Principle of their Activity, 7-13. 

4. Perceptions of the Monads, 14-18. 

(1) Perception, what; distinguished from apperception, 14-16. 

(2) Inexplicable mechanically, 17. 

(3) Therefore, monads are actualized perfections or entelechies, 18. 



408 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF LEIBXITZ. 

5. Kinds of Monads, 19-30. 

( 1 ) Sleeping monads, 19-24. 

(2) Dreaming monads, 25-27. 

(3) Waked up or rational monads, 28-30. 

Paet II. 
Principles of Reason and their source in Absolute Reason, God, §§ 31-48. 

6. Principles of Reason and their source, 31-37. 

7. God, the Principle of Principles, on whom all contingent things and 
even necessary truths depend, 37-4S. 

Paet III. 
The Preestablished Harmony and the Best Possible Universe, §§ 49-90. 

8. Preestablished Harmony, what; it accounts for the apparent interaction 
of the monads, 49-52 and 56. 

9. Why there is a preestablished harmony; the actual world the best pos- 
sible, 53-55. 

10. It accounts for variety and unity; each monad mirrors the universe, 
56-62. 

11. Every particle of matter is a fullness of vital monads; there is life 
everywhere, 63-70. 

12. Souls are not composite: they always have bodies, which change grad- 
ually. Souls and bodies are alike ingenerable: generation is but a develop- 
ment and death an envelopment, 71-77. 

13. Hierarchy of the monads: kingdoms of efficient cause, of final cause, 
and of grace; harmony of the three, 78-90. 

( 1 ) Preestablished harmony between the kingdoms of efficient causes 
and of final causes, 78-82. 

(2) The kingdom of grace— society of free personalities — and the abso- 
lute harmony and perfect system, or "City of God," 83-90. 

ARTICLE XXXVI. 

72. R.EilOXD DE AlOXTilORT. 

Xicolas Remond, de Montmbrt, was Chef des Conseils de M. le Due d'Or- 
lean-s. He was a great admirer of the Platonic philosophy and on reading 
Leibnitz's Theodicee became a great admirer of him also, and carried on a cor- 
respondence with him on philosophical subjects. Eor this, see Gerhardt's 
third volume. This letter (Art. XXXVI) is of especial importance, as in it 
Leibnitz takes occasion to explain the points of contact and of divergence 
between his owu system and those of Malebranehe on the one hand and of 
Descartes on the other. 

ARTICLE XXXVII. 

73. Leibnitz Correspondence with Clarke. 

The occasion of this correspondence Leibnitz describes in a letter (Dee. 23, 

1715i to Wolff, thus: "The Princess of Wales [Wilhelmina Charlotte of Ans- 

baeh], who had read with pleasure my Theodicee, fell into a controversy over 



NOTES. 409 

it, as she herself informed me, with a prelate who frequented the Court. He 
afterward handed the Princess a paper written in English in which he 
defended the Newtonian system and attacked mine. I answered him briefly 
and sent the answer to the Princess." The correspondence extends to five 
letters on each side and was terminated by the death of Leibnitz. It was 
published in 1717 by Clarke, who gave an English translation (here reprinted) 
side by side with Leibnitz's French. The words in [ ] in the Fifth Letter 
(except the words of sense, § 84, our notion of, § 87, without diminution 
§ 99, an order and merely, § 104, general, § 107, which were added by Clarke) 
are additions or changes made by Leibnitz himself in a second copy. They 
are here inserted in Clarke's translation. 

These letters belong to the most important documents on Leibnitz's philos- 
ophy, as in Clarke he found an antagonist worthy of him, who pointed out 
the weak points in his system. For lack of space the letters of Clarke, which 
are accessible to the student in Clarke's own works, are omitted here. 



J-<fC 
J 7 



